Could German WWII Logistics have been improved?

[Awilla the Hun]

I know that this sounds like a cliche "Make the Nazis win" type thread, but hear me out. I don't really make these often. Anyway, one theme that constantly returns in WWII threads is the inadequacy of Nazi logistics for the operations they had to conduct. Supplying units from Norway garrisons to the Afrika Korps (dodging Royal Navy patrols all the while) and the vast distances and partisans of the Eastern Front was too much for it to handle.

Is there any way in which the Germans could have, if they put their (I know it's unlikely) most sensible thinking caps on and made a more effective system? And what sort of cost would it have been on the front line units to obtain a sufficient system of logistics?

 

[BlairWitch749]

I know that this sounds like a cliche "Make the Nazis win" type thread, but hear me out. I don't really make these often. Anyway, one theme that constantly returns in WWII threads is the inadequacy of Nazi logistics for the operations they had to conduct. Supplying units from Norway garrisons to the Afrika Korps (dodging Royal Navy patrols all the while) and the vast distances and partisans of the Eastern Front was too much for it to handle.

Is there any way in which the Germans could have, if they put their (I know it's unlikely) most sensible thinking caps on and made a more effective system? And what sort of cost would it have been on the front line units to obtain a sufficient system of logistics?

certainly... especially if combat commanders are kept on a shorter leash in regards to outrunning rail head supply zones (which put too much strain on trucks and horse drawn supplies)

the cost of such thinking is immense; it limits the German army to bounds of only 300 miles at a time which must be followed by 3-6 weeks of consolidation and displacement of the supply zone; against France this doesn't matter since the campaign was decisively won within the original radius; however, against Russia it severely limits their strategic options and would handicap tantalizing offensive moments (ie smolensk and 2nd battle of kharkov)

 

[amphibulous]

They could have built more trucks at the cost of fewer aircraft. Pierre Sprey, the leader of the A10 project, did an analysis that showed the Ju88 was almost entirely ineffective and that the Stuka - at 1/5 the cost - much more useful. Halve the number of Ju88s, make an equal number of Stukas, and spend the savings on trucks. (However, I'm not sure how the fuel budget would work out - does axing the 88s provide reasonable fuel for the trucks?)

 

[AMF]

Start building the Class 52 locomotive earlier than in OTL. The Baureihe 52 ("Series 52") was a highly simplified steam locomotive design well suited to mass production. It was often called simply the Kriegslokomotive ("war locomotive"):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DRB_Class_52

Convert all captured rail lines to standard gauge from the beginning of Barbarossa:
At the beginning of Barbarossa, there were orders to convert only one track of dual-track lines. This made it necessary to build passing-loops for both gauges, an effort that would not have been neccessary if all tracks had been converted from the start. A few month later, there was an order to convert all tracks, but only to certain line, East of this line the Russian gauge was to be retained. This also caused a lot of unneccessary effort, because now ramps had to be built, where the freight could be re-loaded from a standard gauge to a Russian gauge train. Finally, there was the order to convert all captured lines to the standard gauge. It probably would have made the transport situation a little less difficult if this order had been given right from the start.

 

[Snake Featherston]

In some ways, yes, in other ways I'm not sure *how* to do it. It might be possible by cheating to have someone not-Nazis take over Germany and launch a revanchist war against Poland, Britain, and France and to have this movement try to use the Soviets as their major support base and write off parts of Eastern Europe for the "next war" which would do some parts of it. The problem with German logistics was that what Hitler wanted was far beyond the capacity of the German economy to sustain. His re-armament was putting it at risk of economic overheat without a war, and the re-armament of OTL needed successive conquering and economic shackling of resource-rich areas to preserve itself at any rate equivalent to the 1939 army. The bigger problem was that in assimilating so many different areas this produced the very over-complicated mixture of so many incompatible machines and parts that meant in any serious, protracted war the Nazi war machine would be subject to the law of diminishing returns.

