Could Jubal Early Have Captured Washington D.C. in 1864?

Could Jubal Early Have Taken Washington D.C. In 1864?

  • No

    Votes: 52 68.4%
  • Maybe

    Votes: 8 10.5%
  • Yes, but it wouldn't have affected the outcome of the war.

    Votes: 5 6.6%
  • Yes, and it might well have changed the outcome of the war.

    Votes: 11 14.5%

  • Total voters
    76
I'll concede to you that there wasn't a great deal of fighting at Bladensburg, North Point or Fort McHenry.

But I'll bet the members of 44th Foot, 1st/93rd (Highlands) or 3rd/95th would have loved to have a word with you about whether they were experienced or not.
 

Spengler

Banned
We are bringing up the fact he is attacking a fortified position with less then twice the number of men than that fortified position with no proper artillery train. Also I think he's talking about Baltimore.
 
No, I was going with New Orleans, hence my mentioning of Chalmette Field. But you're right, I should have at least mentioned the names of Jackson and Pakenham. And Gibbs. And Keane. Hey, neat! Notice how many British officers were killed or wounded going against troops among which the most experienced had had as their most difficult battle the Horseshoe Bend and some of which where free men of color with not even militia experience? It's just as if a large Confederate force in Pennsylvania, say a corps, had tried to take a position near a 'copse of trees' by storm. Or if a certain corps commander had tried to force the defenses of Washington.
 
I sort of feel like you're advancing the position that Jubal would find it difficult (which is something I agree with) and then bringing up difficulties which simply didn't apply to contemporaries as major. The city-fighting problem, for example, is not how it tended to work out in those days - formed troops march into the city without the enemy physically stopping them, the city is pretty much considered as lost and needing to be retaken. (That's certainly how it worked in the Napoleonic days.)

I think perhaps part of the disconnect is that I'm looking at this through a broadly Napoleonic lens (the Napoleonic wars seeing various examples of quickly trained troops and fort attacks of this sort) and this looks quite doable in that sense. And there's not really any major change from the Napoleonic wars in this engagement - the guns are almost all smoothbores, the troops use their weapons like smoothbores and so on.

Except and this is an important point the rebels are not a recognised government save to themselves. Further but Early's Division won't have taken Washington the defences will still be intact as will most of the garrison so why should the Union surrender the city? Further we have the example of the barricades in Paris in 1836 which are know to Union officers, soldiers, officials and citizens.

Every agreed surrender in the Napoleonic Wars was because the attacker had to ability to inflict punitive measures against the population. Where the garrison did not care much for the population they continued to resist post breach as at Badajoz so even in the Napoleonic Wars the conventions were only observed when it suited both sides. Here surrendering Washington simply is not in the interests of the Federal Government.

Now there may be a case in which the Union side gives in because it believes that Early is stronger than he actually is but that is not going to result from a grand column type of assault, the lack of follow up waves will be a bit of a give away.

So no the difficulty for Early is real. He does not have the capacity compel the entire garrison to yield Washington. He simply has the strength to break in.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I'll concede to you that there wasn't a great deal of fighting at Bladensburg, North Point or Fort McHenry.

But I'll bet the members of 44th Foot, 1st/93rd (Highlands) or 3rd/95th would have loved to have a word with you about whether they were experienced or not.

1st/44th Foot - no notable experience in the Napoleonic Wars themselves. The 2/44th had a lot, but they were at Waterloo and not at New Orleans.

1st/93rd were at the Cape from 1806-1814.

The 3rd/95th were indeed experienced - and, notably, they were the covering force not the assault force.
 
If Early can take a fort so he can bring up his artillery then I expect we are looking at a different situation. He can threaten to bombard Washington without exposing his men to nearly as much risk. Then you might well see the Union side open to negotiations.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
For what it's worth, I'm trying to bring in the morale side of things for the Union - imagine the impact if Jubal's pushed past the fort line (no matter how much his force can't then take another big battle and is mostly fit for marching), I can imagine a panicked evacuation of DC!

(Perhaps not likely... but then, not impossible. Arguably more likely than the events of Waterloo, where two veteran units fired at each other and then both broke - whacked, huh?)
 
Service in Spain in 1814 is not a trifling thing even if the guerillas are not out to get you. And before the 93rd moved to occupation duty in the Cape, they had to... you know, take the Cape.
 
For what it's worth, I'm trying to bring in the morale side of things for the Union - imagine the impact if Jubal's pushed past the fort line (no matter how much his force can't then take another big battle and is mostly fit for marching), I can imagine a panicked evacuation of DC!

(Perhaps not likely... but then, not impossible. Arguably more likely than the events of Waterloo, where two veteran units fired at each other and then both broke - whacked, huh?)

But the morale side of things is based on perception.

Which is in part why I would expect a more deliberate assault just as a larger force that damn well knew it could take the city would proceed. Early has no solution to the Union deciding to fight it out other than the bluff and hope he is not called on it.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Service in Spain in 1814 is not a trifling thing even if the guerillas are not out to get you. And before the 93rd moved to occupation duty in the Cape, they had to... you know, take the Cape.
Eight years is easily long enough to let the experience fade. Indeed, it's long enough that a substantial fraction of the regiment would probably be new recruits.

