Could Germany defeat the Soviet Union one on one?

Could Germany defeat the Soviet Union one on one?

  • Yes

    Votes: 95 41.9%
  • No

    Votes: 59 26.0%
  • Maybe

    Votes: 73 32.2%

  • Total voters
    227

Deleted member 1487

Just thought that I should mention that, in this scenario, Britain will be just waiting, poised to restart the war against Germany as soon as a reasonable chance of success appears. It is not in Britain's interest to see Germany dominate the continent, nor the Soviets doing the same. Plans to seize Crete, Sicily, Rhodes, Sardinia and Corsica will be put into effect at the earliest possible opportunity. Forces from the (British) Home Islands, Commonwealth and Empire will be put together in southern England, awaiting the possibility of a landing in France.

It really isn't possible to have a German-Soviet one-on-on indefinitely. An interesting scenario nevertheless.

Voted 'maybe' because the situation of the USSR could become so bad ITTL that a political collapse occurs, especially if Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad were all lost and held by Germany. Militarily, the Soviets can simply continue to withdraw until the Germans outpace their supply lines - politically, they are more fragile.
That is a dumb meme that is uncritically repeated, with people seeming to think WW2 was no different than the Napoleonic Wars. It was not an option to reenter once they leave because for one thing India will be demanding immediate independence and will not reenter the war, without which Britain could not fight a war, plus they'd have serious financial issues (they ran out of foreign exchange by January 1941 IOTL), while the Axis Pact would mean declaring war on Germany mean declaring war on Japan and Italy, which Britain would not do. There is no reasonable chance to restart a war, given that to save currency they'd need to rely on imperial resources to rebuild and it would take until 1942 to do so, as IOTL that is about how long it took for the BEF to rebuild, retrain, and expand after Dunkirk with full on war spending to bankruptcy AND Lend-Lease support. It isn't in Britain interest to see Germany defeat the USSR, but they aren't going to be in a position to stop them if they exit the war, something Churchill realized, which is why he didn't want to make a deal in 1940. The Brits on their own aren't going to be able to just role in and seize Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, etc. that's crazy, they required US entry into the war and the full conquest of Africa first to do that in 1943 IOTL. They never got Rhodes either or Crete prior to the Germans pulling out of the region. Frankly it is beyond silly to even suggest that. A lot of practical realities keep Britain out of the war once they drop out.
The Soviets also cannot simply continue to withdraw; the Germans getting to the Volga and moving into the Caucasus red lined their economy and food supply even with increasing Lend-Lease support; had they not won at Stalingrad and liberated the Caucasus and East Ukraine in Winter 1942-43 they'd fall into a famine that would kill most of their working population; as it was they had millions of deaths due to famine in 1943-44 even after liberation of Ukraine and increased LL to levels undreamed of in 1942. So Soviet collapse just on material grounds is inevitable if they don't hold the Kuban and East Ukraine even with LL.
 
Hi guys! Discovered this forum yesterday and I literally binged through the forum the whole day :D i love it!!! Anyways, about the OT, when exactly the british decide to get out of the war? I mean we imply a for example a failed Dunkirk evacuation , a defensive stance in the battle for britain fron the germany in order to lure the british to pace talk? (Like a saked Churchill?) so September 1940 UK get to peace? Or later? An ealry peace could have changed the situation in the east? A clear threat of war on USSR in late 40 would have changed/hastened the reorganization of the red army? Or OTL was already reorganizing at the fastest possible speed allowed by the contingent situation??? So the question is a different time in UK peace can change the card on the table? Thank you in advance?
 
Because there had no offensive plan until Zhukov submitted his unsolicted one in May in response to the major build up to that point along the border. Zhukov was only triggered to submit the proposal due to the advanced German build up on the border and no on else offered an offensive solution at that time that I'm aware of and none were solicited. Stalin wanted to keep the peace and not be the first one to cross the border, because he was paranoid Europe would unite against him.

Edit:
Germany would not be occupying the Balkans formally without the war continuing into 1941 with Britain. Also Stalin would be hypersensitive not to antagonize the Germans until he thought his military was in a place to actually fight them and have a shot of winning.

