Constans II in Italy

Constans II was one of the last Roman emperor to visit the western territories, probably the last to directly lead a military expedition in Italy. Here I want to ask how can his expedition be more successful in Italy and maybe later Africa? Would there be any significative changes in the organization of the two exarchate?
Finally is it possible to see more roman emperors visiting the west if Constans II is successful? especially (but not only) for military purpose?
 
Constans II's objectives in Central Mediterranean were relatively clear : the empire was dealing with a serious crisis, and Arab raids went really deeply into the imperial core territories, and while there was a respite due to the civil war, Constans seems to understand territorial losses weren't over and that both Africa and maybe Anatolia in its entierety were to fall. Constans II's general policy from the 660's was about a complete reorganization of the empire along the new problems : strategically with the systematisation of the thematic system, but probably geopolitically as well with focusing on Central Mediterranean sea.
The Italian campaign proper was arguably a semi-defeat, as he didn't managed to distach the southern principalties from the royal Lombard dominance, but he still managed to hold against the Duchy of Benevent that gained significant territories on Byzzies (and that once Constans gone, did again)and a technical acknowledgement of Imperial authority could have been used later with more success.
What was more problematic was the financial drain, to the point Constans II had to litterally plunder Rome of what he could take to pay its troops.

This is ptobably why Constants is said to planned making Sicilia the new capital of the empire : the loss of Africa was strategically really problematic because it really cut Constantinople from the Western Mediterranean Sea, and was still a prosperous province (even if really limited to the coastal portion). Would Constans having succeeded in his plans, maybe Africa wouldn't have been lost, or rather not this easily.
The problem there was that Constantinople's elite wasn't really fond of the plan and to be let to itself, and that Armenians (which were an important part of imperial military personal) were certainly NOT about to accept such a strategical withdrawal.

In order to have ERE staying permanently in Central Mediterranean, you need a worse situation in Asia IMO, such as a total loss of Anatolia and Constantinople being threatened (and really so : there's good arguments for the First Siege of Constantinople not being that a reliable or even real event courtesy of @123456789blaaa for the article)
Of course, we're talking about a significantly weakened empire that would spawn from Thrace to southern Italy (loosing most of Balkans to Slavs, sklavinies still serving as recruitment pools IMO), and with the possibility to loosing Africa nevertheless, but that's your best pausible shot to see an imperial return in Italy.µ
Which would be problematic, while managable : the popes more and more gained authority in the Ducatus Romanus, even rivaling the dukes themselves, and the exarchs of Ravenna or Carthage could be seen as plausible candidates for leading a coup (which would have, it's true, the benefit of slowing down the game of clue about why the emperor abandoned Constantinople, but with the negative issue of transforming Constantinople as a likely exarchate itself).

The key of imperial survival, ITTL, would be to keep and focus on the fleet as projection power and to deprive Arab fleets (mostly made of non-Chalcedonian sailors) entry in western Med.
 
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Constans II's objectives in Central Mediterranean were relatively clear : the empire was dealing with a serious crisis, and Arab raids went really deeply into the imperial core territories, and while there was a respite due to the civil war, Constans seems to understand territorial losses weren't over and that both Africa and maybe Anatolia in its entierety were to fall. Constans II's general policy from the 660's was about a complete reorganization of the empire along the new problems : strategically with the systematisation of the thematic system, but probably geopolitically as well with focusing on Central Mediterranean sea.
The Italian campaign proper was arguably a semi-defeat, as he didn't managed to distach the southern principalties from the royal Lombard dominance, but he still managed to hold against the Duchy of Benevent that gained significant territories on Byzzies (and that once Constans gone, did again)and a technical acknowledgement of Imperial authority could have been used later with more success.
What was more problematic was the financial drain, to the point Constans II had to litterally plunder Rome of what he could take to pay its troops.
I' ve recently read claims that the italian campaign of Constans II was ill prepared from the beginning thus preventing any imperial success. I don't expect an immediate recover of Italy but maybe with careful planning Constans could recover Benevent and its surrounding,thus eliminating one threat to Italy.
This is ptobably why Constants is said to planned making Sicilia the new capital of the empire : the loss of Africa was strategically really problematic because it really cut Constantinople from the Western Mediterranean Sea, and was still a prosperous province (even if really limited to the coastal portion). Would Constans having succeeded in his plans, maybe Africa wouldn't have been lost, or rather not this easily.
The problem there was that Constantinople's elite wasn't really fond of the plan and to be let to itself, and that Armenians (which were an important part of imperial military personal) were certainly NOT about to accept such a strategical withdrawal.
I find this interesting. During previous centuries an emperor leaving his capital during military campaigns was considered the normal duty of an emperor, so I would like to ask when exactly did the Roman mentality change to the point that leaving the capital behind was considered a treason by the population. Maybe I'am exaggerating some aspects but there seem to be a radical change in the mentality of the Romans between the end of the IV century and the beginning of the VII century. An other interesting aspect is the Armenian predominance during this period. Generals, emperors, usurpers and even administrators were most of the time Armenians (or from the eastern frontier). Is there a change to reverse this and keep the empire cosmopolitan? Like involving other elements from Italy,Africa and the Balkans? Maybe such a change could also allow the emperors to follow an independent strategy instead of being immediately killed when annoying the dominant element.
In order to have ERE staying permanently in Central Mediterranean, you need a worse situation in Asia IMO, such as a total loss of Anatolia and Constantinople being threatened (and really so : there's good arguments for the First Siege of Constantinople not being that a reliable or even real event courtesy of @123456789blaaa for the article)
Of course, we're talking about a significantly weakened empire that would spawn from Thrace to southern Italy (loosing most of Balkans to Slavs, sklavinies still serving as recruitment pools IMO), and with the possibility to loosing Africa nevertheless, but that's your best pausible shot to see an imperial return in Italy.µ
Which would be problematic, while managable : the popes more and more gained authority in the Ducatus Romanus, even rivaling the dukes themselves, and the exarchs of Ravenna or Carthage could be seen as plausible candidates for leading a coup (which would have, it's true, the benefit of slowing down the game of clue about why the emperor abandoned Constantinople, but with the negative issue of transforming Constantinople as a likely exarchate itself).
Is this the only possibility? I'm not looking for a complete restoration of the roman empire, but I would like to see borders similar to that of Gallienus' empire. To see either Rome or Constantinople as the heart of this empire is irrelevant to me (however I would like to see all the remaining roman cities preserving their prestige). However if we can add even a recovery of Illyricum (albeit gradual) even better. About the siege of Constantinople I've always found the supposed duration of the siege strange ( a four years siege is something impressive), however lets suppose that it happened OTL and it' s going to happen now: Isn't there a way to definitely stop the Arabs without having to give up either Anatolia or Africa? The empire could benefit from both if it has the time necessary to reorganize itself. Finally no conquest of Africa means no invasion of Hispania. Maybe not immediately but could the Romans exploit one the endemic civil war of the Goths? not a total immediate reconquest but their resources could be really useful for the empire, considering that roman elements (or romanized elements) were still alive there.
The key of imperial survival, ITTL, would be to keep and focus on the fleet as projection power and to deprive Arab fleets (mostly made of non-Chalcedonian sailors) entry in western Med.
Definitely even more than OTL, given the new geography of this alternate roman empire.
 
