Could London have taken much heavier bombing

We? Where you there?

Yes, I'm actually the ghost of General George C. Marshall, and I'm condemned to wander the earth until I atone for the US Army's individual replacement system in WWII.

By "we" I was referring to the US. I get blamed for what we do wrong, so I don't feel bad for taking credit for what we do right. :-}
 

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Yes, I'm actually the ghost of General George C. Marshall, and I'm condemned to wander the earth until I atone for the US Army's individual replacement system in WWII.

By "we" I was referring to the US. I get blamed for what we do wrong, so I don't feel bad for taking credit for what we do right. :-}

Problem is when we are talking about history, using the words "us", "we" or "them" stinks of bias or prejudice. Both which can lead to revisionism.

Objectivness is the absolutely most important thing to remember when speaking about history. Those three words, are incompatible with objectivness.
 
I'm not sure this is a widely held view any more. Bombing seems to halt the surge in production in 1943, , and accounts from the time, rather than later, draw a very negative picture.

Not just not a widely held view any more. It was never a widely held view at all. All the revisionists base their arguments more or less entirely on attacking a strawman, namely that the Strategic Bombing effort should have won the war on its own, and since that did not occur, it failed. Admittedly, that was a position held by many strategic air advocates prior to and during the war, but just because they were wrong doesn't mean their polar opposite was right. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey goes into considerable detail as to just what the campaign was able to achieve.

The strategic bombing offensive included many operations of dubious value while building up strength and developing tactics. But once they did, among other things with the widespread introduction of long range escort fighters for the U.S., and the perfection of a range of tactics and technologies allowing accurate nightbombing for Bomber Command (both in late 43 to early 44), they crippled German industry. The near total destruction of German fuel production in particular forced the Germans to do ridiculous things, like plan Wacht am Rhein on capturing Allied fuel stocks. And the total air superiority the bombing offensive gave the Allies meant all German operations had to depend on night or poor weather to have a chance at success.

Some smarter revisionists argue that because the campaign took 2+ years to achieve decisive results, it was a waste of resources. But then, it took 2+ years for improved tactics, technology, and greatly increased strength for the Allies to win the Battle of the Atlantic. It took 2+ years for the same to allow the Navy to drive the IJN from the seas, or for American submariners to work out the bugs, allowing them to strangle Japan. That's just the way a war like WWII works. People had to learn a new way of fighting war, strength had to be built up and technologies developed, and the enemy wasn't just going to stand there and wait. Where are the revisionists arguing the U.S. Pacific submarine offensive was a waste of resources?

That all said, note that the strength build up and technological and tactical evolution leading up to Allied air dominance and German industrial collapse were necessary. Nobody was going to achieve that in 1940-41, and even with maximal investment, Germany was never going to knock out Britain or even significantly damage its ability to wage war before the RAF catches up in strength. And the whole thing is a bad idea anyway for Germany, since a 4-engined bomber eats up an entire fighter squadron's worth of aluminum, and burns up as much fuel in a single sortie. Germany could never afford a serious strategic bombing campaign, not without the vast American aluminum and fuel industries subsidizing it.
 
Based on the example of Berlin, yes London could have taken 20 times as much bombing and it would have recovered

Strategic bombing was a very mixed bag in ww2... German production increased in the face of it all the way until November 1944 (and the decline after, can also be attributed to the loss of Ploesti and French sources of raw materials)
 
Strategic bombing was a very mixed bag in ww2... German production increased in the face of it all the way until November 1944 (and the decline after, can also be attributed to the loss of Ploesti and French sources of raw materials)

Why are you making unsubstantiated claims and guessing at attribution when the actual statistics and timings have already been linked? German industrial production went into freefall well before November 44, or in many critical fields, even June 44. Fuel production for instance is described here, and what do you know, steep declines for all fuel types starting around April 44, compared to Ploesti falling in August and which only provided 20% of Germany's liquid fuels in any case.
 
Why are you making unsubstantiated claims and guessing at attribution when the actual statistics and timings have already been linked? German industrial production went into freefall well before November 44, or in many critical fields, even June 44. Fuel production for instance is described here, and what do you know, steep declines for all fuel types starting around April 44, compared to Ploesti falling in August and which only provided 20% of Germany's liquid fuels in any case.

It's not unsubstantiated. German production of aircraft and armored vehicles peaked in November 44... strategic bombing failed to stop them from getting weapons to the troops. 3/4 of all tonnage was dropped after dday where it coincided with massive losses in occupied territory, raw materials and created chaos. After their reserves where worked off there was just nothing left and they where working with scraps (as can be seen in the tires of the me-262)

The American's where very self critical about the effects of their bombing, and neither Speer or Guderian claim it to have critically disrupted the war effort until the weight of ground forces had decisively beaten Germany anyway

It was a huge waste, and the allies would have been better off fielding another 20 divisions for the resources those took
 

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It was a huge waste, and the allies would have been better off fielding another 20 divisions for the resources those took

Or a larger tactical airforce, but then again the fighters of the allied airforces filled that role quite adequetly in France.
 
