Could Israel win a Prolonged War?

For such a thing to happen in the 1960s requires either Great Powers and no superpowers or a TL so alien it belongs in the ASB forum to start with, so that argument might or might not be true.



The irony of that analogy is that the USSR won as decisively as it did only because of Western Lend-Lease, so there's no direct equivalent even here. The Arabs would need foreign aid providing all non-combat production to achieve Soviets in WWII level successes.

So basically, we agree, just arguing semantics?

In response to the OP, could Israel win a prolonged war, the answear is yes, it could?
 
So basically, we agree, just arguing semantics?

In response to the OP, could Israel win a prolonged war, the answear is yes, it could?

No, we disagree in that while we both think the scenario in question is only plausible in one way, I tend to think the Arab states win by default when Israel's over-mobilization policy in a long war begins to cause economic crises of say producing the weapons it needs, meaning that the Arabs, while weaker overall, are proportionately stronger. It would admittedly be no glorious win of badassery and more one that illustrates how flawed over-mobilization actually is.
 
No, we disagree in that while we both think the scenario in question is only plausible in one way, I tend to think the Arab states win by default when Israel's over-mobilization policy in a long war begins to cause economic crises of say producing the weapons it needs, meaning that the Arabs, while weaker overall, are proportionately stronger. It would admittedly be no glorious win of badassery and more one that illustrates how flawed over-mobilization actually is.

I think you exaggerate the effect of mobilization on the Israeli economy, also I don't think that a prolonged war will see the entire IDF mobilized for the entire duration of the war. During the war of attrition the entire IDF was not mobilized, and that is sorta what's suggested in the scenario. No one said Israel will use it's winning streak to take all of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. It will most likely stop after it secured new, defensible, borders.

Also, economoc crisis for the other guy does not give you victory, it helps you get it.
 
It's an interesting problem, given that Israel itself has no faith in winning a prolonged war. The entirety of Israeli military doctrine, training and tactics has been oriented to waging brief and intense wars.

Basically, Israel's conscription policies can mobilize huge numbers of troops. But only for very short times. There is only so much manpower available. Take a significant portion out of the civilian industrial complex, and the country is in trouble, economic dislocations follow.

Equally, doctrines are based on massive expenditure of munitions. In the war on Lebanon in 2006, Israel was actually running out of jet fuel and cluster munitions and required emergency resupply from the US. Lebanon is by no means a huge country, so the rapidity with which Israel exhausted its stores is stunning.

Given the logistical limits, I don't see Israel successfully waging a prolongued war. Tanks need gasoline, jets need fuel, guns need bullets, troops need transport. The further afield these go, the more supply lines are needed, and the more exponentially expensive these supply lines become. Israel simply doesn't have that capacity, never needed it, never bothered to develop it, cannot manufacture it out of nothing, and in all probability couldn't develop it over time.

It's really hard to see an Israeli campaign successfully marching on Baghdad or Mecca or Tunisia. And by this, I mean a real campaign as opposed to the smash em up raids we've seen.

I'd also suggest that actually holding any significant quantity of territory is outside of Israel's capacities.

Whether Arab states would hold up is another question. Generally, the poorer or 'weaker' state with fewer military resources tries to have short intense wars, because it doesn't have the resources for a prolongued one. Obviously that's not on. The Arab states would have to rethink their military doctrines, such as they are.
 
I think you exaggerate the effect of mobilization on the Israeli economy, also I don't think that a prolonged war will see the entire IDF mobilized for the entire duration of the war. During the war of attrition the entire IDF was not mobilized, and that is sorta what's suggested in the scenario. No one said Israel will use it's winning streak to take all of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. It will most likely stop after it secured new, defensible, borders.

Also, economoc crisis for the other guy does not give you victory, it helps you get it.

The thing is that Israel's over-mobilization works perfectly......in a short war. In a prolonged war it will have to de-mobilize its own troops, and this enables the Arabs to only have to start getting lucky once or twice to start creating compounding disaster dominoes.
 
It's an interesting problem, given that Israel itself has no faith in winning a prolonged war. The entirety of Israeli military doctrine, training and tactics has been oriented to waging brief and intense wars.

