Consequences of a much more aggressive operation torch

In reading up on some of the planning for Operation Torch, it is really appalling at how conservative Marshal was about the plan and how his insistence on the landings at Casablanca gobbled up resources which could have been used to capture Tunisia in the first wave and wrap up the campaign in Africa MUCH faster

So what do we think the consequences would be if Marshal completely relented to Churchill and committed task forces to land at Tunis and Bizertte
 
The bad news is that American forces don't get a chance to make mistakes against the junior varsity. And they don't get to capture 230,000 enemy soldiers since the German effort to pour reinforcements into North Africa won't have enough time to be effective.

The good news is that the Allies can accelerate their offensives. Is a winter landing in Sicily feasible?
 
Another problem: Fredendall might remain in a command position, which could lead to an even bigger disaster than OTL.

I think Marshal was right to be cautious, though coupling that with taking the opportunity to learn a few more lessons from the Brits would have been even better. Some lessons needed to be learned in blood.
 
IOTL:

A) Western Task Force: 3rd ID, 9th ID, and 2nd AD for 3 separate landing zones in Morocco (Safi in the south, Fedala near Casablanca, and Port Lyautey 50 miles north of Fedala).

B) Center Task Force: 1st ID, 1st AD, and 508th Para Regiment go for Algiers.

C) Eastern Task Force: 34th ID and UK 78th go for Oran.


What steps are necessary to get Tunisia into Operation Torch?

1 - Drop the Port Lyautey and Safi landings and remove one division from the Western Task force.

2 – Pair another US division coming from the states with the orphan division from the Western Task Force (also originating from the states) and give them responsibility for Algiers, along with the paratroopers flying out of England.

3 – Reassign the Center Task Force, less the 508th, to take Oran.

4 – Reassign the Eastern Task Force to take either Bizerte or Tunis. I don’t think splitting them into a landing at Bizerte and a landing at Tunis is the way to go. Unless Bizerte could be done with just 1 regiment.


Some obvious water in the face reality checks:
- Did the US have a spare division that could go?
- Was there enough shipping to support an extra division?
- Are there enough supplies and supply ships to support an extra division and an extra destination point?
- Are there enough fighting ships to cover an extra destination which is the closest to Italian/German naval and air assets?
 
Maybe instead of another us formation being used.... the first canadian division which was already in the uk could be deployed
 
- Are there enough fighting ships to cover an extra destination which is the closest to Italian/German naval and air assets?

I think this was the best reason to keep to the west - the Italian Navy could have sortied, and that could have led to a fleet action. Likely? No, but Allied planners would have to have allowed for it if they wanted to hit Tunisia.
 
If you do not believe that Germany can successfully invade Spain and cut the route through the Straits of Gibraltar, there is no need for any landing in Morocco and only sufficient naval forces are needed to watch for a French sortie using only cruisers, destroyers and submarines (naturally you also need to guard against German and Italian submarines). Thus there surely were sufficient naval forces available and probably the extra carriers, Ranger and three CVEs would have kept loses from the Sicily based Luftwaffe sufficiently low to allow a successful landing.
 
If you do not believe that Germany can successfully invade Spain and cut the route through the Straits of Gibraltar, there is no need for any landing in Morocco and only sufficient naval forces are needed to watch for a French sortie using only cruisers, destroyers and submarines (naturally you also need to guard against German and Italian submarines). Thus there surely were sufficient naval forces available and probably the extra carriers, Ranger and three CVEs would have kept loses from the Sicily based Luftwaffe sufficiently low to allow a successful landing.

Uh... what about the Italian surface fleet? Five battleships to start with (one or two might have been out of service, can't recall off the top of my head).
 
With possession of the entire North African coast, the US will push for a cross Channel invasion in Spring/Summer 1943. That might be disastrous except that Hitler will likely still strip the rest of Europe for his Kursk offensive.

If the US is smart, they won't invade until Hitler commits his forces at Kursk. That will prevent any quick reinforcements to the West. By the time Hitler is able to do that, the Western Allies should not only have a secure bridgehead, but pushed substantially inland. Without a certain incident in Sicily, Patton is likely to be one of the original commanders, perhaps even an Army Group leader.

The German counterattack is likely to be devastating, but I don't think they'll succeed in pushing the Allies back across the Channel. The Allies may even recover lost ground before 1943 ends. Hard to say where the final battle lines will be drawn for that year. So much depends on specifics.

If the Allies invade before Germans attack Kursk, things get a lot uglier as Hitler may cancel the attack and throw the resources into France. Of course, Hitler may decided on an entirely different strategy with such a quick conquest in North Africa.

Of course, the British might succeed in cancelling any such plans. They were very reluctant to cross the Channel. But it's hard to see how they can win that fight if the US argues hard and the landing craft resources are available.
 
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Anaxagoras

Banned
The bad news is that American forces don't get a chance to make mistakes against the junior varsity. And they don't get to capture 230,000 enemy soldiers since the German effort to pour reinforcements into North Africa won't have enough time to be effective.

This. At Rick Atkinson points out in his wonderful book on the North African campaign, the fighting in 1942-43 was critical in ironing out the problems with the American Army and identifying which of the American commanders were competent enough to be trusted with greater responsibilities. If the Allied victory were too quick and easy, not only would overconfidence have infected the American Army, but bad leaders and tactics would have continued during the next round of fighting.

And you're right on the second point as well. IOTL, the Germans pumped heavy reinforcements into Tunisia, who basically arrived just in time to be captured. ITTL, those troops would remain ready to fight in Russia, Italy and France, and the Allied cause would be the worse for it.
 
Uh... what about the Italian surface fleet? Five battleships to start with (one or two might have been out of service, can't recall off the top of my head).

The Italian Navy is unlikely to sortie. It rarely challenged the British Mediterranean Fleet. It is unlikley to do so against a combined US/UK operation. And if the invasion fleet projects into the central Mediterranean, we can expect the British Med Fleet to likely sail in support of it insuring Allied naval supremacy for the critical first phase.

Of course, the risk was high enough that Eisenhower decided against trying to do so. In this POD, he takes the gamble. The gamble is likely to pay off. The Italian Navy probably stays in port.

Of course, if they did mobilize to challenge anyone IOTL in response to Torch, someone can correct me.
 
if the Germans get routed by Torch capturing Tunisia; it leaves considerable extra forces (who went to Tunisia in OTL) on the continent who could try to help liberate the 6th army out of the Stalingrad pocket
 
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