Could Britain have restrained Russia from threatening Austria in 1914? Should it have?

Should Britain's policy in June-July have focused on discouraging Russian threats against Austria?

  • Yes, a focus on restraining the Russians from escalating was probably the best move for Britain.

    Votes: 18 31.0%
  • No, a focus on keeping Russia happy with the Entente (as in OTL) was the best move for Britain.

    Votes: 8 13.8%
  • Neither- Britain had no leverage to prevent escalation on the continent in June-July 1914

    Votes: 32 55.2%

  • Total voters
    58

raharris1973

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"Britain wanted to keep Germany from dominating the continent by either overpowering France and Russia or luring them into her camp. This was entirely legitimate and necessary, but it alone is not enough to make Britain’s a real balance of power policy. For…the important point is that the British neither recognized nor did anything about the most critical threat to the European balance after 1900, but helped make it much worse….The greatest danger stemmed not from German or Russian power but from Austrian weakness. One of the few incontestable points in balance-of-power theory is that preserving the system means preserving all the essential actors in it. Equally obvious, nothing is more likely to occasion a major war than a threat to the existence or great-power status of an essential actor….Long before 1914 it was obvious that Austria’s existence was threatened. Everyone saw her as the next sick man of Europe after Turkey….From 1908 on almost everyone anticipated the long-awaited general war would probably arise over a Russo-Austrian quarrel involving Serbia. From 1912 on the Russians and Serbs repeatedly told their western friends that Austria’s collapse was imminent, and that they intended to have the lion’s share of the remains.

Yet Britain’s “balance-of-power” policy entirely ignored this immediate danger, and served actually to increase the threat from Germany as well. Germany…was virtually bound to accept war, even provoke it, rather than let Austria go under and thus lose her last reliable ally….A real balance-of-power policy would have required from the Entente…a policy of restraint for themselves and controlled support for Austria….The threat to Austria…was a product in great part of Entente policy. As a result of the preoccupation of diplomatic historians with motives and aims instead of effects, both German and Entente policies have always been discussed almost exclusively in terms of the German problem, when in fact their effects were far greater on the Austrian problem. The best answer to the German encirclement myth is not that Entente policy was really moderate and unprovocative; there has been too much white-washing of British, French and especially Russian policy in this whole debate. The answer is rather that the Entente really encircled Austria rather than Germany….Austria…was hopelessly encircled by 1914 and knew it. Russia, supported by France, was forming a new Balkan League around Russia’s protégé and Austria’s worst enemy, Serbia. Rumania was defecting, Bulgaria was wavering and exhausted under strong Russo-French pressure. Turkey was leaning toward Russia, Italy was cooperating with Russia in the Balkans; even Germany was wholly unreliable support politically, and Austria’s chief competitor economically in the Balkans.

The isolation and encirclement resulted, moreover, principally from Entente moves and policies, always discussed as if they had nothing to do with Austria….Austria was…the actual target of Entente diplomacy….In fact one can argue that Britain’s policy (like Russia’s and even, in certain respects, France’s) was more anti-Austrian than anti-German….[The British] never took Austria seriously and were regularly ready to let her pay, or make her pay….[Britain] urged Russia to concentrate her power and attention on Europe---the worst possible threat to Austria. The British…worked to break up the long-standing Austro-Russian cooperation in Macedonia, valuable though they knew it to be for European peace….When Austria annexed Bosnia, legalizing a situation long existing de facto and giving up her hold on the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar in the process, Britain helped promote an international crisis over the violation of a treaty thirty years old, whose relevant provision had never been intended by Britain herself to remain long in force….

On the eve of war, the Foreign Office was aware of the fear prevalent in both Berlin and Vienna that Austria might collapse….[but] No thought of any action to help maintain Austria’s independence and integrity was entertained….Of course there was no great anti-Austrian plot. The British did not think of Austria as their enemy; they tried not to think of her at all. They did not plan to isolate and destroy her; they simply did not concern themselves…with the question of whether the concessions and defeats imposed upon Austria before the war, and the territorial sacrifices to be imposed on her during and after it, would leave her viable….What makes Britain’s responsibility for the plight of Austria a heavy one, although less direct than Russia’s or France’s, is that Britain alone was in a position to manage the European Concert so as to control the Balkan situation….Only the presence of the Habsburg monarchy holding down the Danube basin kept Germany or Russia from achieving mastery over Europe….Let Austria go under, and a great war for the mastery of Europe became almost mathematically predictable…."
 
