Could Germany defeat the Soviet Union one on one?

Could Germany defeat the Soviet Union one on one?

  • Yes

    Votes: 95 41.9%
  • No

    Votes: 59 26.0%
  • Maybe

    Votes: 73 32.2%

  • Total voters
    227
Remove the British economic blockade, strategic bombing, the naval war, and all other fronts in WW2, plus maybe no Battle of Britain losses to the Luftwaffe and no losses from 1941 on for the Luftwaffe and Germany army (Afrika Korps, 2nd and 5th Panzer, plus a LOT more Luftwaffe and paratroopers available for Barbarossa) and you change the war radically. Same with the Italian army being able to send it's own handpicked, perfectly equipped army/air forces in 1941. It's a complete game change for the War in the East.

What is Germany buying overseas, exactly? And why would Italians want to die for Moscow?
 

Deleted member 1487

What is Germany buying overseas, exactly? And why would Italians want to die for Moscow?
Whatever they wanted: fuel, raw materials, industrial goods, same as they were pre-war. If not them then through conquered nations as an intermediary. Unless the US wants to go full autarky and try to do a global market conquest of Latin America and all neutral nations they can't really stop it. And Mussolini wanted to fight communism, his ideological foe; IOTL why did the Italian 8th army want to fight in Russia? They did because Mussolini sent them despite the war in the Balkans and Mediterranean. Here they could be better equipped and supplied.
 
It's been working out just fine so far for the US debt since Vietnam. And they did seize quite a lot of gold.


What's it going to matter? If you've read David Glantz's "Stumbling Colossus" they were desperately trying to prepare for war by reorganizing, upgrading their equipment, and expanding their army all at once, but they turned their military into a total mess with that and the ongoing purges. Doing more to prepare for war is actually not going to improve their combat abilities that much and would be more than offset by the greater force the Germans could bring to bear. The Soviet military was just a disaster of epic proportions by this point and the more men and equipment they put on the border, the worse it would be for them when the Germans pincer them. Their communications and general CiC was a complete disaster and relied primarily on landlines that the Luftwaffe cut when they started bombing and German infiltrators had been cutting left and right from before the start of the invasion.
For example why the border is just a pocket waiting to be formed:

Is it possible the Soviets, dreading a certain 1941 invasion could go defense in depth in this TL, a light screening infantry force on the border with the bulk of the forces to the rear (1938 borders?)?

Also, It seems improbable to me that the British would agree to any peace where the Germans are going to continue to occupy Norway (and thus attack Murmansk from there, leaving a route for Lend-Lease).
 
What is Germany buying overseas, exactly? And why would Italians want to die for Moscow?

This seems very realistic the Italians would go all in here attacking the Soviet Union, based on their enthusiastic contribution to the Spanish Civil War, where they had little to gain and spent way to much.

The mobile Trieste and Airiete divisions used in the desert would be useful additions on the eastern front, plus a bunch of extra air force, and I wonder if in this TL the Turks could be badgered to let some Italian naval force into the Black Sea.
 
Whatever they wanted: fuel, raw materials, industrial goods, same as they were pre-war. If not them then through conquered nations as an intermediary. Unless the US wants to go full autarky and try to do a global market conquest of Latin America and all neutral nations they can't really stop it.

The US pressured people in OTL to not trade with the Axis, and Britain would want to do so as well. So those markets aren't quite ready.
 

Deleted member 1487

Is it possible the Soviets, dreading a certain 1941 invasion could go defense in depth in this TL, a light screening infantry force on the border with the bulk of the forces to the rear (1938 borders?)?

