Could 1940 Blitzkrieg work if France controls the Westbank of the Rhine?

Winston Churchill begins his war memoirs with-

"On Armistice Day, November 11,1918, the German armies had marched homeward in good order. "They fought well," said Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Generalissimo of the Allies, speaking in soldierly mood: "let them keep their weapons."

But he demanded that the French frontier should henceforth be the Rhine.
Germany might be disarmed; her mili- tary system shivered in frag- ments; her fortresses dis- mantled; Germany might be im- poverished; she might be loaded with measureless indemnities; she might become a prey to in- ternal feuds; but all this would pass in 10 years or in 20. But the Rhine, the broad, deep, swift- flowing Rhine, once held and fortified by the French army, would be a barrier and a shield behind which France could dwell and breathe for generations. "

The French objective since Charlemagne split up the Frankish Empire was to secure the westbank of the Rhine. The French Revolution in 3 years accomplished what the Bourbons had failed to do in 300 years. And indeed the most important conquest of the Napoleonic Era was the Republican capture of the Rhine. It was the securing of France's "natural frontiers" that made possible all of Napoleon's offensives.

In 1918 France was once again in a military position to secure the Rhine frontier. It was only the interference of Woodrow Wilson's idealism that prevented this.

I'm interested in the military aspects of Hitler's Panzers attempting a blitzkrieg across the Rhine. So suppose domestic political history plays out the same in both France and Germany 1918-1940. Assuming the French and German militaries stand roughly equivalent to OTL, how much stronger is the Rhine than the Maginot Line? For the sake of this military simulation, let us assume that France gains the entire German Rhineland and does not share it with Belgium or the Netherlands. Is France safe behind the Rhine or is that an 18th century military idea no more defensible in the 20th century than medieval castles?
 
Looking at it through a purely military viewpoint, the Rhine would be a very useful barrier, but even more useful would be the control of Germany's extremely valuable Ruhr region, which, even if France annexes only the half west of the Rhine, would still deal a crippling blow to German industry.

However, annexation of the left bank of the Rhine would raise a whole host of butterflies and issues which would majorly affect France. The annexation of territory containing millions of German citizens would be extremely difficult to justify under any humanitarian or ideological reasons (in fact, the only justification was military security), not to mention numerous other problems. If, for example, the Germans are turned into French citizens, and given the right to vote, the French Parliament would be flooded many extremely hostile representatives, and even become a significant voting bloc. Under no circumstances would France do this. Instead, and more likely, the Germans will almost certainly be disenfranchised, and probably not given citizenship. This raises the question of the governance of these territories. Are they ruled as colonies, by appointment, or kept under a semi-permanent state of military rule? How does France integrate this territory into her state? If France, for example, were to expel some large part of the German population east of the Rhine, she would come under severe criticism, even from her allies, for the inevitable human rights abuses and laxitudes which would follow.

In regards to Germany, you have a somewhat weaker Germany, but with its Silesia industrial region still intact. Despite this, right-wing parties will be much more powerful, and much more hostile to France. A strong possibility includes a greater rapprochement with the USSR, despite ideological differences, with the USSR backing what's left of Germany, partially as Germany is so much weaker, and thus more susceptible to the USSR's influence, and also because Germany will have less time to rail against the USSR when there's a much more pleasing target to the west. Expect the Rhineland issue to dominate most of German foreign policy up to a second WW, if there is one. You can certainly expect it to overshadow even Poland, by a great deal.

Oh, also, does Germany keep the Rhine bridgeheads and the eastern half of the Ruhr?
 
The French objective since Charlemagne split up the Frankish Empire was to secure the westbank of the Rhine. The French Revolution in 3 years accomplished what the Bourbons had failed to do in 300 years. And indeed the most important conquest of the Napoleonic Era was the Republican capture of the Rhine. It was the securing of France's "natural frontiers" that made possible all of Napoleon's offensives.

In 1918 France was once again in a military position to secure the Rhine frontier. It was only the interference of Woodrow Wilson's idealism that prevented this.

I'm interested in the military aspects of Hitler's Panzers attempting a blitzkrieg across the Rhine. So suppose domestic political history plays out the same in both France and Germany 1918-1940. Assuming the French and German militaries stand roughly equivalent to OTL, how much stronger is the Rhine than the Maginot Line? For the sake of this military simulation, let us assume that France gains the entire German Rhineland and does not share it with Belgium or the Netherlands. Is France safe behind the Rhine or is that an 18th century military idea no more defensible in the 20th century than medieval castles?

If Germany attacks into the teeth of France's defenses, France kicks German ass and the war's over. Germany was only able to win by bypassing those defenses, here political demands mean it has no choice but to attack the French right where the French will want them to attack them.
 
