Could Germany defeat the Soviet Union one on one?

Could Germany defeat the Soviet Union one on one?

  • Yes

    Votes: 95 41.9%
  • No

    Votes: 59 26.0%
  • Maybe

    Votes: 73 32.2%

  • Total voters
    227

Deleted member 1487

No, it wasn't. Italian performance was execrable. It was only because the Germans had a pair of infantry divisions (one of which is mentioned in your link) and a panzer division running around to shore them up that they lasted eleven days instead of a few hours.
I'm surprised you have bought into the 'Italians sucked at war' myth. They fought as well as they could given that their weapons weren't very good or really able to do much damage against British tanks, let alone the T-34. Plus the Soviets concentrated their forces on them and when coupled with their poor state of equipment relative to the enemy, they couldn't hold up despite fighting hard for days until they collapsed. It wasn't their lack of will to fight, it was material reasons they collapsed.
 

Deleted member 1487

In any "Stalin accepts what his intelligence is telling him", there are four possibilities with the ability for the Red Army to fulfill them depending on how soon ahead of time Stalin accepts the intel of the oncoming attack. Listing them in order from most to least probable:

1. Stalin orders immediate full-scale mobilization and shifts Soviet industry to full footing. Defense plans are rationalized, and undertaken either more efficiently or in a better order. Fresh forces are ordered mobilized and consolidated to be deployed into the second strategic echelon along the D'niepr. Airfields are camouflaged, border districts are directed to go to combat readiness, and many other "provocative" measures that were avoided OTL would be undertaken. But overall Soviet strategic dispositions remain unchanged.

2. As above, except Stalin does change Soviet dispositions by ordering the strategic reserves to push up to the frontier region.

3. Stalin orders a pre-emptive strike.

4. Stalin pulls Soviet forces back either to the 1939 border or the D'niepr river.
For #1 when would he do that given that he knows mobilization means war?
And the Soviet military was in no position to realistically implement any serious planning, they couldn't really even get MP41 going properly.

2. is possible

3. Stalin nixed that IOTL in May 1941 when Zhukov presented it.

4. Stalin wouldn't do that, it was entirely against everything he understood about war and never did anything really like that during WW2.
 
I don't have the time to really get into right now.

That's just as well. My motivation for more detailed debate, with more thorough cites and everything, is pretty shot at the moment due to minor depression. Even what I've used thus far is either copy and pasting previous work on the subject or surface knowledge with generalizations.

For #1 when would he do that given that he knows mobilization means war?

That's a separate question. I am merely answering the question being asked of what Stalin might do if he accepted that Hitler is going to attack him.

And the Soviet military was in no position to realistically implement any serious planning,they couldn't really even get MP41 going properly.

That's very much "incompetent Russians can't do anything" sort of thinking. The reality is that the Russians were caught with their pants down, under the belief War would not come until mid-'42 at the earliest, and this affected both their planning and implementation of said plans. How much better planning they'd be able to do without such illusions though is rather open to question and something of an unknown.

And the forces for MP-41 only existed on paper, so the failure of that plan isn't surprising.

3. Stalin nixed that IOTL in May 1941 when Zhukov presented it.

4. Stalin wouldn't do that, it was entirely against everything he understood about war and never did anything really like that during WW2.

Why do you think I put them at 3 or 4? If you bothered to read my post, you'd see the part where I said I was listing these outcomes in descending likelihood.

No. Always no.

I wouldn't say that. This isn't the US vs Japan here, in either direction (or, alternatively, the US-with-unlimited-political-will vs Germany). Both sides have the physical resources to either defeat or stalemate the other if they play them correctly... or incorrectly.
 
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Deleted member 1487

That's just as well. My motivation for more detailed debate, with more thorough cites and everything, is pretty shot at the moment due to minor depression. Even what I've used thus far is either copy and pasting previous work on the subject or surface knowledge with generalizations.
Discussions about motivations for war crimes and atrocities is generally not a happy subject. Hope you feel better soon.


That's a separate question. I am merely answering the question being asked of what Stalin might do if he accepted that Hitler is going to attack him.
Not exactly, that stuff it highly intertwined. When he knows/excepts it matters to what he actually does immediately given that it may not be enough time to actually get that stuff done and he may want to triage before war starts. But your points then make a lot more sense in that regard and yes, you're probably right that as soon as he accepts that Hitler is about to attack he would probably order immediate preparations.

That's very much "incompetent Russians can't do anything" sort of thinking. The reality is that the Russians were caught with their pants down, under the belief War would not come until mid-'42 at the earliest, and this affected both their planning and implementation of said plans. How much better planning they'd be able to do without such illusions though is rather open to question and something of an unknown.