Also, It seems improbable to me that the British would agree to any peace where the Germans are going to continue to occupy Norway (and thus attack Murmansk from there, leaving a route for Lend-Lease).
Soviet doctrine was forward, offensive defense. They did not believe in defense in depth EVER; even at Kursk, rather than let the Germans fight their way through the defensive belts they built, they counterattacked repeatedly into the teeth of German armored forces and got slaughtered, had they held back until the Germans had worn themselves out fighting through the defenses THEN counterattacked they could have encircles and wiped out German panzer divisions en masse. So given that even by 1943 the Soviets were so offensively minded that they couldn't even utilize their own defenses they had so expensively and painstakingly built up. They certainly weren't going to do that in 1941. The MP41 plan was to have the strategic echelons absorb and counterattack an invasion and transition to the strategic offensive ASAP, which only worked in getting them slaughtered in 1941 IOTL. They moved up the Stalin Line to the Molotov Line in 1940 based on that idea. The Brits were willing to sell out Norway IOTL (I'm assuming Halifax is PM if any peace is had in 1940).

The US pressured people in OTL to not trade with the Axis, and Britain would want to do so as well. So those markets aren't quite ready.
IOTL only after they declared war. There were private 'moral boycotts' of German products and pressure by activist groups against companies doing business with Germany, but that didn't get far. The Jewish Boycott of Germany fell apart in 1934 and the 1938-41 boycott wasn't stopping much. Britain needed European trade in peace to sustain it's economy, without it Imperial trade isn't anywhere near enough, as the trade wars of the 1930s amply demonstrated.
https://www.amazon.com/Low-Dishonest-Decade-Eastern-Economic/dp/0826417612
There was a major reason that the Brits helped the Germans get loans to rebuild their economy in the 1930s and then were competing with them for Baltic and Balkan trade later; they needed the trade to run their economy. Guess what? Post-WW2 they found that an economically crushed Germany was too vital for Europe and they needed to let them reindustrialize to save their post-war economy, so deindustrialization was reversed within 2 years. Now imagine what happens if the German run continental trade bloc is cut off from Britain, not just Germany. It's all nice to make 1 sentence claims about moral positions what the Anglophone world would do in the event of a German victory, but the actual history of the 1920s-30s and post-war showed that just wasn't viable.
 
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CaliGuy

Banned
Britain drops out of the war in 1940 and the Reich never declares war on the US.

Germany can now devote most of their resources, vehicles, manpower, and effort against the USSR in time for Operation Barbarossa. The USSR is still getting Lend Lease though.

Can Germany not distracted by other fronts and campaigns (air, naval, Africa etc) defeat the USSR?

How much does not fighting the US/UK increase the Reich's chances of victory against the USSR?
I could see a Nazi-Soviet stalemate occurring in this TL; however, an outright Nazi victory is unlikely. In addition to the Soviet Union's extremely massive size and population, there is also the huge likelihood that the Soviet Union would be more prepared for Operation Barbarossa had Stalin actually saw it coming (which he almost certainly would have had Britain dropped out of the war in 1940).
 
I could see a Nazi-Soviet stalemate occurring in this TL; however, an outright Nazi victory is unlikely. In addition to the Soviet Union's extremely massive size and population, there is also the huge likelihood that the Soviet Union would be more prepared for Operation Barbarossa had Stalin actually saw it coming (which he almost certainly would have had Britain dropped out of the war in 1940).
Stalin pretty much did see it coming IOTL. He literally had multiple sources telling him the Reich would invade in June 1941 and he ignored them over and over.

If he moves more troops closer to the border then that just means larger encirclements by the Heer once the war starts which would be worse for the Red Army than OTL.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Remove the British economic blockade, strategic bombing, the naval war, and all other fronts in WW2, plus maybe no Battle of Britain losses to the Luftwaffe and no losses from 1941 on for the Luftwaffe and Germany army (Afrika Korps, 2nd and 5th Panzer, plus a LOT more Luftwaffe and paratroopers available for Barbarossa) and you change the war radically. Same with the Italian army being able to send it's own handpicked, perfectly equipped army/air forces in 1941. It's a complete game change for the War in the East. Without Britain and the US the USSR has substantially less GDP than Germany alone, not factoring in Italy and Germany's allies. Plus in terms of combined population the Germans+allies outnumber or at least equal the Soviets. IOTL the Germans from the moment Barbarossa started Germany was still spending over half it's military budget on weapons to fight the British and it only increased as the war went on, meaning Germany never spent more than half it's OTL military budget on fighting the USSR.
https://www.amazon.com/How-War-Was-Won-Cambridge/dp/1107014751/ref=cm_cr_pr_pdt_img_top?ie=UTF8