I' ve recently read claims that the italian campaign of Constans II was ill prepared from the beginning thus preventing any imperial success. I don't expect an immediate recover of Italy but maybe with careful planning Constans could recover Benevent and its surrounding,thus eliminating one threat to Italy.
That the campaign wasn't well tought is possible, it was the first attempt at an imperial reassertion of power after decades of holding out where it was possible. The bad assesment of Lombard politics was maybe a follow up on Maurician policies whom interventions in Spain and Gaul, in order to forge an anti-Homean alliance from Chalcedonian rulers and pretenders and Hermengild, Gondovald and Brunhild while understable, does show that he was less focused on having Franks attacking Lombards than securing Gaul as a pro-Chalcedonian entity.
(It seems he toyed with the idea forging an exarchate in Gaul from the remains of Gondovald's revolt, for instance)

If so, I wonder if Constans' goal was less about conquering the duchy, than taking back lost coastal territories, and make Benevent (if not the possible future king of Lombards that was the duke) acknowledging Imperial suzerainity.
That's entierely speculative, that said, and I, for one, would be interested on the claims you read : can you remember, or better link, to them?

I find this interesting. During previous centuries an emperor leaving his capital during military campaigns was considered the normal duty of an emperor, so I would like to ask when exactly did the Roman mentality change to the point that leaving the capital behind was considered a treason by the population.
The point was less to leave the capital than abandoning it, which is a frown-up not reserved to Byzzies but virtually every strong and bureucratized enough state.

Is there a change to reverse this and keep the empire cosmopolitan? Like involving other elements from Italy,Africa and the Balkans? Maybe such a change could also allow the emperors to follow an independent strategy instead of being immediately killed when annoying the dominant element.
Well, the obvious answer would be to prevent Arab conquest and not make Armenians the immediate frontline. I suspect that's not what you're in for, though.
Italy and Africa were peripheral enough (especially Africa which barely appears in Byzantine accounts after the early VIIth century) to not be considered an offical pool. Maybe with a stronger Byzantine presence in Italy? Of course it would risk butterflying away Constans' expedition.

Is this the only possibility?
The only I can really see happening : probably some other members, with better knowledge, could help out.

however I would like to see all the remaining roman cities preserving their prestige)
That's done for since the Gothic Wars IMO: Justinian reconquests were badly politically planned, and it ended up doing more harm than build-up for both late Roman ensemble in Italy.
Isn't there a way to definitely stop the Arabs without having to give up either Anatolia or Africa?
An earlier fitna, maybe?
Beaming the @John7755 يوحنا signal.
Maybe not immediately but could the Romans exploit one the endemic civil war of the Goths?
I'll go for a rant a bit : sorry, it's not against you.

Roman Empire and ERE were basically Clue®cracies, while Gothic Spain was an anti-dynastic kingship after the disappearance of Baltis.
Both ensured succession crisis, altough for various reasons (in the second case, because no noble wanted to see a dynasty monopolizing redistribution and honores), but amusingly, it's only "endemic" for Barbarians.
Similarily, both Romans and Franks (and other Romano-Barbarian kingdoms) practiced splitted rulership (WRE/ERE, various Frankish kings) but, strangely, only the second is a sign of poor understanding of what a state is.
See a pattern there already? Oh, but you'll always have someone to come and say something along the lines of "B..But BARBARIANS! Ugly, smelling, brutish Barbarians!"

At some point, people have to acknowledge that these states were more akin and succeeding to the Late Imperial Roman structures and administrations, if they want an accurate perception of Late Antiquity.

/rant over.

