Constantinople divided between Greece and Turkey

Now, this is probably close to, if not entirely ASB, (especially considering this is not my strongest place to speculate further upon.)
But that’s what intrigued me about it. The idea of having such a large and historical city divided in half between Greece and Turkey to (hopefully) appease both of them.

My idea to make this happen is firstly for the treaty of Sèvres to be slightly altered so that Greece is allowed to keep eastern thrace, and Turkey gains the same as IOTL.

Next are some new segments I thought up to (possibly) lessen complications later on.
1: Neither side is allowed to claim the other half.
(both countries must recognise that the other half is and will always belong to the other)
2: Neither side can turn their half into the country's capital.
(see segment 1 + the Israel & East Jerusalem situation.)

Alternatively, this can be turned into a treaty in its own right as well. (Treaty of Constantinople?)

So, how do the two countries fare now that the Dardanelles & Bosphorus are controlled by two rather than one state? And/Or would the two halves evolve into "different" cities over time? Like, would we have a Greek city named Constantinople, and a Turkish city named Istanbul?

A quick M-BAM version I made from the greek half.
View attachment 374892

Even the European city had a large majority Turkish and Muslim population. What is Greece going to do with that?

This, not even considering the British will laugh at such agreement. Dividing such strategic place is like inviting the Soviets to occupy it.
 
Even the European city had a large majority Turkish and Muslim population. What is Greece going to do with that?

This, not even considering the British will laugh at such agreement. Dividing such strategic place is like inviting the Soviets to occupy it.
All depends on when the division took place as opposed to the treaty. If the POD is due to differing facts on the ground ( city having fallen already due to say Greece entering the War, Gallipoli actually working due to it being part of a coordinated joint attack), a lot of the Turkish population may have already fled or been expelled. This is an era when population exchanges were seen as something that might need to be done.
As to the Soviets, in the 1920's they would not be seen as a threat to the straits, they could not even beat Poland so not yet seen as a major power.
 
All depends on when the division took place as opposed to the treaty. If the POD is due to differing facts on the ground ( city having fallen already due to say Greece entering the War, Gallipoli actually working due to it being part of a coordinated joint attack), a lot of the Turkish population may have already fled or been expelled. This is an era when population exchanges were seen as something that might need to be done.
As to the Soviets, in the 1920's they would not be seen as a threat to the straits, they could not even beat Poland so not yet seen as a major power.

For what it's worth the straits were demilitarised between Lausanne and the Montreux convention in 1936 and at the same time Turkey under Kemal was quite friendly to the Soviet Union. What triggered their remilitarization was actually concern about Italy at the time.
 
You might want to look at Nicosia for a modern example of Turkish and Greeks splitting a capital city
 
You might want to look at Nicosia for a modern example of Turkish and Greeks splitting a capital city

This actually underlines my uncertainty about just where the dividing line in Constantinople is supposed to be here.

Are we talking about splitting the Old City (within the old Theodosian Walls + Galata)?

Or are we talking about just splitting the greater metropolitan area, with the Bosporus as the dividing line?

(I say this because I was/am under the impression that the city limits were not extended to the eastern side of the Bosporus after the establishment of the Republic.)

It's pretty hard to see how you could split the Old City - I don't see how that could be tenable, honestly. This is not like Berlin or Vienna or Nicosia where both sides have land-based access to their part of the city.

With a couple more lucky breaks and a little better strategy, the Greeks probably could have kept...well, at least most of Thrace (i.e., that given them by the Treaty of Sevres). Getting Constantinople (Old City) is not out of the realm of possibility - geography works in the Greeks' favor.
 
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Turkey losing Edrine and Istanbul in Europe will undoubtedly cause Turkish Revanchism. There is a very good chance Turkey could join the *Axis if such a thing happens.

That would be an interesting sweetener for Germany to offer the Turks in 1940-41 to get them into the war. So much would depend on exactly what kind of regime was in power in Turkey at the time. If it's a Kemalist government, it's still not likely Turkey would join - they would be even weaker with the loss of Thrace, and far too vulnerable to Allied and Soviet invasion. (As I like to say, for a Turkish leader like İnönü, joining the Axis was something only possible once the Wehrmacht was crossing the Hindu Kush and the Ruwenzori - i.e., when the Germans no longer needed them.)