And the forces for MP-41 only existed on paper, so the failure of that plan isn't surprising.
No, it was just the state of Soviet armed forces, they had lots of plans at the top levels about what do to, but the major planning at lower levels was just not getting done or done well because of the utter chaos the Soviet military was in as a result of purges, reorganization, reequipping/retraining, and expanding. Stalin apparently did his utmost to make sure his military was as disorganized as possible in 1941. In 1942 the military would have been recovered enough that it could much more rapidly respond to such orders, but in 1941 they were just a mess because of factors imposed on them by political leadership. I didn't mean to say that the Soviets were incapable of doing such planning, just that in 1941 IOTL they were subjected to too much disorder to really get stuff done quickly or well. Even if Stalin were suddenly to flip a switch as say 'prepare for war' the system was too mucked up by his screwing with it to effectively act within the likely timeframe they'd have. It's amazing they got much done IOTL given the constraints they faced.

Why do you think I put them at 3 or 4? If you bothered to read my post, you'd see the part where I said I was listing these outcomes in descending likelihood.
I did and just don't think they'd even be options for Stalin at all, so shouldn't even be listed. Its being pedantic to point that out, but I think it is relevant to the discussion to note what Stalin was willing to do at all. The only option that seems possible actually is just a combo of 1 and 2 once Stalin has accepted that war was inevitable and coming quickly. The problem of course is getting Stalin to realize that.
 
Discussions about motivations for war crimes and atrocities is generally not a happy subject.Hope you feel better soon.

Oh, that isn't it. I can sift through the depths of potential human depravity with aplomb, I'm a bit odd like that, it's an event in personal life that's put me out of sorts. Thanks for the well wishes.

Not exactly, that stuff it highly intertwined. When he knows/excepts it matters to what he actually does immediately given that it may not be enough time to actually get that stuff done and he may want to triage before war starts.

Yeah, I don't disagree with that. I actually say something similar.

I did and just don't think they'd even be options for Stalin at all, so shouldn't even be listed. Its being pedantic to point that out, but I think it is relevant to the discussion to note what Stalin was willing to do at all. The only option that seems possible actually is just a combo of 1 and 2 once Stalin has accepted that war was inevitable and coming quickly. The problem of course is getting Stalin to realize that.

Eh, I was partly listing them for the sake of completeness. I don't at all disagree that Stalin would ever seriously contemplate, if at all, those last two options but then we tend to wind up conversing about things that historical individuals/institutions showed little-to-no indication of ever actually doing despite it being physically feasible.
 

Deleted member 1487

Oh, that isn't it. I can sift through the depths of potential human depravity with aplomb, I'm a bit odd like that, it's an event in personal life that's put me out of sorts. Thanks for the well wishes.
Yeah, no worries, depression is nothing to mess with.

Yeah, I don't disagree with that. I actually say as much in my post at the top.
Ok.

Eh, I was partly listing them for the sake of completeness. I don't at all disagree that Stalin would ever seriously contemplate, if at all, those options but then we tend to wind up conversing about things that historical individuals/institutions showed little-to-no indication of doing despite being physically feasible.
Indeed, to a degree that is what AH Forum is built on. But I think we tend to be more based in what was possible for a given POD, rather than all the potentialities. If the POD was that Stalin for some reason decided to go defense in depth we certainly could discuss the consequences of that (after I lodged complaints of course :p ), which would have been by far the best idea of all. Of course then he wouldn't have dismantled the Stalin Line, which would have been extremely helpful to the Red Army.
 

nbcman

Donor
For #1 when would he do that given that he knows mobilization means war?
And the Soviet military was in no position to realistically implement any serious planning, they couldn't really even get MP41 going properly.

2. is possible

3. Stalin nixed that IOTL in May 1941 when Zhukov presented it.

4. Stalin wouldn't do that, it was entirely against everything he understood about war and never did anything really like that during WW2.

With regards to your response to item #1, why wouldn't the Soviets point out that the Germans and other aligned states are still mobilized and their economies are still on a war footing after the end of the war in the West? Could the German continued mobilization in peacetime not be considered an aggressive act against the peace loving people of the Soviet Union and that the Soviet mobilization is purely defensive in nature?
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The difficulty here is that one of the most critical elements was handwaved. WHY did the British leave the war? What were the terms?

This decides thing like Lend Lease, how much of the Heer has to remain in the West, how many U-boats have to be produced, etc.