One of the few incontestable points in balance-of-power theory is that preserving the system means preserving all the essential actors in it.
This seems like a reasonable point - but in June-July 1914 Austria was the one doing the threatening, however threatened it may have felt in the preceding years. By this time, the issue was not preserving Austria, it was about preserving Serbia (and Montenegro).

Especially since allowing Austria to attack wouldn't have just lost these two countries to the Entente - it would have turned the entire Balkans into a Central Powers playground. That would have been a pretty huge upheaval in the balance of power, even if we ignore other issues.
The answer is rather that the Entente really encircled Austria rather than Germany...Bulgaria was wavering and exhausted under strong Russo-French pressure. Turkey was leaning toward Russia...
Was Turkey really leaning toward Russia in 1914? For that matter, was Bulgaria really wavering? It may have wavered in a year or two, but is there anything indicating that was the case in 1914?
In fact one can argue that Britain’s policy (like Russia’s and even, in certain respects, France’s) was more anti-Austrian than anti-German….[The British] never took Austria seriously and were regularly ready to let her pay, or make her pay…
Britain had taken Austria's side instead of Russia's and France's on multiple important occasions in the 1912-1914 period. Its policy was not at all unconditionally anti-Austrian. And in the July crisis itself, IMO, Britain had done all it reasonably could to reserve peace in Europe.

As noted, even Austria-Hungary's closest ally often found it difficult to take A-H seriously or support its ambitions.
 
Contrary to assertions of apocalyptic consequences if A-H was allowed to thrash Serbia in 1914, Serbia simply wasn't key to Europe's situation. The fall of Serbia's revanchist, military-dominated government wouldn't bring the sky crashing down.

Even Serbia's annexation by A-H wouldn't automatically have a catastrophic effect for the European system -- and A-H wasn't going to annex Serbia. The immensely influential Tisza, among others, wouldn't permit it. When Hoyos made an unauthorized suggestion that Serbia might be partitioned between A-H, Romania and Bulgaria, Tisza quashed him. In fact, A-H announced that it was NOT going to embark on "a war of conquest".

Nor would Serbia's chastisement by A-H bring the Balkans under the CP thumb. Germany really wasn't interested, and it should be obvious to anyone familiar with A-H's condition in 1914, that A-H was in no shape to exert the effort required to dominate the Balkans, when Russia loomed so close nearby.

So I don't agree with the Chicken Little arguments about the apocalyptic results of A-H fighting a private war with Serbia. The only loss would be to Russia's own imperial designs upon Balkan hegemony. NOTHING that could happen to Serbia could have been as dangerous and damaging to Europe as World War One was.

Did Britain have the leverage to rein Russia in? First, since Grey irresponsibly refrained from even trying, we cannot know what effect he might've achieved. Second, I think he did possess that leverage -- indirectly. The French had a tremendous amount of influence on Russia, and Poincare was certainly egging the Russians on (though not publicly). Had Grey grown a spine, and told Cambon plainly that Britain would not support the Franco-Russian Entente over a Balkan power-play, I consider it virtually certain that Poincare could have and would have reined in the Russians.

Edit: In fact, had Grey shown some backbone towards the CP during the Crisis, he might well have prevented the War.
Once Russia mobilized, Germa military leaders stopped particularly caring about Britain's likely actions -- the Franco-Russian threat overrode all other considerations. But prior to 30Aug, had Grey told the Austrians and Germans that, in the event of a wider war brought about by Austria's actions, Britain would certainly side with France, I think it would've had a great impact on Austrian leaders. But Grey couldn't work up the moral courage to do this, either.
 
