Could Japan do well in WW2

Any chance that the Japanese had to "win" the Pacific war hinged entirely on one variable: the will of the American public to resist and fight. As long as we as a nation were determined to win, the Japanese had ABSOLUTELY NO CHANCE, for all the reasons that CalBear and the eminent John Parshall have noted numerous times.

Is it possible that a set of circumstances could have occured that would have broken the will of the American public and given the Japanese the negotiated peace they so desperately sought? (BTW, a negotiated peace was the best of any possible outcomes they could have achieved. A total victory is pure ASB) Possible, yes. Plausible, no.

IF the Japanese resisted the temptation to attack Pearl Harbor,

IF the FDR administration caved to public pressure to relieve the Philippines,

IF the War and Navy Departments threw out established policy and immediately sent the fleet west,

IF the Japanese fleet was successful against us in the proverbial Decisive Battle, and most of all

IF the American public decided that this was just too much to bear and threw in the towel, then...

Maybe, just maybe. But not in any reality that I am aware of.

Dave
 
ok so in response to CalBear questioning the validity of my earlier claims I present you this:

"At the same time the air battle was heating up. On June 27th the Kwantung Army sent the 2nd Hikodan (Air Brigade) to attack the main Soviet air base at Tamsak-Bulak in Mongolia. It is very hard to sort out losses in the air war, as both sides minimized their losses and exaggerated their victories. However the Japanese surprised the Russians with their sudden strike. The Nakajima Ki- 27, the Japanese Army Air Force's new, all-metal monoplane fighter, was clearly superior to the Poliparkov I-15s, I-16s, and somewhat better I-153s. The Japanese pilots, were better trained as well. On the whole, the Russians lost 1.5 planes for every Japanese plane they shot down.

Here the fragmented Japanese system of command began to handicap their operations. IJA headquarters in Tokyo had not authorized the strike on Tamsag-Bulak, and forbade expanding air operations. Thus the JAAF could not capitalize on their tactical superiority to get complete command of the air. "

from the website:

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx

I dunno if this was where I originally read it, but it says about what I was talking about.

Now I don't mean to say that the Japanese had any chance in hell of ever actually acheiving a real victory against the Russians here, however what I am saying is that if the Japanese stay in Russia and preoccupy Stalin and he sends enough troops away from the war with Germany it might have made the difference at stalingrad or somewhere else along the European front, which means a possible German Victory against the Soviets. Also the Japanese would have avoided fighting the Americans who wouldn't have entered the war at that point, which I think is largely agreed as the biggest reason for the Japanese losing the war.
 

CalBear

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ok so in response to CalBear questioning the validity of my earlier claims I present you this:

"At the same time the air battle was heating up. On June 27th the Kwantung Army sent the 2nd Hikodan (Air Brigade) to attack the main Soviet air base at Tamsak-Bulak in Mongolia. It is very hard to sort out losses in the air war, as both sides minimized their losses and exaggerated their victories. However the Japanese surprised the Russians with their sudden strike. The Nakajima Ki- 27, the Japanese Army Air Force's new, all-metal monoplane fighter, was clearly superior to the Poliparkov I-15s, I-16s, and somewhat better I-153s. The Japanese pilots, were better trained as well. On the whole, the Russians lost 1.5 planes for every Japanese plane they shot down.

Here the fragmented Japanese system of command began to handicap their operations. IJA headquarters in Tokyo had not authorized the strike on Tamsag-Bulak, and forbade expanding air operations. Thus the JAAF could not capitalize on their tactical superiority to get complete command of the air. "

from the website:

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx

I dunno if this was where I originally read it, but it says about what I was talking about.

Now I don't mean to say that the Japanese had any chance in hell of ever actually acheiving a real victory against the Russians here, however what I am saying is that if the Japanese stay in Russia and preoccupy Stalin and he sends enough troops away from the war with Germany it might have made the difference at stalingrad or somewhere else along the European front, which means a possible German Victory against the Soviets. Also the Japanese would have avoided fighting the Americans who wouldn't have entered the war at that point, which I think is largely agreed as the biggest reason for the Japanese losing the war.

I didn't question it. Another poster did. I would, however, point out that a 1.5-1 kill ratio is nothing to write home about, not when you opponent has more planes & the USSR had a LOT more than a 1.5 to 1 advantage in platforms.