However, if the loss of Constantinople and Thrace results in a more radicalized regime in Turkey in the 20's...it's not impossible that they might be bribed into the war. But in that case, Turkey as we know it would be destroyed - it wouldn't be enough of a game changer to make the Axis victorious - divided between Soviet and Allied zones/proxy states, and likely some additional hunks of flesh (like Smyrna) given to the loyal Greeks.
 
That would be an interesting sweetener for Germany to offer the Turks in 1940-41 to get them into the war. So much would depend on exactly what kind of regime was in power in Turkey at the time. If it's a Kemalist government, it's still not likely Turkey would join - they would be even weaker with the loss of Thrace, and far too vulnerable to Allied and Soviet invasion. (As I like to say, for a Turkish leader like İnönü, joining the Axis was something only possible once the Wehrmacht was crossing the Hindu Kush and the Ruwenzori - i.e., when the Germans no longer needed them.)

However, if the loss of Constantinople and Thrace results in a more radicalized regime in Turkey in the 20's...it's not impossible that they might be bribed into the war. But in that case, Turkey as we know it would be destroyed - it wouldn't be enough of a game changer to make the Axis victorious - divided between Soviet and Allied zones/proxy states, and likely some additional hunks of flesh (like Smyrna) given to the loyal Greeks.

The first British reaction if having to face an Axis Turkey in 1941 would be I suspect, sending the SOE in Turkish Kurdistan and promising the Kurds independence, it would be a low cost option causing chaos in South-West Turkey thus making already bad axis logistics for operations against Iraq and Syria even worse. You'd also see some important butterflies in the Middle East, Iran is probably never invaded by the British and Soviets in such a TL, it's probably bribed with better oil deals and lend lease to join the allies instead and do you get an Iraqi coup when there is fear of Turkish invasion in early 1941? And at the Paris peace treaty you'd be probably seeing the Soviets annexing most of Wilsonian Armenia, a Kurdish state plus the British perhaps installing a pet sultan to what remains, after all ATL Kemalism is being descredited as one more variant of fascism. Nevertheless I don't actually see Turkey suffering other major territorial losses, the Greek population of western Anatolia is gone for 25 years in 1947 so I don't much see a Greek Smyrna as likely, you can reward Greece elsewhere instead. Maybe some very limited changes like the Cyzicus/Erdek and/or Cesme/Erythraia peninsula if the western allies want to show Turkey giving something but said something remaining still limited. There will be also a question of returning Alexandretta /Hatay to Syria if shown in the same light as the Sudetenland but again not certain the Syrians have sufficient political capital and the French care enough for it to happen.
 
Greek Constantinople, will be starting with a population of well over half a million, not close to PC to get over the exact numbers, but in addition to roughly 300,000 Greeks it will be getting for pretty obvious reasons the Armenians of the city (around the 150,000 mark in 1914) and on grounds of geography the bulk of the Jewish and Levantine populations. On top of this you have to add Greek refugees for Anatolia, OTL about 300,000 were settled in Athens and another 100,000 in Thessaloniki. ATL even counting Greeks and Armenians from the Asian side of the city being relocated on the Greek side, there will be lots of housing Athens simply completely lacks to settle refugees, thus I'd expect something between half and two thirds of the refugees settled in Athens OTL to end up in Constantinople instead bringing us to a population somewhere around the 700,000 mark depending on details . This means Constantinople completely overwelms Thessaloniki in terms of population, in 1924 it has about as many people as Thessaloniki reached in the 1980s and is comparable in size if somewhere larger than contemporary Athens. How it involves from there is something of a guess. I'd expect Athens to overtake it in population, being the capital but by the present day you have probably Athens and Constantinople each somewhere in the range of 2-3 million each with Thessaloniki perhaps a bit smaller than OTL. If anything that is a net gain for Athens in development and livability terms.

A Greece with three major cities, including a Constantinople that is a rival for Athens, would indeed have interesting dynamics.