Anyhow : Justinian and Marcian essentially intervened in Spain as to ensure Roman presence, if not supremacy, rather than outright conquest. I wholly agree that it's possible that a faction of the Gothic "senate" (meaning the more or less organized assemblies of the Gothic nobility) would call Byzzies for help as they did in the VIth century, or as they did with Franks in 632, or as they did with Arabo-Berbers in 711.
I don't really see consequences such as outright conquest of the former province of Spania (let alone Hispania, as you said) but the acknowledgement of imperial suzerainity or at least dominance. At best, some hold outpoints on Spanish coast for harbouring the fleet?

considering that roman elements (or romanized elements) were still alive there.
They were basically alive everywhere in most of former Romania in the west (at the partial exception of Illyricum and not that obvious in post-imperial Britain). Long story short, Romano-Barbarian kingdoms were as much the direct continuation of what Roman ensemble was in the west, than what ERE was for the east.
It doesn't mean they weren't an evolution and changed from the late imperial model, but essentially it came from there.

Definitely even more than OTL, given the new geography of this alternate roman empire.
It was really what made the survival of ERE IOTL too, especially in their wars against Arabs. It would be more of a stress, but not this much more than IOTL. The big difference IMO, is that the empire could survive significant backleashes IOTL without it, much less ITTL.
 
If so, I wonder if Constans' goal was less about conquering the duchy, than taking back lost coastal territories, and make Benevent (if not the possible future king of Lombards that was the duke) acknowledging Imperial suzerainity.
That's entierely speculative, that said, and I, for one, would be interested on the claims you read : can you remember, or better link, to them?
I'm not entirely sure, but it should be S. Cosentino, Storia dell'Italia bizantina (VI-XI secolo). Da Giustiniano ai Normanni. It was just a relatively minor claim, while describing the situation of Italy during the VII the century, but there could be something true about it.
Well, the obvious answer would be to prevent Arab conquest and not make Armenians the immediate frontline. I suspect that's not what you're in for, though.
Italy and Africa were peripheral enough (especially Africa which barely appears in Byzantine accounts after the early VIIth century) to not be considered an offical pool. Maybe with a stronger Byzantine presence in Italy? Of course it would risk butterflying away Constans' expedition.
I understand the fact the Italy was not exactly in a position to finance any major army, what I don't understand is what happened to Africa between the age of Heraclius and Justinian II? I mean Africa was at the time of Justinian one of the richest place to reconquer and its reconquest happened without any major devastation (compared to the "Italian" war), and it effectively sustained Heraclius against Phokas. Ok sometimes it also spawned some usurpers, but why weren't the Romans able to properly exploit the resources available there? Maybe the office of an Exarch was not suited for Africa (due to excessive power that one single man would have), but I think that at least they should be able to finance a local army instead of constantly relying on Constantinople (like it happened at the end of the VII century). Maybe I'm missing something, but it seems like the Romans did something really wrong here.
That's done for since the Gothic Wars IMO: Justinian reconquests were badly politically planned, and it ended up doing more harm than build-up for both late Roman ensemble in Italy.
That's something we both agree, however I would like to avoid an earlier POD (like no Gothic devastation, death of Mauricius, Arab invasion ecc.). I prefer to take the desperate situation of the VII century and try to improve it.
I'll go for a rant a bit : sorry, it's not against you.

Roman Empire and ERE were basically Clue®cracies, while Gothic Spain was an anti-dynastic kingship after the disappearance of Baltis.
Both ensured succession crisis, altough for various reasons (in the second case, because no noble wanted to see a dynasty monopolizing redistribution and honores), but amusingly, it's only "endemic" for Barbarians.
Similarily, both Romans and Franks (and other Romano-Barbarian kingdoms) practiced splitted rulership (WRE/ERE, various Frankish kings) but, strangely, only the second is a sign of poor understanding of what a state is.
See a pattern there already? Oh, but you'll always have someone to come and say something along the lines of "B..But BARBARIANS! Ugly, smelling, brutish Barbarians!"

At some point, people have to acknowledge that these states were more akin and succeeding to the Late Imperial Roman structures and administrations, if they want an accurate perception of Late Antiquity.

/rant over.
I didn't mean to assert that the barbarians were inferior to the Romans and probably I used some wrong expressions. What I meant was that the Romans (provided that the Heraclian
establish a proper dynasty) could exploit a favourable situation (like a civil war) to take the coastal region of Spain, before proceeding with further conquest. I recognize that this would require a stabilization of the eastern frontier, some success in Italy and at least 30-40 year without constantly worrying about usurpers, separatist etc. The Goths were not an easy target, but maybe under the right circumstance we could see something similar to the Arab invasion of Spain (albeit more gradually as I'm not interested in an immediate Roman recovery), forcing what is left of the Gothic state to recognize roman supremacy.
They were basically alive everywhere in most of former Romania in the west (at the partial exception of Illyricum and not that obvious in post-imperial Britain). Long story short, Romano-Barbarian kingdoms were as much the direct continuation of what Roman ensemble was in the west, than what ERE was for the east.
It doesn't mean they weren't an evolution and changed from the late imperial model, but essentially it came from there.
This could be an alternative: forcing Romano-Barbarian king to recognize they were just ruling, officially, in the name of the emperor. Even without direct rule, as long as they keep roman elements and support the empire (militarily and economically) then it's fine for me.
It was really what made the survival of ERE IOTL too, especially in their wars against Arabs. It would be more of a stress, but not this much more than IOTL. The big difference IMO, is that the empire could survive significant backleashes IOTL without it, much less ITTL.
Basically what I'm aiming for with this thread is to preserve Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean which involve also naval supremacy.
 
Sorry for the delayed answer and the wall of text.

I'm not entirely sure, but it should be S. Cosentino, Storia dell'Italia bizantina (VI-XI secolo). Da Giustiniano ai Normanni. It was just a relatively minor claim, while describing the situation of Italy during the VII the century, but there could be something true about it.
Thanks, I'll try to get a copy. The topic is really interesting besides our own discussion.