Here is an analysis of the campaign published by the CGSC. The conclusion, which addresses IJA doctrine is pretty much on point.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp
 
well, I'm not trying to support the idea that the Japanese would win outright, only the idea that the Japanese would be stupid enough and stubborn enough that in the event of maintaining a somewhat favorable kill ratio in the air they stay in Russia and as such the Russians keep troops in the far east. This in turn may very well affect the outcome of the war against the Germans. Keep in mind you and I may look at the casualty figures and think it doesn't look so good for the Japanese, but the Japanese military had a tendency during WWII to see things differently than common sense would indicate.
 

stalkere

Banned
How about this?

Basically, you really need a pre-1900 POD.
A "business-like" approach to war, similar to the American idea. Some straight thinking about military matters- such as better damage control in the IJN and better tactical cohesion, the development of a strategic bombing capability.

I dunno the state of cold -weather oil extraction - could the Empire have gotten at the Siberian Oil? Lots of reserves, I think, in a possible reach of the Empire, but iirc, IT'S DEEPER than they could have drilled?

I mean, if the Japanese had swung North, forgoing the DEI and not taking on the US or UK - could they have made it that way.

Mebbe a less rascist approach to the Chinese - Making the "Asia for Asians" a reality, and not just a sour joke - that might have made a big difference.

The Japanese were really hampered with a ridiculous mindset. Combine that with the lack of resources and you have an EPIC FAIL in the making.

And BTW, before you accuse me of being stupidly racist, be advised that my mother was from a good Samurai family. In my youth, I had a few discussions with my Uncle and his friends, most of whom were WWII IJAF veterans.
Yeah, I had relatives who were on both sides of the lines in the Pacific War. Gives me a rather unusual perspective on this subject, IMHO.
 
Any chance that the Japanese had to "win" the Pacific war hinged entirely on one variable: the will of the American public to resist and fight. As long as we as a nation were determined to win, the Japanese had ABSOLUTELY NO CHANCE, for all the reasons that CalBear and the eminent John Parshall have noted numerous times.

Is it possible that a set of circumstances could have occured that would have broken the will of the American public and given the Japanese the negotiated peace they so desperately sought? (BTW, a negotiated peace was the best of any possible outcomes they could have achieved. A total victory is pure ASB) Possible, yes. Plausible, no.

IF the Japanese resisted the temptation to attack Pearl Harbor,

IF the FDR administration caved to public pressure to relieve the Philippines,

IF the War and Navy Departments threw out established policy and immediately sent the fleet west,

IF the Japanese fleet was successful against us in the proverbial Decisive Battle, and most of all

IF the American public decided that this was just too much to bear and threw in the towel, then...

Maybe, just maybe. But not in any reality that I am aware of.

Dave


DaveJ576

That's the only way I could see the Japanese possibly 'win' a limited war which includes the US. By win I mean get a negotiated peace and possibly even some gains. Even then I think its unlikely and one other change would be necessary. That is not that the Japanese don't attack Pearl but that they don't attack the US at all. Then, with the British/Dutch position looking on the verge of collapse, threatening both their capacity to fight the Germans and also keep important resources out of Japanese hands, Roosevelt feels forced to go for a dow on Japan which is divisive in the US.

On the US dow the Japanese attack the Philippines, which is virtually isolated. The USN war plans were to leave the islands to be conquered but this might be politically impossible, especially in an unpopular war and with MacArthur possibly kicking up a storm. [Know that a lot of the US forces in the Philippines were expecting to be relieved]. The USN, under heavy pressure sends a fleet with a relief force to the islands. This is exactly the sort of war the IJN was expecting to wage and they have the advantage of sizeable land based air resources, having occupied most of the islands by this time. Also the US force is tied down escorting the relief force and the presence of a large battle fleet mean that is the focus of the US battle plan - i.e. the Americans use the carriers mainly for supporting roles. Put those factors together with the US underestimating the Japanese and a slice of luck and the US fleet could suffer a serious defeat, possibly becoming a partial slaughter on the long retreat eastwards.

Under those circumstances the US losses are far, far heavier than at Pearl. Not only in sheer numbers of ships but also since they are sunk in deep water many trained sailors while the ships of course can't be refloated. The US can replace the losses but that will take time and by the time they can take the offensive again the Japanese will have defeated European resistance in the east - possibly causing unrest in India as well. Given the unpopularity of the conflict, under those conditions and presuming the Japanese don't get too much of a victory disease [which is a big if] you might just see a negotiated peace.

The only other way the Japanese can will is the variant of this where Roosevelt is unable/unwilling to get a dow through Congress. Then the Japanese can mop up the British and Dutch colonies. They still have China as a quagmire but it will be weaker with supply routes cut or the losses of the Pacific conflict might force both sides to agree some settlement to that.