Even with Lend-Lease the USSR would be screwed fighting Germany and it's European allies by itself without Europe being blockaded by the British and later US.
To be fair, though, the USSR was willing to make up for its financial deficit with its willingness and ability to sacrifice an extremely massive amount of its men! Also, though, without Britain staying in the war, Stalin (and thus the Soviet Union) would probably be much more prepared for Operation Barbarossa in 1941!
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Stalin pretty much did see it coming IOTL. He literally had multiple sources telling him the Reich would invade in June 1941 and he ignored them over and over.

He might be more likely to believe these sources if Britain is out of the war, though.

If he moves more troops closer to the border then that just means larger encirclements by the Heer once the war starts which would be worse for the Red Army than OTL.

Actually, I was thinking more along the lines of evacuating more people and industry to the East while he still can.
 
If he moves more troops closer to the border then that just means larger encirclements by the Heer once the war starts which would be worse for the Red Army than OTL.

Actually, I was thinking more along the lines of evacuating more people and industry to the East while he still can.

In any "Stalin accepts what his intelligence is telling him", there are four possibilities with the ability for the Red Army to fulfill them depending on how soon ahead of time Stalin accepts the intel of the oncoming attack. Listing them in order from most to least probable:

1. Stalin orders immediate full-scale mobilization and shifts Soviet industry to full footing. Defense plans are rationalized, and undertaken either more efficiently or in a better order. Fresh forces are ordered mobilized and consolidated to be deployed into the second strategic echelon along the D'niepr. Airfields are camouflaged, border districts are directed to go to combat readiness, and many other "provocative" measures that were avoided OTL would be undertaken. But overall Soviet strategic dispositions remain unchanged.

2. As above, except Stalin does change Soviet dispositions by ordering the strategic reserves to push up to the frontier region.

3. Stalin orders a pre-emptive strike.

4. Stalin pulls Soviet forces back either to the 1939 border or the D'niepr river.

Number 1 and 4 lead to more positive outcomes for the USSR. Number 2 and 3 lead to more negative ones. Number 1 is most likely because it pretty well conforms with Soviet pre-war plans. Number 2 does not exactly conform with pre-war plans, but it does conform with Soviet strategic thinking at this time. Number 3 is also not necessarily against Soviet military strategy, but it also runs against Stalin's own cautious nature as he'll be wanting to safeguard against the possibility that he is wrong. Number 4 is listed as least likely is because that's going further than just Stalin accepting his intelligence... it also involves changing the entire Soviet defensive strategy and how they believed the war would work out. An extended delaying battle away from the frontiers while preserving the bulk of the army in depth would have worked out much better for the Red Army. Unfortunately that wasn't the kind of war the Soviets planned to fight in 1941 and good intelligence that is believed won't, on its own, change that.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
In any "Stalin accepts what his intelligence is telling him", there are four possibilities... depending on how soon ahead of time Stalin accepts the intel of the oncoming attack. Listing them in order from most to least probable:

1. Stalin orders immediate full-scale mobilization and shifts Soviet industry to full footing. Defense plans are rationalized, and undertaken either more efficiently or in a better order. Fresh forces are ordered mobilized and consolidated to be deployed into the second strategic echelon along the D'niepr. Airfields are camouflaged, border districts are directed to go to combat readiness, and many other "provocative" measures that were avoided OTL would be undertaken. But overall Soviet strategic dispositions remain unchanged.