And which were you thinking for service in Spain in 1814? The 1/44th?
I actually can't find that they were in any major battles in Spain - they don't show up at Toulouse. It certainly doesn't make them anything like as experienced as 2/44th, for example.


Which is in part why I would expect a more deliberate assault just as a larger force that damn well knew it could take the city would proceed. Early has no solution to the Union deciding to fight it out other than the bluff and hope he is not called on it.

True, but "he bluffs" and "they fall for it" is a non-zero possibility.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
True, but "he bluffs" and "they fall for it" is a non-zero possibility.

Until July 9-12, the whole operation was, in fact, a bluff on the part of Lee and Early. Lee's orders never discussed actually capturing Washington but only appearing to threaten it. It wasn't until Early learned of the state of the Washington defenses that he, very briefly, believed that he might actually succeed in temporarily capturing the city; he abandoned the projected attack as soon as he knew the VI Corps had arrived. It should be said, however, that the Union observers in the city at the time, including Stanton and Halleck, believed that the fall of the city was a very real possibility. Lincoln, though he remained more calm than the others, was concerned enough to wire Grant to suggest that Grant himself return north to deal with the situation. Stanton even had a steamer prepared on the docks to whisk Lincoln away if it became necessary.
 
Well, not every battalion can capture a French eagle. And while 1/44th didn't fight in any pitched battles in Spain that I can find about, that doesn't preclude small actions. And Wellington wasn't really one to let his regiments' training fall by the wayside.

As for the 93rd, there's no particular sign it had been relieved or majorly reinforced while in the Cape. No reason to assume strong attrition due to disease before they moved to the Americas, since the climate is quite mild. Furthermore, if we assume they had strongly suffered in their numbers, we have to consider whether II Corps of the AoNV was really made up of "Jackson's veterans" since he had died more than a year before and that Gettysburg and the Overland Campaign, not to mention dysentery, had put it through the wringer.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Part of the reason I keep this up is that I think the standard rule of thumb - the "3:1 ratio to attack" - is a rule of thumb and not a guaranteed one. It's possible for circumstance to allow a force to hold out at 10:1 odds, or it's possible for a smaller force to attack and rout a larger one. Even with benefit of entrenchment - a good example is that Napoleon's forces were often able to punch larger forces aside with skill and panache, despite field fortifications.
Part of this is morale at work.

The scale of PoD it would take for Early to be able to push through the defences is not huge - not with the actual state of the defences as poor as it was. It's not on the level of "10,000 troops attacking 15,000 in forts with better weapons" where it basically takes some kind of miracle, it's at (though not in the middle of) the area where either side could win.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Well, not every battalion can capture a French eagle. And while 1/44th didn't fight in any pitched battles in Spain that I can find about, that doesn't preclude small actions. And Wellington wasn't really one to let his regiments' training fall by the wayside.
Yes, and the 1/44th didn't capture an Eagle.
While their not fighting in any major actions doesn't preclude small actions, it means that the preponderance of evidence is that they were not in fact particularly experienced in any sense of the word (not having been in any actions worthy of note) - indeed, they weren't with Wellington's army in many of the battles where Wellington had his whole force, so it's arguable to even call them Wellington's regiment.

As for the 93rd, there's no particular sign it had been relieved or majorly reinforced while in the Cape. No reason to assume strong attrition due to disease before they moved to the Americas, since the climate is quite mild. Furthermore, if we assume they had strongly suffered in their numbers, we have to consider whether II Corps of the AoNV was really made up of "Jackson's veterans" since he had died more than a year before and that Gettysburg and the Overland Campaign, not to mention dysentery, had put it through the wringer.
Yes, but eight years without any actual fighting is long enough to let skills seriously degrade - it's questionable to call them experienced at that point.
 
Until July 9-12, the whole operation was, in fact, a bluff on the part of Lee and Early. Lee's orders never discussed actually capturing Washington but only appearing to threaten it. It wasn't until Early learned of the state of the Washington defenses that he, very briefly, believed that he might actually succeed in temporarily capturing the city; he abandoned the projected attack as soon as he knew the VI Corps had arrived. It should be said, however, that the Union observers in the city at the time, including Stanton and Halleck, believed that the fall of the city was a very real possibility. Lincoln, though he remained more calm than the others, was concerned enough to wire Grant to suggest that Grant himself return north to deal with the situation. Stanton even had a steamer prepared on the docks to whisk Lincoln away if it became necessary.
Sure, but neither Halleck nor Stanton are particularly experienced in this regard (Halleck's fairly undistinguished military career hadn't included many assaults on fortifications, and Stanton was a civilian). Their opinions really shouldn't be seen as reliable in judging the threat to the capital.

And coming in without a plan is not a great way to conduct an assault. Especially when you don't have the artillery and supplies for one.

More generally, Early is advancing through Union territory with an army that is both too small to defeat the garrison in an all-out assault and too large too move undetected; the (much larger than you seem to estimate) forces in Washington would know exactly where he was coming from. He can't invest the whole city; he doesn't have the men. And he can't spend much time on probing attacks and recon; he knows that Grant has reinforcements on the way. So his axis of advance is fairly predetermined, and that means the garrison will be concentrated along that axis.
 
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