Consequences of the British focusing on winning the Battle of the Atlantic first?

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Weren't the mid-1942 plans made in case a Russian collapse looked imminent and only for use in such an emergency?

There were multiple plans prepared from 1941 through the end of 1943. Several of those plans had variations for use were the USSR to collapse. The plan I refered to was for establishing a lodgement on the Cotientin without any specific refrence to what happened in the east. That & the others were effectively shelved when Alan Brooke became CIGS in mid 1942. tho some residual staff work continued until the end of the year. There was a lot of discussion at the high level confrences & proposals included in the memos and minutes from those confrences, but until COSSAC was established in 1943 actual 'planning' was effectively halted. This went beyond staff work at HQ. ie: Work on Montbattens prefabricated port project remained fragmented and very slow after Montbatten was sent to India.
 
The RAF could have also thrown the Lancaster B.II at Coastal* - the Hercules variant had a lower ceiling than the Merlin ones and subsequently higher losses. I doubt they would have wanted to lose the Stirling though - it was effective enough with 100 Group carrying various black boxes and it's roominess made it ideal as a transport.

*I've been wanting to do an Airfix Lancaster as a GR.II in Coastal colours and all the bits are sitting there to do it...
 
Can't see why or how.

The number of amphibious assets won't be any more ready. The number of troops won't be any more ready. Most critically the WAllies won't have air supremacy. If anything it will take longer to establish air supremacy because there will have been less winnowing of the Luftwaffe.
More amphibious assessment could be produced by not needing to replace lost cargo ships.The equipment not lost will help out the supply situation.As for the Luftwaffe the shift to clearing the skies over France would begin earlier.
Every ship headed to the Soviet Union not sunk will adversely effect the Germans.
 
...Its not uboat kills that won the battle - it was preventing the uboats from being able to sink Merchantmen that won the battle - sinking them was just a bonus.

and that is the crucial effect that is hard to quantify on graphs of ships lost, ub sunk, ub at sea etc.

It was also hard for naval officers to grasp - especially in the USN (see Second Happy Time)

However in a way its an understandable mistake.
IMHO this is a mirror image of the discussion about what part of a plane should be given extra armour.
Some said "look at the planes that land with damage. That is where it should go"
Others said "NO. The planes survived that kind of hurt. Think about the ones LOST and ask where might they have been hit"


Aside: in line with my thesis of "combined solutions needed" at least 3 Allied tools worked together to save ships even if no ub was sunk

  1. Station X at Betchley Park made cracked Enigma and the decrypts allowed convoys to be routed away from areas of danger.

  2. Air escorts operating "over the horizon" from a convoy would drve down ub in a picket line ahead of the track
    or those attempting to trail a convoy while calling in the clans.
    In either case the convoy could jink

  3. Huff Duff radio detection finding from escorts would indicate the UBs when coordinating the pack
    again allowing a jink or a preemptive counter attack
 
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perfectgeneral

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Can't see why or how.

The number of amphibious assets won't be any more ready. The number of troops won't be any more ready. Most critically the WAllies won't have air supremacy. If anything it will take longer to establish air supremacy because there will have been less winnowing of the Luftwaffe.
Rather than have Bomber Command try to hit things they can't and out of range of confirmation, how about an airfield campaign in France? Heavily influence the skies of non-Vichy France as a constant drain on Luftwaffe resources, with a better hope of accurate navigation and an incentive to develop longer range interceptors as escorts. If the Luftwaffe withdraws, there are plenty of opportunities arising from that.

The high end kit bought for BC was expensive in research and development assets. Greater amphibious assets and longer range air supremacy assets would eat into build up of BC, but the bomber force was built up at great expense before it was truely effective. A longer "test campaign" for BC would have made a lot of early savings.

A MAC convoy escort strategy pre-war (kits and sponsored merchant/tankers) Stops the UB menace in it's tracks. A lot of rash and expensive choices are not made. I hope we have Atlantic Conveyor type candidates for conversion to this day.
 
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More amphibious assessment could be produced by not needing to replace lost cargo ships.The equipment not lost will help out the supply situation.As for the Luftwaffe the shift to clearing the skies over France would begin earlier.
Every ship headed to the Soviet Union not sunk will adversely effect the Germans.

Depends when exactly we're assuming the U-boats are decisively beaten, and how much more materiel that really means will arrive in England. If 'victory' happens in late '42 and the final u-boat offensive is defeated in early '43 (instead of early '43 and late 43 respectively), would that six months or so be adequate to pour in the massive amount of manpower and equipment needed for D-Day to be remotely practical? It seems more likely to me that Churchill would still insist on invading Italy instead of France in 1943.

Large-scale amphibious operations also require immense practical knowledge which the Allies had to learn over the course of multiple such operations before launching D-Day in 1944. Without the experience from Husky, would they be able to manage an even larger operation?
 

perfectgeneral

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Italy should have been started in 1942. At least Sicily needs to be taken to allow use of the Med to shorten shipping routes. Probably by opening a second front in western North Africa. Supplying around the horn of Africa is a logistically limiting campaign for Tunis. Rolling up Morocco will trigger war with Vichey, but that is a price worth paying. As much was risked just to hit the French fleet. Holding Morocco and then Algeria would provide a source of minerals for steel production closer to home than continental North America. Even with convoys arcing out into the Atlantic to avoid a Biscay pounding.

