Conventional World War III within 5 years of WWII ending and NO nukes developed

[Berkeley2017]

In an ATL where nukes are delayed until around the late 1950s or early 60s due to screwups in the physics community, AND assuming history otherwise proceeds as OTL until 1945, how would a conventional world war iii turn out if the USSR decides to invade Western Europe? It must start around 1951 in the latest (WW2 TTL probably lasts till 1946 due to Operation Downfall occurring). Could either the Soviets completely conquer Western Europe or NATO be able to march onto Moscow? Or would both powers fight to a stalemate?

 

[The Red]

The Soviets would overrun NATO and reach the Pyrenees within a few months, then the food shortages would begin to harm Western Europe to the extent that Stalin's earlier warnings about being unable to feed Western Europe would come true.

 

[Gunner's_Quadrant]

The Soviets would overrun NATO and reach the Pyrenees within a few months, then the food shortages would begin to harm Western Europe to the extent that Stalin's earlier warnings about being unable to feed Western Europe would come true.

You are pre-supposing that US and Allied force levels in Western Europe would be drawn down just like the OTL. One of the key reasons US force levels were dropped so drastically was due to possession of the atomic bomb and that high troop levels weren't necessary. Without it, it is very likely the US troop levels would be much higher and a much slower advance by the Soviets.

 

[sloreck]

The USSR was wrecked in 1945, and looting Eastern Europe for industrial plants as well as their German occupation zone took some time to set up and in no way got them to even prewar levels. Eastern Europe was much less industrialized than Western Europe, and was trashed worse than Western Europe. The transportation network in the western part of the USSR and in Eastern Europe was a shambles, and started from a lower starting point than that in Western Europe. The job the Allies did in rebuilding infrastructure in Western Europe by VE Day was way more than the Soviets did in the east even years later, and the rebuilding kept going in the west. Even with the drawdown of allied forces just the logistics of a Soviet move west would be difficult. Absent the atomic bomb the US, at least, will not demobilize as much as OTL and even Britain will be keeping a little more force. The USA will undoubtedly do more to build up the forces of the previously occupied nations than OTL.

It is worth noting that, unlike WWI & WWII, a WWIII 1945-50 will see no significant obstacle to transport of materials across the Atlantic. Sure the Soviets have some submarines, but relatively few, no experience in open ocean operations, and with choke points to get out in to the Atlantic against highly experienced ASW forces. In the Pacific, USN forces would end up trashing Vladivostok, as well as bombers from Japan. The USA can neutralize Petropavlosk and, if they want to take it.

It would be bloody in Europe, but the idea that, ITTL, the Soviets would sweep to the Channel and the Pyrenees in a walk is simply wrong. Of course if the forces for the west are exactly the same as OTL, this could happen but absent the atomic bomb the US and its allies will develop a different strategy to protect Europe, as much as they would prefer something on the lines of what happened OTL.

 

[Berkeley2017]

Ok, so lets say the Soviets had the luck of the Germans during the Battle of France (as in EXTREMELY lucky) and arrives at the pyrenees anyways. How much Dday V2 turn out?

 

[Urcea]

Ok, so lets say the Soviets had the luck of the Germans during the Battle of France (as in EXTREMELY lucky) and arrives at the pyrenees anyways. How much Dday V2 turn out?

The Soviets get a round thrashing - committing all or a serviceable portion of their fighting force in Western Europe is basically suicide. I would add that the WAllies would likely have considerable more cooperation here than they did in the initial push (you'd probably see, say, Spain get involved)

 

[Bobsalt]

Ok, so lets say the Soviets had the luck of the Germans during the Battle of France (as in EXTREMELY lucky) and arrives at the pyrenees anyways. How much Dday V2 turn out?

It doesn't matter how lucky they get. They aren't going to have the logistical support necessary to advance anything like that far. As has already been pointed out, the infrastructure east of West Germany was poor. Much of the damage from the war had not yet been repaired. A major buildup of supply depots would be required before starting an offensive, and this would be detected by the Allies, which means they would be making preparations themselves - one of which would be assigning targets for tactical air interdiction of supplies. Even being "EXTREMELY lucky" I don't see the Soviets getting further than a couple hundred miles or so at best before things bog down. With the proposed start of 1951 most of the lend-lease transport has at this point broken down due to lack of technical know-how to make repairs or simple lack of parts. I do not think the Soviet Union had enough motorized transport to keep supplies flowing, especially under constant Allied air attacks. Another point to consider - the railway gauges change at the border of Russia. This means any supplies shipped by rail have to be sent to the Russian border, unloaded, and then reloaded onto trains that fit the rail gauge of western Europe. This is going to create bottlenecks that will be prime targets for air strikes. Meanwhile, the Allies will be able to hit strategic targets within the Soviet Union with B-29s and B-36s. The Soviets are going to have a real problem trying to keep their combat units in supply in this scenario.