Turkish Instabul on the other side of the Bosporus? In 1924 it is still the largest city in the Turkish Republic with an excellent geographic position on an international waterway hence I simply cannot see it withering away. I don't see Kemal being overthrown for a defeat in Thrace after driving the Greeks out of Anatolia (if we keep with my 1923 pod from the previous thread) he's likely to get more autocratic, scapegoat some people and the western powers for the defeat but firmly stay in power despite increased opposition otherwise. As a matter of fact I could see Istanbul being developed in an antagonistic matter to Constantinople, the showpiece of the Republic that shows how the New Turkey is progressing faster.

Hmm. Reminds me of Berlin?
 
Nevertheless I don't actually see Turkey suffering other major territorial losses, the Greek population of western Anatolia is gone for 25 years in 1947 so I don't much see a Greek Smyrna as likely, you can reward Greece elsewhere instead. Maybe some very limited changes like the Cyzicus/Erdek and/or Cesme/Erythraia peninsula if the western allies want to show Turkey giving something but said something remaining still limited.

The British (especially) and the Americans *will* be concerned about strategic control of the Straits - to keep the Soviets out of it. Because that means keeping them out of the Med.

One way or another, I think they will want to establish a presence on both sides of the Straits. Either through Asian accessions to the now-allied Greeks, or some kind of occupied zone with the hope that that perhaps a pro-Western Turkish rump state or states can be erected (something I'm doubtful of in this scenario). Much as Athens might pine for Smyrna, giving them all of, say, Çanakkale Kocaeli Provinces instead would be quite a sweetener to keep an unstable Greece onside.

Of course, this raises another question. Stalin quite readily acceded to Churchill's "percentages" memo on spheres of influence in the Balkans, and giving the British a 90% interest in Greece (a commitment which, remarkably, Stalin actually kept). But if Greece now has control of part or all of the Straits would he be so willing to give way so easily? As we know, Stalin tried repeatedly to cajol Churchill and Roosevelt into giving the Soviets a military presence on the Straits, or in the alternative at Dedeagach. Now, Greece becomes a more valuable piece on the board.

All of which underlines that İnönü was no fool. With or without European Turkey in hand, joining the Axis before it had already achieved decisive victory over Britain and the USSR was a fool's errand, if indeed not a death sentence, for Turkey.

I agree, BTW, that full-on support for the Kurds would have been an easy and natural first step for Churchill the moment Ankara throws in with Hitler. He had few troops to spare to shift up to Mosul and Syria; a full-on Kurdish rebellion would keep the Turks somewhat occupied while he sorted out a more robust response.
 
P.S. Since we are on the subject, does anyone know if any of the Wehrmacht's plans for moving through Turkey (for purposes of attacking into the Levant and, after Barbarossa commenced, into the Soviet Caucasus) have been published anywhere?
 
The British (especially) and the Americans *will* be concerned about strategic control of the Straits - to keep the Soviets out of it. Because that means keeping them out of the Med.

One way or another, I think they will want to establish a presence on both sides of the Straits. Either through Asian accessions to the now-allied Greeks, or some kind of occupied zone with the hope that that perhaps a pro-Western Turkish rump state or states can be erected (something I'm doubtful of in this scenario). Much as Athens might pine for Smyrna, giving them all of, say, Çanakkale Kocaeli Provinces instead would be quite a sweetener to keep an unstable Greece onside.

Of course, this raises another question. Stalin quite readily acceded to Churchill's "percentages" memo on spheres of influence in the Balkans, and giving the British a 90% interest in Greece (a commitment which, remarkably, Stalin actually kept). But if Greece now has control of part or all of the Straits would he be so willing to give way so easily? As we know, Stalin tried repeatedly to cajol Churchill and Roosevelt into giving the Soviets a military presence on the Straits, or in the alternative at Dedeagach. Now, Greece becomes a more valuable piece on the board.

All of which underlines that İnönü was no fool. With or without European Turkey in hand, joining the Axis before it had already achieved decisive victory over Britain and the USSR was a fool's errand, if indeed not a death sentence, for Turkey.

I agree, BTW, that full-on support for the Kurds would have been an easy and natural first step for Churchill the moment Ankara throws in with Hitler. He had few troops to spare to shift up to Mosul and Syria; a full-on Kurdish rebellion would keep the Turks somewhat occupied while he sorted out a more robust response.