2. As above, except Stalin does change Soviet dispositions by ordering the strategic reserves to push up to the frontier region.

3. Stalin orders a pre-emptive strike.

4. Stalin pulls Soviet forces back either to the 1939 border or the D'niepr river.

Number 1 and 4 lead to more positive outcomes for the USSR. Number 2 and 3 lead to more negative ones. Number 1 is most likely because it pretty well conforms with Soviet pre-war plans. Number 2 does not exactly conform with pre-war plans, but it does conform with Soviet strategic thinking at this time. Number 3 is also not necessarily against Soviet military strategy, but it also runs against Stalin's own cautious nature as he'll be wanting to safeguard against the possibility that he is wrong. Number 4 is listed as least likely is because that's going further than just Stalin accepting his intelligence... it also involves changing the entire Soviet defensive strategy and how they believed the war would work out. An extended delaying battle away from the frontiers while preserving the bulk of the army in depth would have worked out much better for the Red Army. Unfortunately that wasn't the kind of war the Soviets planned to fight in 1941 and good intelligence that is believed won't, on its own, change that.
Thanks for this information! :D

Also, though, how exactly would scenario #1 have played out?
 
Thanks for this information! :D

Also, though, how exactly would scenario #1 have played out?

The effect of full readiness of the frontier forces in most cases the effect will unfortunately be limited. As David Glantz details in Stumbling Colossus, "NKO categorically prohibited military district commanders from redeploying first echelon forces or improving their forward defenses. At least one brave military district commander violated these instructions." [p.105]. Glantz then details the unauthorized defensive measures undertaken by Baltic Special Military District commander General F. I. Kuznetsov, including ordering all formations under his command including ground and air forces to full combat readiness a full week before the invasion, and ordering minelaying and improved fortifications. Unfortunately as Glantz writes, "Despite these courageous actions on Kuznetsov's part, there is no evidence that the additional preparations made any difference in district combat performance when the war began."

The reason is logistical. The inadequate Soviet transportation infrastructure which caused so many went both ways and while the bulk of materiel was moved by rail, to meet the requirements of combat formations the final leg from the rail heads by road to the combat formations in the field was vital. Due to the miserable state of many of these roads, this final critical leg was particularly demanding. Most supplies was stored at depots in Moscow, Orel and Karkhov several hundred kilometers behind the front,Soviet forces were too far from their own logistic bases to be properly supported. This left them low on fuel and ammunition when the war began, with much of their equipment poorly maintained or inoperable. This was a significant factor in the Whermacht's easy destruction of so many Soviet armies. Fixing their inadequate logistics by mid-'41 was simply too great a task to successfully complete in conjunction with all the other demands on Soviet manpower and industry.

So, at best, it results in a few additional German casualties and losses and possibly some more Soviet soldiers managing to retreat east when things go south... which admittedly could conceivably impact them once they advance to the D'niepr given how close run the battles around Smolensk and Kiev were.

However, this logistical dislocation is also the major benefit of both options 1 and 4. Historically, when the Germans ran into the OTL Soviet strategic reserve, it caused them major difficulties that nearly resulted in Operation Barbarossa collapsing outright. Having a larger strategic reserve, if not the main bulk of the pre-war Red Army, deployed there would have greatly increased the odds of Barbarossa failing around the Smolensk-Kiev line. Not only would the Germans have been weakened by the shoddy roads (as they were OTL), but the strain on the rear services supporting the Soviet formations would be considerably eased, and consequently would greatly increase the combat power of the supported formations as well as allowing a larger number of them to fight effectively.

IOTL why did the Italian 8th army want to fight in Russia?

The Italian 8th didn't want to fight in Russia and their morale, and consequently combat performance, was totally in the gutter because of it. Even the Romanians and Hungarians fought better then them, as they had some stake if Germany lost and consequently more motivation to fight.

