Consolidating the British Aero Industry in the 1930s

Something occurred to me at work today

in the 1930s Britain had a eclectic mix of Aircraft Companies.

However due to the small number of aircraft being ordered few of them were capable of producing large numbers of planes

After the war and nearly effectively during the war many firms sub contracted building another firms design and eventually after several consolidations of companies merged to form larger companies etc until today when its effectively BAe

What POD or PODs could happen to 'consolidate' those companies in fewer but larger manufacturers in Britain by the early 30s?
 
This is from a British Aircraft Procurement 1934-39 essay that I started (and did not finish) folllowing the recent What To Build In Place Of The Stirling Thread.

The Aircraft Industry

In April 1919 the Armstrong-Whitworth Development Company bought out Siddeley-Deasy and in May 1919 became Armstrong-Siddeley Motors Ltd a subsidiary with J. D. Siddeley as Managing Director. In 1927, Armstrong-Whitworth merged its heavy engineering interests with Vickers to form Vickers-Armstrong. At this point, J. D. Siddeley bought Armstrong-Siddeley and Armstrong-Whitworth Aircraft into his control. In 1928, Armstrong-Siddeley Holdings bought Avro from Crossley Motors. In 1935, J. D. Siddeley's interests were purchased by Tommy Sopwith owner of Hawker Aircraft and the Gloster Aircraft Company to create Hawker Siddeley. However, Armstrong-Whitworth, Avro, Gloster and Hawker carried on as separate entities competing against each other until the 1960 reorganisation, when they merged with Blackburn, De Havilland and Folland to become Hawker Siddeley Aviation.

However, in this version of history J. D. Siddeley created a new firm called Avro-Whitworth from Armstrong-Whitworth and Avro with one design team and one factory. In 1935 the new Hawker Siddeley Group created a new aviation firm called Hawker Siddeley Aviation with two divisions. The Avro-Whitworth Division under Roy Chadwick concentrated on bombers and transport aircraft. The Hawker-Gloster Division had one design team under Sydney Camm with George Carter as his deputy concentrated on fighters, but there was no rationalisation of the factories. Furthermore Blackburn, De Havilland and Folland became part of Hawker Siddeley Aviation in 1948 instead of 1960. The latter was due to a Government led rationalisation of the aviation industry, which effectively bought the real world's reorganisation of 1960 forward to 1948.

Meanwhile Vickers bought the Bristol Aeroplane Company in the late 1930s and merged its design team with their design team at Weybridge which concentrated on bombers and transport aircraft, while the Supermarine Division concentrated on fighters and flying boats. English Electric and Vickers-Armstrong merged their aviation interests in 1948, which effectively created the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) 12 years earlier. To complete the story, BAC, Hawker Siddeley and Scottish Aviation merged by mutual consent in 1960 and nationalisation still takes place in 1977. In the real world Handley Page refused to merge and became insolvent in 1970. In this version of history it joined BAC in 1948.

The Air Ministry had Hafner's firm taken over by Westland in 1939 rather than Bristol in 1944. The Government also has Saunders Roe take over the Weir families aviation interests in 1940 instead of 1951. Both firms merge with Fairey in 1948 instead of 1960 as part of the post-war reorganisation of the industry.

The consolidation of the engine design groups was more important than the consolidation on the airframe firms. In this version of history Cosmos Engineering was taken over by Armstrong Siddeley rather than Bristol. Cosmos and Armstrong Siddeley Motors were merged to create a new company called Bristol Siddeley Engines (BSE). BSE acquired Metrovick's aero engine business (which included the F.9 Sapphire) after the war. Blackburn Engines and De Havilland Engines became part of BSE in 1948 instead of 1960. Meanwhile Rolls Royce buys Napier in 1926 instead of 1961. Rolls Royce absorbs BSE merge by mutual consent in 1960, instead of buying the company in 1966 for £63 million and that helps Rolls Royce to avoid bankruptcy in 1971.
 