I understand the fact the Italy was not exactly in a position to finance any major army, what I don't understand is what happened to Africa between the age of Heraclius and Justinian II?
Basically? It comes down to Justinian poor geopolitical perception of western Romania from one hand, and Imperials being busy litterally everywhere else. Like it happened on Italy, except less known and sourced.

I translated the conclusion of this study, that summarize well the problem.

Beginning this book, almost ended now, we made a constantation that established itself a project : modern historiography, unanimous, considered decisive the role of populations called Maurs then Berbers in the evolution of Roman Africa in the third centuries before the Arab conquest; but it strangeley never tried to explain what could have been this role, wom importance and aspects were only sketched, often in a dark way, within essays or huge synthesis, more richs in general considerations than in scientific analysis. History of Maurs, of their place in african society, of their relationship with succeeding powers between the first crisis symptoms of the Western Roman Empire and the Arab presence, and their possible responsibility in the latter's success, was still to be written down. But we remembered the risky bet that could be such a research project. Even without the usual problems of all Ancient History, this topic had two specific obstacles to overcome that may had greatly limited its range. The first was in the rarity and particular nature of textual sources : Greeks, Latins, Syrians or Arabs, available written sources were almost all issued outside the Berber world and from circles often hostile or despising people considered mainly as barbarians. This first difficulty was increased by the scientific legacy that we recieved. A century and half of educated research on North African Late Antiquity made a really rich base that couldn't be neglected. But in the same time, historiographical analysis unveiled immediately how what we called five evidence prisma distorted or made harder the use of these studies when they mentioned Berbers.

Allying their influence, these two phenomenons exerted a particularly reducing effect on the studies devolved to Maurs of the Byzantine period, the era that this study had to privilege as the last before the collapse of romanity in Africa, and in the same time the one that in its initial phase, let us most sources. Relationship between Byzantines and Berbers were almost always seen as only a face of an history that was first about the Empire. And the difficulties regarding documentation for some, an ideological bias for many, reduced this topic to a study of military means used by Greeks to submit barbarians considered as naturally hostiles.

Then, we wanted there, and it was the fundamental base of our research, consider at the contrary every form of relationship of Byzantines, but as well Romans and Vandals, with Berbers in an African perspective first, and not a roman, vandal or byzantine one. Without trying to systematically "reverse" history, and never neglecting other social groups present then in Africa, this study was mainly based on Maurs themselves, whom identity was the great mystery of this time. Eternal Jugurthas or disguised Africans for scholars, they were always submitted to the quest of the one definition, that by principle disregarded their complexity. Radically opposed to C.Courtois, P.A. Février own his thesis of the ambigious Maur only trough this shared bias. Basing the criticism of sources on the maur identity, our method tried to take the problem to its source, with much hope as it was accompanied by a parallel hypothesis : the apparent instability and chaos of Berber history between the Vth and VIIth centuries may be explained first by their own structures, and critically from their integration in African romanity. To use the chosen example, understanding of apparently really confuse events of Libyan Wars of 530-550 could be based more, according this hypothesis, on a highlighting of the complexity of Maur world on which the Empire was confronted, and on the perception that the latter had, rather than a study about military problems or byzantine administration.

Was this hypothesis profitable? Summaries of recorded results seems at least proving that it deserved to be followed. After a preliminary critical analysis of the exceptional source that are Vandalic War of Procopus and critically Johannide of Corripos, and the elaboration of an utilization method for this texts, a first representation of the maur world imposed itself, characterized both by its important presence in the new byzantine Africa, but as well by its fundamental division in two categories. Based on two of the analysis criterium seen previously and that had fortunatly inspired Corippos's reflexion, the insertion degree in the Empire and the attitude before it, this division opposed groups considered as within the provinces and accustomed to romanity, and groups defined as "syrtics", considered foreign to the roman world and its civilization. Considered and written down by a direct witness, a Roman of Africa of 550's, this division broke right from the beggining all clichés on the one and intemporal Maur. The study demonstrated then its relevance, deepeining the original characters of each group.

Began on the syrtic peoples, localized on the modern libyian territory, this study was blocked quickly by the aforementioned historiogaphical obstacles. On two groups, Austuriania and Laguatan, was elaborated a grand theory assimilating many "syrtic" tribes to a "new race, Neoberbers" : defined as hords of camel-ridders akin to modern Tuareg, these tribes were supposed to be engaged since the IIIrd century in a great East/West migration, leading them to invade the most romanised provinces of Africa, and first Byzacena, since the end of Vth or early VIth, beforme taking over Maghreb in the following centuries. Widespread since half a century, this theory implied both a socio-cultural definition of the whole of Maur peoples, and an interpretation of Berbero-Byzantine conflicts, the essential objectives of this very book. Without accepting it or rejecting it at first, we used it at first as a base hupothesis on our study about "Outer Maurs", considering the possibility to abandon it if it was to be inefficient at some point.

And this is what effectively happened. Critical analyisis and collation of an important lot of sources often neglected lead us to propose a new representation of Laguatan and of their semi-desertic Libya's neighbors. Issued probably from ancient Nasmons, Laguatan and Austuriania, clearly pagans and that practiced a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life, never went in Antiquity in great migrations to the West. Excluding exceptional raiding in 544-548, they at the contrary continuously searched, and eventually succeeded, to take the control of the Tripolitan, then Cyrenean predesert, where Arabs found them in the VIIth century.