The equation is incomplete.
 
voted maybe because we do not know how GB forced out of the war. worse beat at Dunkirk or Axis Iraq? (the latter they are in pretty strong position even if Soviets anticipate invasion)

The Iranian Shah was very pro-German and gave them a bunch of contracts to develop Iranian infrastructure from pre-war through 1941 when the British invaded and overthrew him

with GB out of war Germany would still have Syria? from which they could bomb Baku.

even if shut out of Iran?
 

Deleted member 1487

With regards to your response to item #1, why wouldn't the Soviets point out that the Germans and other aligned states are still mobilized and their economies are still on a war footing after the end of the war in the West? Could the German continued mobilization in peacetime not be considered an aggressive act against the peace loving people of the Soviet Union and that the Soviet mobilization is purely defensive in nature?
IOTL there was a ton of contradictory information coming in about the German preparations, as IOTL the planned invasion date that was reported to Stalin and actually planned on by the Germans, May 15th, would come and go, as would several other invasion dates as per OTL, so Stalin would likely be quite confused and have the similar excuses for dismissing intelligence about the invasion; he might even think as per OTL that the Germans are trying to provoke him into mobilizing so he would give them an excuse to go to war. IOTL though Hitler did a ruse to convince Stalin that he wasn't going to invade, he wrote him directly and explained that he was massing troops in the east for training for an invasion of Britain, which went with a few other deception operations German intelligence running at the time, and asked him personally to write Hitler if his generals tried to provoke war in the East. I'd imagine something similar would happen ITTL where Hitler writes Stalin personally with an excuse for the massing of troops, which Stalin accepts, because like IOTL he wants to believe it because he's not ready for war and what Hitler is saying fits into his personal biases; Hitler in the letter claimed that his generals/underlings might try and provoke a war which he, Hitler, doesn't want and wants Stalin to tell him personally and asks him not to be provoked; Stalin had a pathological fear of his subordinates trying to undermine him, so I think he bought Hitler's ruse because he it fit into his conceptions of the dangers of being a dictator and saw in Hitler a kindred ruler who was trying to manage a disloyal military/party. Stalin seemed to consider the threat from within bigger than that from without and also believed that Hitler's bourgeois army officers were trying to start a war for ideological reason, so was psychologically primed to accept Hitler's note.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...es/studies/vol50no1/9_BK_What_Stalin_Knew.htm
David Murphy’s book is the latest in the growing corpus of literature surrounding this debate. Murphy’s contribution is virtually unique, however. Whereas other historians have looked at Stalin’s actions and sought the reasoning behind them, Murphy examines the intelligence received by Stalin—in other words, as the title of the book suggests, “what Stalin knew.”[1] The author, a retired CIA officer, is supported in this by the publication of three collections of Soviet documents on state policy in the period leading up to the war and the activities of the security and intelligence services. Admittedly selective, these collections nonetheless add considerably to our understanding of the period.

In something of a surprise, Murphy reprints two secret letters from Hitler to Stalin that he found in the published Russian sources, hitherto unknown in the West. In these, the Führer seeks to reassure the Soviet dictator about the scarcely concealable German military buildup in eastern Europe. Hitler confides to Stalin that troops were being moved east to protect them from British bombing and to conceal the preparations for the invasion of the British Isles. He concludes with an assurance “on my honor as a head of state” that Germany would not attack the Soviet Union.[2] Some may question the authenticity of these letters, but they are difficult to dismiss out of hand. Assuming they are genuine, they add to what is perhaps the most bewildering paradox of the Soviet-German war: Stalin, the man who trusted no one, trusted Hitler.

So to understand what would happen ITTL we need to understand why Stalin did what he did IOTL and how that might play out ITTL.
Also there is a sticky issue of how Germany mobilizes for war when they are at peace, unlike OTL in 1941, and sells it to the German people; to go to war with Poland he required a lot of build up to sell it, could he do a sneak attack when Germany is at peace and have the military/German people accept it? Mobilization on the necessary scale would be very public, Hitler better have a damn good reason for doing so, which could/would telegraph to Stalin what is coming...if that is the case and it does, what does that mean for Soviet preparations and how long does the weather delay mobilization?

with GB out of war Germany would still have Syria? from which they could bomb Baku.

even if shut out of Iran?
Germany never had Syria IOTL really, Vichy did. Yes Vichy would have it in 1941 with the war ending in 1940, but it won't be able to be a base for German troops pre-invasion and probably post-invasion without heavily provoking the Brits.
 
with GB out of war Germany would still have Syria? from which they could bomb Baku.

Germany never had Syria IOTL really, Vichy did. Yes Vichy would have it in 1941 with the war ending in 1940, but it won't be able to be a base for German troops pre-invasion and probably post-invasion without heavily provoking the Brits.