Edit#2: the mobilization plan for 1941 wasn't even complete until July 20th 1941, ie. 1 month after the Germans invaded IOTL! p.100 Stumbling Colossus. It was ordered August 1940 too, so an invasion plan is unlikely to even be complete come May 1941 even if ordered in August 1940.
1. Germany would not be conquerin the Balkans they would have an Axis pact and a huge military buildup in all of these countries. Stalin would not ignore this so the OTL Zhukov plan would be presented much earlier ITTL.
2. See 1.
 

Deleted member 1487

1. Germany would not be conquerin the Balkans they would have an Axis pact and a huge military buildup in all of these countries. Stalin would not ignore this so the OTL Zhukov plan would be presented much earlier ITTL.
2. See 1.
What? Again why would Stalin order it? He's more interested in avoiding war entirely and only had his forces plan for defensive battles fighting off invasion. Beyond that Soviet updated mobilization plans were ordered IOTL in August 1940 and weren't considered completed until July 20th 1941. The actual defense plan wasn't even fully planned out yet; even if there was an offensive plan there is no way in hell it would even be ready by July 1941, which is at least 1 month too late to matter.
 
Why do you think so? IOTL Stalin didn't solicit the plan from him at all, he just submitted it of his own accord in mid-May and apparently it never even reached Stalin.


There was no defense in depth, withdrawals generally did not happen and if they did it was against orders and people were execute for it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Pavlov_(general)

USSR strategic policy of course operated on the assumption of war not before 1942 or 1943. A defensive approach was untenable politically. It hinged on the deployments in the border region holding until such time as a USSR offensive could be undertaken. No way will Stalin attack in 41 and were he do so it would be a failure like the USSR at the second battle of Kharkov.

Defense in depth was probably not a good idea in the case of Barbarossa.

Relevant to this question, "Stumbling Colossus" p. 102 citing the Soviet official history of the Great Patriotic War the quote says it would have taken the USSR 5 years to equip and prepare it's forces to fulfill MP41 starting in 1941. So 1946 is the earliest the USSR given it's peace time economy could have produced a military capable of meeting plans laid out in 1941. The 1941 military was in no way ready for combat, as the German invasion demonstrated unless you count using the armed forces as a speed bump until they could fully mobilize what remained of the economy.
Edit:
P.100: MP41 was ordered in August 1940, first draft done in February 1941, revised repeatedly, and not considered complete until July 20th 1941. It was an enormously complex plan that wasn't even done when the Germans invaded and required another month of development to be finished with after the invasion started.
I would agree to the first part.

As a note, the complexity was probably reduced by the destruction of a large portion of the Red Army.
 
A defensive approach was untenable politically. Ithinged on the deployments in the border region holding until such time as a USSR offensive could be undertaken. No way will Stalin attack in 41 and were he do so it would be a failure like the USSR at the second battle of Kharkov.

You kinda contradicted yourself in the space of a single paragraph there...

Defense in depth was probably not a good idea in the case of Barbarossa.

What? Of course it would have been a good idea, in the extremely improbable event it occurred to anyone who could convince Stalin of it. It conserves many more Soviet forces further east, where they can be logistically supported, at a range at which the German logistical tether would be stretching to snapping simply through the act of moving eastward.
 
You kinda contradicted yourself in the space of a single paragraph there...



What? Of course it would have been a good idea, in the extremely improbable event it occurred to anyone who could convince Stalin of it. It conserves many more Soviet forces further east, where they can be logistically supported, at a range at which the German logistical tether would be stretching to snapping simply through the act of moving eastward.

Stalin found himself in a dilemma. Hitler would clearly be the one to preempt hostilities and invade but Stalin rationalized this was not the case as the entire strategic policy of the USSR was to attack. This help explains why the first echelon of the Red Army was such a fiasco because it was not a serious attempt at defense, possibly? The whole fiasco with USSR forces at the border regions could be attributed to the confused political situation where Stalin convinces himself Barbarossa isn't coming.

In order for their to be depth the second echelon of the Red Army had to be in support of the first. That means the second would be annihalted as well I think with particular ease in the case of Barbarossa.
 
That is a dumb meme that is uncritically repeated, with people seeming to think WW2 was no different than the Napoleonic Wars.

It's about as dumb as saying that Britain will just sit back and say "This is fine". Particularly without careful consideration of who's actually running Britain at this point, and how British relations with the US are holding up. Certainly there are measures short of war which are viable, such as trade embargoes.
 