This conclusion, confirming while limiting them, the particularities of the syrtic ensemble, strengthened as well the distinction of "Inner Maurs" relatively to this group. Without early migrations of great nomads in Byzacena or Numidia, we had to suppose that maurs populations of these regions determined themselves their fate, relatively of an original socio-economical and cultural evolution, that was still to be examined.

This part of the study was the longer and in the same time, the most decisive as it was about the less known groups of african society, living in former romanized regions, quickly christianized in the IIIrd and IVrd centuries, and without native urprising between the Ist and Vth centuries. Presence, number, past and critically the identity of these population in Corripus and Procopius' era created many questions. We had then in a first time, by a precise study of their three main representants of the mid VIth, Antalas, Cusina, and Iaudas, be sure of their localisation, then attempt to understand, wondering about their past, what justified both their classification as Maurs and their particular status. The density of chapters that was develloped on this questionary only reflects the complexity of the answer. Any too global view became wrong. On the chronological matter first, as it appeared that a part of the VIth Maurs was issued from populations that in the Vth weren't officially considered as such; on the social and cultural matter then, as a suite of intermediary situation could be guessed in "Maur" country between Afri and Mauri: on religion then, as the christianisation of tribes was extremly unequal. Inner Maurs' past have both the representation of latinized and christianized chiefs as the imperator Masties in Aurès, and highlanders as dark as Frexes of Guenfan in Byzacena S-W; it unites tribes that in the IVth had an acknowledged automony under the leadership of customary chiefs or prefects, and rural communauties agglomerated in villages in roman demesnes. Key of all the behaviroial ambigiuities to people as Antalas or Cusina face to the byzantine power, this past didn't obliterated an essential reality, that was clearly percieved by their Africano-Roman neighbours and established their unity : these populations all became in the mid VIth "Maurs" because they were integrated to a tribal structure. Neither strictly politic, religious or cultural, the base of their collective identity, highlighted by Corippos, was before everything the gens.

A far more flexible structure than modern historiography implies, totally compatible with Roman citizenship, tribe indeed survived in Byzacena and southern Numidia even in the IVth century, but depending on the situation, in two different levels : either it remained an autonomous entity with an official status; or it was only an organisation of village's social relationships, able to maintain a living reality even for groups serving great landowners. Its existance within provinces didn't mattered to the Empire : with their leaders invested by governors or prefects, even official tribes, with roman citizenship, christanized or about to be, were indeed peaceful and probably more or less integrated to roman economical structures. The regular silence of contemporary sources is less surprising, as well the absence of native agitation movements. These were generally rare in central provinces, as the Berber policy of the Empire allied fortunatly strength, flexibility and pragmatism. Rome didn't distinguished two, but probably three Maur categories. Face to Inner Maurs, it knew and tried to isolate a given number of unstable saharian groups, for exemple in the south of Tobna or in Tripolitana. Against these gens, limes was maintained, but most of all reinforced by agreements with a third kind of tribes, placed to the borders. Some of these officialy served the Empire as gentiles units, other contended to enjoy the roman neighborhood, gaining the right to lead their cattle in province, or selling their goods or workforce.

This balanced system was only gradually put in question in the Vth century. Probably shaken by the Vandal invasion, it collapsed only after the 480's, for reason still unknown, probably as much political than economical : inner difficulties of Hasding regime, issued mostly from its religious policy, mixed themselves to an impoverishment of southern Byzacena and Numidia counryside, maybe provoked by a slight climatic oscillation. Saharians progression in Tripolitana then began, leading little by little bordering tribes whom originality disappeared. In the same time, more in the North, first uprising appeared, sometimes to the initiative of second circle tribes, there too with a rising effective of gentes, that absorbed thanks to the flexibility of their structure, a destabilized rural proletariat. Increased continuously in the following half-century, this movement produced definitive effect with the Byzantine presence : duality of the Berber world, clearly drawn, when the inner complexity of each of these great groups, Inner and Outer Maurs, increased.

Did Justinian's men knew and understood this extreme complexity? Our work points that they came in 533 while largely ignoring it. Underestimating difficulties, and ignoring critically the originality of the Inner Maur group, Byzantines provoked a fighting process that may have been wished for by Romans of Africa. The seemed to have first compromised with the gentes presence in the provinces, using the clear will to find a modus vivendi with the Empire.

In reality, referring to a largely unrealistic and artificial mode, Justinian's men worked, as soon Vandals defeated, to eliminate these communities judged all equally foreign and barbarians. A first wave of conflict was born out of it, whom the Empire managed to take the upper hand only by changing of strategy, and compromising with some leaders. Once the peace established and the roman power reinforced, the prefect Solomon didn't renounced to the schema designed by Justinian in 533 and it definitely seem that these initiatives caused the great wars of 544-548. Succession of defeats for three years, they weren't catastrophic for Constantinople : heterogeneity of the coalition uniting Inner Maurs and syrtic tribes was translated indeed by divergent strategies, preventing every decisive victory. Jean Troglita and the return to realism once practiced by Solomon in 546 saved imperial position in Africa : the byzantine general eventually choose to come back to Fall 533 situation, acknowledging inside provinces maur communities, that with leaders and particular customs, maintained a relative autonomy.

