Could Britain/Free France Pull Off D-Day?

Could Britain/Free France Pull off D-Day?

  • Yes

    Votes: 68 43.0%
  • No

    Votes: 90 57.0%

  • Total voters
    158
Alright then, why is it ON is assuming that Goering would issue the retreat order when it was clear the way the generals were leaning and the consequences of a retreat being apparent?


What if that moment never comes then? Even as late as mid-1944 and engaged in Italy Germany was able to contain the Allies in Normandy for a while, but ITTL without the US involved its likely that the Eastern Front doesn't go as bad as IOTL in 1943-44, especially if there is no Italian front in 1943 or a Tunisia-level defeat

Well, I'm sure it won't be good for the British or the Soviets. I would assume, though, that Nazi Germany loses eventually.

Though without Spaatz and his staff around to formulate the Oil Plan, without the USAAF around to split German air defense (and later, to initiate escorted daylight attacks, forcing the Luftwaffe to offer itself up for defeat), without the powerful inter-allied pressure that eventually compelled Harris to (half-heartedly) lend RAF support to the oil-destroying "panacea merchants", it will probably be a longer struggle than mere ground-force considerations suggest.
 

Deleted member 1487

Well, I'm sure it won't be good for the British or the Soviets. I would assume, though, that Nazi Germany loses eventually.

Though without Spaatz and his staff around to formulate the Oil Plan, without the USAAF around to split German air defense (and later, to initiate escorted daylight attacks, forcing the Luftwaffe to offer itself up for defeat), without the powerful inter-allied pressure that eventually compelled Harris to (half-heartedly) lend RAF support to the oil-destroying "panacea merchants", it will probably be a longer struggle than mere ground-force considerations suggest.
That's the thing, I don't think it would likely end up in an Axis defeat; it certainly won't be an Axis victory, unless you consider a stalemate a victory. I see the Soviets running out of steam and the British finally having to just accept an armistice a la North Korea rather than continue, because in 1944 then V-1 is going and without a successful Normandy Britain will be getting hit with those for a long time and the technology will improve. They were working on improved jet engines that would have dramatically widened the range they could be fired from (it increased range, speed, and allowed it to be launched from a grass airfield without any special launch equipment), which renders the OTL defensive AAA belt useless until they really want to spend insane sums on even more AAA. Jets were coming online in 1944, the RAF would not be doing nearly as well as the CBO IOTL, there wouldn't be an oil issue for the Axis without the USAAF (at least not the famine of OTL after the bombing started), while the Soviets aren't going to be pushing nearly as far and will run out of men and have food issues without liberating Ukraine.

Assuming the 6th army isn't lost at Stalingrad, which is a distinct possibility without Hitler or the US in the picture then the Soviets are going to have a MUCH rougher time in 1943 and on, because besides the valuable manpower the Germans lost, they also lost huge amounts of equipment and Allied armies, as well as the ability to keep the Donbass, which was a critical source of raw materials like Nickel. Beyond that as I pointed out in the other thread along the same lines Goering approved Kammhuber's (the guy that ran Germany's night defenses) plans to expand the night defenses in 1942 IOTL, but then Hitler countermanded the order and ended German intruder operations over Britain and blunted the expansion of German night defenses for over a year. ITTL if Goering is Führer that order won't be countermanded and the RAF will have a rougher 1943-44 and may well not be able to operate by night over Germany by 1944. If that happens then Britain is going to have to make a deal because they've lost their most important means of fighting Germany.
For more details this is an excellent book on the night war from the German perspective:
http://www.amazon.com/German-Night-...9603980&sr=8-1&keywords=german+night+fighters

Unless Britain is going to risk Operation Vegetarian they won't be able to win ITTL, but then a 'win' is making a desert and calling it peace; it would be literal genocide and the destruction of continental Europe. If they refrain from that then they will start facing a realistic Luft '46 scenario come 1946; I know its sounds absurd and is a bugaboo of a lot of people on this forum, but without the US contribution the Germans can hold out long enough to get there if peace hasn't been declared.
 
Wiking,
I haven't devoted enough study to the factors involved to be convinced that Germany can hold out vs the USSR, even under these circumstances. I don't think it ridiculous to suggest that she might, however.

I will have to get that book. I read with fascination Hinchliffe's The Other Battle, and would like to know more.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wiking,
I haven't devoted enough study to the factors involved to be convinced that Germany can hold out vs the USSR, even under these circumstances. I don't think it ridiculous to suggest that she might, however.

