Could a defeat against Taiwan trigger the fall of communist China?

[Antiochus V]

I have mixed views on the future ability of Taiwan to defend itself without foreign help, which rather changes the scenario into the Chinese government falls after a war with at least one other major power.

However if we go for a historical situation, perhaps around or just after the Tianamen square protests the government of Taiwan declares independence then. Seeking to divert attention from domestic problems the government of China hastily invades and makes a real hash of it, heavy losses at land and in the sea, massive civilian casualties in Taiwan and global revulsion are the result. This is probably the sort of situation in which the Chinese government is most vulnerable, but even then it relies on the invasion being the final straw and not underlying cause.

 

[authenticity]

Imho, there's no way Taiwan, on it's own, can prevent an invasion. Mainland China is simply too powerfull. The only way to stop it would be if the US got involved. Which would bring up the very real possibility of at least a tactical nuke going of. Would ruin the day, for everyone.

This goes against the established thought of security analysts who make living off following cross-strait issues for decades. Is this based on facts and educated analysis hereto never presented, or an adolescent guess on an online forum? Fwiw the tipping point (to PLA's favour) is not far off.

 

[Hammerbolt]

This goes against the established thought of security analysts who make living off following cross-strait issues for decades. Is this based on facts and educated analysis hereto never presented, or an adolescent guess on an online forum? Fwiw the tipping point (to PLA's favour) is not far off.

Puting aside the feeble atempt at childish insults, what exactly is the "established thought" then?

 

[authenticity]

I have mixed views on the future ability of Taiwan to defend itself without foreign help, which rather changes the scenario into the Chinese government falls after a war with at least one other major power.

Now, Chinese PLA rarely publish any data on their resources, with one exception: They are generous on details on their troops around Fujian, which they hope would be acting as a deterrent to a DPP independency scenario. We know PLA's relatively weak (but rapidly strengthening) amphibious capabilities with less than 20,000 marines. Taiwan is capable of defending itself with minimal US assistance given territorial advantages and China's lack of air and sea superiority. Taiwan could easily pluck off PLA landing craft as they motored across the strait.

China has a large missile force to destroy Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, but it would still need to take Taipei by total surprise to be successful - Taiwan has some 36 military airfields on its islands, highways doubling as bases and endless number of mobile cruise missiles/launchers. China cannot strike all of them out, even in a surprise attack - a total surprise which is basically impossible to achieve. You don't need Taiwan/US sig, sat and com intel (a PLA Navy soldier in Mawei cannot tie his shoes without the Taiwanese knowing) - a pair of toy binoculars will do.

We are talking about a scale of destruction that the US (a much stronger force than China) could not unleash against an infinitely weaker and poorer armed adversary that defended a flat piece of land, like Serbia or Iraq. Areas where PLA could build a beach head is just a few km of coastline - an amphibious force would be immediately outnumbered. Pentagon reports show iit would take a ridiculous little amount of ordnance, around 10,000 kgs - we're talking about one single bomber - to decimate an invading force.

EDIT: I would recommend this (peer-reviewed) article in International Security by Michael Beckley at the Harvard KSG that explain and summarise China's ability to attack Taiwan and SE China Sea (and their ability to mount a defence) as a great primer on the subject

https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00294

 

[authenticity]

Going back to the original theme of this post: WI Xi and the Politburo green lights an invasion of Taiwan - that inevitably fails?

Setting aside the rationale why CPC leadership would go ahead with an effort they have already concluded is doomed to fail (DPP independence declaration a trigger?)...

At onset, Xi is not in control of the party, which is strongly divided over key policy directions, senior posts and opposition to economic reforms. There is basically only one area where there is a uniform view across CPC: territorial integrity.

If Xi would fail to deliver on such core national interest (even if he opposed the attack in the first place) like Taiwan, he would be ousted in matter of hours by a broad alliance of the power factions: the princelings, Deng & Hu loyals, provinces, Shanghai bang, Youth League or the Shanxi group.

I'm struggling to think of a group Xi hasn't upset.

 

[dvyws]

And now you all have me panicking over the fate of the Harbour Bar in Kao-Siung and the Hollywood bar in Keelung...

They being my favourite watering holes in the Far East, following the demise of the Licky Tomato bar in Kobe*.