That this balance, if it had been chosen since 533, would have been unstable anyway, the few we know of the post-548 seems to prove it with the short mentions of Maur wars in the chronicles. Still, the lack of knowledge of african realities by the byzantine power certainly aggravated a political crisis developped since the end of Vth century, that could have, at term, lead to a Berbero-ROman society akin to the model we see then in Mauretania. The tentative of Imperator Masties in Aures unveil the possibilities of such process. Byzantine reconquest then broke this evolution, not wished, admittedly, by Romans of Africa if Corripos is to be trusted. Then was recreated an isolate of traditional romanity in a western world where everywhere could be seen cultural and social fusion between Latins and Barbarians. The history of this isolated, between 548 and first Islamic attacks, wasn't reduced to a succession of war : it did had its time of prosperity, as discovered more and more by archeologists. But in all Arab texts, insisting on the distinction in Ifrikiyya of Berbers, Afarik and Rum, does prove that the byzantine era maintained communautarian firm distinction that Justinian laws and Solomon strongholds proclaimed right from the beginning.

And still, potentialities of the multiples nuances of African societies, and particularly maurs, didn't disappeared by the VIIth century, as proven by the history of the Arab conquest, and the first appearance of Botr/Branès that achieve this book. Outer Maur submission, Botr, was made in Cyrenaica and Tripolitan in mere years, and since the 670's Lawata and Zenata were associated to Islamic expeditions. On the contrary, in Byzacena and Numidia, in the Inner Maur country, renamed Branès maybe because of the christianisation, conquerors were opposed by regular alliance of Berbers and Romans, lead by greek Gregoire, Berber Kusayla and then, at least in the first part of this adventure, by the famed and mysterious Kahina. These spontaneous unions point well all the synthesis possibilities that could have appeared one century earlier between each side.

They lead us to close this book on what should be more than a paradox. C.Courtois, achieving his thesis, tought that the real drama of roman Africa wasn't the Vandal invasion, but the riebirth of a Berber world remained itself, meaning rejecting necessary the romanity. At the end of this long study, we wonder if the real rupture in this history wasn't the byzantine reconquest. Without this, in an easter Maghreb where the roman influence was really strong, the Maur expansion could have lead, not without violence, to a berbero-roman civilisation, original and dirable, as was merovingian civilisation in Gaul. The "divine surprise" that was Belisarius' successful expedition, aprooved by a roman society proclaiming its fear of the Maur, broke this possibility. Maybe did it as well condamned the future of the romanity it claimed to save.

Very roughly, Byzzies came in a Vandalic Africa that was already lossing ground against romanized Berbers, which were on the verge of creating a Mauri-Roman ensemble not unlike what happened in Gaul with Franks.
It's important to understand that, during the classical and late imperial period, Mauri were forming communities of their own, both outside and inside Roman Africa in connection with the provincial administration and management of the region. Vandals more or less inherited the situation but the late imperial balance was declining (partly out of a sense of political rivality and religious antagonizing, partly due to the troubles and destabilization Vandalic takeover caused). They did managed in the 450/460's to clientelize and/or enforce their authority on North-Western Africa, but from the 480's onwards, Vandals lost more and more ground to the point they mostly held a coastal band by the early VIth century. While Justinian was pretty much about restoring Imperial and Chalcedonian dominance in Africa (at first, he planned to restore Childeric as king of Vandals as he was acknowledging a certain suzerainty from Constantinople), the certainty of a support from Africano-Roman population that refused a Mauri dominance really won the decision.
Thing is, Romans and Justinian concieved Africa as a former roman province without any geopolitical concession : Berbers were seen as Barbarians without legitimacy to occupy and rule part of the province (even if it was partially the case even during the IIIrd century). It soon devolved in a low-intensity war that lasted nearly 20 years (trough two big revolts) before a certain status quo (that sources largely imply to have been negotiated) emerged, but it was both damaging for Roman Africa and for Romano-Berbers. The first establishing an undisputed rulership and putting an end to Berber advance to the coast, effectively reversing it; the second acknowledging imperial dominance while making their autonomy recognized and "officialized" auxiliaries in the defeat of other Berber groups (with a hierarchical system of titles and honores in Byzantine institutions). In spite of new conflicts, it lasted roughly up to 560's.

During the reign of Justin II, there was a renew of a conflict with Mauri, due to political assasinations and uneasy balance of power, it's sometimes called Garmul's revolt (possibly in conjunction with Gothic campaigns in Byzantine Spain, and Garamantes conversion to Christianity)
Sometimes Berbers were victorious and Roman generals/leaders were killed, sometimes Romans won and Berber were crushed: documentation becomes really rare at this point, so it's mostly up to some chronicles (Romans and Gothic). It was eventually defeated, but with a lesser Roman grasp on Mauri polities; and other revolts (even less known) followed. Romans were generally victorious military wise, less obviously so politically. Not that the political system set up by Iohannes Troglita was significantly put in question, but it was obviously not that stable.
And at this point Byzzies had other pressing issues (Avars, Lombards, Persians) closer to home : Mauricios acknowledged the basic reality of Africa and Italy and officialized their autonomy, as Africa was probably considered (not only by Constantinople but as well by Goths, Franks and Lombards) as too far off to be really noteworthy.

The big problem isn't just that Berbers and Romans were often warring, but that Berbers formed "integrated" communities not only trough neighboring kingdoms, but also within Roman Africa in its strictest sense with "Inner Mauri" communities that seems to have joined in the bandwagon on either side (it's even possible that Berbers briefly took Carthage in the 570's, although the interpretation is problematic : it could "only" be about them taking much of Africa, "Carthage" being a poetic license)
We know that even late Roman Africa was a prosperous region in spite of this, with an important intellectual drive : but it was remote, largely independent and geopolitically troubled.
We simply don't have sources about what happen in Africa in the latter half of VIIth and the VIIIth : in all probability, what always happened since the reconquest, safe the province was more and more on its own and managing a precarious balance between local foes and allies.