Deleted member 1487

It's about as dumb as saying that Britain will just sit back and say "This is fine". Particularly without careful consideration of who's actually running Britain at this point, and how British relations with the US are holding up. Certainly there are measures short of war which are viable, such as trade embargoes.
No on is saying that they'd just be saying 'this will be fine' even with Halifax would be in charge, they be rearming and preparing to defend themselves while trying to make allies and ensure they couldn't be leveraged. No one is saying that will be enough either, but they won't be able to get back into the war easily at all given all the problems that will crop up in the aftermath of exiting the war. Leaving the war means Churchill cannot be in charge and likely Halifax is, so relations with the US are probably not good at all. Plus FDR is not going to be sanguine about their ability to stay economically independent, nor willing to shell out for their defense, rather he's going to be interested in rearming in the US and wishing Britain the best.
 
I think you have British-American relations in this scenario all wrong, because you have American-German relations all wrong.

The US would be hostile to Germany and Japan - that's a given from OTL. If Britain is attempting to follow a path of opposing Germany and seeking allies, as you state above, then the drivers for close relations with the US remain. Relations would certainly be much less close than OTL, since there's less urgency about the situation and much more doubt about actual British intentions, but less close than OTL does not mean "not good at all", given that both still share a common enemy and that both lack friends.

Realistically, the US would be even more worried about German dominance of Europe and future intentions than OTL, and its strategy would include attempting to apply pressure on Britain to oppose Germany. Since that matches British desires too, there's an open door factor here. The question then becomes how the US can influence Britain to support its goal of opposing Germany. OTL support is obviously out, but if we take the embargo on Japan as an example of US actions against hostile powers, then it's quite reasonable to say that a German attack on the USSR might provoke with a US trade embargo and rapprochement with Britain, with Britain following suit in return in terms of for some level of aid, or a trade deal, or a mutual defence deal, whatever.

Now this could all go wrong. For example, Japan might seek to split the US from Britain by asking for oil/steel/finance in exchange for, er, shipping? and a guarantee of the colonial empires in the East. But it would be obvious to take such a deal would be to choose between the US and the Axis Powers, and I suspect that the US would apply considerable influence to prevent such a deal. Britain - let alone France and the Netherlands - are in a position of weakness in this situation and need a powerful friend, and obviously the US outranks Japan.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think you have British-American relations in this scenario all wrong, because you have American-German relations all wrong.

The US would be hostile to Germany and Japan - that's a given from OTL. If Britain is attempting to follow a path of opposing Germany and seeking allies, as you state above, then the drivers for close relations with the US remain. Relations would certainly be much less close than OTL, since there's less urgency about the situation and much more doubt about actual British intentions, but less close than OTL does not mean "not good at all", given that both still share a common enemy and that both lack friends.

Realistically, the US would be even more worried about German dominance of Europe and future intentions than OTL, and its strategy would include attempting to apply pressure on Britain to oppose Germany. Since that matches British desires too, there's an open door factor here. The question then becomes how the US can influence Britain to support its goal of opposing Germany. OTL support is obviously out, but if we take the embargo on Japan as an example of US actions against hostile powers, then it's quite reasonable to say that a German attack on the USSR might provoke with a US trade embargo and rapprochement with Britain, with Britain following suit in return in terms of for some level of aid, or a trade deal, or a mutual defence deal, whatever.

Now this could all go wrong. For example, Japan might seek to split the US from Britain by asking for oil/steel/finance in exchange for, er, shipping? and a guarantee of the colonial empires in the East. But it would be obvious to take such a deal would be to choose between the US and the Axis Powers, and I suspect that the US would apply considerable influence to prevent such a deal. Britain - let alone France and the Netherlands - are in a position of weakness in this situation and need a powerful friend, and obviously the US outranks Japan.
Clearly German-US relations would be frosty bordering on a Cold War, but in 1940 if there is peace the escalating tensions that built up due to the Battle of the Atlantic and Blitz aren't happening, though German controlled European trade relations will probably piss off FDR even more...though with Britain out FDR might not run again in 1940. British-US relations without Churchill would be quite a bit frostier too, as Halifax and FDR did not get along that well. Things are quite a bit more fluid and less friendly all around here and the US, especially if FDR doesn't run again, will likely be much more isolationist and concerned with it's hemisphere and fixated on Japan. Britain though will be highly dependent on European trade and the US won't be willing to make the economic sacrifices to prop up their economy even with a bi-lateral trade deal; they tried that pre-war under Chamberlain and things did not go well; Halifax was part of Chamberlain's government and remembered that vividly, so will likely carry some of that hostility going forward especially if he thinks the US is trying to leverage him. Churchill was critical to positive US-British relations IOTL, so his absence in an ATL will change things quite a bit more than you think (his absence is the only way to be peace in 1940 too).
 