Steve
 
The Japanese could not leave the Solomons to the Allies. The Solomons were vital to defending Rabaul, which in turn was vital in holding the door closed to the DEI. The DEI was the whole point of the Pacific War.

I'd disagree. Solomons are an area where the Allied ability to construct airfields rapidly is a good advantage to the Allies (or almost exclusively the US) to overcome Japanese superiority. Also, being far away, the main fleet cannot be effectively supported to operate that far.

This would also force Allies to conduct their initial offensives not against peripheral hastily constructed outpost (Guadalcanal) but well prepared base area (Truk). Considering the initial Allied problems this would either delay beginning of the US offensives into 1943 or result in a possible bloodbath for the USN.

Post which war?

Post Second World War with Type A mass produced ships. Technology and skills were ready but the idea wasn't until far too late.

http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/030622.shtml

Lost of 52 boats, is in the greater scheme of things, a minor issue, albeit a major one to the submariners.

Surely US can outproduce Japan in everything except possibly silk, but larger casualties on US sub forces will result in less efficiency until a larger construction program can be made. This will cause delay in US sub effectiveness.

The difficulty with even, perhaps especially, land based efforts is that they missed finding the U.S. forces far more than they found them. Kamakazi pilots were given only the most basic training, especially in landing, and the landing conditions from advanced bases were dreadful.

Sure, but the payoff was still fairly good.

The Japanese did raid into the Indian Ocean, in most spectacular fashion, in the Spring of 1942. Unfortunately, the Dolittle Raiders struck Japan in the same week.

Yes, they let a minor incident set off their strategy.

Problem here is that the Japanese COULDN'T defeat China, not enough to knock it out of the war. Too much China, too few Japanese. By 1941 the braver IJA commenders were, very quietly lest they get assassinated, pointing out that the China War was unwinnable.
...
India was nothing but another good place for the graves of brave Japanese.

Without supplies from India Chiang Kai-Shek would have no outside support at all. I doubt the old fox would risk his power being reduced instead of a tacit truce being made. One also has to remember very large collaborationist part of the Chinese population.

Again, I do agree that a conventional military conquest of India is simply out of question. But Japanese could have plausibly put more resources upon Indian campaign in 1942 instead of putting them into Solomons etc. 14th Army was in really sad shape that spring and historically the initial INA recruitment drives were quite succesfull. One must remember that the idea here is essentially to gain a political victory.
 

CalBear

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Donor
Monthly Donor
I'd disagree. Solomons are an area where the Allied ability to construct airfields rapidly is a good advantage to the Allies (or almost exclusively the US) to overcome Japanese superiority. Also, being far away, the main fleet cannot be effectively supported to operate that far.

This would also force Allies to conduct their initial offensives not against peripheral hastily constructed outpost (Guadalcanal) but well prepared base area (Truk). Considering the initial Allied problems this would either delay beginning of the US offensives into 1943 or result in a possible bloodbath for the USN.



Post Second World War with Type A mass produced ships. Technology and skills were ready but the idea wasn't until far too late.

http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/030622.shtml



Surely US can outproduce Japan in everything except possibly silk, but larger casualties on US sub forces will result in less efficiency until a larger construction program can be made. This will cause delay in US sub effectiveness.



Sure, but the payoff was still fairly good.



Yes, they let a minor incident set off their strategy.



Without supplies from India Chiang Kai-Shek would have no outside support at all. I doubt the old fox would risk his power being reduced instead of a tacit truce being made. One also has to remember very large collaborationist part of the Chinese population.

Again, I do agree that a conventional military conquest of India is simply out of question. But Japanese could have plausibly put more resources upon Indian campaign in 1942 instead of putting them into Solomons etc. 14th Army was in really sad shape that spring and historically the initial INA recruitment drives were quite succesfull. One must remember that the idea here is essentially to gain a political victory.


The actual number of ground troops initially deployed to the Solomons was fairly low, diverting them from the region would not have provided sufficient additional manpower to strategically change the force balance in Burma. Without that situation being dramatically altered the rest of the early advance into India fallas apart.

Regarding China, one thing that is sometimes under estimated is the degree of influence that Moscow maintained in the region. Had the need arisen, the Communist military would have become much more active against the Japanese. Out side of the Chinese themselves, no country on Earth was more threatened by a victorious Japan on the Asian Mainland. The remarkably effective balancing act that Moscow's representatives managed in war-time China is one of the great untold stories of the War.
 
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