I will have to get that book. I read with fascination Hinchliffe's The Other Battle, and would like to know more.
Fair enough. I did a bunch of study for a planned TL, so I feel confident that it was the US that pushed Germany over the edge to defeat and without the US in the war even with LL the AUK+USSR more likely than not couldn't defeat Germany, especially without Stalingrad. Even David Glantz, who is basically the best source on Soviet WW2 history in English due to his work in those archives and his lifetime dedication to study of their military for the US army said it was Stalingrad the determined that the Germans would lose the war (with the US in of course), strongly imply that without that defeat that they couldn't really be beaten in the East even with the US in the war. So no US in the war plus no Stalingrad disaster means the Soviets can't defeat Germany. I know that that seems to be a glib analysis based on one historian's one line comment, but everything else I've read on the conflict confirms that. Still, even with a Stalingrad disaster, but no active US participation in the conflict the Soviets would be hard pressed to break through the German 1943 lines and actually win the war and would likely end the war short of their 1941 border.

Also I'll add that the Luftwaffe seems to have been deemed the center of gravity of the German armed forces, the Soviets and Wallies all seemed to agree that it needed to be destroyed to ensure victory and it really was its lack of presence in the east past late 1942 that made the difference. In the West one of the greatest contributions of the US was the attrition and destruction of the Luftwaffe in 1943-44, which opened the economy up to relentless bombing in 1944-45 and freed the VVS of the major threat of the Luftwaffe from 1943-45, which enabled them to be the flying artillery on demand for the Red Army and grind the Germany army to dust. The German army was adamant that they could have held had the Luftwaffe been able to hold off the VVS and render better air support against breakthroughs and Soviet artillery concentrations from 1943-45, but as we know the LW was being killed in the West and unable to render that critical support in the East in sufficient quantity.

That is a good book I'd recommend getting the older version via the library if you can.
 
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Wiking,

About LL, and overall logistic support. I think that, if the U.S. declines to engage in the ETO for whatever reason, she is unlikely to provide anywhere near the OTL total of LL and logistical support. In this case, the U.S. obviously has less commitment to the war in Europe, so it seems likely that that diminished commitment would also impact the level of support she would be willing to provide.

I find it a bit unlikely to posit a "U.S. refuses to engage in ETO, but nonetheless provides full OTL-level assistance in all other respects" scenario.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wiking,

About LL, and overall logistic support. I think that, if the U.S. declines to engage in the ETO for whatever reason, she is unlikely to provide anywhere near the OTL total of LL and logistical support. In this case, the U.S. obviously has less commitment to the war in Europe, so it seems likely that that diminished commitment would also impact the level of support she would be willing to provide.

I find it a bit unlikely to posit a "U.S. refuses to engage in ETO, but nonetheless provides full OTL-level assistance in all other respects" scenario.
Perhaps, perhaps not. I think ITTL it would be an issue of the lack of US domestic will to declare war, but as it was LL was really ramping up anyway before the entry into war, so I could well see it reaching OTL levels of support if not even more for the British.
 
Perhaps, perhaps not. I think ITTL it would be an issue of the lack of US domestic will to declare war, but as it was LL was really ramping up anyway before the entry into war, so I could well see it reaching OTL levels of support if not even more for the British.

Okay, I'll buy that. What about other logistical support? Did the U.S. provide fuel, weapons, munitions, etc, apart from LL?
 

Deleted member 1487

Okay, I'll buy that. What about other logistical support? Did the U.S. provide fuel, weapons, munitions, etc, apart from LL?
AFAIK everything provided was part of LL. But remember too that the British provided Reverse LL:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#Reverse_Lend-lease

I'd imagine the US and British would provide the Soviets with OTL LL, no more and no less because OTL was the maximum they could actually move into the country and even that required billions in investments in infrastructure in Iran and Soviet ports by the Wallies. Britain saves not having to provide LL, while also not hosting US forces. They can get US LL, as much as they have the manpower to use, which I think means more for Indian troops from 1942 on.

So while there is a major loss of US troops and the equipment they operate, the British can save a bit themselves and get the advantage of US neutrality patrols and less damage to shipping in the Atlantic due to the Germans not doing Operation Drumbeat without US entry and having to confine themselves to areas that the British already have covered; the mid-Atlantic Gap cannot be attacked by the Uboats ITTL if they are to keep the US out of the war. So the Battle of the Atlantic is basically over by early 1942 ITTL rather than May-1943. That's a pretty huge savings compared to OTL for the Brits, but then if the Germans reduce naval construction they have a lot more resources for armor and other production (including a lot of steel for expanding synthetic oil production earlier than IOTL).
 
Wiking,
Nice post; I hadn't thought through those ramifications.

Do you anticipate major use of Indian forces (mostly infantry, I'd assume) in the ETO, under these circumstances?