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I voted neither because it is the closest if not exactly correct. I don't think it would have done any harm but I don't think Britain had a huge amount of influence that deep in the continent where seapower is limited and the protagonists had field armies that would eat the BEF for breakfast.
 
By the time of June-July it was too late to assail balance of power concerns I think. With Austria on its deathbed it wouldn't be long until Germany would be the only relevant power against France, Russia and Britain. You'd need Britain to do either one of two things a) be more neutral and not part of the Entente b) constantly remind Austria and Germany that Britain would join Russia/France should it come to that and force them to play safe.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe...g/1002px-Map_Europe_alliances_1914-en.svg.png

Should Austria collapse earlier Britain joining the CPs seems much more rationale from a balance of power perspective. Of course it was always really strange they joined Entente in the first place since France and Russia threaten Britain spheres of interest far more than Italy, Austria or Germany.
 
While colonial competion was much greater between Britain and France, Russia and Italy than with Germany you are forgetting the economic element where Germany was rightly regarded as a threat for market share in a way that the Entente powers weren't. As for Britain stopping the escalation I voter neither as well. Not because Britain didn't have influence, it did, especially through the threat of the blockade and the ability of the City of London to prop up it's allies financially both of which were rightly taken more seriously than the BEF. But by June 1914 it was too late to excercise that influence, too many Austrians were convinced that a short victorious war was the only way to prop up the Empire and paper over it's divisions while both the Russians and Germans had to back their ally both for strategic and prestige reasons. France meanwhile a.) wanted Elsass-Lothringen to become Alsace-Lorraine again and b.) knew the needed to back Russia in order to contain Germany. Britain could have used it influence pre-June to try and de-escalte the broader international situation so that one incident wouldn't trigger global war. In terms of obvious actions a.) making it clear that Britain would intervene if the Channel Ports were threatened (i.e. reaffirming the Treaty of London), b.) making it clear to France and Germany that the Entente was a defensive alliance only c.) telling the Austrians and Germans that they wouldn't support Russia and France redrawing the map of Central Europe and in fact would be neutral in the Central Powers favour if they tried.
 
Of course it was always really strange they joined Entente in the first place since France and Russia threaten Britain spheres of interest far more than Italy, Austria or Germany.

My understanding of things is that Britain felt isolated and vulnerable after the Boer War and Fashoda. So it tried to become less isolated by solving some of these colonial issues, and France and Russia, also feeling weak, isolated and exposed to Germany, were happy to oblige. With improved British-French relations, Germany felt isolated and tried to split Britain from France, which made them feel threatened and forged them closer together. Meanwhile, German naval expansion forced Britain to bring ships home, which left her weak in the far east, which forced her to improve relations with Japan and Russia, resulting Germany feeling isolated again.

None of it really sounds deliberately directed at Germany as such, but that was certainly the effect.
 
I feel like the issue in 1914 was that Britain had lost its diplomatic room to maneuver - Grey understood that the only way they could compel desired behavior on either side of a conflict was by acting as a neutral party, the issue being that nobody saw them as neutral by then. So if they'd gone to the French and asked them to tell the Russians to back down or else Britain would sit the war out, they wouldn't have been believed. And likewise, if they'd gone to the Germans and asked something similar of them, they were already seen as in bed with the French already, so why not invade Belgium? They went straight from isolated to too heavily entangled to operate freely.
 
I voted neither because it is the closest if not exactly correct. I don't think it would have done any harm but I don't think Britain had a huge amount of influence that deep in the continent where seapower is limited and the protagonists had field armies that would eat the BEF for breakfast.

I think that 'neither, but' is right. Britain was inevitably going to be drawn in, irrespective of what was said beforehand, if the war became general. It might not have happened immediately but the prospect of a German-dominated continent would have swung the balance once the fighting started and once Germany gained significant victories in 1914 in both east and west (as OTL). Enough pre-war planning had occurred for all sides to understand that.

I also agree that Britain's army was too readily discounted by the 'quick war' theorists (probably rightly, though there's an argument that it made the critical difference in enabling the French to reorganise in defence of Paris).