Basically, Israel's conscription policies can mobilize huge numbers of troops. But only for very short times. There is only so much manpower available. Take a significant portion out of the civilian industrial complex, and the country is in trouble, economic dislocations follow.

Equally, doctrines are based on massive expenditure of munitions. In the war on Lebanon in 2006, Israel was actually running out of jet fuel and cluster munitions and required emergency resupply from the US. Lebanon is by no means a huge country, so the rapidity with which Israel exhausted its stores is stunning.

Given the logistical limits, I don't see Israel successfully waging a prolongued war. Tanks need gasoline, jets need fuel, guns need bullets, troops need transport. The further afield these go, the more supply lines are needed, and the more exponentially expensive these supply lines become. Israel simply doesn't have that capacity, never needed it, never bothered to develop it, cannot manufacture it out of nothing, and in all probability couldn't develop it over time.

It's really hard to see an Israeli campaign successfully marching on Baghdad or Mecca or Tunisia. And by this, I mean a real campaign as opposed to the smash em up raids we've seen.

I'd also suggest that actually holding any significant quantity of territory is outside of Israel's capacities.

Whether Arab states would hold up is another question. Generally, the poorer or 'weaker' state with fewer military resources tries to have short intense wars, because it doesn't have the resources for a prolongued one. Obviously that's not on. The Arab states would have to rethink their military doctrines, such as they are.

While I agree about Israel not having the capacity to march on Baghdad, that was not the scenario. In both wars that were mentioned, 1967 and 1973, Israel reacted to the "Arab threat". The point in getting the Sinai was not to capture land, it was strategic depth. More so with the Golan and the West bank. In 1982 Israel carved out a strip from Lebanon and pulled out after it saw there was no point, rockets got more range and you can't just keep taking more land.

In 2006 Israel did not run out of ammo, it didn't have any. War time supply depots were closed since a state of war was not declared at the time, only ~6 months after IIRC. The entire conflict was faught with spare and training munitions, and whatever was bought from the US. I think I've mentioned in another thread how even in 1973 the situation was not as bad as depicted.

The thing is that Israel's over-mobilization works perfectly......in a short war. In a prolonged war it will have to de-mobilize its own troops, and this enables the Arabs to only have to start getting lucky once or twice to start creating compounding disaster dominoes.

The mobilization also isn't as big of a problem. The IDF's doctrine is to wage short wars, spending as little time as possible on Israeli soil before moving to a counter attack on the enemy. But after you've done that, the Arab armies did not pose the same threat as they did before hostilities started. If a war was to last longer, Israel will stop in defensible borders, probably keep the reserves active for a few more months, like IOTL after 1967/1973, then release forces in the usual 2/3 doctrine, where you keep 2/3 of your forces most of the time, 1/3 during holidays/periods of low alert.
 
The mobilization also isn't as big of a problem. The IDF's doctrine is to wage short wars, spending as little time as possible on Israeli soil before moving to a counter attack on the enemy. But after you've done that, the Arab armies did not pose the same threat as they did before hostilities started. If a war was to last longer, Israel will stop in defensible borders, probably keep the reserves active for a few more months, like IOTL after 1967/1973, then release forces in the usual 2/3 doctrine, where you keep 2/3 of your forces most of the time, 1/3 during holidays/periods of low alert.

Germany wanted short, simple, brutal wars waged as little on its soil as possible, too. That it wanted this did not mean it got this. Israel may want a short, simple, war and structure its forces for this but it does not mean that winning shattering initial victories in battles translates into winning wars.
 
Your argument, Sir, is not with me, but with the Israeli military.

If you would like to ascribe ASB abilities and resources to it, that's your lookout.
 
Germany wanted short, simple, brutal wars waged as little on its soil as possible, too. That it wanted this did not mean it got this. Israel may want a short, simple, war and structure its forces for this but it does not mean that winning shattering initial victories in battles translates into winning wars.

Battle plans never survive the first shot.

Still, that is no argument why Israel will lose. Modern wars between modern armies do not last very long either. This scenario asks if Israel can win a long war. IMHO it can, and there is precedent in the form of the war of attrition.

