Could Germany defeat the Soviet Union one on one?

Could Germany defeat the Soviet Union one on one?

  • Yes

    Votes: 95 41.9%
  • No

    Votes: 59 26.0%
  • Maybe

    Votes: 73 32.2%

  • Total voters
    227
I'm sorry, but you seem to be leaping all over the place with your questions and it's leaving me very confused. I need clarification on this.

When you say "the failure of Barbarossa" here, whose failure are you talking about? The ultimate German failure at the gates of Moscow or the initial Soviet failure to mount a credible defense? I'm talking about the latter Soviet when discussing the defense-in-depth strategy, which is semi-related with the former. I guess I'll answer them both.

The failure of the initial Soviet defense stems from a host of issues. But even given all the problems inflicted upon the Red Army by the purges, expansion, old equipment, surprise, and lack of training, the Soviet forces that were annihilated on the frontier were far better trained and equipped then those which halted the Germans at the gates of Moscow yet only in the south did they achieve any degree of success in even conducting a fighting withdrawal (which was subsequently thrown away by Stalin at Kiev). Why? Because of the the logistical issues I previously discussed undercutting what combat capability these formations had.

The ultimate German failure of the invasion can be traced down to two primary causes, in order of importance: Soviet resistance within the Soviet interior and fatally flawed planning on the part of the Germans. Soviet resistance on the frontier played no role given how ineffective it was. It was extended Soviet resistance at places like Luga, Smolensk, Kiev, and Rostov and not Brody, Bialystok, or Riga that wore the Germans down and conditioned the ultimate failure of Typhoon specifically and Barbarossa in it's entirety.
I am talking about the USSR.

I would entertain that the Germans would still break through the Stalin line even with the change in logistics as it is, and possibly giving the Germans even more time for ITTL Typhoon to succeed. We should take Kursk as an example to draw from. USSR forces to be used at the Stalin line could have the option at most of minor (localized) counter offensives from a reserve force resourcing from the force given to the defense in depth. These counteroffensives would be against the enemy axes of advance as those become clear which would be identified by units and formations in the area of operations of a area defense (defense in depth), relying on the superior rail and road network at the Stalin line to support these troop movements from the reserve force at the Stalin line. There would maybe be a minimum combat power fixing force to monitor the situation in and between the area of the frontier districts and stopping at the Stalin line. Their purpose would be to do themselves area defense against or delay the enemy. The defense in depth deployment pattern entailed by your plan would still be vulnerable to deep strategic penetration and large breakthrough attempts by major armoured offensives not least of all because the Stalin line is stretched over such an area as it is over less than ideal terrain. It is also likely in this case (your plan) that the Germans will understand this situation in its entirety. There is also what kind of response would happen when Soviet forces begin counteroffensives against German forces (in terms of how the Germans respond) but a large force smashing into the deep flank of a German breakthrough or even the German rear areas themselves is exactly what the Germans were so afraid of. Whether or not Soviet command and control in a general sense is up to the challenge is another matter as in the case of Kirpanos. It would be much better to have forces positioned past the Stalin line I suspect but not as many as OTL.

Soviet doctrine was forward, offensive defense. They did not believe in defense in depth EVER; even at Kursk, rather than let the Germans fight their way through the defensive belts they built, they counterattacked repeatedly into the teeth of German armored forces and got slaughtered, had they held back until the Germans had worn themselves out fighting through the defenses THEN counterattacked they could have encircles and wiped out German panzer divisions en masse. So given that even by 1943 the Soviets were so offensively minded that they couldn't even utilize their own defenses they had so expensively and painstakingly built up. They certainly weren't going to do that in 1941. The MP41 plan was to have the strategic echelons absorb and counterattack an invasion and transition to the strategic offensive ASAP, which only worked in getting them slaughtered in 1941 IOTL. They moved up the Stalin Line to the Molotov Line in 1940 based on that idea. The Brits were willing to sell out Norway IOTL (I'm assuming Halifax is PM if any peace is had in 1940).

Defense in depth inherently entails or involves counterattacks though as would forward defense for that matter. Whether forward defense or defense in depth it didn't work in 1941 against Germany because of a myriad issues like logistics and command and control of Soviet forces (and probably a break down of mental cohesion of Soviet forces also). The command in control issues may or may not have to do with instability caused by the expansion of the Red Army. The German army at that time was the superior. The Molotov line was simply the logical thing to do after taking the new territory. Otherwise they would have to contemplate to abandon all that territory to the Germans which while likely would have been operationally correct is somewhat nonsensical psychologically and politically.
 
Top