This is from a British Aircraft Procurement 1934-39 essay that I started (and did not finish) folllowing the recent What To Build In Place Of The Stirling Thread.

The Aircraft Industry

In April 1919 the Armstrong-Whitworth Development Company bought out Siddeley-Deasy and in May 1919 became Armstrong-Siddeley Motors Ltd a subsidiary with J. D. Siddeley as Managing Director. In 1927, Armstrong-Whitworth merged its heavy engineering interests with Vickers to form Vickers-Armstrong. At this point, J. D. Siddeley bought Armstrong-Siddeley and Armstrong-Whitworth Aircraft into his control. In 1928, Armstrong-Siddeley Holdings bought Avro from Crossley Motors. In 1935, J. D. Siddeley's interests were purchased by Tommy Sopwith owner of Hawker Aircraft and the Gloster Aircraft Company to create Hawker Siddeley. However, Armstrong-Whitworth, Avro, Gloster and Hawker carried on as separate entities competing against each other until the 1960 reorganisation, when they merged with Blackburn, De Havilland and Folland to become Hawker Siddeley Aviation.

However, in this version of history J. D. Siddeley created a new firm called Avro-Whitworth from Armstrong-Whitworth and Avro with one design team and one factory. In 1935 the new Hawker Siddeley Group created a new aviation firm called Hawker Siddeley Aviation with two divisions. The Avro-Whitworth Division under Roy Chadwick concentrated on bombers and transport aircraft. The Hawker-Gloster Division had one design team under Sydney Camm with George Carter as his deputy concentrated on fighters, but there was no rationalisation of the factories. Furthermore Blackburn, De Havilland and Folland became part of Hawker Siddeley Aviation in 1948 instead of 1960. The latter was due to a Government led rationalisation of the aviation industry, which effectively bought the real world's reorganisation of 1960 forward to 1948.

Meanwhile Vickers bought the Bristol Aeroplane Company in the late 1930s and merged its design team with their design team at Weybridge which concentrated on bombers and transport aircraft, while the Supermarine Division concentrated on fighters and flying boats. English Electric and Vickers-Armstrong merged their aviation interests in 1948, which effectively created the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) 12 years earlier. To complete the story, BAC, Hawker Siddeley and Scottish Aviation merged by mutual consent in 1960 and nationalisation still takes place in 1977. In the real world Handley Page refused to merge and became insolvent in 1970. In this version of history it joined BAC in 1948.

The Air Ministry had Hafner's firm taken over by Westland in 1939 rather than Bristol in 1944. The Government also has Saunders Roe take over the Weir families aviation interests in 1940 instead of 1951. Both firms merge with Fairey in 1948 instead of 1960 as part of the post-war reorganisation of the industry.

The consolidation of the engine design groups was more important than the consolidation on the airframe firms. In this version of history Cosmos Engineering was taken over by Armstrong Siddeley rather than Bristol. Cosmos and Armstrong Siddeley Motors were merged to create a new company called Bristol Siddeley Engines (BSE). BSE acquired Metrovick's aero engine business (which included the F.9 Sapphire) after the war. Blackburn Engines and De Havilland Engines became part of BSE in 1948 instead of 1960. Meanwhile Rolls Royce buys Napier in 1926 instead of 1961. Rolls Royce absorbs BSE merge by mutual consent in 1960, instead of buying the company in 1966 for £63 million and that helps Rolls Royce to avoid bankruptcy in 1971.


Thats a pretty good effort mate

And a more more consolidated aircraft industry is probably pushing it a bit too much

So say the above happens what impact would that have?

What still gets made and what doesn't get made?
 
A lot of changes before, during, and after WWII. The only thing I can guess is that design and procurement even in the leadup to the war will be unrecognisable. Interesting butterflies though.
 
Thats a pretty good effort mate

And a more more consolidated aircraft industry is probably pushing it a bit too much

So say the above happens what impact would that have?

What still gets made and what doesn't get made?