Whatever they wanted: fuel, raw materials, industrial goods, same as they were pre-war. If not them then through conquered nations as an intermediary. Unless the US wants to go full autarky and try to do a global market conquest of Latin America and all neutral nations they can't really stop it. And Mussolini wanted to fight communism, his ideological foe; IOTL why did the Italian 8th army want to fight in Russia? They did because Mussolini sent them despite the war in the Balkans and Mediterranean. Here they could be better equipped and supplied.

I wasn't aware that South America et al were hotbeds of industry (and a lot of their industry was foreign owned).
And again, where is the hard cash coming from? You cant just loot western Europe and expect the USA and the Empire to just sit back and go 'oh, sure, that's fine'. Especially when looting them has dire consequences for their own economies (as OTL).

You seem to be assuming that the world will queue up to sell to Germany. Yet pre-war, even before the economic screws really started to tighten, Germany was having great problems doing this (and the USA and Britain were really close to saying 'this is dumping, we are closing you down.'). Now they are squeezing countries with which they have (presumably) made peace, are still building armaments like its going out of fashion, no-one trusts them worth a damn and yet somehow its all ok now? This just doesn't make sense.
 
Stalin found himself in a dilemma. Hitler would clearly be the one to preempt hostilities and invade but Stalin rationalized this was not the case as the entire strategic policy of the USSR was to attack. This help explains why the first echelon of the Red Army was such a fiasco because it was not a serious attempt at defense, possibly? The whole fiasco with USSR forces at the border regions could be attributed to the confused political situation where Stalin convinces himself Barbarossa isn't coming.

In order for their to be depth the second echelon of the Red Army had to be in support of the first. That means the second would be annihalted as well I think with particular ease in the case of Barbarossa.

I think you fail to realize what a defense-in-depth would entail. The first strategic echelon wouldn't be by the border but much further east, around the Stalin line, along the 1939 border. Forming the main defenses further east would considerably ease the strain on the Soviet rear services and consequently would greatly increase the combat power of the supported Soviet formations, as well as allowing a larger number of them to fight effectively.

So while a defensive line further east would allow the Germans an easier time crossing the border, the shoddy roads would still inevitably weaken them, and when they ran into the Soviet main defensive line, that line would be both stronger (due to having much better logistical support due to not having to deal with the same hundreds of km of shitty roads now hampering the Germans) and able to effectively apply greater numbers against the invaders.

So the Germans wouldn't have an easy time destroying the second echelon, indeed they'd struggle to even overcome the first. The problem is that the Soviets in '41 doctrine didn't call for that kind of set up and for them to adopt it would have been a serious break with what existed of their then current defense plans.
 

Deleted member 1487

@wiking did the Reich really direct 40% of their resources IOTL in areas other than the Eastern Front (U Boats, North Africa, air defense etc)?
More than that:
https://www.amazon.com/How-War-Was-Won-Cambridge/dp/1107014751/ref=cm_cr_pr_pdt_img_top?ie=UTF8
That isn't even factoring in the impact of the blockade and economic warfare on the Axis war effort.

Getting into the weeds on artillery in WW2 the Soviets developed a dominance in number of tubes pretty early on, but were horribly inefficient with their use until late in the war when they were able to devise a system that minimized their weaknesses and maximized their strengths. But the Germans were able to remain artillery competitive despite their gross inferiority in numbers with their efficiency and flexibility.
The Germans would have had double their historical artillery park and added their most effective pieces had they not had to invest in air defense from 1941 on, which would have been a major game changer in the East from 1942 on; given their systemic artillery method superiority (though Soviet heavy guns were better between 122mm-152mm calibers) the Germans with more and better guns would have offset any Soviet numerical superiority, as firepower wins in an attritional battle; without the strategic air war the electronic and computing industries could have created the fire direction computers and artillery radar the army was begging for for their artillery and would have enhanced them to US artillery efficiency levels...but the strategic air defense system gobbled up all latent capacity there (50% of the electronics industry was dedicated to air defense radar) leaving little for the army; in fact by 1944 there was a major shortage of radios for the German army due to combat losses and lack of replacements, as air defense got first claim on any electronics production. In terms of war production resources the army remained a pauper throughout the war, getting about 40% or less of total resources...and all the army wasn't fighting in the East.