It's not unsubstantiated. German production of aircraft and armored vehicles peaked in November 44... strategic bombing failed to stop them from getting weapons to the troops. 3/4 of all tonnage was dropped after dday where it coincided with massive losses in occupied territory, raw materials and created chaos. After their reserves where worked off there was just nothing left and they where working with scraps (as can be seen in the tires of the me-262)

Strange how you continue to make unsubstantiated claims even after the source contradicting you has already been presented. German air production is given here. So aero engine production peaked in April, while airframe production peaked in May. And as previously cited, fuel and rubber production both went into steep decline in Q1 44. Powder production peaked in May, while explosives production peaked in June. And finally, you can't forget the logistics strikes, with German rail traffic going into steep decline starting May.

The only things you got right were armored vehicle production (which matters not at all with no fuel to run them as proven by Wacht am Rhein) and the fact that once the reserves were worked off, there was nothing left. And the reason the reserves were worked off was because strategic bombing drove production beneath consumption before D-Day, and that plus the additional increase in consumption D-Day caused, used up the reserves shortly.

The American's where very self critical about the effects of their bombing, and neither Speer or Guderian claim it to have critically disrupted the war effort until the weight of ground forces had decisively beaten Germany anyway

Indeed, the Americans were very self critical, as one can see from reading the Strategic bombing survey which goes into detail on all the things they should have done better and places where they outright failed (most notably in the attacks on ball bearing production, which turned out not to be bottlenecked). Yet the facts on what they actually did achieve is right there, and your insistence on relying on the self-serving memoirs of Speer and Guderian instead explains a good deal.
 
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"The big problem with Germany's bombing" was that strategic bombing simply doesn't work! Albert Speer achieved higher production figures in every year thru 1944, despite the devastation wrought by Allied bombing. Germany would have done better with a bigger Luftwaffe, maybe 4-engine bombers, & so forth-- but it still wouldn't have brought about a Brit surrender.

No it only had Germany building Thousands of AA Guns and keep almost 1 million men in Germany manning AA Guns and digging out cities after they were bombed .
 
Strange how you continue to make unsubstantiated claims even after the source contradicting you has already been presented. German air production is given here. So aero engine production peaked in April, while airframe production peaked in May. And as previously cited, fuel and rubber production both went into steep decline in Q1 44. Powder production peaked in May, while explosives production peaked in June. And finally, you can't forget the logistics strikes, with German rail traffic going into steep decline starting May.

The only things you got right were armored vehicle production (which matters not at all with no fuel to run them as proven by Wacht am Rhein) and the fact that once the reserves were worked off, there was nothing left. And the reason the reserves were worked off was because strategic bombing drove production beneath consumption before D-Day, and that plus the additional increase in consumption D-Day caused, used up the reserves shortly.



Indeed, the Americans were very self critical, as one can see from reading the Strategic bombing survey which goes into detail on all the things they should have done better and places where they outright failed (most notably in the attacks on ball bearing production, which turned out not to be bottlenecked). Yet the facts on what they actually did achieve is right there, and your insistence on relying on the self-serving memoirs of Speer and Guderian instead explains a good deal.

I haven't read the report yet but I find your reliance on a report published in September 1945 rather dubious.

The allies would only have the haziest of information about the German warmachine and production by that time, not least because of the chaos that befell Germany.

What is a fact is that the bomber barons were unable to win the war on their own despite their boasts and while they undoubtedly harmed the German warmachine, the German industry was still able to produce weapons up to 1945. It took ground forces to defeat the Germans.
 
I haven't read the report yet but I find your reliance on a report published in September 1945 rather dubious.

The allies would only have the haziest of information about the German warmachine and production by that time, not least because of the chaos that befell Germany.

You do realize that history pretty much works exactly the opposite of what you seem to think, right? The Survey was based on the actual factories examined after capture, captured German documents, and the testimony of senior German production staff, much of which is no longer available today. Even a few short years after would see a great deal of self-serving historical whitewashing by the surviving German leadership trying to blame everything on other people and to secure their own legacy. In history, things generally get hazier the later you get from the actual event in question, and unless you can point to documents only declassified or discovered after the report was issued, your argument is self-undermining. Now interpretation can be questionable immediately after the fact, but I cited no interpretation, only actual statistics.

More to the point, it seems clear that you don't actually have an argument. That they kept on producing...something...right to the end means nothing when, as in fact was the case, it was no where close to what they needed, and essentially uncoordinated: airframes without engines, tank chassis without turrets, transportation destroyed and unable to match airframes with engines even if there were engines, and no fuel to run anything even if final products are assembled.

I cited a source. Either cite your own source that contradicts, or concede. Trying to poison the well is meaningless without your own source, even with a line of argumentation that isn't self-undermining.

What is a fact is that the bomber barons were unable to win the war on their own despite their boasts and while they undoubtedly harmed the German warmachine, the German industry was still able to produce weapons up to 1945. It took ground forces to defeat the Germans.