Britain's value to the French and Russians was essentially threefold:

1. Money. Having the world's leading financial player onside (at the start of the war), significantly tipped the scales in any test of endurance.
2. The navy. Again, strangling Germany at sea would pay dividends in time.
3. The potential army. Although Britain's regular army was small, there was plenty of capacity to grow it if necessary and once engaged, it would grow.

None of which mattered much if the war was over by Christmas but all of which would be of immeasurable value if it dragged on. but the strategic arguments for pre-war co-operation would become even more intense after the outbreak and so there'd have to be a good chance that the French and Russian war parties would have gambled that the facts on the ground would determine Britain's attitude, rather than communiques in July 1914.
 
Snip.

Of course it was always really strange they joined Entente in the first place since France and Russia threaten Britain spheres of interest far more than Italy, Austria or Germany.

Not so strange:

Buchanan in Apr 1914 --
"‘Russia is rapidly becoming so powerful that we must retain her friendship at almost any cost."

Nicholson in 1912 --
"It would be far more disadvantageous to have an unfriendly France and Russia than an unfriendly Germany. Germany can give us plenty of annoyance, but it cannot really threaten any of our more important interests, while Russia especially could cause us extreme embarrassment and, indeed, danger in the Mid-East and on our Indian frontier".


Britain cozied up to those who appeared able to harm her interests most.
 
Not so strange:

Buchanan in Apr 1914 --
"‘Russia is rapidly becoming so powerful that we must retain her friendship at almost any cost."

Nicholson in 1912 --
"It would be far more disadvantageous to have an unfriendly France and Russia than an unfriendly Germany. Germany can give us plenty of annoyance, but it cannot really threaten any of our more important interests, while Russia especially could cause us extreme embarrassment and, indeed, danger in the Mid-East and on our Indian frontier".


Britain cozied up to those who appeared able to harm her interests most.

I mean that logic is more like "Well we'd lose if they fought us so let us be so nice that they won't want to fight us", that's no longer balance of power play. I still think a confident Britain's natural ally is Germany. I wasn't aware Britain had given up on maintaining balance of power and just wanted to not fight by 1914. Since you seem knowledgeable on the topic, could you specify the period where Britain stopped playing a balancing roll and started focusing on protecting themselves? I was under the impression that balance of power strategy was to avoid a nation becoming so dominant on the continent that they would have no powerful continental allies and so could ignore the UK and I suppose if the UK's decision to give up on that gave rise to the USSR who Britain certainly was incapable of facing and had no European competitor.
 
Snip.

Since you seem knowledgeable on the topic, could you specify the period where Britain stopped playing a balancing roll and started focusing on protecting themselves? I was under the impression that balance of power strategy was to avoid a nation becoming so dominant on the continent that they would have no powerful continental allies and so could ignore the UK and I suppose if the UK's decision to give up on that gave rise to the USSR who Britain certainly was incapable of facing and had no European competitor.

Britain was (though neither Cabinet nor Commons was aware of it) fairly firmly attached to the Franco-Russian Entente by 1912.

Grey -- without authorization -- had permitted staff talks which resulted in plans to deploy the BEF to the Continent in event of war, and had also given France assurances of naval support against the Germans.
The promise of naval support was given in return for the French agreeing to move most of its Fleet to the Med, freeing up RN units to be stationed in Home Waters.

When Cabinet and Commons found out about Grey's actions, they were very wroth, and demanded that Grey attach "escape clauses" to the various agreements, specifying that Britain was in no way bound by them. This Grey did.

When Aug 1914 rolled around and both Cabinet and much of Commons wasn't eager to subordinate British policy to Franco-Russian machinations, Grey produced those documents. He claimed (rather hypocritically) that they did NOT entail any obligation on Britain's part; but that they nonetheless DID obligate Britain, since "honor" required Britain to support France whom Britain (that is, Grey, actually) had led to rely upon her.
Nice.

Anyway, read The Sleepwalkers by Clark, The Lions of July by Jannen, and The Darkest Days by Newton. All address Grey's pro-Entente duplicity, and his unwillingness to take a clear stand.
 