* I suppose their demise is inevitable, though - after the Licky Tomato burned to the ground in the fire that engulfed most of Kobe many years ago, I transferred my affections to the Shrimp Bar at Barbour's cut on the Houston river. Sadly it washed away in the storm surge from a hurricane (it was made of wood, and literally just floated away into the Gulf of Mexico). Then there was Pat O'Brian's in New Orleans (Hurricane Katrina), and Wetherspoons pub in Woolwich - burned down in the London riots.

For some reason the landlord of the Ship Inn in Gainsborough has offered me money to NOT drink there...

 

[Hammerbolt]

Now, Chinese PLA rarely publish any data on their resources, with one exception: They are generous on details on their troops around Fujian, which they hope would be acting as a deterrent to a DPP independency scenario. We know PLA's relatively weak (but rapidly strengthening) amphibious capabilities with less than 20,000 marines. Taiwan is capable of defending itself with minimal US assistance given territorial advantages and China's lack of air and sea superiority. Taiwan could easily pluck off PLA landing craft as they motored across the strait.

Any information on how many could be airdropped, once the air defences? The straight is less than 200km; even a Blackhawk-class heli could carry troops across.

 

[authenticity]

Any information on how many could be airdropped, once the air defences? The straight is less than 200km; even a Blackhawk-class heli could carry troops across.

Beckley's estimate (see link in my first post) is around 6,000 paratroopers, which is probably an optimistic figure. With air superiority being an ASB prospect, PLAA would probably not attempt the endeavour in the first place. Even twice that number, PLA is dead in the water. I really recommend reading it before asserting any opinions on the topic.

Here is a slightly more optimistic view by Australia's (and highly respected) Lowly Institute. Conclusion: For now an invasion is questionable, but not impossible: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/has-pla-really-overlooked-its-amphibious-force

Finally: if it was actually doable, Xi would have done it. I tend to concur with the US, Australian and Taiwanese analysts (who I deal with in my daily work) that China will attempt an invasion in the coming decade as Taiwan's sea and air superiority, will be lost in the coming five years.

 

[Hammerbolt]

Beckley's estimate (see link in my first post) is around 6,000 paratroopers, which is probably an optimistic figure. With air superiority being an ASB prospect, PLAA would probably not attempt the endeavour in the first place. Even twice that number, PLA is dead in the water. I really recommend reading it before asserting any opinions on the topic.

Here is a slightly more optimistic view by Australia's (and highly respected) Lowly Institute. Conclusion: For now an invasion is questionable, but not impossible: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/has-pla-really-overlooked-its-amphibious-force

Thanks, good information.

Finally: if it was actually doable, Xi would have done it. I tend to concur with the US, Australian and Taiwanese analysts (who I deal with in my daily work) that China will attempt an invasion in the coming decade as Taiwan's sea and air superiority, will be lost in the coming five years.

Tbh, I doubt China will do it as long as the US stands by Taiwan. The risks of a confrontation, and a possible escalation are simply too great.

 

[Barry Bull]

This goes against the established thought of security analysts who make living off following cross-strait issues for decades. Is this based on facts and educated analysis hereto never presented, or an adolescent guess on an online forum? Fwiw the tipping point (to PLA's favour) is not far off.

It is really a question of how one frame the invasion. The PLAAF is rapidly advancing in terms of material superiority, esp. in terms of stealth aircrafts which the ROCAF would have difficulty to counter.

Any information on how many could be airdropped, once the air defences? The straight is less than 200km; even a Blackhawk-class heli could carry troops across.

It is less a problem of air transport capacity, but lack of good landing sites. The experience of the ROC Army paratroopers is that there are only a few sites in Taiwan that are open and flat enough to allow paratroopers to land safely, relatively speaking. To drop mechanized equipments would mean larger landing sites which are rarer. And the few usable landing sites are all relatively far away from important locations and well known to the ROC forces. It is open secret that anti airborne obstacles and measures are in place to deny the use of such sites to the PLAAF airborne troops.

The sames goes for naval landing sites.

The 200km figure is deceiving as one need to take into account detours, combat / evasive manuvers and fuel wasted when individual helis are waiting others to get into formation. Also, the PLAGF remains quite poorly equipped with middle and heavy transport helis.