You once tried to argue that the German soldiers weren't very imbued with Nazi ideology in their fight in '41, that only the higher ups were in on the racist angle and that for the German soldier it was just about fighting Communism. The Italian case shows that this isn't at all right and is nothing more then Clean Wehrmacht mythologizing. Just fighting communism wouldn't have been a patch on the historical National Socialist indoctrination which not only inured their officers to terrible atrocities but also turned their soldiers into fanatics. We tend to associate political education only with the Communists but the Nazis had it too. Several times a week their soldiers and officers attended classes with Nazi officials who filled them full of their duty under National Socialism. The results were evident on the battlefield where German soldiers fought with a determination that shocked their opponents.

All forms of motivation are not created equal.
 
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Deleted member 1487

To be fair, though, the USSR was willing to make up for its financial deficit with its willingness and ability to sacrifice an extremely massive amount of its men! Also, though, without Britain staying in the war, Stalin (and thus the Soviet Union) would probably be much more prepared for Operation Barbarossa in 1941!
The problem there is that once you dig into the issues the Soviets had with their military that's not actually going to help much. Plus there is the problem of when the Soviets realize it's going to happen. Spies reported it would happen on May 15th initially and when that time went and passed without invasion (partially the Balkan invasion, also the wet weather) he refused to believe the intelligence coming in, because they kept giving him certain dates and they would pass, plus the Germans got into the Balkans. Assuming no Balkans campaign there is still the weather, which would keep the Germans from invading until June 10th at the earliest. So Stalin is going to get repeated bunk intel on the invasion date, but won't have the Balkan campaign to allay his his fears of the German build up. He also thought the invasion wouldn't start as an all out invasion, but as a series of escalating border incidents over a week that would result in war so that Hitler could sell it to his people (perhaps would happen if Germany was at peace, because likely the Germans would have to demobilize upon getting peace in 1940). Given that the April order to mobilize 800k reservists still wasn't done as of June 22nd by the Soviet military, they didn't mobilize quickly in peace. So the question really comes down to when is Stalin suppose to know when the Germans are coming to attack for sure? When does Soviet mobilization happen, because Stalin needs to be 100% sure war is coming if he's going to order full mobilization, because he does not want war in 1941 if it could be helped and mobilization guarantees war will happen. Stalin is pretty stuck, mobilization triggers an invasion by giving Hitler an excuse, while he wants to prevent war and intel coming in seems faulty, because it is wrong about German invasion dates. He might well be fooled again, maybe he does get a chance to prepare, but a very short time of a week or two in which mobilizing enough forces at the border is impossible in time given Soviet mobilization problems and still results in really bad performance in the border engagements, while not doing that much to improve the later battles deep in the USSR.

The Italian 8th didn't want to fight in Russia and their morale, and consequently combat performance, was totally in the gutter because of it. Even the Romanians and Hungarians fought better then them, as they had some stake if Germany lost and consequently more motivation to fight.
Their performance was uneven, a lot of that came down to poor equipment and inability to actually knock out Soviet armor when it came at them, much like the Romanians.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Itali...0.93_February_1943.2C_Operation_Little_Saturn
The situation for the Italian troops along the Don River remained stable until the Soviets launched Operation Saturn on 11 December 1942. The aim of this operation was the annihilation of the Italian, Hungarian, Romanian, and German positions along the Don River. The first stage of Operation Saturn was known as Operation Little Saturn. The aim of this operation was the complete annihilation of the Italian 8th Army.

The Soviet 63rd Army, backed by T-34 tanks and fighter-bombers, first attacked the weakest Italian sector. This sector was held on the right by the Ravenna and Cosseria infantry divisions. From the Soviet bridgehead at Mamon, 15 divisions—supported by at least 100 tanks—attacked these two divisions. Although outnumbered 9 to 1, the Italians resisted until 19 December, when ARMIR headquarters finally ordered the battered divisions to withdraw.[13] By Christmas both divisions were driven back and defeated after bloody fighting.