It's telling that Arabs had far less problems taking over the coast controlled by Romans than the really harsh fight they got from Berbers themselves, which lasted decades. It's noteworthy to remember that a good part of modern Tunisia was raided the heck out by Arabs in the 640's and 650's. The province was viable on its own, but that's it IMO

That's something we both agree, however I would like to avoid an earlier POD (like no Gothic devastation, death of Mauricius, Arab invasion ecc.). I prefer to take the desperate situation of the VII century and try to improve it.
No Gothic devastation '(or African messing-up) would require Justinian not being Justinian, so we'd probably have to deal with it ITTL.
Death of Maurice is rather interesting, being the last emperor having a real western-Med policy (if a policy of balance, pro-Chalcedonian and pro-Imperial) But a continuation of his policies probably call for a way stabler Imperial politics. It would probably butterfly away most of Byzantine history in the VIIth (and as such Constans II) but you could end up with a superficial return to the "Christian Commonwealth" conception, which is basically a more or less enforced suzerainity from Constantinople, not from something really institutionalized but from funding of pro-Chalcedonian forces (in Gaul with Gondovald and Brunehaut, in Spain with Hermenengild) and general redistribution and exchanges from court to court.

But this depended on Constantinople's capacity to project its economical power regularily. The Romano-Persian wars were a really important drain on imperial budget, and by the VIth century, silk and gold (along with grain and other perisable goods) became rarer in western Romania or even in balkanic Romania . It lead to a certain distanciation of western Romania polities (Franks specifically looked more and more on North Sea, and the provencal system of coinage, largely based on Roman denarii, stopped in the VIIth), and a "nativisation" of Balkanic Romania at the benefit of Slavic chiefdoms.

What I meant was that the Romans (provided that the Heraclian establish a proper dynasty) could exploit a favourable situation (like a civil war) to take the coastal region of Spain, before proceeding with further conquest.
At this point, it was no longer the Imperial policy (giving the Justinian conquests' consequences, probably for the best) : what would be searched would be an enforcement of Imperial influence trough economy, religion and a bit of warfare. There wasn't much reasons for re-conquering Betica, truth to be told, apart what ammounted to "I mean, we're there, so why not?" and the need of some bridgehead. It worked out better than expectable, but it also managed to unify Goths behind their kings more than it would have happened without, honestly.
If Romans were to carve up a territory, I'd rather see the traditionally rebellious and distinctive province of Gaul (often, and wrongly, called Septimania) which does have an history of being part or center of a sub-kingdom or rivaling kingdom (such as the "Eastern Kingdom" of Paulus). We could addmitedly, even in a Maurician perspective, see the creation of coastal exarchates, maybe like the one he might have tought about in Gaul after the Revolt of Gondovald, but like in Africa or Italy, it would likely be largely independent ensemble made up of imperial official and autonomous local Roman/Hypenathed-Romans nobles, rather than semi-autonomous provinces.

1) Mummolus (a Roman count that more or less ruled over Burgundy) revolts against Gontran (the king whom seat was Orléans) and prepare to be besieged in Avignon, that was bordering one of the other parts of the Frankish Kingdom.

In the same time : Desiderius of Toulouse (another Roman) and Bladast of Novempopulania (a Goth) revolt themselves against Chilperic I that reigned from Soissons, while they took Western Aquitaine from Gontran at his benefit not long before.

Desiderius and Mummolus end by forming some sort of alliance, while Gontran Boson of Auvergne (a Frank) goes to Constantinople to encounter Gondovald more or less bastard of Clotaire I that was spoiled from his rights by Caribert (brother of Gontan, Chilpéric and Sigibert, but that died at this point).

Desiderius was part of the powerful Syagrii family (that rooted from Albi and Quercy to Burgundy and Provence); while Mummolus was tied with Ferreolii, Firminii and maybe up to the Frankish royal family of Koln.
Bladast is known to have intervened in Spain at the benefit of Leovigild.
Gontran Bonson, while Frank, shares familial ties with Roman nobility of Auvergne.

The whole alliance (that while essentially Roman, holds the majority of military power) is supported by diverse bishops (almost all Romans, except a Romano-Frank) of southern Gaul, and was critically turned against Chilperic, while avoiding to attack Childebert II.

2)

Gondovald arrives in Marseille at the end of 582, welcomed by nobility of the kingdom of Childebert II, and with a treasure that Mauricus gave him.

Brunehilde just recovered much power, with the majority of Childebert, tying alliances with Visigoths of Ermenengild catholic faction, opposed to Leovigild, that recieved as well Byzantine support.

In this geopolitical configuration, sending Gondovald as a claimant in Gaul, that would help Brunehild to take advantage of the situation to take over the part ruled over by Chilperic whom rule was discredited, but whom possession was part of a complete unification of the Frankish Kingdom's policy.
In the same time, Merovingian lineage is declining, and Gondovald argues of the possibility of an extinction to claim his legacy.

Gontran Bonson switch sides to join with Gontran (getting his hand on the treasure) and tries to take Avignon, only to see Brunehilde (regent of Childebert II and Visigothic princess) helping the revoltees, sending an army with at his head a Frankish relative of Mummolus.

Gondovald still joins Mummolus in Avignon, but Childebert II suddenly allies himself with Chilperic, his father's murderer; and Chilperic even makes Childebert his heir. Gondovald have to withdraw on Mediterranean Sea (Lerins Islands or possibly Byzantine Corsica), while the new allies campaign unsuccessfuly in Aquitaine.