 

[Barry Bull]

EDIT: I would recommend this (peer-reviewed) article in International Security by Michael Beckley at the Harvard KSG that explain and summarise China's ability to attack Taiwan and SE China Sea (and their ability to mount a defence) as a great primer on the subject

https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00294

While the article is nice, it is disappointing that there is no discussion on the effect of PLA air and missile interdiction to ROC mobilization and getting the mobilized reserves into position.

The effect of J-20 entering deployment on ROC AWACS and ground based early warning system is also a point that people ought to take notice.

 

[BlondieBC]

Pretty self explanatory, I want to know whether you think a military defeat against Taiwan would trigger the fall of the CCCP from power. By defeat I mean the impossibility to invade the island.
The casus belli is a referendum for Taiwanese independence
In this scenario, there has been no outside interference in the conflict, outside of the usual arms deals

Probably best answer is "Could but probably would not". It also depends a lot on the year and how bad the defeat was. War is this chaotic, angry beast that rarely gives leaders what they expected. There are lots of variable that can synergize in a negative way here. The big one that jumps to mind is effects on trade. It is not that the Taiwanese can really blockade all trade, but that other countries or shipping lines are very reluctant to ship to a war zone. Briefly looking at a map, Hong Kong and Shanghai appear to be within 300 miles of Taiwan and merchant ships are not that hard to hit, especially if well out to sea. So think about this type of ATL.

• Assume China happens to be lead by some Flag Officers that are bad like some of OTL leaders.
• Assume Chinese weapon capabilities are a bit overrated.
• Taiwan gets the jump and does a decisive strike in the early hours of the wear. Catches a bunch of fighters on the ground or otherwise poorly used. Think Japan attacking PI in first day of WW2 in Pacific. Or Egyptian Air Force in 6 day war. Then China stays aggressive since they have to cover invasion fleet.
• Troops get ashore. Enough to hold for long time, but not enough to take island.
• By day 6 or so, Chinese long range fighter air power is thing of past. By day 10 or so, Chinese warships have taken heavy losses and only enter waters near Taiwan in force.
• Chinese army in Taiwan fights bravely before surrendering 100 days or so in war.
• Chinese just can't quite use nukes cause of USA. Once clear China is losing in Air, USA massively resupplies Taiwan.
• After 200 days or so, cease fire is declared.

I am not so much focusing on these events to destabilize China, but the trade. What happens when ocean going trade to China is down by over 90% for 200 days. Over 200 days without new petroleum shipments. Looks like F-16 has decent range, so some inland targets may be hit. Not sure what would be key, but think of something like Three Gorges Dam is hit and lake has to be drained. This means shipping can't go through the locks, so the Yangtze is cut in half. If you don't like this, think of something else like systematic damage to docks. Or coal plants. Remember the cumulative effect of say 30 F-16 hitting industrial targets each day for 150 days. Say 10,000 of the 2000-lb bombs. It would be a lot of power plants for example.

So yes, you can write an ATL where a the Chinese government falls. But most Chinese losses will be 1-2 bad years, then China gets her mojo back.

 

[authenticity]

I am not so much focusing on these events to destabilize China, but the trade. What happens when ocean going trade to China is down by over 90% for 200 days.

Trade effects would be more immediate than 200 days and collateral economic and infrastructural damage. Taiwanese firms owns (and control) about 20% of China's exporting capabilities, roughly equivalent to China's entire GDP growth. There would be an immediate effect on China's current account (even prior to the attack), which is already running a deficit.

Which goes back to the original question. Xi is in a precarious situation. The only consensus in the politburo right now is on how to deal with the DPP-ruled Taiwan. If there was an independence declaration by Tsei, Xi would be forced to go to a protracted war - a war he can neither afford to win (in economic terms) nor to lose (historical loss of face, ending with him hung).

The only viable scenario for Xi and CPC is their frienemies in KMT returning to power, back cross-strait rapprochement through track two diplomacy, strengthening economic dependencies building on the existing cross-strait trade agreement. Beijing may even allow Taiwan CPTPP or conclude an agreement with Europe to rally support for a cross-strait investment agreement.

 

[authenticity]

While the article is nice, it is disappointing that there is no discussion on the effect of PLA air and missile interdiction to ROC mobilization and getting the mobilized reserves into position.