This is less economic determinism than it seems, after all, the Nazi war machine did produce a sequence of short, decisive tactical campaigns that was uninterrupted bar its war with the UK (where it needed a navy it was not going to have before the economic meltdown) and with the USSR (which was too big, too underdeveloped, and where their whole fundamental premise of the campaign was vastly and deeply flawed at both political and military levels, some of both misperceptions were unavoidable in 1941 and perceptible only after it was already too late to do anything about them).

Hitler's major problem from a strictly economc viewpoint was in trying for autarky in a state which could not support it in itself and in a process where he deliberately set up things to get his war in four years from release of the Hossbach Memorandum but was unable to get Germany sufficiently prepared for war in time for it to do more than win short-term victories only. He had what successes he did because his enemies were on the whole even less prepared in terms of Poland and the West, to say nothing of Scandinavia, where the USSR had the opposite problem of being very well prepared....for an entirely different war than what WWII actually turned out to be.

 

[MUC]

1. Stay out of Africa.
The Africa campaign chewed up enormous amounts of trucks from the Axis armies. Since no railway was available and the ports were too far away, all the supplies had to be brought to the front by truck. The RAF attacked the supply lines constantly and killed tons of trucks. Furthermore all the Axis equipment was lost when the Axis surrendered in Tunis in 1943. Total waste of resources.
Does anyone have a figure of how many Axis trucks were lost in N. Africa and what percentage of all the Axis truck pool they represented? I remember reading a figure once and it was horribly high.

2. Turn over to war production earlier.
It's interesting to see, that despite intensive strategic bombing the Axis war production rose during the war, to reach its peak in 1944. Bring Speer in earlier on and you stand a better chance to have better logistics earlier on. The German population never experienced food rationing as well, something quite familiar to the British. This kept morale high, but also stressed logistics.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

They could have built more trucks at the cost of fewer aircraft. Pierre Sprey, the leader of the A10 project, did an analysis that showed the Ju88 was almost entirely ineffective and that the Stuka - at 1/5 the cost - much more useful. Halve the number of Ju88s, make an equal number of Stukas, and spend the savings on trucks. (However, I'm not sure how the fuel budget would work out - does axing the 88s provide reasonable fuel for the trucks?)

They had vastly different mission profiles. The Ju88 was never a CAS bomber until shoe-horned into the role by Udet with the dive bombing requirement, degrading its performance for its real mission as a 'fast bomber'. It should have focused on logistic strikes, because that was what it was designed for. Obviously it wasn't a CAS aircraft and performed badly in that role. The Stuka could do what the Ju88 could, nor could the Ju88 do the Stukas job anywhere near as well.
Edit: Not to mention that in Russia the Luftwaffe was turned into a virtually pure tactical bombing mission profile, which wasted its potential badly. Hitler did not seem to understand what operational air war was and why it worked in France.

Instead the Germans could have used the newly (in 1939) built VW plant to make trucks instead of helmets and mess tins.

 

[The Oncoming Storm]

Something else that would have helped would have been no Holocaust. As well as it's inhumanity it required a significant amount of resources and the trains that took people to the death camps would have been far better served taking men and supplies to the frontline.

They also wasted time and money on building different types of vehicles when they would have been far better served with a standard type that would be adapted to fit several roles. Finally cancel the V-Weapons project and divert the money into more tanks, Von Braun himself admitted post war that it had been a waste of time, the V-2 carried roughly the same load as a heavy bomber but cost much more and was far less accurate.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Something else that would have helped would have been no Holocaust. As well as it's inhumanity it required a significant amount of resources and the trains that took people to the death camps would have been far better served taking men and supplies to the frontline.

They also wasted time and money on building different types of vehicles when they would have been far better served with a standard type that would be adapted to fit several roles. Finally cancel the V-Weapons project and divert the money into more tanks, Von Braun himself admitted post war that it had been a waste of time, the V-2 carried roughly the same load as a heavy bomber but cost much more and was far less accurate.