If France had that level of power and influence after the Great war to occupy the Westbank, would they not have considered the simplest option with the greatest effect, the elimination of the German State. For While France as a nation State had a long History, Germany did not. In fact some in Germany in 1918 were born before there was a Germany, and most had parents whom were born and lived in the germanies before the German State was created. A disunited Germany would have stopped a Blitzkrieg from being crafted that could have worked against France in 1940. By 1940, Germany might have finally become united into a Nation State again (assuming there was a Hitler, unification likely would have consumed his entire Political and actual life), but would not have had the time to develop a modern integrated War Machine. I estimate this would have taken till 1950, which means that both France and the U.K. would have had enough time to modernize, and the Soviet Union would have been able to rebuild from the damages of Stalin (assuming he was in charge) did with his Purges.
 
If France had that level of power and influence after the Great war to occupy the Westbank, would they not have considered the simplest option with the greatest effect, the elimination of the German State. For While France as a nation State had a long History, Germany did not. In fact some in Germany in 1918 were born before there was a Germany, and most had parents whom were born and lived in the germanies before the German State was created. A disunited Germany would have stopped a Blitzkrieg from being crafted that could have worked against France in 1940. By 1940, Germany might have finally become united into a Nation State again (assuming there was a Hitler, unification likely would have consumed his entire Political and actual life), but would not have had the time to develop a modern integrated War Machine. I estimate this would have taken till 1950, which means that both France and the U.K. would have had enough time to modernize, and the Soviet Union would have been able to rebuild from the damages of Stalin (assuming he was in charge) did with his Purges.

Following your reasoning, Bohemia and Moravia should stay a part of Austria, right? They were never an independent country before after all?
Likewise all Poles living never experienced an independent Poland?

The problem with your nice ideas of "the Germanies".
For almost three hundred years "the Germanies" became the chosen battleground in any European war. Sooner or later any war involving any neighbors of "the Germanies" spilled over into "the Germanies".
For the simple reason that "the Germanies" were disunited and couldn´t defend themselves. So fighting battles there might devastate some German
territories and might kill German civilians but it would leave the territories of the war-fighting countries untouched. How convenient for them!
A lot of Germans in the 19th century - even if they didn´t like Bismarck and the Prussians that much - finally had enough of being the chosen battleground of their neighbours. Not to mention the fact that their neighbours in the 300 years before used their armies to annex parts of "the Germanies".

So I suspect lots of Germans would fell resentment to your plan of making them victims again? And a lot sooner than you might expect?
 
The Rhine is a much, much better barrier than the Ardennes or any hypothetical Maginot Line. Not to mention the loss of all that industry in the Ruhr. Of course, the French would be ruling over millions of pissed off Germans...

Still, this would cause oodles of butterflies. It might not necessarily be the Nazis that later come to power, and it would be a different kind of war, if war there was.
 
An independent Rhenish Republic as was half heartedly sponsored in OTL? Perhaps a more serious effort is put into it, with financial backing from France and military bases leased within its territory. It would be a lot easier to do that than France outright annexing the land - and effectively you have the same military security outcome that is desired.
 
The Rhine is a much, much better barrier than the Ardennes or any hypothetical Maginot Line. Not to mention the loss of all that industry in the Ruhr. Of course, the French would be ruling over millions of pissed off Germans...

Still, this would cause oodles of butterflies. It might not necessarily be the Nazis that later come to power, and it would be a different kind of war, if war there was.


If the French had pulled this of (doubtfull at best) four years of war had destroyed a lot of homes in the battle zone and led to a lot of hatred. It's not unthinkable that they might do what the Poles did 27 years later and expell the Germans at bayonet point to provide homes and jobs for those displaced French families.
 
If the French had pulled this of (doubtfull at best) four years of war had destroyed a lot of homes in the battle zone and led to a lot of hatred. It's not unthinkable that they might do what the Poles did 27 years later and expell the Germans at bayonet point to provide homes and jobs for those displaced French families.

However, doing so would be difficult to justify, even by the destroyed homes of some Frenchmen; They would not only be completely forfeiting what existed of their moral high ground by committing what can only be described as completely purposeful war crimes, un-equaled by even the imaginings of the most racist and anti-Semitic German generals, and the Americans, to say the least, would find it difficult to swallow a proposition which is rather bluntly nationalist, and which pisses all over the principles of self-determination outlined in the fourteen points. Furthermore, expelling all the Germans would create a massive labor shortage in the Rhineland which would make it fairly useless until it can be suitably repopulated, in particular, by skilled workers who can replace the expellees. And you probably just accelerated the seizure of power by ultra-nationalist parties in German by about ten years.
 
