Could arabs have won a modern war without air superiority?

[Khanzeer]

As it says in the title
Can modern arab armies [ 1965-1990 for the purpose of our discussion ] win a conventional war against israel / iran/ other middle eastern [ arab] opponents in the absence of air superiority?

If so please mention what changes do they need in their weapons doctrine training to have a chance to weather a superior air force and still able to fight the enemy army to a stalemate at the very least.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

As it says in the title
Can modern arab armies [ 1965-1990 for the purpose of our discussion ] win a conventional war against israel / iran/ other middle eastern [ arab] opponents in the absence of air superiority?

If so please mention what changes do they need in their weapons doctrine training to have a chance to weather a superior air force and still able to fight the enemy army to a stalemate at the very least.

No

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

To elaborate, a ground based air defense a order of magnitude larger than the Egyptians had in. 1973 is needed. What they had was good, but it's sucess in 1973 was due as much to Israeli intelligence failure and overconfidence. It did not take long to figure out the problem & start remediation.

 

[Michele]

As it says in the title
Can modern arab armies [ 1965-1990 for the purpose of our discussion ] win a conventional war against israel / iran/ other middle eastern [ arab] opponents in the absence of air superiority?

If so please mention what changes do they need in their weapons doctrine training to have a chance to weather a superior air force and still able to fight the enemy army to a stalemate at the very least.

Note that side A not having air superiority does not entail that side B has air superiority, which seems to be what you are implying. Control of the air can be contested roughly equally. It is possible that neither side has air superiority, at least not everywhere/not all the time.

 

[Khanzeer]

To elaborate, a ground based air defense a order of magnitude larger than the Egyptians had in. 1973 is needed. What they had was good, but it's sucess in 1973 was due as much to Israeli intelligence failure and overconfidence. It did not take long to figure out the problem & start remediation.

If coupled with a point defence interceptor force that does not try to win air superiority from the enemy but just concentrates on mission kills , will it make it more effective?

And that army stays within the SAM umbrella at all times

 

[Khanzeer]

Note that side A not having air superiority does not entail that side B has air superiority, which seems to be what you are implying. Control of the air can be contested roughly equally. It is possible that neither side has air superiority, at least not everywhere/not all the time.

I would appreciate if can give example of such a campaign from the same era
Iran iraq war maybe ?

 

[Alanith]

The Arabs cannot be expected to reliably win against Israel without either screwing the later into the ground or changing the former beyond recognition.

 

[Petros >Peter Fergus<]

Egypt was winning the 1973 War without air superiority. They fumbled when they left the cover of their surface to air missiles.

A reverse of the Israeli surprise attacks in 1967 wouldn't have been attempted, it would be too likely to trigger a nuclear response from Israel.

They haven't fought since then.

To elaborate, a ground based air defense a order of magnitude larger than the Egyptians had in. 1973 is needed. What they had was good, but it's sucess in 1973 was due as much to Israeli intelligence failure and overconfidence. It did not take long to figure out the problem & start remediation.

In the same way that the Israeli surprise attack in 1967 succeeded thanks to failures in Egyptian intelligence. We don't know how they'd have done in a contest for air control, only that the Egyptians decided to focus on air denial after that.

I don't think Israel could have launched any successful offensives in the 1973 war if the Egyptians didn't start to advance outside their reliable SAM umbrella.

 

[Michele]

I would appreciate if can give example of such a campaign from the same era
Iran iraq war maybe ?

Yes, good example. There were instances of successful air operations on both sides, and of successful ground-to-air interdiction, but neither side had all the time unchallenged air superiority. Yes, on paper one side should have had it, but that was not the case in reality, not always and everywhere.
Note BTW that that was a "modern WWI" war, lasting years. By rights, a superiority should have emerged.
Most wars in the timeframe of reference were, on the contrary, much shorter, which means it's easier that the side that should gain air superiority because of the balance of forces cannot manage to do so for some reason, before the war is nearly over.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

If coupled with a point defence interceptor force that does not try to win air superiority from the enemy but just concentrates on mission kills , will it make it more effective?

And that army stays within the SAM umbrella at all times

Unfortunatly the Soviet technology & system provided could not advance fast enough to keep up with the ground forces. The latter had to advance as they did to achieve Egypt political/military goals.

That the early success of the Egypt air defense was due in a significant part to Israli errors suggests that same system still covering the ground forces could not have done the job. Once the Isralis figured out their errors the Soviet regional AD system in place would not cope. Its like the ground battle. The israli ground commanders made some bad decisions previous to the war & early on. Once they understood the battle they were actually fighting they adapted and came up with better actions.

One variable I am not completely clear on is how much US assistance affected the tactics and operations as the air battle developed.