Putting aside all the additional forces and resources the Barbarossa invasion would have in 1941 in a 1-on-1 scenario and debate about the surprise factor and how the invasion would play out differently if it happened in peace time vs. when already at war with Britain, in terms of resources that would be available for a long war, the Germans would have more than double the resources to commit to the East in 1942 even if manpower was the exact same as IOTL (it would not be without other fronts and occupying the Balkans). That only increases as the war goes on, as the other fronts IOTL siphoned off increasing German resources. The Germans might even be able to reequip their Axis allies with modern equipment entirely without any other fronts and no blockade.

I wasn't aware that South America et al were hotbeds of industry (and a lot of their industry was foreign owned).
And again, where is the hard cash coming from? You cant just loot western Europe and expect the USA and the Empire to just sit back and go 'oh, sure, that's fine'. Especially when looting them has dire consequences for their own economies (as OTL).
Who said it was? It however was a major source of raw materials and trade for Germany, which would be critical. Plus pre-war the Germans were the major medical drug producer for the continent, which with a less than 12 month long war means they wouldn't lose that monopoly and with it trade leverage. The hard cash comes to a degree from trade, from taking over the trade relations of continental Europe (they had planned an EU-like trade bloc, which would have it's trade policy run from Berlin, which gave Berlin control over imports and exports for the continent and it's gold stocks to run a common currency/trade policy), personal accounts looted from Jews, sale of art treasures if needed, etc. What is the US going to do about it if they want access to the continental European trade markets? Plus US corporations have a lot of property in Europe, so if the US government wants to go trade war/embargo of the continent corporate America loses vast assets, more than the US could confiscate from European companies in America. Looting the European economies IOTL was such a problem because of the blockade, those economies were grinding to a halt due to lack of imports, while the German requisitions made things worse...but the primary issue was lack of the necessary resources to run their economy due to the blockade; remove the blockade and not only does Germany not need to loot them nearly as much, they also can import and export to run their economies unlike OTL. That's not to say that Berlin wouldn't mismanage trade relations, but having empires to import from really makes it a different ball game in terms of national economies.

You seem to be assuming that the world will queue up to sell to Germany. Yet pre-war, even before the economic screws really started to tighten, Germany was having great problems doing this (and the USA and Britain were really close to saying 'this is dumping, we are closing you down.'). Now they are squeezing countries with which they have (presumably) made peace, are still building armaments like its going out of fashion, no-one trusts them worth a damn and yet somehow its all ok now? This just doesn't make sense.
It's not just a question of Germany, but of Germany having dominance over the continent of Europe. And yes they would have so much trade leverage, as contient Europe was and is the largest economic zone on the face of the planet, more so then than now even, that with Berlin in control over trade policy for Europe the world if they wanted functional trade would have to sell to Germany. The British no longer have the option not to play ball as they depended on continental trade to avoid a major recession if not outright depression, while the US's biggest pre-war trading partner was Europe. Germany in control of Europe has enormous leverage that the rest of the world, even the US, cannot ignore; the US can only run on deficit spending for so long to prop up their economy via military build up, but that becomes unsustainable and trade will be necessary unless they want a massive economic contraction when government spending tappers off. Otherwise it is command economy time. Plus with Germany having cash to spend no company is going to want to not sell; US companies were trying to find ways around FDR's embargo of Japan to get assess to that cash until Japanese assets were frozen by the government.
 
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I think you fail to realize what a defense-in-depth would entail. The first strategic echelon wouldn't be by the border but much further east, around the Stalin line, along the 1939 border. Forming the main defenses further east would considerably ease the strain on the Soviet rear services and consequently would greatly increase the combat power of the supported Soviet formations, as well as allowing a larger number of them to fight effectively.