3) (You can have an aspirin)

But, in a new addition in what was an overly long list of Twilight Zone-like twists (and it's not finished), Chilperic manages to sire an heir, Clotaire II. Childebert II can't hope inheriting and alliances reverse once again : Childebert and Gontran being allied against Chilperic.

And then Chilperic is murdered :)D) while Gondovald was about to come in Gaul anew and Gontran proclaims his desire to protect Clotaire II, and occup Chilperic and Childebert's Aquitaine (totally abusing from the situation).
Gondovald appears now as an usurper, while Gontran the main target of the revolt originally, becames the loyal protector of Merovingian interests. All of that in less than 3 years.

Gondovald have only to join up with Romans revoltees, and to follow their ambitions (basically, the same thing that Ermengild had to at the same time). The Romano-Frankish army goes north in late 584 and proclaims Gondovald king, in the same times he take backs Childeric's part in his name, but in his own name for the other cities, in a march that wasn't too problematic and establishing his court in Bordeaux. (yellow are parts he didn't controlled)

But (yes another "but") he's overtaken by events : some nobility of Childebert II's part of Frankish Kingdoms began to want *him* as king. Childebert II and Brunhilde being not too happy about it. In the same time, Gontran proclaims Childebert II as his sole heir.
Gundovald is fucked.

Or was he?
...
Yes, he was.

He's eventually attacked by a huge army formed by the whole of the Frankish Kingdom, led as well by Franks and Romans and have to withdraw in Novempopulania with Bladast as main support, hoping reinforcement from others Goths.
Leovigild having crushed his son's rebellion, and doesn't help Gondovald (that not only was part of Constantinople's meddling, but as well kidnapped the promised wife if Reccared after having stole her douary).

So, when it comes to support, it was far less based on "who's Roman, who's Frank, who's from Constantinople" but decided essentially from Frankish situation.
As long he was an asset in Brunhilde/Childebert II's amibitions, nobody complained and he recieved much support from Franks of these courts but from Romans as well (that prooved being huge assets for their kingdoms before the revolt. An "Austrasian" held conspiracy isn't to reject.

And of course, the whole idiotic list of twists that would be easily considered as ASB if used in any timeline posted on this board.

Regarding Spain, Hermenegild's failure is the main responsible. Without rebellion, or with a victorious one, you may had a more important Gothic support.
As for Italy, that I didn't mentioned yet, Audhari married his half-sister and his son was made Duke of Asti (and father of the "bavarian" king Haribert). Giving the absence of troubles from Provence, an at least passive support may be expected (and is, in a macro-historical perspective, pointing out the traditional alliances between Aquitaine and Lombard Italy)

Of course, it's largely dependent on what happen in Near East.


I recognize that this would require a stabilization of the eastern frontier, some success in Italy and at least 30-40 year without constantly worrying about usurpers, separatist etc.
With a quick stabilisation of the empire and neither long Romano-Persian wars, neither Arab conquest, you could arguably limit Lombard conquest to Annonarian Italy, preserve the aformentioned system. It would certainly butterfly away most of your OP, tough. But for better or worse, Francia was going to be the dominant polity in western Romania since Ostrogoths went down. Their "tight" sphere of influence by Dagobert's reign went from Kent to Central Europe. As remote or concerned allies, they're going to count.
Again, I don't think a JUSTINIAN SMASHES approach would work out ITTL, no more than IOTL anyway. A "Christian Commonwealth" dominated by Constantinople able to enforce diplomatically and politically its suzerainty, and holding coastal regions in western Med? It could work, and could happen.

This could be an alternative: forcing Romano-Barbarian king to recognize they were just ruling, officially, in the name of the emperor.
This was, technically, the case for the Vth and a large part of the VIth, until Roman influence and capacity of projection went down.
Technically because Rome had essentially a power of influence, and not a real political dominance.

Basically what I'm aiming for with this thread is to preserve Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean which involve also naval supremacy.
I hope I gave you satisfactory elements in this sense. It doesn't have anything to do with your OP anymore, this said.
 
To take it a bit further if Basil II's niece Theodora had been male (giving the Macedonians at least one more generation under a reasonably competent ruler) then could (after the probable reconquest of Sicily) that empire exploit divisions in, say, the Investiture Controversy, to carve out client states in Lombardy and Provence (or for that matter coastal Hispania)? The divisions between east and west, while substantial, are not IMHO fatal at this point, and the Ottonian project is recent enough that it could conceivably shatter under the right circumstances. Combined with the feudal fragmentation of Andalusia and France that could be a real opportunity, especially if *Theodorus gets a decent heir of his own.
 
Unfortunately I’m not currently able to arrange a proper reply to your last message,so I will resume this thread later, if you are still willing to continue this. However I’ve found the description of the revolt and it’s roman elements really interesting. So I want to ask if you have any particular book to suggest about the Romano-barbarian kingdoms (particularly Franks visigoths and Mauri) especially from the V to the VII century. I would be really interested in their interaction with the remaining local Roman elements but even a more general theme would be ok.
 
To take it a bit further if Basil II's niece Theodora had been male (giving the Macedonians at least one more generation under a reasonably competent ruler) then could (after the probable reconquest of Sicily) that empire exploit divisions in, say, the Investiture Controversy, to carve out client states in Lombardy and Provence (or for that matter coastal Hispania)? The divisions between east and west, while substantial, are not IMHO fatal at this point, and the Ottonian project is recent enough that it could conceivably shatter under the right circumstances. Combined with the feudal fragmentation of Andalusia and France that could be a real opportunity, especially if *Theodorus gets a decent heir of his own.
I find an alternate succession to basil II really interesting however, unfortunately, given the period we would face a radically different context and different opportunities compared to a VII century POD
 
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