The effect of J-20 entering deployment on ROC AWACS and ground based early warning system is also a point that people ought to take notice.

I agree J-20 forward stealth capability is a game changer, but I was under the belief that Taiwan's early warning system (and mitigating China's first-strike advantage) is not hinged on E2 awacs alone. Historically, Taiwan got first signals through hum-int rather than sig. I've never spoken to Beckley, but the article itself is a state-of-play analysis, intended to debunk the myth/propaganda of the "invincible PLA", which probably PLA itself doesn't subscribe to.

There needs to be a serious researched piece on how Taiwan's air and sea superiority may be lost, which will be quite useful for a wider security policy audience, rather than the usual tactical nuts and bolts that seems to be geared towards the clientele working in strategic exports, or people with serious arms fetish. Most of discussion right now is focused on how it is bound to happen if we don't sell them the F35 or allow them to upgrade their submarine fleet with IDS.

 

[Hammerbolt]

• Assume China happens to be lead by some Flag Officers that are bad like some of OTL leaders.
• Assume Chinese weapon capabilities are a bit overrated.
• Taiwan gets the jump and does a decisive strike in the early hours of the wear. Catches a bunch of fighters on the ground or otherwise poorly used. Think Japan attacking PI in first day of WW2 in Pacific. Or Egyptian Air Force in 6 day war.

This assumes a truly stagering amount of incompetence at every level, tbh. Forget the flag officers. You are talking 200+ fighters taking off, forming up and heading out across open sea, prety much unseen and unchalenged, carrying Mavericks, JDAMs and HARMs, while everyone in every air defence asset in the mainland (on the ground, on ships and in the air) is either asleep, drunk or drugged?

And, assuming this actually happens, what, exactly, would prevent China from raining severall hundred CJ-10, DF-11, DF-15, B-611 and DF-21 missiles on every base in Taiwan? The few Patriot and Sky Bow bateries? Whatever fighters survived that initial attack?

 

[Pelranius]

Now, Chinese PLA rarely publish any data on their resources, with one exception: They are generous on details on their troops around Fujian, which they hope would be acting as a deterrent to a DPP independency scenario. We know PLA's relatively weak (but rapidly strengthening) amphibious capabilities with less than 20,000 marines. Taiwan is capable of defending itself with minimal US assistance given territorial advantages and China's lack of air and sea superiority. Taiwan could easily pluck off PLA landing craft as they motored across the strait.

China has a large missile force to destroy Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, but it would still need to take Taipei by total surprise to be successful - Taiwan has some 36 military airfields on its islands, highways doubling as bases and endless number of mobile cruise missiles/launchers. China cannot strike all of them out, even in a surprise attack - a total surprise which is basically impossible to achieve. You don't need Taiwan/US sig, sat and com intel (a PLA Navy soldier in Mawei cannot tie his shoes without the Taiwanese knowing) - a pair of toy binoculars will do.

We are talking about a scale of destruction that the US (a much stronger force than China) could not unleash against an infinitely weaker and poorer armed adversary that defended a flat piece of land, like Serbia or Iraq. Areas where PLA could build a beach head is just a few km of coastline - an amphibious force would be immediately outnumbered. Pentagon reports show iit would take a ridiculous little amount of ordnance, around 10,000 kgs - we're talking about one single bomber - to decimate an invading force.

EDIT: I would recommend this (peer-reviewed) article in International Security by Michael Beckley at the Harvard KSG that explain and summarise China's ability to attack Taiwan and SE China Sea (and their ability to mount a defence) as a great primer on the subject

https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00294

That assumes the Mainland will invade Taiwan. Without outside intervention, the Mainland can indefinitely maintain a blockade against Taiwan.

A long term blockade at the very least will force Taipei to enter political negotiations, among other things.

 

[Pelranius]

China is going to have to back off on the Taiwan issue at some point. They'll have a PR nightmare and immediate blockade slammed down on them.

And it provides a great justification for Japan to rearm. And of course they'd scream bloody murder if the Japanese started building fleet carriers again, despite it being a black eye of their own making.

Never mind the technology, what will keep China from successfully enforcing their rather racist "one China" policy is the regime's tenuous grasp of causality, arrogance, and bad press everywhere their state news agencies don't censor.