The western allies will have to make concessions here over the straits I think. Why? Lets begin with the status of the straits when the war begins. The alt-Lausanne would be still demilitarizing them and a Montreux convention is unlikely if Turkey was on the axis side. Hence you begin with having a pre-war status qwo of the straits being demilitarized. What reasonable excuse the Western allies have to alter it... effectively targeting their own ally? Second come 1944 the Soviets would be rather well positioned to for example drop paratroopers in the straits area or have the Black sea fleet land troops in the area. The West will have to accept a Soviet presence in the straits and their continued demilitarization under the circumstances.

Alt-Greece by the way is likely to be quite a bit more stable in the inter-war years, way smaller problems in resettling the refugees with Thrace and Constantinople part of Greece, plus just enough more votes from the Constantinople Greeks to secure a republican electoral advantage through the 1930s...
 
The western allies will have to make concessions here over the straits I think. Why? Lets begin with the status of the straits when the war begins. The alt-Lausanne would be still demilitarizing them and a Montreux convention is unlikely if Turkey was on the axis side. Hence you begin with having a pre-war status qwo of the straits being demilitarized. What reasonable excuse the Western allies have to alter it... effectively targeting their own ally?

Internally? All they need is traditional British paranoia about Russian access to the Med.

Externally? The British justification for making an early attempt to seize the Straits back from Germany/Turkey will be to open up a much better avenue for Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviets.

There are so many variables here for the POD and how it plays out. But if the British are at all in any position to retake the Straits in 1943-44, Churchill will crawl over broken glass to do it.
 
If you were looking at a pre-1914 POD.

A Greco-Turkish War April 1915.
The 1st Balkan war broke out on 18 Oct 1912 just after the Ottoman Empire had disbanded 120,000 troops station in Rumelia (Ottoman Europe) and redeployed 35,000 troops to Yemen. With the Ottoman Fleet operating against the Bulgarians until November, the Greeks occupied Lemnos from 21-27th Oct 1912 and went on to take Imbros, Thasos, Agios Efstratios, Samothrace, Psara and Ikaria by mid-November. Landings followed on Lesbos 21 Nov - 22 Dec and Chios 27 Nov with fighting lasting until 3 Jan 1913. The Ottoman Navy reacted to these two invasions on Dec 7 1912 by replacing their commander, Tahir Bey with Ramiz Naman Bey, the leader of the hawkish faction among the officer corps. On Dec 16 the Battle of Elli was fought and Ramiz Naman Bey was quickly replaced by the energetic Lt. Commander Rauf Bey as effective command of the Ottoman fleet on Dec 20. An indecisive action aborted a Turkish counter invasion on Tenedos on Jan 4 and the Battle of Lemnos followed on Jan 18. The final action of the war was Greece invading Samos on 13-16 March 1913.

The Treaty of Athens between the Ottoman Empire and Greece was not signed until November 14th 1913 following the conclusion of the 2nd Balkan war. It left Ioannina, Crete and Salonica to Greece, but the question of the Aegean islands was unresolved. It was expected that the Great Powers would arbitrate. However, the Ottomans were quite sick of the Great Powers lack of support and assistance by this stage and would not accept Greece holding the North Aegean islands. They openly declared that they would forcefully take back Chios and Lesbos in March-April 1915. This would be after the new battleships and crews had been worked up and before Salamis would be ready.

In 1914, Greece had a population of about 4.8m of which non-Greeks made up 13%. Greece's army was 7-8 Infantry Divisions and had a trend of spending £ 1.2m on defence. This was a burden of about 1.5% of GDP ( £ 78m).

The other factor Greece and Turkey had to consider in 1914 was Bulgaria. Bulgaria had 11 Infantry Divisions and 1 Cavalry Division, a GDP of 65m and was spending £ 1.55m on defense or 2.4% of GDP. Against Bulgaria, the Ottomans have deployed a large proportion of their army - 15 Divisions of the 1st Army (I-V Corps). In the east against Russia was the Ottoman 2nd Army of IX, X and XI Corps with 9 Divisions. To the south were the 2nd Army (Aleppo), 4th Army (Damascus & Mosul) and 6th Army (Baghdad) and the remaining 10 Divisions in the VI, VII, VIII, XII and XIII Corps.