Also, I don't think the analogy to the German army in WW2 is in place. The scenario says an Arab attack on Israel. All it has to do is defend itself, not conqure Europe.


Your argument, Sir, is not with me, but with the Israeli military.

If you would like to ascribe ASB abilities and resources to it, that's your lookout.

ASB abilities and resources? How so? What makes you think the Israeli army is not capable to peform the job it was created to do, defending Israel against an all-Arab invasion?
 

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Donor
Germany wanted short, simple, brutal wars waged as little on its soil as possible, too. That it wanted this did not mean it got this. Israel may want a short, simple, war and structure its forces for this but it does not mean that winning shattering initial victories in battles translates into winning wars.


Germany was not allied with a superpower. Israel is and will continue to be so. I see US massive aid if a war with the Arabs will take a turn for the worse
 
Sooner or later the arabic countries will imitate Russia 1917- suffering from a long war and deprivations the civilians revolts, and since a lot of the military isn't available for riot control (and available military units don't want to fight for the government that started the war) the government will fall.

Dictatorships are in many cases very unstable and unpredictable. The middle east even more so.
 
ASB abilities and resources? How so? What makes you think the Israeli army is not capable to peform the job it was created to do, defending Israel against an all-Arab invasion?

If you have issues with the Israeli military's assessment of its strategic and tactical abilities and limitations, then go take it up with them.

If you insist on attributing imaginary qualities, well, that's your lookout. But I'm afraid that I'm not going to entertain you.
 
Sooner or later the arabic countries will imitate Russia 1917- suffering from a long war and deprivations the civilians revolts, and since a lot of the military isn't available for riot control (and available military units don't want to fight for the government that started the war) the government will fall.

Dictatorships are in many cases very unstable and unpredictable. The middle east even more so.

Hmmm. Quaddaffi lasted 42 years. The Egyptian dictatorship founded by Nasser lasted 55 years, through Sadat and Mubarak. The Assads 42 years. The Sauds have been around since 1918. The Baathists in Iraq were long timers. Tunisia, Morocco.

Most middle eastern dictatorships, and I'll include the monarchies, seem to be remarkably long lived.
 
Battle plans never survive the first shot.

Still, that is no argument why Israel will lose. Modern wars between modern armies do not last very long either. This scenario asks if Israel can win a long war. IMHO it can, and there is precedent in the form of the war of attrition.

Also, I don't think the analogy to the German army in WW2 is in place. The scenario says an Arab attack on Israel. All it has to do is defend itself, not conqure Europe.

If we take the Germans as an example or Japan all the brutality in the world when structured for a long world merely gets you the enemy raising a flag over your capital and bombing and smashing his way through unhindered.

Germany was not allied with a superpower. Israel is and will continue to be so. I see US massive aid if a war with the Arabs will take a turn for the worse

If the superpowers, either one or two, were involved no long war is possible for exactly that reason.

Sooner or later the arabic countries will imitate Russia 1917- suffering from a long war and deprivations the civilians revolts, and since a lot of the military isn't available for riot control (and available military units don't want to fight for the government that started the war) the government will fall.

Dictatorships are in many cases very unstable and unpredictable. The middle east even more so.

That would be the Russia that went through three governments and the first Bolshevik war with Germany to be pushed over in the span of 1917? Not exactly the easiest comparison to make as Israel is not the German Empire and can't just park its armies somewhere and wait for that to happen.
 
Hmmm. Quaddaffi lasted 42 years. The Egyptian dictatorship founded by Nasser lasted 55 years, through Sadat and Mubarak. The Assads 42 years. The Sauds have been around since 1918. The Baathists in Iraq were long timers. Tunisia, Morocco.

Most middle eastern dictatorships, and I'll include the monarchies, seem to be remarkably long lived.

And of course Russia went through Romanovs, Provisional Government, and Bolsheviks in 1917, while it required the First Soviet-German war to push the Bolshies to sign Brest-Litovsk by underscoring their er......resistance....was futile. Germany had the luxury to park its armies and sit and wait. Israel would not.
 
Hmmm. Quaddaffi lasted 42 years. The Egyptian dictatorship founded by Nasser lasted 55 years, through Sadat and Mubarak. The Assads 42 years. The Sauds have been around since 1918. The Baathists in Iraq were long timers. Tunisia, Morocco.