Meanwhile, on 17 December 1942, the Soviet 21st Army and the Soviet 5th Tank Army attacked and defeated what remained of the Romanians to the right of the Italians. At about the same time, the Soviet 3rd Tank Army and parts of the Soviet 40th Army hit the Hungarians to the left of the Italians.

The Soviet 1st Guards Army then attacked the Italian center which was held by the 298th German, the Pasubio, the Torino, the Prince Amedeo Duke of Aosta, and the Sforzesca divisions. After eleven days of bloody fighting against overwhelming Soviet forces, these divisions were surrounded and defeated and Russian air support resulted in the death of General Paolo Tarnassi, commander of the Italian armoured force in Russia.[14]

On 14 January 1943, after a short pause, the 6th Soviet Army attacked the Alpini divisions of the Italian Mountain Corps. These units had been placed on the left flank of the Italian army and were until then still relatively unaffected by the battle. However, the Alpini position had turned critical after the collapse of the Italian center, the collapse of the Italian right flank, and the simultaneous collapse of the Hungarian troops to the left of the Alpini. The Julia Division and Cuneense Division were destroyed. Members of the 1 Alpini Regiment, part of Cuneese Division, burned the regimental flags to keep them from being captured. Part of the Tridentina Division and other withdrawing troops managed to escape the encirclement.

On 26 January 1943, after heavy fighting which resulted in the Battle of Nikolajewka, the Alpini remnants breached the encirclement and reached new defensive positions set up to the west by the Germans. But, by this time, the only operational fighting unit was the Tridentina Division and even it was not fully operational. The Tridentina Division had led the final breakout assault at Nikolajewka. Many of the troops who managed to escape were frostbitten, critically ill, and deeply demoralized.

Overall, about 130,000 Italians had been surrounded by the Soviet offensive. According to Italian sources, about 20,800 soldiers died in the fighting, 64,000 were captured, and 45,000 were able to withdraw.[15]

Many clearly fought well and inflicted damage on the Soviets before being ground up by superior firepower and numbers, they didn't run away at first sight of Soviet troops.
 
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CaliGuy

Banned
The problem there is that once you dig into the issues the Soviets had with their military that's not actually going to help much. Plus there is the problem of when the Soviets realize it's going to happen. Spies reported it would happen on May 15th initially and when that time went and passed without invasion (partially the Balkan invasion, also the wet weather) he refused to believe the intelligence coming in, because they kept giving him certain dates and they would pass, plus the Germans got into the Balkans. Assuming no Balkans campaign there is still the weather, which would keep the Germans from invading until June 10th at the earliest. So Stalin is going to get repeated bunk intel on the invasion date, but won't have the Balkan campaign to allay his his fears of the German build up. He also thought the invasion wouldn't start as an all out invasion, but as a series of escalating border incidents over a week that would result in war so that Hitler could sell it to his people (perhaps would happen if Germany was at peace, because likely the Germans would have to demobilize upon getting peace in 1940). Given that the April order to mobilize 800k reservists still wasn't done as of June 22nd by the Soviet military, they didn't mobilize quickly in peace. So the question really comes down to when is Stalin suppose to know when the Germans are coming to attack for sure? When does Soviet mobilization happen, because Stalin needs to be 100% sure war is coming if he's going to order full mobilization, because he does not want war in 1941 if it could be helped and mobilization guarantees war will happen. Stalin is pretty stuck, mobilization triggers an invasion by giving Hitler an excuse, while he wants to prevent war and intel coming in seems faulty, because it is wrong about German invasion dates. He might well be fooled again, maybe he does get a chance to prepare, but a very short time of a week or two in which mobilizing enough forces at the border is impossible in time given Soviet mobilization problems and still results in really bad performance in the border engagements, while not doing that much to improve the later battles deep in the USSR.
Thanks for all of this information and for explaining everything to me! :)
 

CaliGuy

Banned
However, I nevertheless have a question--how crucial was the West in the Soviet victories in Moscow and Stalingrad? After all, if the Soviets still win these two battles (or some equivalents to them) in this TL, the Nazis almost certainly cannot win the war in the East!
 