 

[sloreck]

The OP was 1945-50 for this, so hence my earlier post.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

You are pre-supposing that US and Allied force levels in Western Europe would be drawn down just like the OTL. One of the key reasons US force levels were dropped so drastically was due to possession of the atomic bomb and that high troop levels weren't necessary. Without it, it is very likely the US troop levels would be much higher and a much slower advance by the Soviets.

Maybe. IOTL the US wasn't confident on the bomb actually being able to stop the Soviets until they were into the 50's yet they demobbed anyways. Much of the same political pressure to do so would still be there to do so, even from the anti-communists ironically enough. Truman's defense secretary once complained about how the same people who criticized the administration for being soft on communism were also the ones who ardently protested maintaining American forces in Europe the loudest.

It doesn't matter how lucky they get. They aren't going to have the logistical support necessary to advance anything like that far. As has already been pointed out, the infrastructure east of West Germany was poor. Much of the damage from the war had not yet been repaired. A major buildup of supply depots would be required before starting an offensive, and this would be detected by the Allies, which means they would be making preparations themselves - one of which would be assigning targets for tactical air interdiction of supplies.

From a military perspective, the Soviet transport infrastructure in Eastern Europe was more then adequate to support a massive assault in mid-1945, much less 1951.

With the proposed start of 1951 most of the lend-lease transport has at this point broken down due to lack of technical know-how to make repairs or simple lack of parts. I do not think the Soviet Union had enough motorized transport to keep supplies flowing, especially under constant Allied air attacks.

The Soviets manufactured more trucks in a year in 1950 (362,985) then they received through lend-lease during the entire war (315,000).

Another point to consider - the railway gauges change at the border of Russia. This means any supplies shipped by rail have to be sent to the Russian border, unloaded, and then reloaded onto trains that fit the rail gauge of western Europe. This is going to create bottlenecks that will be prime targets for air strikes. Meanwhile, the Allies will be able to hit strategic targets within the Soviet Union with B-29s and B-36s. The Soviets are going to have a real problem trying to keep their combat units in supply in this scenario.

Air power needs breathing space to work. Allied airpower in Normandy in 1944 pinned the Germans down, but it did so after achieving air supremacy at the end of a long campaign spanning two years of relentless operations on the Eastern, Western and Mediterranean fronts. And the Red Air Forces of 1951 is in a far superior position to that of the Luftwaffe in 1942. Even if the WAllies stop demobilizing their air forces to the point of July 1945, then the Soviets will have a 2:1 superiority in tactical aviation (fighters, attack aircraft, and tactical bombers).​

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Reading on Plan DROP SHOT might be appropriate at this point.

 

[kent]

Berlin or Korea either could have been the cause of an outbreak of fighting. Russia shooting down aircraft flying supplies into Berlin or some guards shooting into West Berlin or at the border of East and West Germany could have sparked a start to what nether Stalin nor Truman wanted. Once started hard to see France or England being able to hold off the Russian army before the US is able to bring it's army back to the force it was at the end of WW2.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Reading on Plan DROP SHOT might be appropriate at this point.

How does a nuclear war plan from the 1950s apply to a scenario where nukes get delayed into the late-50s or early-60s and war breaks out in 1951? I think looking at American war plans in the latter part of the 40s, like Plan CRANKSHAFT, would be more useful.

Berlin or Korea either could have been the cause of an outbreak of fighting. Russia shooting down aircraft flying supplies into Berlin or some guards shooting into West Berlin or at the border of East and West Germany could have sparked a start to what nether Stalin nor Truman wanted. Once started hard to see France or England being able to hold off the Russian army before the US is able to bring it's army back to the force it was at the end of WW2.

Yeah, US warplans in the late-40s basically wrote off continental Europe and Asia. It then called for two more years of build-up and expeditionary fighting at the edges of Soviet controlled Eurasia, most notably the Middle East, before a return to the continent could be expected. Of course that was under OTL circumstances where the US demobbed to an extraordinary degree. That may or may not hold IATL. In any case, I do expect the US and friends to ultimately win a prolonged war it's just going to be a very long, very bloody fight with lots of setbacks.​

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

How does a nuclear war plan from the 1950s apply to a scenario where nukes get delayed into the late-50s or early-60s and war breaks out in 1951? I think looking at American war plans in the latter part of the 40s, like Plan CRANKSHAFT, would be more useful. ...