Most middle eastern dictatorships, and I'll include the monarchies, seem to be remarkably long lived.

The Romanovs lasted 300 years including having Moscow burnt to the ground. It did not help in 1917.

Do you draw any conclusions from the fact that the countries above, with one exception, haven't been in a prolonged war of the kind this discussion is about? Which of the countries above have taken losses like ACW or WW1 and kept fighting?
 
The Romanovs lasted 300 years including having Moscow burnt to the ground. It did not help in 1917.

Do you draw any conclusions from the fact that the countries above, with one exception, haven't been in a prolonged war of the kind this discussion is about? Which of the countries above have taken losses like ACW or WW1 and kept fighting?

Yes, that the superpowers were not interested in such a war as it might expose them to embarrassment and/or the risk of a global strategic nuclear exchange. As to which belligerent did, that would be Iraq in its war with Iran, the only state in the entire Middle East other than Iran to wage a prolonged war in modern times. The significant factor here is that neither superpower got directly involved in favoring either side, enabling both to seek the kind of total victories denied both Israel *and* the Arabs in their own wars.
 
I think a prolonged war would be like the period from 1967 through 1973; full mobilisation and lightning offensive, demobilisation and war of Attrition, remobilisation and another high intensity war. The offensive power of Israel would be it`s trump card, it could use its mobilisation periods and short wars to set up the conditions whereby it could efficiently withstand the attrition phase lasting years. The Suez Canal, Golan Hieghts, Jordan river and much later the Litani river are all good geographical features around which to build a defence against attrition warfare. And if the superpowers aren`t involved then other behaviour, such as forced migration of troublesome people and annexation of conquered territory, becomes an option.
 
I think a prolonged war would be like the period from 1967 through 1973; full mobilisation and lightning offensive, demobilisation and war of Attrition, remobilisation and another high intensity war. The offensive power of Israel would be it`s trump card, it could use its mobilisation periods and short wars to set up the conditions whereby it could efficiently withstand the attrition phase lasting years. The Suez Canal, Golan Hieghts, Jordan river and much later the Litani river are all good geographical features around which to build a defence against attrition warfare. And if the superpowers aren`t involved then other behaviour, such as forced migration of troublesome people and annexation of conquered territory, becomes an option.

Except that the concept of a prolonged *conventional* war is what I'm discussing. The Israelis would have to sustain their striking power in a prolonged campaign on multiple fronts. Meaning that the Israelis won't have the luxury of being able initially to pick and choose between their enemies, while those enemies do have the luxury of being able to provide a continous pressure on the Israelis exacting casualties and committing Israel to endless overstretch.

What you're describing is the Israel of 1948 and 1967, and it didn't as I remember provide that much security for them and hasn't provided it. It replaced the Arab Palestinian problem with an Israeli Palestinian problem that in the long term is in all probability going to destroy either the concept of a Jewish state in a majority-Arab territory or Israel existing as anything even pretending to be democratic.
 
I`m also talking about a prolonged conventional war, much like WW1 and WW2. These wars were a succession of offensives/operations to reach a certain objective followed by pauses to rebuild offensive capacity and consolidate gains. In the western desert the British/Axis tried to capture a forward position with a port behind it to accept shippments of replacement equipment. On the Eastern front offensives hoped to reach positions like major rivers so counter attacks would be easier to defend against.

In the Arab/Israeli context these battle rhythms would be prolonged since these states don`t have the resources of the major powers of WW1 & 2. The offensives would be short and the recovery period prolonged, while both sides recovered their battle damaged equipment, fortified their stop lines, treated their wounded, trained replacements, mitigated economic damage, built and purchased replacement weapons.

The comparison with Iran/Iraq is not appropriate because of the lack of long open borders between the combattants. Borders would be the Golan Hieghts, Litani and Jordan Rivers and Suez canal or Sinai passes. These are not suitable places for human wave attacks when the high tech weaponary runs low. Human wave attacks mounted by Arabs against these positions will result in no military gains for them, but fightful slaughter by simple weapons like towed artillery and machine guns.
 
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