Grey -- without authorization -- had permitted staff talks which resulted in plans to deploy the BEF to the Continent in event of war, and had also given France assurances of naval support against the Germans.
The promise of naval support was given in return for the French agreeing to move most of its Fleet to the Med, freeing up RN units to be stationed in Home Waters.

When Cabinet and Commons found out about Grey's actions, they were very wroth, and demanded that Grey attach "escape clauses" to the various agreements, specifying that Britain was in no way bound by them. This Grey did.

Yes Britain would have likely joined Belgium or no Belgium, they were already entrenched with the French due to the Anglo-French naval agreements the French having already deferred protection of northern France to Britain. Thus as you said "honor" bound to defend France. I do think that the British did not want a European war. The Russians did not want Austria to annex Serbia, but the British apparently knew that the K.u.K only planned to reach Belgrade, then go home. I don't know if the Russians would have accepted this, but in my opinion there was a good chance of the Russians allowing the Austrians to carry out the plan. Russia could merely say, "Serbia was in the wrong" and pressure the Austrians by saying they'll allow them to take Belgrade and withdraw so long as Russian influence in Serbia is maintained. Russia at this time probably would have preferred to delay the war as long as possible so they could finish improving their infastructure.
 

raharris1973

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I voted:
Yes, a focus on restraining the Russians from escalating was probably the best move for Britain. ....and the best move for Europe and the world I might add.

Responding to the thoughtful comments in the thread in turn:

Especially since allowing Austria to attack wouldn't have just lost these two countries to the Entente - it would have turned the entire Balkans into a Central Powers playground. That would have been a pretty huge upheaval in the balance of power, even if we ignore other issues

So your thought is more or less that allowing Serbia & Montenegro to get crushed strengthens Bulgaria's ties to Berlin and Vienna, while Greece and Rumania distance themselves from the unreliable Entente? As for the balance of power effects, I guess it is a setback for Russia, and by extension the Entente, in terms of the "yards" on their side of the field. At the same time, the "yards" the Entente concede in the Balkans only sets them back to where things were in 1912, when Serbia was small and the Ottomans dominated the Balkans and had a common border with Austria-Hungary. Rolling back to the 1912 balance of power "horror of horrors" I guess. That doesn't sound like anything the Entente couldn't live with going forward, especially if you judge Russian economic and military growth, and Germany falling behind in the naval race, as countervailing factors.

Was Turkey really leaning toward Russia in 1914?

Yes, I cannot recall the name of the book that elaborated on this, but Talaat Bey was seeking a Russian alliance in 1914. The Ottomans were trying to manage the threat with a "trust but verify" policy. Diplomatically they were trying to align with the Russians [but the Russians were having none of it] while at the same time the Ottomans were seeking to bolster their Black Sea Navy.

For that matter, was Bulgaria really wavering?
that I don't know

I agree largely with Tail2Long's logic in his first post in the thread.

I agree with Thoresby's prescriptions though I admit it threading a needle.

King Augeas's post parallels Schroeder's reasoning I quoted to some degree, Britain ended up with an anti-Austrian policy by default and without an attitude of malice towards the empire or premeditation of war

TRH brings up the risk of Britain failing to convince anyone of what they would need to think in order to restrain themselves. However, I don't see how this is worse than OTL, when Britain was telling people what they wanted to hear and not telling people what they knew they didn't want to hear.

Yes Britain would have likely joined Belgium or no Belgium, they were already entrenched with the French due to the Anglo-French naval agreements the French having already deferred protection of northern France to Britain.

If by this you mean Britain was going to go to war over any German attack on France in 1914, whether or not it went through Belgium, I think you are right thezerech. I am not so certain this would be the case if Germany went east first and defended in the west.