So while a defensive line further east would allow the Germans an easier time crossing the border, the shoddy roads would still inevitably weaken them, and when they ran into the Soviet main defensive line, that line would be both stronger (due to having much better logistical support due to not having to deal with the same hundreds of km of shitty roads now hampering the Germans) and able to effectively apply greater numbers against the invaders.

So the Germans wouldn't have an easy time destroying the second echelon, indeed they'd struggle to even overcome the first. The problem is that the Soviets in '41 doctrine didn't call for that kind of set up and for them to adopt it would have been a serious break with what existed of their then current defense plans.

Forward/peclusive defense could have been what was envisioned at the time for the USSR for a defensive posture with a war of attrition waged on the inter-German border as a sort of stop gap measure until an offensive posture could be entertained as early as 42, 43, or even 46. However, a defense in depth could also of course be done on the Soviet border region but since the strategic depth for the USSR was what it was then what you describe would work. However, this comes down to what you think the failure of Barbarossa was in terms of causation. Was it the combat, mobilzation, deployment readiness of Soviet forces? Was it entirely that forward defense lead them to their fate? Or some combination of these and even other factors? Your Fabian strategy merely stipulates at least in my view why Barbarossa was a disaster simply because defense in depth was not used. There might be others factors that are unresolved by merely doing defense in depth at the Stalin line. There is associated risk in just changing the plan at least in my view because for the OTL plan we at least have hindsight working for us. And the USSR won OTL let us not forget. I'm of the opinion that the USSR will in all proabibilty still win because of doubts that Typhoon could succeed. Also, instead of a war of attrition there is also the option of going towards more maneuver orientated defense and introduction of strategic mobility. An interesting scenario where you could attempt to encircle German mobile forces separated by their second echelon infantry on their axis of attack. Theoretically, they could have destroyed the mental cohesion of the German forces in a way the Germans did to the USSR during Barbarossa. The presence of adequate reserves for the front echelon would theoretically be able to stop major breakthroughs but would they in reality given the state of the Red Army?
 
I'm sorry, but you seem to be leaping all over the place with your questions and it's leaving me very confused. I need clarification on this.

However, this comes down to what you think the failure of Barbarossa was in terms of causation. Was it the combat, mobilzation, deployment readiness of Soviet forces? Was it entirely that forward defense lead them to their fate? Or some combination of these and even other factors? Your Fabian strategy merely stipulates at least in my view why Barbarossa was a disaster simply because defense in depth was not used.

When you say "the failure of Barbarossa" here, whose failure are you talking about? The ultimate German failure at the gates of Moscow or the initial Soviet failure to mount a credible defense? I'm talking about the latter Soviet when discussing the defense-in-depth strategy, which is semi-related with the former. I guess I'll answer them both.

The failure of the initial Soviet defense stems from a host of issues. But even given all the problems inflicted upon the Red Army by the purges, expansion, old equipment, surprise, and lack of training, the Soviet forces that were annihilated on the frontier were far better trained and equipped then those which halted the Germans at the gates of Moscow yet only in the south did they achieve any degree of success in even conducting a fighting withdrawal (which was subsequently thrown away by Stalin at Kiev). Why? Because of the the logistical issues I previously discussed undercutting what combat capability these formations had.

The ultimate German failure of the invasion can be traced down to two primary causes, in order of importance: Soviet resistance within the Soviet interior and fatally flawed planning on the part of the Germans. Soviet resistance on the frontier played no role given how ineffective it was. It was extended Soviet resistance at places like Luga, Smolensk, Kiev, and Rostov and not Brody, Bialystok, or Riga that wore the Germans down and conditioned the ultimate failure of Typhoon specifically and Barbarossa in it's entirety.

Also, instead of a war of attrition there is also the option of going towards more maneuver orientated defense and introduction of strategic mobility. An interesting scenario where you could attempt to encircle German mobile forces separated by their second echelon infantry on their axis of attack. Theoretically, they could have destroyed the mental cohesion of the German forces in a way the Germans did to the USSR during Barbarossa. The presence of adequate reserves for the front echelon would theoretically be able to stop major breakthroughs but would they in reality given the state of the Red Army?