Greeks were protesting in Athens over the persecution of Greek Orthodox subjects in Asia Minor along with restoration of confiscated property. The Ottomans replied that while it would address Greek complaints, the real blame for the unrest lay with the Balkan League for displacing Muslim refugees into Turkey. Viewing war as imminent, Turkish diplomats were trying to hammer out terms of an Ottoman-Bulgarian alliance directed against Athens.

The Greek plan...
The Greeks were buying up shipping on the London market and both sides were stockpiling Welsh steaming coal, this was regarded as a sure sign of war. The situation was so desperate that the Greek Navy was planning pre-emptive strike on the new Dreadnoughts. The C-in-C of the Greek Fleet, RN Admiral Mark Kerr had 'gone Native' and was risking his career by pressing his good friend First Sea Lord Battenburg about what were the legal implications were if Kerr became a Greek citizen to join the fight against the Turks. Russia even suggested that the new ships fly the White Ensign for their transfer and safe arrival. Newcastle to Constantinople was 2 weeks at 10 knots so Osman and Reşadiye would arrive by mid August although neither ship had a full crew.

The Greek Navy envisaged a surprise attack of 160,000 men to hold strategic areas and then negotiate from a position of strength. The navy was to be bolstered with 2 ex US Navy Battleships that arrived in July 1914.

The main features of the plan were:
  • 20,000 men land and hold Alexandretta cutting the railway to the south and isolating the 10 Ottoman Infantry Divisions of the 2nd, 4th and 6th Armies.
  • 30,000 men land at Aivali on the Gulf of Adramyti to block the troops stationed in the Smyrna Fortified Area from going north.
  • 2 Regiments land at the rear of the Kum Kale fort, taking it and turning its guns on the Sedd-el-Bahr fort on the Gallipoli side.
  • 80,000 men land from Gaba Tepe south on the Gallipoli peninsula and take the forts from the rear.
  • 30,000 men with naval gunfire support, land and take the Belair lines at the narrow point of the peninsula. In 1914, these had crumbled and filled with water since they held the Bulgarians at bay in 1912.
The Ottoman 2nd Army was fixed on the Russian border and would take months to redeploy due to the lack of transport. The Bulair lines could only be attacked with whatever the Ottomans could spare from the perimeter facing the Bulgarians. The flaw in the plan was how the Bulgarians would react as the Greek plan relied of Bulgaria staying neutral.

Aegean Crisis
In late June 1914 Greek PM Venizelos decided to cancel his plans for a preemptive strike taking some factors into consideration:
  • Serbia and Romania’s reluctance to safeguard Bulgaria’s neutrality in a Greek- Turkish war
  • The negative attitude of the Great Powers.
  • The Turkish threats for massacre of the entire Greek population in Asia Minor in case of a Greek-Turkish war.
Last, but not least the alleged re-establishment of Greece’s naval superiority in the Aegean Sea after the purchase of the two American battleships Idaho and Mississippi, now renamed Kilkis and Lemnos. Both ships were completed back in 1908 but still ranked as pre-dreadnoughts. Nevertheless, Venizelos seemed to believe that, even if Turkey got the two modern Sultan Osman and Reşadiye, the experience and the bravery of the skilled Greek sailors would tip the balance in favor of Greece in the case of a Greek-Turkish naval showdown.

Therefore, Venizelos opted for a peaceful settlement over the Greek- Turkish dispute, believing that he could negotiate from an advantageous position. He prepared a Draft Treaty of Peace and Reciprocal Protection that provided the defensive Greek-Turkish alliance for the preservation of the status-quo in the Balkans, a voluntary exchange of populations and the agreement that the disputed islands would become autonomous under Turkish formal suzerainty, but with a Greek governor- general.

Turkey valued an alliance with Bulgaria rather than the Greeks and once the new Turkish Dreadnoughts are ready then the Greek Navy will be outclassed and unable to hold the Aegean islands she gained in 1912-13. The Bulgarians and Ottomans quickly signed a non-aggression pact in August 1914 after the war started so the negotiations must have been going on for some time.
 
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