I know there's always somebody around who responds to every proposed setback by suggesting that Britain will simply whistle up two million Indians, fully equipped and trained for European combat, but I've never been convinced. They badly needed more warm bodies in both World Wars, but made only sharply limited use of Indian troops in Europe.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wiking,
Nice post; I hadn't thought through those ramifications.

Do you anticipate major use of Indian forces (mostly infantry, I'd assume) in the ETO, under these circumstances?
They were IOTL. Its just not just an issue of equipment. I'm assuming the US and Japan are at war ITTL and Japan is attacking the Brits too, so the Indians will primarily be used to defend their home and for occupation duty in the Middle East. The lack of training establishment in India will be the big hold on getting European level combat ready Indian troops. I do think Japan will be defeated ITTL in 1944 after a bloody US invasion of the Home Islands and then would require a US invasion of China and Korea to finish off the IJA, as the Soviets won't be able to do that ITTL due to a surviving Germany.

Come 1945 I think there will be Indian troops that could be used in Europe, but I doubt they'd want to fight in Europe at that point. IOTL they were rebelling as it was:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Indian_Navy_mutiny

I know there's always somebody around who responds to every proposed setback by suggesting that Britain will simply whistle up two million Indians, fully equipped and trained for European combat, but I've never been convinced. They badly needed more warm bodies in both World Wars, but made only sharply limited use of Indian troops in Europe.
I agree, the issue was more than just equipment, it was the lack of training establishment and the need to defend India from Japan in Burma, as well as reclaiming the Empire from Japan for prestige reasons. Plus the 2 million men were the total by 1945, not ready in 1942. It took the entire war to get that many men under arms and the majority never saw combat IOTL. Plus its not like the majority of Indians joined up to serve in Europe, they were volunteering to fight Japan and defend India in Asia, not fight an imperial war against Germany.
 
Mawdsley's quote in that second part pretty much lines up with what Megargee says (Bock is basically saying "both trying to withdraw and holding fast are risky so the Fuhrer has to decide") so I'm not sure how it disagree with his interpretation.

He's saying that both trying to hold and withdrawal come with risk. But he then goes on to outline the disadvantages which withdrawal has that holding doesn't, which does seem to imply that he's for holding, particularly when the other quotes hasdrubal barca provided are taken into consideration.

The first bit, which talks about the 13th, lies outside of Megargee's timespan so I'll have to look into it elsewhere. And your last bit... contains no real information other then Kershaw's opinion.

The chronology would seem to fit with Kershaw's opinion though. Bock gave his assessment on the 13th, but only got it through to Hitler on the 16th. That very night, Hitler made the decision to stand fast. And unless Bock was outright lying in his war diary, Hitler's decision would seem to have been based on Bock's assessment as both Kershaw and Fritz indicate. From the quote of the diary provided by hasdrubal barca, "The Fuhrer then explained, quoting my reasons word for word, the pros and cons of staying or retreating, and came to the conclusion that under the prevailing conditions it made no sense to withdraw to an unprepared position leaving behind artillery and equipment. In several days we would be facing the same situation again but now without heavy weapons and without artillery. There was only one decision and that was not t take a single step back."

It does occur to me, though, that Bock advocating standing fast on the 13th, withdrawing on the 15th, and then just metaphorically threw up his hands and went "I don't fucking know!" on the 16th is pretty indicative of some serious indecision on his part. It is rather understandable given the overwhelming strain from the crisis and his age... but it makes me skeptical of precisely how serious of an impact his advice had on those above him. I mean, if you got a piece of advice from someone one day and then the opposite piece of advice from the very same person the next day... what would you think of them?

Are you sure Megargee places Bock coming up with the the ninety mile retreat idea on the 15th? Because every other source I can find which mentions it indicates that it was brought up earlier, in response to a conversation with Halder. From Samuel Mitcham, The Rise of the Wehrmacht, page 498 "On the morning of December 9, he telephoned Halder... After this conversation... He instructed his subordinate commands to prepare to retreat 60 to 90 miles..." From this Army Historical Study, "On the morning of the 9th, resuming a telephone conference begun the night before... From there on the exchange trailed off into futility. Bock responded, "By then the army group will be kaputt [smashed]." Halder replied, "The German soldier does not go kaputt!"... After that Bock instructed the army commands to plan to take the entire army group back sixty to ninety miles to the Rzhev-Gzhatsk-Orel-Kursk line. But he did not believe that would help either because it would take weeks to prepare the new line and to start back before then would be "an excursion into nowhere." Furthermore, the equipment losses sustained in the small withdrawals undertaken so far would be multiplied by the hundreds. At best, the potential relief would probably be negligible." So basically it seems the retreat was an idea he never really believed in that he came up with as an emotional reaction to the conversation with Halder which went badly.