So...exactly the strawman argument I already pointed out in post 63. What the bomber barons claimed they were capable of is irrelevant to determining whether what they actually accomplished was worth it. It took ground troops to drive the Japanese from the Pacific Islands, does that mean the Navy's campaigns should be discounted? It took a hell lot of air dropped mines to shut off Japanese sea traffic, does that mean the submarine offensive was worthless? It took access to the Portuguese Azores and ground troops capturing the French ports to end the U-boat threat, does that mean the resources invested in all those ships and aircraft for the Battle of the Atlantic should instead have been invested in however many more divisions? Hell, it took the Atomic bomb and Soviet entry to defeat Japan, does that mean the U.S. should have abandoned the entire Pacific War until then?
 
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You do realize that history pretty much works exactly the opposite of what you seem to think, right? The Survey was based on the actual factories examined after capture, captured German documents, and the testimony of senior German production staff, much of which is no longer available today. Even a few short years after would see a great deal of self-serving historical whitewashing by the surviving German leadership trying to blame everything on other people and to secure their own legacy. In history, things generally get hazier the later you get from the actual event in question, and unless you can point to newly declassified documents or something of that nature, your argument is self-undermining. Now interpretation can be questionable immediately after the fact, but I cited no interpretation, only actual statistics.

More to the point, it seems clear that you don't actually have an argument. That they kept on producing...something...right to the end means nothing when, as in fact was the case, it was no where close to what they needed, and essentially uncoordinated: airframes without engines, tank chassis without turrets, transportation destroyed and unable to match airframes with engines even if there were engines, and no fuel to run anything even if final products are assembled.

I cited a source. Either cite your own source that contradicts, or concede. Trying to poison the well with a self-undermining line of argumentation is meaningless.


You are using specious reasoning

There where a number of parallel factors that severely lowered German war production at the end of the war including but not limited to

1. Constant changes in specifications of weapon's system's so that the designs where never frozen which severely effected production (notable victims include the panther, me-262, anti aircraft tanks and newer infantry personal weapons)

2. Hitler releasing skilled workers to serve in the army who where replaced by poorly trained slave labor (over 150k before Kursk)

3. Speer refusing to retool factories that where producing obsolete weapons (such as the ME-109G) which created tremendous parts backorders

4. Loss of resource rich areas in France and Western Russia after being overrun by ground forces

5. Reliance on super weapon projects which absorbed tremendous resources

6. Selection of weapons and vehicles that where far too complex for Germany's dwindling "reliable" labor pool

7. The creations of mini empires of power in the state which created tremendous confusion and diverging directives
 
You are using specious reasoning

There where a number of parallel factors that severely lowered German war production at the end of the war including but not limited to

1. Constant changes in specifications of weapon's system's so that the designs where never frozen which severely effected production (notable victims include the panther, me-262, anti aircraft tanks and newer infantry personal weapons)

2. Hitler releasing skilled workers to serve in the army who where replaced by poorly trained slave labor (over 150k before Kursk)

3. Speer refusing to retool factories that where producing obsolete weapons (such as the ME-109G) which created tremendous parts backorders

4. Loss of resource rich areas in France and Western Russia after being overrun by ground forces

5. Reliance on super weapon projects which absorbed tremendous resources

6. Selection of weapons and vehicles that where far too complex for Germany's dwindling "reliable" labor pool

7. The creations of mini empires of power in the state which created tremendous confusion and diverging directives

Strange how this responds not at all to what you actually quoted. But I'll respond anyway. Only (4) can in any way support your contention that the strategic bombing offensive was worthless. All the others are German internal issues that would have been there regardless of how the Allies choose to allocate their resources. Except of course, insofar as the bombing offensive contributed to investment in the V weapons and trying to turn the Me-262 into a bomber as a means of "striking back," and how the desperate struggle for Defense of the Reich forced the continuing production of those obsolete ME-109Gs, which run exactly counter to your thesis. As for (2)...well you know where else Germany could get men without drawing on the pool of skilled workers? How about the million men tied up in air defense?

Now, as to (4), the timings I have cited have already proven you wrong with respect to France and Romania (and also the rest of the Balkans), as well as all the territories lost to Bagration. Please cite your sources as to what resources were lost in the rest of occupied Russia that so damaged German industry. Certainly the timing for fuel proves you wrong there as well.
 
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May I be permitted to espouse the benefits of combined operations? When various commanders, units and divisions work individually to their own agenda, the effect is so much worse than the effect of all forces working combined to a common goal. Strategic bombing didn't win the war, nor did fighters or tactical air, nor transport, nor armor, nor infantry, nor the Navy, nor the merchant marine, nor the USO girl who danced with the soldiers. Together as a force, they all won the war. On some occasions, combined operations were shown to be the determining factor absolutely. In other instances, not so obvious. But it was always a factor. Why did blitzkrieg work? Were the German tanks so much better? Yes, because they had radios to call air strikes and artillery and infantry. Think of all the battles lost through lack of communications. But even radios didn't win the war. It was the entire package, inclusive.
 
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