CRANKSHAFT & its contemporary 1945-48 plus revolved around air power & nuclear weapons.

http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/00gentile.pdf

For example:

In four draft plans produced between April and June 1946, the primary task “was a prompt strategic air offensive” that would “destroy the So- viet war-making capacity.” The bomb would be critical because the United States in 1946 held sole ownership of atomic weapons, which produced a distinct advantage. War would be total. To destroy the Soviet will to resist would require first destroy- ing the effectiveness of the Soviet war machine.

The ability of conventional forces to achieve a decisive result in the near term declined rapidly from 1946 as conventional forces were drawn down. The New Sec Def Louis Johnson was pushing hard at dissolving conventional Army and navy strength. It was clear by even mid 1946 that fielding the sort of conventional forces that could defeat Soviet military force would require up to two years to mobilize and redeploy overseas. Between that & Louis Johnsons faith in the air forces leaders the several 1946 - 48 plans were oriented to a early defeat of the USSR through strategic airpower centered on the new atomic weapons.

Plans TOTALITY, PINSCHER, BROILER, & CRANKSHAFT focused on working out strategy, operations, and tactics for the atomic weapons and conventional airpower. For ground and naval forces the game plan varied, with vacillation between temporarily abandoning Europe, fighting a ground war on the Rhine or elsewhere, or possible ground offensives. At the heart of these plans was the idea that a strategic air offensive centered on atomic bombs, but with conventional weapons as well, would decisively destroy the Soviet ability to sustain conventional field forces. That is conventional naval and ground operations would be more of a mop up or policing action vs collapsing Soviet military forces.

By 1948 there was a clear counter movement to the Louis Johnson doctrines. In the Revolt of the Admirals it broke into the open, elsewhere it was confined to fundamental changes in thought.

The Joint Chiefs released the Harmon Report in 1949, which analyzed the probable effects of atomic bombs on seventy Soviet cities. It concluded that the United States could launch such an offensive; but while it would destroy 30 to 40 percent of Soviet industry, it would not appreciably affect public will. In fact it could “validate Soviet propaganda against the United States, unify the people, and increase their will to fight.” The study concluded that the most tangible benefit of the offensive was speed: it “would constitute the only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious damage to vital elements of the Soviet war making capacity. Striking first and hard could be a credible war fighting concept.

The concepts behind the DROPSHOT plans originated in this counter current. The 1948 Berlin Crisis with its possibility of a limited local conventional operation was a warning the current doctrine of the complete supremacy of airpower was questionable. The Harmon Report was instigated out of this counter current & was intended to support the urgings of leaders within the US Army to alter the US war plans significantly. The new round of planning included the Navy in refining and rationalizing the more conventional aspects and longer term portions of the previous plans. Most important there was a recognition that a few weeks or months of strategic bombing won not rapid collapse of the the Red Army across Europe & Asia. This led to more serious planning of how conventional forces, naval army & air, could or should be used, everything from the form of the forces to their mobilization through deployment, was subject to deeper consideration. Into 1950 this was still just a theoretical exercise & much of it was opposed by the strategic air opponents. However the latter half of 1950 revealed through the Korean War the bankruptcy of the policies of Johnson & his supporters. The lessons there were clear in how they affected planning for total war vs the USSR.

The rebuilding of conventional ground and Naval forces of the US reflected the abandonment of the doctrine of total supremacy of strategic air power. The rebuild also was connected to the new requirements outlined in the DROPSHOT plans, as well as the needs for US interests in the continuing small wars globally.

 

[sloreck]

Absent atomic weapons, even if the USA does demobilize it won't be as much or as long. The USAAF/Air Force will still make claims that "airpower can win it all" but absent atomic weapons, this will have way less traction. Keeping the draft may very well happen, and things like better tanks will be accelerated compared to OTL. Obviously war plans based upon the use of atomic weapons won't be written, any plans will need to be based on the weapons that exist. There will most certainly be such plans, as the USA is not going to cede Western Europe to the USSR should there be a war. Any war planner with a brain is not going to want to cede that much territory to the USSR, requiring another amphibious re-entry in to Europe - the Soviets will most assuredly have studied such things, and also their manpower will be much more than the Germans had, and they would not hesitate to try and smash it right away and not let a secure lodgement occur.