Operation Pike was known to the Germans why wouldn't they try to use the French airbase in NE Syria for at least contingency? they are probably going to be doing any number of things to provoke the British, with this, if discovered, being neither the least nor the worst.
 

Deleted member 1487

Operation Pike was known to the Germans why wouldn't they try to use the French airbase in NE Syria for at least contingency? they are probably going to be doing any number of things to provoke the British, with this, if discovered, being neither the least nor the worst.
Was it known to them? I've never read that it was. There is the issue of antagonizing the British and French that would be an issue, plus signaling potential intentions in the region that would cause a diplomatic problem. Oh and the small issue that the Germans wanted to take it intact for their own use.
 
Is it possible the Soviets, dreading a certain 1941 invasion could go defense in depth in this TL, a light screening infantry force on the border with the bulk of the forces to the rear (1938 borders?)?
Not without Johnny the ASB Space Bat. This is completely contrary to how Stalin dealt with an enemy he had the opportunity to attack between 39-42-- He attacked until he could not attack anymore, with disastrous results. In some ways, the Russians never stopped. The Germans just ran out of men and mobile units to really do anything about it.

There will be no tedious defense in depth because of the lessons learned from napoleon. The Russian defense only wound up this way IOTL because they were caught flat footed. If Stalin expected an attack, he would have thrown everything at the front and attacked first.

However, if Stalin does that in mid May 1941, he gets the majority of his military destroyed within four to six near the German, Hungarian, and Romanian border. For the next four to six weeks Germany pretty much rolls into Russia unopposed mopping up cropping up reserves that have zero training.

Napoleon arrived in Moscow on September 14th with men traveling by horse and foot. German Panzers would be rolling in roughly the same time, if not before.
 
Operation Pike was known to the Germans why wouldn't they try to use the French airbase in NE Syria for at least contingency? they are probably going to be doing any number of things to provoke the British, with this, if discovered, being neither the least nor the worst.

Was it known to them? I've never read that it was. There is the issue of antagonizing the British and French that would be an issue, plus signaling potential intentions in the region that would cause a diplomatic problem. Oh and the small issue that the Germans wanted to take it intact for their own use.

"The German Blitzkrieg and the swift fall of France on 10 May 1940 derailed the plans, when the French military failed to hold back the Wehrmacht advance. The Germans captured a train stalled at the village of La Charité-sur-Loire that contained boxes of secret documents evacuated from Paris. Amongst these were documents dealing with Operation Pike. On 4 July, in a propaganda campaign to justify the invasion of France, the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB, German News Bureau) released excerpts of the captured documents relating to Operation Pike"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pike

not advocating for bombing, pointing out the early exit of British and German leverage over Vichy allows use of a forward airbase.
 

Deleted member 1487

"The German Blitzkrieg and the swift fall of France on 10 May 1940 derailed the plans, when the French military failed to hold back the Wehrmacht advance. The Germans captured a train stalled at the village of La Charité-sur-Loire that contained boxes of secret documents evacuated from Paris. Amongst these were documents dealing with Operation Pike. On 4 July, in a propaganda campaign to justify the invasion of France, the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB, German News Bureau) released excerpts of the captured documents relating to Operation Pike"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pike

not advocating for bombing, pointing out the early exit of British and German leverage over Vichy allows use of a forward airbase.
Thanks for the info that must have been added recently, I've read that article many times and never saw that. But again the issue is more of the Germans wanting to capture that oil intact and assuming the Soviets would rapidly collapse anyway, so why bother bombing it.
 
Thanks for the info that must have been added recently, I've read that article many times and never saw that. But again the issue is more of the Germans wanting to capture that oil intact and assuming the Soviets would rapidly collapse anyway, so why bother bombing it.

am looking at Syria from standpoint of proximity not (any projected) use, this is assuming that Turkey remains neutral and their airbases remain unavailable.
 
Not without Johnny the ASB Space Bat.

It's about ASB as, say, the Germans not going through with trying to take Moscow in 1941. It's very much against the grain against the prevailing leadership, institutions, and beliefs but there is nothing physically impossible about it.

This is completely contrary to how Stalin dealt with an enemy he had the opportunity to attack between 39-42

Stalin categorically rejected a plan which called for a pre-emptive strike on the Germans and the war plan he did approve called for a active defense backstopped by fortified regions while the Red Army geared up for a major counteroffensive. So Stalin making a pre-emptive strike isn't very likely at all. The problem in '41 was that the Soviets didn't have the forces to do it.
 
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