It does become very clear that there are "undercurrents" in French politics in 1930's, which cannot be discounted.
The amount of people (and politicians) in favour of Nazi ideology are stunning. Whether that also turned into support for Nazi Germany is something else.
Of course, all of this also impacted France after 1944/5, trying to reconcile resistance with active support for Germany.
Now, if Britain is less forceful in getting France onboard OR France just takes more time, we can (according to Cook) see it dragging until 6-9 September.
if it drags on with French inertia, the whole thing becomes rather meaningles.
Would the delay have been due to lenghty debates in parliament or due to Daladier/Bonnet?
Somehow, it looks as though nobody believed that Germany could settle a war in a few days. On top of, there would be time to consider etc. So, one day follows the next and nothing really gets done until it is too late.
What could/would Chamberlain and Halifax have done if France is fence sitting until 6-9 September and then: nothing.
Conclusion I think: France could have wiggled out of its obligations but it would require more time and delays until 6-9 September. After that date a DoW would have been considered hopeles.
To facilitate these delays, Hitler only had to play Mussolini and/or any other negotiation strategy.
Dahlerus comes to mind, although he was more on the British.
So, a massive diplomatic effort might have saved the day. Could Hitler have played the US as well in this game?
It raises some interesting scenarios (as also seen below):
No french DoW, but a British one. Now what. Britain can't exactly do anything
Ivan