How's Japan going to pay for those fleet carriers without scrapping the rest of their military?

 

[RousseauX]

I am not so much focusing on these events to destabilize China, but the trade. What happens when ocean going trade to China is down by over 90% for 200 days. Over 200 days without new petroleum shipments. Looks like F-16 has decent range, so some inland targets may be hit. Not sure what would be key, but think of something like Three Gorges Dam is hit and lake has to be drained. This means shipping can't go through the locks, so the Yangtze is cut in half. If you don't like this, think of something else like systematic damage to docks. Or coal plants. Remember the cumulative effect of say 30 F-16 hitting industrial targets each day for 150 days. Say 10,000 of the 2000-lb bombs. It would be a lot of power plants for example.

So yes, you can write an ATL where a the Chinese government falls. But most Chinese losses will be 1-2 bad years, then China gets her mojo back.

Why would 30 F-16 be capable of hitting industrial target for 150 days??? Even under circumstances far more favorible to the a land striking air force, 30 planes would be attritioned away very, very fast even if the casualty right per sortie is ~10%.

China currently has AA misses capable of blanketing the entirety of the Taiwanese island. The idea that 30 F-16s will have free reign to operate over southern China does not conform with reality. The Taiwanese air force would have trouble keeping up an air -presence- over the straits, let along free roaming over southern China.

 

[RousseauX]

How's Japan going to pay for those fleet carriers without scrapping the rest of their military?

more to the point, even if they do China can out build Japan in terms of naval/carrier killer capacities if Japan opts for carriers. Simply because the Chinese economy is a lot bigger.

Japan re-arming and going into an arms race with China is going to look a lot like interwar Japan trying to outbuild the US.

 

[Pelranius]

Probably best answer is "Could but probably would not". It also depends a lot on the year and how bad the defeat was. War is this chaotic, angry beast that rarely gives leaders what they expected. There are lots of variable that can synergize in a negative way here. The big one that jumps to mind is effects on trade. It is not that the Taiwanese can really blockade all trade, but that other countries or shipping lines are very reluctant to ship to a war zone. Briefly looking at a map, Hong Kong and Shanghai appear to be within 300 miles of Taiwan and merchant ships are not that hard to hit, especially if well out to sea. So think about this type of ATL.

• Assume China happens to be lead by some Flag Officers that are bad like some of OTL leaders.
• Assume Chinese weapon capabilities are a bit overrated.
• Taiwan gets the jump and does a decisive strike in the early hours of the wear. Catches a bunch of fighters on the ground or otherwise poorly used. Think Japan attacking PI in first day of WW2 in Pacific. Or Egyptian Air Force in 6 day war. Then China stays aggressive since they have to cover invasion fleet.
• Troops get ashore. Enough to hold for long time, but not enough to take island.
• By day 6 or so, Chinese long range fighter air power is thing of past. By day 10 or so, Chinese warships have taken heavy losses and only enter waters near Taiwan in force.
• Chinese army in Taiwan fights bravely before surrendering 100 days or so in war.
• Chinese just can't quite use nukes cause of USA. Once clear China is losing in Air, USA massively resupplies Taiwan.
• After 200 days or so, cease fire is declared.

I am not so much focusing on these events to destabilize China, but the trade. What happens when ocean going trade to China is down by over 90% for 200 days. Over 200 days without new petroleum shipments. Looks like F-16 has decent range, so some inland targets may be hit. Not sure what would be key, but think of something like Three Gorges Dam is hit and lake has to be drained. This means shipping can't go through the locks, so the Yangtze is cut in half. If you don't like this, think of something else like systematic damage to docks. Or coal plants. Remember the cumulative effect of say 30 F-16 hitting industrial targets each day for 150 days. Say 10,000 of the 2000-lb bombs. It would be a lot of power plants for example.

So yes, you can write an ATL where a the Chinese government falls. But most Chinese losses will be 1-2 bad years, then China gets her mojo back.

Blowing up the Three Gorges Dam (assuming that it could be done) would result in at least hundreds of thousands of deaths. Deaths for which China will respond to tenfold (I leave up to your imagination to think of what that would look like...)

And that also assumes that those 30 F-16s don't get blown up on the ground.