In that circumstance (Germany goes east) I could see the British picking from a range of options.

a) they could have declared war on Germany anyway out of a desire to stay on the Franco-Russian good side [if they win without us, they'll be pissed, if they lose they will be pissed and Germany will be too powerful], or the opportunity to blockade Germany and throttle its economic competition
b) they could have remained neutral and watchfully waited to see if Germany was was trying to impose too harsh a defeat on Russia or if it was turning to the offensive in the west.
c) they could have been a biased pro-French neutral, veto'ing German naval sorties against France on pain of war.
d) they could have declared war on Germany and fought it on the cheap, blockading Germany, snapping up its colonies but not bothering to send ground forces to a France that is on the offensive and not pushed back into fighting for its life on its own territory.
e) they could have declared the war and made a slower, stingier ground commitment to France, never forcing conscription or committing beyond what they could support with volunteer forces.
 

Deleted member 94680

British key policy was that no one power would dominate the continent, by 1900 onwards, it seemed that that power would be Germany.

Britain always sided with the 'weaker' side of any alliance block in the understanding that British power (financial, naval, etc) would balance it all out - avoiding war. War was bad for Empire and business.

When the French seemed the threat (Napolean) they sided with the 'weaker' powers to fight - Prussia, Russia, Spain, Portugal etc. When the Russians were the threat (Nicholas I) the British sided with the French and the Turks. After the Treaty of Paris, the assumption was that the French were the strongest on the continent and the Franco-British rivalry returned. 1871 and Sedan changed all that, the unified German Empire became the threat. German awful diplomacy aside, it's unlikely that Britain would align itself with Berlin as that would make the German side too stong in the balance of power.

Grey was broadly following traditional British policy by reaching agreement with the Russians and the French - the greatest threat was continental Germany (with no real navy to speak of and colonial forces that Britain could deal with with one hand behind it's back, the obvious threat was much closer to home). That's why he got as far as he did by tying Britain and France together. An attempt to reach the same kind of agreement with Germany would have been shut down quickly, for instance.

When the details of the agreement became apparent, the Cabinet was horrified (as others have pointed out) and attempts were made to refute it. Germany forced the hand by invading Belguim and making it clear they were trying for domination of the Continent. Traditional British policy took over.
 
No. The Russian Government regraded themselves as having been humiliated when the A-Hs formally took over Bosnia in 1908 without Russia getting anything in return. In the wake of that they were always going to back Serbia to the hilt and tell A-H to drop dead.
 
So your thought is more or less that allowing Serbia & Montenegro to get crushed strengthens Bulgaria's ties to Berlin and Vienna, while Greece and Rumania distance themselves from the unreliable Entente?
Right.
As for the balance of power effects, I guess it is a setback for Russia, and by extension the Entente, in terms of the "yards" on their side of the field. At the same time, the "yards" the Entente concede in the Balkans only sets them back to where things were in 1912, when Serbia was small and the Ottomans dominated the Balkans and had a common border with Austria-Hungary. Rolling back to the 1912 balance of power "horror of horrors" I guess. That doesn't sound like anything the Entente couldn't live with going forward, especially if you judge Russian economic and military growth, and Germany falling behind in the naval race, as countervailing factors.
A rollback to 1912? Doesn't really look that way. In 1912, all the Balkan countries were free; some were pro-Russian and some neutral (but leaning towards the Entente). With the partial exception of the weak and unstable Ottoman Empire.

In this scenario, all pro-Entente elements have been violently removed from the map or scared into distancing themselves. Your mileage may vary, but at this point the phrase "Central Powers playground" sounds like a perfectly accurate description of the region.

It's especially worth noting that this gives Germany a direct connection to the Ottoman Empire, letting it send arms and supplies unhindered via the Balkan railways. It makes the Ottoman Empire even more dangerous for Russia and the Entente - much more dangerous, potentially - and further increases German influence there.
Yes, I cannot recall the name of the book that elaborated on this, but Talaat Bey was seeking a Russian alliance in 1914. The Ottomans were trying to manage the threat with a "trust but verify" policy. Diplomatically they were trying to align with the Russians [but the Russians were having none of it] while at the same time the Ottomans were seeking to bolster their Black Sea Navy.

The Ottoman proposals for an alliance, IIRC, involved some difficult if not impossible conditions; like persuading Greece to cede the Aegean isles. Russia was non-committal but not unfriendly to the Ottomans at the time, even promoting the transfer of Albania to Ottoman control.
 
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