There are several half-finished essays about the impact it has on my laptop. So if I ever finish them I will post them here or email them to you.
 
A lot of changes before, during, and after WWII. The only thing I can guess is that design and procurement even in the leadup to the war will be unrecognisable. Interesting butterflies though.

One of them is that Derek Wood doesn't write, Project Cancelled - The Disaster of Briain's Abandoned Aircraft Projects.

However, he might wright a book called Project Completed - The Triumph of the British Aerospace Industry Since 1945.
 
There are several half-finished essays about the impact it has on my laptop. So if I ever finish them I will post them here or email them to you.

Much appreciated

One of them is that Derek Wood doesn't write, Project Cancelled - The Disaster of Briain's Abandoned Aircraft Projects.

However, he might wright a book called Project Completed - The Triumph of the British Aerospace Industry Since 1945.

That would be nice :D
 

Driftless

Donor
As with all things Alternative History, the OTL folks were acting on the basis of what they knew - or thought they knew....

Honest questions here: How many of the OTL situations you are describing did they get right, how many could have been done better in hindsight, and what was an obvious error right from the get-go? Also, I can imagine some companies had superior technical expertise, but lacked business skills and vice-versa.
 
As with all things Alternative History, the OTL folks were acting on the basis of what they knew - or thought they knew....

Honest questions here: How many of the OTL situations you are describing did they get right, how many could have been done better in hindsight, and what was an obvious error right from the get-go? Also, I can imagine some companies had superior technical expertise, but lacked business skills and vice-versa.

Correct, my alt TL is with the benefit of a mountain of hindsight.

Corelli Barnett in the Audit of War heavily criticises the British Government for allowing so many airframe and engine fims to exist. He also gives some of the strengths and weaknesses of the firms.

So does Charles Gardner in his history of the British Aircraft Corporation. He also says that the Atlee Government was planning a rationalisation of the aircraft industry that was frustrated by the Korean War.

The Atlee Government does rationalise the aircraft industry in Derek Wood's Scenario 1945. Some of what he suggested is incorporated in my 1945-75 alt history.
 
One of them is that Derek Wood doesn't write, Project Cancelled - The Disaster of Briain's Abandoned Aircraft Projects.However, he might wright a book called Project Completed - The Triumph of the British Aerospace Industry Since 1945.

Allow me to be pessimistic. The reason there were so many cancelled projects was primarily because Britain had so many smaller aircraft companies each with their own design team. So for every possible need for a new aircraft there would be a dozen designs ranging from the unimaginative safe to the over-the-top imaginative. The real problem was not that Britains leaders lacked foresight in their aircraft contract, it was that Britain at that time had far more design bureaus then production capacity and far more production capacity then money to pay for new aircraft. Consolidating all aircraft factories in one big conglomerate would not help, it would simply cut the number of projects making it to the advanced design stage into half, if not into one tenths
 
Allow me to be pessimistic. The reason there were so many cancelled projects was primarily because Britain had so many smaller aircraft companies each with their own design team. So for every possible need for a new aircraft there would be a dozen designs ranging from the unimaginative safe to the over-the-top imaginative. The real problem was not that Britains leaders lacked foresight in their aircraft contract, it was that Britain at that time had far more design bureaus then production capacity and far more production capacity then money to pay for new aircraft. Consolidating all aircraft factories in one big conglomerate would not help, it would simply cut the number of projects making it to the advanced design stage into half, if not into one tenths

Well they could merge into what 5 Companys or something like that im pretty sure he didnt say what you think
 
Still, 'Project Cancelled' mostly laments that out of 15 competing designs, the government, by lack of foresight, always chose the safest option and shied away from really groundbreaking designs. If Britains air industry were consolidated into 5 big conglomerates, the only difference would be that out of 15 studies, 10 would directly be stopped by their respective mega company's accounting department for being too adventurous and you would end up with only 5 competing designs. And out of those, the government, by lack of foresight, always chose the safest option and shied away from really groundbreaking designs....
 
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