In any case, it seems to me that at the very least there was enough support for holding that Goring might very well have decided in favor of it.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Anyone have Stahel's recent book on Moscow? I'm curious to see what it says as far as the chronology. If not Ill rent it next week.
Which one? I think I have all that have been published, the last one IIRC ends in December before the Soviet offensive.
 

Deleted member 1487

Beyond that as I pointed out in the other thread along the same lines Goering approved Kammhuber's (the guy that ran Germany's night defenses) plans to expand the night defenses in 1942 IOTL, but then Hitler countermanded the order and ended German intruder operations over Britain and blunted the expansion of German night defenses for over a year. ITTL if Goering is Führer that order won't be countermanded and the RAF will have a rougher 1943-44 and may well not be able to operate by night over Germany by 1944. If that happens then Britain is going to have to make a deal because they've lost their most important means of fighting Germany.
Looking at my copy of the book I mentioned I was off on the time frames. In August 1942 Kammhuber did ask for a major expansion, but was denied by Goering, but when he asked again in May 1943 Goering approved it enthusiastically because the Luftwaffe thought the US 8th air force would start night bombing like the RAF. Hitler denied that expansion thereafter. Hitler also cancelled intruder operations in late 1941 that wouldn't happen if Goering was in charge. So if the US wasn't involved the damage the RAF was doing didn't trigger a major expansion of the night fighter force with Goering's consent until 1943, even though the USAAF did play some role in Kammhuber's motivations to ask again (it may have been a ploy to get more resources though, as he wanted expansion earlier, but was denied by Goering). I think Goering was just as much influenced by the damage to the Ruhr the RAF was doing in Spring 1943, so would likely approve this expansion in May 1943, which would influence the situation come late Summer 1943 at the earliest and definitely matter to the Battle of Berlin in Autumn 1943-Spring 1944. The British defeat there would be worse as Kammhuber was asking for a 4 fold increase in strength, which would have likely have happened about the time the RAF started their deep raids against Berlin. IOTL the bombing had to be called off by the RAF due to large losses and to start aiding the bombing in France in preparation for Normandy. ITTL if the increase doubles the Luftwaffe's night fighter force from 500 aircraft in early 1943 to 1000 by the time the Battle of Berlin starts, that is likely going to double the RAF's losses; Kammhuber wanted a final number of 2100 aircraft, which the Luftwaffe had managed to achieve IOTL anyway by late 1944, but likely will have gotten close to that by either late 1943 or Spring 1944 ITTL. A 2-4x as large night fighter force would be pretty devastating to Bomber Command in the 1943-44 period, which historically Bomber Command suffered its worst defeat:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berlin_(RAF_campaign)
t is generally accepted that the Battle of Berlin was a failure for the Royal Air Force (RAF) as it was not the knockout blow that Harris had predicted. The RAF lost 1,047 bombers, with a further 1,682 damaged, and well over 7,000 aircrew, culminating in the raid on Nuremberg on 30 March 1944, when 94 bombers were shot down and 71 were damaged, out of 795 aircraft.[6][7][8]

I'm assuming we aren't going to double RAF losses due to a doubling of the Luftwaffe night fighter force, but a 3-4x as large night fighter force would probably at least double the kill and damage totals, which would effectively render Bomber Command combat ineffective by Spring 1944 and require months of recovery before they could try again.
 
Hmm

Could Britain/Free France Pull Off D-Day?

Background:
U.S. not directly involved in European Theater but is sending lend lease
Eastern Front unfolding similar to OTL and Churchill fears Soviets will end up beyond the Rhine
North Africa and Sicily cleared by end of 1943, invasion of Italian mainland cancelled

In this scenario could Great Britain and Free French forces pull off something similar to Operation Overlord in 1944? Could Free French divisions take the beaches that would were in OTL assigned to the United States? How capable were the Free French when compared to OTL American divisions? Do you think the landings would succeed or fail?

Interested in your thoughts.:)

EDIT: Also any ideas on Operation Dragoon?
If there's no Operation Torch (I don't see Churchill being that keen to do it without the US, for political and diplomatic reasons, and I'm not sure de Gaulle would want the Free French to have to use force on their fellow Frenchmen on that scale, because that would look a lot like a civil war) presumably the Vichy French still have part of mainland France under their control?
 

Deleted member 1487

Wiking wrote



Not compared to the B17 it didn't!

The B17 could carry 3.6 tons of bombs, the Wellington 2.1. The Wellington had less armor and defensive guns too. As to the Wikipedia range they have a tendency to quote the longest range with the minimum payload, so I have no idea what the functional combat range was with given payload.
 
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