 

[Khanzeer]

Unfortunatly the Soviet technology & system provided could not advance fast enough to keep up with the ground forces. The latter had to advance as they did to achieve Egypt political/military goals.

If they didn't advance at all then the situation at Syrian front would have worsened?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Possiblly

 

[Linkwerk]

As it says in the title
Can modern arab armies [ 1965-1990 for the purpose of our discussion ] win a conventional war against israel / iran/ other middle eastern [ arab] opponents in the absence of air superiority?

If so please mention what changes do they need in their weapons doctrine training to have a chance to weather a superior air force and still able to fight the enemy army to a stalemate at the very least.

Can modern arab armies .

armies .

Well there's your problem. Recent history is full of military forces in the Arab world performing well on the ground in the face of total enemy air dominance- just not state armies. Everything from tactical-operational defensive (Hezbollah 2006) to operational-strategic offensive (Islamic State, 2014) campaigns have been successfully fought by forces in the middle east with no air forces directly into the teeth of world-class air arms. The Houthis have been regularly carrying out cross-border operations into Saudi Arabia since the start of that bombing campaign.


It seems to be a pattern that the Soviet-trained or influenced Arab militaries (Iraqi, Syrian, pre-1973 Egyptian) when they win, approach land warfare as a protracted siege environment with air warfare playing an ancillary role to that. The major western-supported Arab state armies of the 20th century (Saudi, Jordanian) seem to want to put all their resources into creating proficient air arms and hoping that alone can keep their regime-loyalty focused land forces in business. I don't think the Saudis or Jordanians would send ground troops into an environment with even contested air superiority.

Given the right circumstances, though (limited nearby objectives, maintaining an air force mostly as a fleet-in-being or deterrent, a clear political and popular commitment to a protracted conflict) a Soviet-supplied Arab state could take and hold limited strategic objectives in the face of regional or western air threats. That's quite literally been done on an operational level, it's just usually rapidly un-done by political decisions.

 

[marathag]

The big problem that the Arabs winning in the '70s-80s is that's likely to spiral to WWIII, and nobody wins that

 

[West]

Yes they could win the war, if their willing to throw enough people into the meatgrinder and fight a total war lasting years they can do it.

 

[Khanzeer]

Strike sortie rate is another factor, even if you lose control of the skies but your opponent cannot generate enough sorties to seriously hinder your ground operations then does it really matter

In this way did any nations [ Arab or otherwise ] plan to use ballistic missiles as an equalizer? Hitting airfields without having to resort to risking expensive strike planes

 

[Gunnarnz]

In this way did any nations [ Arab or otherwise ] plan to use ballistic missiles as an equalizer? Hitting airfields without having to resort to risking expensive strike planes

Yes, of course. Look at the FROG-7 and SS-21, as well as the Scud - their accuracy isn't particularly great, but they can loft a nuke or chem warhead at an airfield or POMCUS site quite well. Even if you aren't using NBC weapons, they can drop HE or cluster munitions all over an airfield. The Soviets (and later Russians) put a good deal of effort into SRBMs as a form of long-range artillery and a way of closing down the advantages NATO had in certain key areas. When they were in the business of training and supplying other nations I'm sure the idea got passed on.

 

[HARRY]

It depends on the type of warfare involved in both the Vietnam War (French & American parts) the losing side had air superiority also the Russians in Afghanistan

 

[starman]

Egypt was winning the 1973 War without air superiority. They fumbled when they left the cover of their surface to air missiles.

Assuming you're referring to the failed attack of October 14, Israeli air superiority had little to do with it. With the possible exception of 3rd brigade most losses were due to IDF tanks. The same was true of most other failed Egyptian attacks.

In the same way that the Israeli surprise attack in 1967 succeeded thanks to failures in Egyptian intelligence. We don't know how they'd have done in a contest for air control, only that the Egyptians decided to focus on air denial after that.

The Egyptians had no choice but to rely on SAMs because the MIG-21 had so many drawbacks--poor cockpit visibility, limited endurance, ineffective weapons....

don't think Israel could have launched any successful offensives in the 1973 war if the Egyptians didn't start to advance outside their reliable SAM umbrella.

The Egyptians' worst mistake was to squander too much in futile attacks from October 10-17.

 

[starman]

To elaborate, a ground based air defense a order of magnitude larger than the Egyptians had in. 1973 is needed. What they had was good, but it's sucess in 1973 was due as much to Israeli intelligence failure and overconfidence.

The Israelis had Tagar and Dougman but implementation of the former was hindered by the need to deal with Syrian ground forces. The latter just failed...

It did not take long to figure out the problem & start remediation.

The real "remediation" came from ground forces knocking out SAM batteries.