However, I nevertheless have a question--how crucial was the West in the Soviet victories in Moscow and Stalingrad? After all, if the Soviets still win these two battles (or some equivalents to them) in this TL, the Nazis almost certainly cannot win the war in the East!

Moscow, not very. Stalingrad is much more crucial but whether it was decisive is very much in dispute in historical academia. It could go either way.

Their performance was uneven,

No, it wasn't. Italian performance was execrable. It was only because the Germans had a pair of infantry divisions (one of which is mentioned in your link) and a panzer division running around to shore them up that they lasted eleven days instead of a few hours.
 
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How exactly did the West help in Stalingrad?

Some lend-lease patching over possible holes in the Soviet war economy, mainly. Whether these holes could not have been patched over (if less well) via substitution or not is the main determinant between whether the Soviets collapse or hold together long enough to get the decisive counter-offensive in. This, naturally, even assumes that the War in the East develops to that point that there is even a recognizable Battle of Stalingrad.
 

Deleted member 1487

However, I nevertheless have a question--how crucial was the West in the Soviet victories in Moscow and Stalingrad? After all, if the Soviets still win these two battles (or some equivalents to them) in this TL, the Nazis almost certainly cannot win the war in the East!
In Moscow it depends on how you weight indirect factors like the strategic air war, the RAF fighter/bomber raids in France, the economic blockade of Europe, Lend-Lease, the naval war, the Mediterranean campaign, the impact of the Balkan campaigns, etc. I'm of the mind that by itself the Greek campaign cost the Germans the chance to take Moscow for a variety of reasons that would take too long to explain right now (I've got to get ready for work soon). Stalingrad is a longer explanation, but I think Western help was critical.

T
You once tried to argue that the German soldiers weren't very imbued with Nazi ideology in their fight in '41, that only the higher ups were in on the racist angle and that for the German soldier it was just about fighting Communism. The Italian case shows that this isn't at all right and is nothing more then Clean Wehrmacht mythologizing. Just fighting communism wouldn't have been a patch on the historical National Socialist indoctrination which not only inured their officers to terrible atrocities but also turned their soldiers into fanatics. We tend to associate political education only with the Communists but the Nazis had it too. Several times a week their soldiers and officers attended classes with Nazi officials who filled them full of their duty under National Socialism. The results were evident on the battlefield where German soldiers fought with a determination that shocked their opponents.

All forms of motivation are not created equal.
It depends on what you mean by the Wehrmacht and ideology when it comes to the war in the East, many were willing to follow any orders and took their war as serving the country, not realizing what Hitler was actually planning when they got there and war crimes started piling up that they participated in. The 'clean Wehrmacht' is clearly a myth, but the issue of why they participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity and why they fought at all is a highly complex topic I don't have the time to really get into right now.

The Italians had their blackshirts too, the military was generally pretty anti-communist and many of the officers and men were willing to fight the Soviets and crush communism, but they were not on board with what Hitler was interested in. The Italians followed orders to fight Stalin IOTL and would ITTL and fight as well as they did IOTL, which was better than they generally are given credit for. They'd have better equipment and supply given that it would be Italy's only active front and probably the best soldiers and most committed would be sent, especially Italian Fascist Blackshirt units (their version of the SS). In large part once there they are trapped and stuck fighting and when it comes down to it soldiers don't fight for nation or ideology once the killing starts, they fight for the guys on their left and right and when stuck in a highly hostile country with only their friends/brothers as their support system, they've got no choice but to fight for survival. Running away often gets you massacred and the Italians weren't nearly as bad in combat as popular history likes to suggest, even when outnumbered, undersupplied, and in a bad situation in Russia.
 
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