If the French had pulled this of (doubtfull at best) four years of war had destroyed a lot of homes in the battle zone and led to a lot of hatred. It's not unthinkable that they might do what the Poles did 27 years later and expell the Germans at bayonet point to provide homes and jobs for those displaced French families.

nah. poland had lots of poles coming in from the sovietised east.

france on the other hand has already too little frenchmen to fill up france. filling up the rhineland with french would lower overall population density in france.

high population density is good for industry - lots of skilled workers in one easy to access place.
 
about the rhine would be a very useful barrier ?

how long neede the allies to cross the rhine during invasion of Thrid Reich ?
General Patton cross it and one day later was 10 km deep on east rhine
and caputure 19000 german troops
 
about the rhine would be a very useful barrier ?

how long neede the allies to cross the rhine during invasion of Thrid Reich ?
General Patton cross it and one day later was 10 km deep on east rhine
and caputure 19000 german troops

The German army by that time had pretty much completely fallen apart at that point, and in any case, the best German troops were always reserved for the Eastern Front.
 
about the rhine would be a very useful barrier ?

how long neede the allies to cross the rhine during invasion of Thrid Reich ?
General Patton cross it and one day later was 10 km deep on east rhine
and caputure 19000 german troops

Patton had a vastly superior logistical and military system to a German force that would be attempting to attack over the Rhine in this scenario.
 

Cook

Banned
So suppose domestic political history plays out the same in both France and Germany 1918-1940.
You really could not suppose such a thing with French occupation of the Rhineland, too much is changed by it.

However…

The Treaty of Versailles, imposed on Germany in 1919 included specific details concerning the Rhineland, designed to provide a measure of security to France against any future German attack. Specifically:

Article 42
Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the East of the Rhine.

Article 43
In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44
In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

On 7 March 1936, without prior notification, Hitler sent his forces to remilitarize the Rhineland in direct violation, not only of the Treaty of Versailles, but also of the Locarno Pact signed in 1925. As such he had committed a hostile act and one that threatened the basic assumptions of France’s national security; France had full legal justification to use military force to expel the German armed forces from the Rhineland and reoccupy the German territory that they had left only six years before. Had they had the will to do so they had more than enough forces to do so; the Wehrmacht had sent nineteen infantry battalions to occupy the Rhineland, a total of 32,000 troops out of overall army strength of 250,000. This was backed by Luftwaffe strength of only ten available armed aircraft. France, without calling up reserves had 320,000 troops available in mainland France, there were also 100,000 native troops in North Africa that were able to be moved to the mainland on short notice. The French air force was also sizable. If there were a battle for the Rhineland it would have been decidedly one sided even if the French hadn’t mobilized their huge army reserve.

In fact there would not have been a battle for the Rhineland even if the French had reacted; Hitler was bluffing and had given orders that no resistance was to be offered to any French reaction. At the first sign of trouble his forces were to march out of the Rhineland as quickly as they had marched in; Germany simply lacked the strength for a fight. Conscription had only been reintroduced the year before, rearmament had barely started and the Luftwaffe had just celebrated its first birthday and consisted of mostly training aircraft.

Had they decided to do so the French could have marched into the Rhineland in strength, unopposed and because of the treaties of Versailles and Locarno, fully within their rights to do so and to remain until the situation in Germany improved, depriving Hitler of the mining and industry of the entire Rhineland including the Saar, and exposing the Ruhr industrial heartland of Germany to bombardment should fighting breakout.

If that had happened, the mystique of Fuhrer infallibility that started then and grew with each successive back-down by the western powers in the years that followed would have been stillborn. Hitler would have faced more resistance internally to Germany’s path to war. Even if the bumbling German opposition to Hitler had never improved, Hitler would still have been faced with French control of the Rhineland buffer, the broad obstacle of the Rhine itself, in some places half a kilometre wide and swiftly flowing, as well as ground east of the Rhine itself.

Instead the French did nothing for two reasons, the first being Hitler’s perfect timing; France was only six weeks away from an election and military action, even though it could be fully justified, would have been hugely unpopular with the French electorate. The second reason is that France in the interwar period never did anything unilaterally, insisting on consulting London first on everything. This was rather odd since the British, even if they were interested in stopping Hitler (which in 1936 they were not) didn’t have any means with which to do so; the French had been persuaded in 1919 not to annex the Rhineland by assurances from the British that they would send an army to defend France if it was ever threatened again but when the time came, instead of the forty infantry divisions they’d counted on, only two understrength British divisions would have been available to send to France.

 
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