At the very least the Germans could have put more effort into making rocket artillery that would if nothing else have provided some sorely-needed firepower in some very desperate spots to a greater degree than the Nebelwerfer did. Better use of the same expertise in a fashion that would have contributed to the war as opposed to the misguided idea that scaring civilians of the powers kicking Germany's ass was going to make them *less* interested in finishing the job.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Start building the Class 52 locomotive earlier than in OTL. The Baureihe 52 ("Series 52") was a highly simplified steam locomotive design well suited to mass production. It was often called simply the Kriegslokomotive ("war locomotive"):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DRB_Class_52

Convert all captured rail lines to standard gauge from the beginning of Barbarossa:
At the beginning of Barbarossa, there were orders to convert only one track of dual-track lines. This made it necessary to build passing-loops for both gauges, an effort that would not have been neccessary if all tracks had been converted from the start. A few month later, there was an order to convert all tracks, but only to certain line, East of this line the Russian gauge was to be retained. This also caused a lot of unneccessary effort, because now ramps had to be built, where the freight could be re-loaded from a standard gauge to a Russian gauge train. Finally, there was the order to convert all captured lines to the standard gauge. It probably would have made the transport situation a little less difficult if this order had been given right from the start.

This was a much better use of the Henschel factories, considering it kept retooling because constantly changing directives instead of producing the aircraft it was ostensibly supposed to.
Also cancel the V2 and/or Me210 and save massive resources for other projects.

 

[Arachnid]

2. Turn over to war production earlier.
It's interesting to see, that despite intensive strategic bombing the Axis war production rose during the war, to reach its peak in 1944. Bring Speer in earlier on and you stand a better chance to have better logistics earlier on. The German population never experienced food rationing as well, something quite familiar to the British. This kept morale high, but also stressed logistics.

The idea that Germany didn't go over to full war production till Speer came in is a myth, I suggest you read Wages of Destruction where Tooze demonstrates that the Germans did go for full war production in September 1939 only to reverse themselves in Autumn 1940 after victory in France before it's effects would start showing and then switch course again in Spring '41 once the UK was clearly staying in the war and the decision to go for Barbarossa was made. That 6 month switch caused an untold mess which was in the process of being sorted out when Speer came in and took all the credit for the Armaments Miracle despite the foundations already having been laid.

As for food rationing Germany did have food rationing just not as tight as in the UK and as until the very end Germany wasn't short of food, simply throwing it away would have been silly.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The idea that Germany didn't go over to full war production till Speer came in is a myth, I suggest you read Wages of Destruction where Tooze demonstrates that the Germans did go for full war production in September 1939 only to reverse themselves in Autumn 1940 after victory in France before it's effects would start showing and then switch course again in Spring '41 once the UK was clearly staying in the war and the decision to go for Barbarossa was made. That 6 month switch caused an untold mess which was in the process of being sorted out when Speer came in and took all the credit for the Armaments Miracle despite the foundations already having been laid.

As for food rationing Germany did have food rationing just not as tight as in the UK and as until the very end Germany wasn't short of food, simply throwing it away would have been silly.

So we can postulate what would have been produced without the major inefficiencies and disruptive orders given in 1940 (and before). Germany did have other potential that was lost through mismanagement, not necessarily being under-mobilized.

 

[theman from the ministery]

At the very least the Germans could have put more effort into making rocket artillery that would if nothing else have provided some sorely-needed firepower in some very desperate spots to a greater degree than the Nebelwerfer did. Better use of the same expertise in a fashion that would have contributed to the war as opposed to the misguided idea that scaring civilians of the powers kicking Germany's ass was going to make them *less* interested in finishing the job.

looking at this from a immoral point of view didn't the slave labour make up for this ?


(IDK myself just puting it out there )

 

[wcv215]

looking at this from a immoral point of view didn't the slave labour make up for this ?


(IDK myself just puting it out there )

No, slavery is a horribly inefficient use of manpower at the best (relatively) of times. Anything more than simple construction or agriculture cannot be done with slave labor well. The slaves will sabotage as much as they can in the less technical fields, those reports of southern slaves breaking equipment are not due to their incompetence, imagine what they could do if put toward more advanced manufacturing.

 

[Daffy Duck]

Question

Ok..this is probably stupid question but I'm asking it anyway..Please don't jump all over me for this.