The problem was that Soviet forces tried this, most notably in the south. Logistical issues aside, the Red Army in 1941 just wasn't built for a maeneuver war. It had to engage the Germans at a point where the Germans logistics limited their ability to maeneuver. The massive mechanized counter attack at Brody turned into a complete disaster. General Kirpanos who organized that counter attack had rejected Stalin's orders to avoid "provocative" defensive preparations and so his troops were much better prepared than most other Soviet forces. Unfortunately once the battle began Kirponos' co-ordination completely broke down, and 1st Panzer Group was able to face and defeat the five Soviet mechanized corps piecemeal. And just like on other fronts the Soviet forces were crippled by poor logistics, which left them with poorly maintained vehicles, low on fuel, and ammo.

Even with their issues in organization, equipment, and training, had very few supplies on hand to conduct operations, and once they were cut off from their rear areas their equipment ran out of ammunition, fuel, or just broke down. The Germans avoided direct combat with Russian mechanized forces when possible, bypassing the tanks and slashing into their rear areas. Thousands of Soviet tanks were lost simply because they were no longer receiving the necessary support to keep them combat ready.

Had those tank formations had a more robust logistics tail or had sufficient supplies been dumped forward to allow an extended period of self-sufficiency (which the Soviets were working on, but the first depots were still a month away from completion), then yes, they could have continued to operate independently even after the Germans had bypassed them and wrecked tremendous havoc on the German supply columns and follow-on infantry. As it was, most of them just fell apart without getting much chance to show their stuff. Basically think of it like a really powerful killbot... with an extension cord. The Germans ran around behind the killbot and pulled its plug out, then waited out the one minute required to run down it's battery.
 
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Towelie

Banned
Could Germany defeat the Soviets if they had made peace with Britain in 1940, and still had access to the resources of their European wide empire and Balkan allies? Yes. They could have planned things better, but I think that the Soviets would starve and not be able to support their armies in the field without Anglo-American aid, to say nothing about how static their army would be and how unable it would be to mount motorized offensives without American and British vehicles and spare parts.

Germany as a nation in 1939 vs. Russia in 1939? Erm, no. Neither side would make much progress in such a scenario for a few years.

But make no bones about it. The Russians needed American aid to feed their armies and to move them. When the Russians were fighting maneuver battles with static forces in 1941-42, the results spoke for themselves.
 
Germany, could yes, but the Nazis never. The Nazis would have had to come as liberators for the various peoples of Eastern Europe, but their ideology made them ideologically incapable of doing so.
 

Towelie

Banned
Germany, could yes, but the Nazis never. The Nazis would have had to come as liberators for the various peoples of Eastern Europe, but their ideology made them ideologically incapable of doing so.
Nazi policies of looting occupied countries and total war arguably made Germany last a lot longer in WW2 than they would have otherwise. Hitler's personal health decaying and his grip on reality eluding him as time went on made bad situations worse. But I don't think you can say that Nazism was that huge of a reason why they lost.

The Nazis did not lose in Russia because they failed to raise a bunch of Ukrainian or Latvian auxillary units. Nor did the partisan activities in Eastern Europe substantially impact the results of major campaigns. They lost because they tried to carry out a 2-3 year conquest in the span of 6 months and did not plan for winter, nor did they plan for extending rail traffic deep into Russia. They also faced an enemy that got most of its food and motor transport capabilities from foreign allies who could ship them these goods. If the Germans had planned out a multiyear campaign, or if they faced a Russian Army that would face starvation and have no motorized or mechanized capabilities, they could have won.

The idea that Hitler and the Nazis caused every German defeat is a canard that frankly should have been debunked a long time ago. German generals in their memoirs liked to fall back on this, but that also ignores the reality of German successes like Fall Gelb being adapted precisely because of Hitler, or prewar annexations that Hitler pushed for, or the tactical necessity of the Kiev diversion in 1941. This doesn't absolve Hitler of the multitude of his stupid decisions, but the idea that the Germans would have done better in WW2 with a different government form is one I find suspect. A Democratic government would not have been able to pull off the prewar aggressions that gave Germany such a leg up in WW2 (like for example, the resources of Czechoslovakia, the ability to surround Poland on 3 sides, etc.) if they even wanted to. A right wing militarist government might have had a chance, but the lack of totalitarianism would have made the same issues that existed in WW1 flare up again (left wing militant sentiment in Northern Germany, Bavarian nationalism)
 
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