This requires that the Air Force take combined operations seriously. It requires a RN commitment to amphibious transport by 1941. A joined up west to east hammer to meet the Egyptian anvil will need secure supply lines into Atlantic Morocco.
 
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Anyone know what the fuselage width and depth was on the B-24, Halifax and Lancaster compared to the post war Shackleton?
 
Holding Morocco and then Algeria would provide a source of minerals for steel production closer to home than continental North America.
That would require ships to transport the ore and then men and facilities in the UK to manufacture the steel, IIRC deliveries from the US would often be in the form of already refined metal ingots which could be used to manufacture goods straight away as that took up less space and removed a large part of the process to the more peaceful America. It might be cheaper for the British to import the ore themselves but it will also cost them in other ways making it swings and roundabouts.
 
An earlier Battle of the Atlantic win might allow for an earlier cross channel invasion as with greater ability to move troops supplies etc across the atlantic and beyond the 'Soft Underbelly' strategy would hold less weight with the US leadership

But I would say that other operations would have to be cancelled or toned down in order to provide the assets necessary for this
  • Op Husky - invasion of Sicily
  • Early and mid 1943 Russian Convoys - each one was a major naval operation in its own right
  • Early and mid 1943 Amphibious operations in the Pacific
And of course the landings being in 1943 would have to rely more on British Divisions as there would be fewer US Divisions available (ie fully stood up and trained etc) than was the case in 1944 - perhaps the USMC might get to see combat in Europe?
 
and that is the crucial effect that is hard to quantify on graphs of ships lost, ub sunk, ub at sea etc ...

John Ellis in 'Brute Force' makes a fair start in this direction. Chart showing the percent of tonnage delivered to the UK of tonnage embarked for the UK is eye opening. The chart is divided by annual deliveries & therefor is a bit crude, but still it is a big step in understanding how the battle played out. Another chart Ellis presents shows the ratio of tonnage sunk to submarines sorties. That also has a few surprises hidden in it.
 
An earlier Battle of the Atlantic win might allow for an earlier cross channel invasion as with greater ability to move troops supplies etc across the atlantic and beyond the 'Soft Underbelly' strategy would hold less weight with the US leadership

But I would say that other operations would have to be cancelled or toned down in order to provide the assets necessary for this
  • Op Husky - invasion of Sicily

Marshals preference.

  • Early and mid 1943 Russian Convoys - each one was a major naval operation in its own right

    If the Mediterranean operations are reduced the Soviet convoys may not require large scale reduction.

    Early and mid 1943 Amphibious operations in the Pacific

    Those were a substitute for the cancellation of the 1943 invasion. Likely course is Marshal continues with a reduced CARTWHEEL type operation to screen Rabaul & leaves MacArthur Hanging with no build up for his cherished South pacific offensive. I've tried to estimate the savings here. The general take is cargo delivery to the South Pacific tied up a cargo ship 90 days, vs under 30 for round trip delivery to the UK. So if that is correct a 50,000 ton delivery to the SP = 150,000 tons to the UK.
And of course the landings being in 1943 would have to rely more on British Divisions as there would be fewer US Divisions available (ie fully stood up and trained etc) than was the case in 1944 - perhaps the USMC might get to see combat in Europe?

Yes and no, The number of US combat units deployed overseas in 1943 had to do with strategic requirements as Marshal saw them after his defeat at the January SYMBOL conference. At the start of 1943 there were two US Army ground combat divisions in UK Iceland, six more in Africa, approx 20 trained NG div still in the US. How many more ready divisions were in the US I'm unsure tonight. Neither Marshal nor King wanted Marine divisions in the ETO. Instead any US Army units sent to the PTO in 1943 would be off to the ETO instead.
 
John Ellis in 'Brute Force' makes a fair start in this direction. Chart showing the percent of tonnage delivered to the UK of tonnage embarked for the UK is eye opening. The chart is divided by annual deliveries & therefor is a bit crude, but still it is a big step in understanding how the battle played out. Another chart Ellis presents shows the ratio of tonnage sunk to submarines sorties. That also has a few surprises hidden in it.

Sounds worthwhile finding... unfortunately the book fund is low just now :frown:

I'll see if I can get it as a birthday present or on interlibrary loan:angel:
 
Sounds worthwhile finding...

Brute Force' picks up where Toozes 'Wages of Destruction' leaves off The most valuable parts of the book show how the raw production affected the corelation of forces on the battle field. Another hyper informative chart in the book shows the front line or operational strength of the major nations bi-annualy. When you look at the Axis vs the Allied air strength in Europe in the first half of 1943 its clear the Axis have lost & their best move is to make peace at whatever price.

You can question or refuse Ellis agenda and conclusions, but the 50+ charts, tables, and graphs are extremely useful in understand the material strengths of each side military.
 
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