When the Axis invaded the USSR (Operation Barbarossa), instead of converting the existing railway system to their own, why didn't they just use the existing railway system (already in place in the USSR)?

 

[BlondieBC]

Ok..this is probably stupid question but I'm asking it anyway..Please don't jump all over me for this.

When the Axis invaded the USSR (Operation Barbarossa), instead of converting the existing railway system to their own, why didn't they just use the existing railway system (already in place in the USSR)?

Soviet evacuated/sabotaged the locomotives. Easier to move the trains out, the remove all the tracks. Also, German industry can build German style trains easier than both German and soviet style trains. And where you switch gauge, you have to unload/reload.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Ok..this is probably stupid question but I'm asking it anyway..Please don't jump all over me for this.

When the Axis invaded the USSR (Operation Barbarossa), instead of converting the existing railway system to their own, why didn't they just use the existing railway system (already in place in the USSR)?

They had different gauges, meaning the tracks, those that survived, had to be regauged, which was less time consuming than building new lines, but still time consuming and wasn't finished until 1942, by which time the Germans needed the regauge the recently captured lines in Ukraine.

 

[amphibulous]

They had vastly different mission profiles. The Ju88 was never a CAS bomber until shoe-horned into the role by Udet with the dive bombing requirement, degrading its performance for its real mission as a 'fast bomber'. It should have focused on logistic strikes, because that was what it was designed for. Obviously it wasn't a CAS aircraft and performed badly in that role. The Stuka could do what the Ju88 could, nor could the Ju88 do the Stukas job anywhere near as well.

Thank you, Captain Obvious. Sprey's analysis, which you don't seem to have read, was based on overall effectiveness, not the effectiveness of each in the Stuka CAS role. (Sprey is generally critical of strategic bombing's effectiveness; even if you're not, he makes a very strong case that the German's mis-allocated resources.)

 

[amphibulous]

The German population never experienced food rationing as well, something quite familiar to the British. This kept morale high, but also stressed logistics.

The rest of your post was well-thought out, but the above is wrong:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=46&t=159844

Ration stamps were issued to all civilians. These stamps were color coded and included rations for:
• Sugar (white stamps)
• Meat (blue stamps)
• Fruits and nuts (purple stamps)
• Dairy Products (yellow stamps)
• Eggs (green stamps)
• Oil
• Grains
• Bread
• Marmalade (In Germany the term "marmalade" also refers to jams and jelly - citrus products were generally unavailable during the war).
• Kaffee-ersatz (imitation coffee made from roasted barley, oats, and chicory mixed with chemicals from coal oil tar)

Food stamps were issued in 10, 25, 50, 100,and 500 gram denominations depending upon the type of food product in question. Civilian stamps were generally district specific and had to be used in the district in which they were issued. The stamps were only authorizations to purchase food. They did not entitle civilians to free handouts. Civilians had to buy food and submit the appropriate number of authorizing stamps. Soldiers on home leave were also issued food stamps...

BEFORE May of 1942: civilian rations in Germany were:
• 10,600 grams of bread = 353.33 grams/day or 12.5 oz
• 2000 grams of general food stuffs / 66.66 grams per day or 2.3 oz.
• 900 grams of sugar = 1.06 oz. per day

AFTER May, 1942: rations in Germany were dropped to
• 8000 grams of bread (about a half loaf a day)
• 1200 grams of meat (less than a 10th of lb. of meat per day)
• 600 grams of general foods
• 130 grams of sugar

...and there was no guarantee that the rationed amount would be available.

 

[Shaby]

Some people here suggest Germans drop certain aircraft projects or never engage into them, citing bad to abysmal performance of such airplanes. In particular, I've seen Me 210 mentioned. Pray tell how do Germans, without hindsight or prescience know which aircraft will work? Me 210 was dropped, but after it became obvious it is junk. It might very well have been excellent airplane and on paper it was and designers claimed it was even better. Ditto for any other project in Luftwaffe or any other airforce. You simply do not know which plane is going to work. Until after it is made.