Consequences of a fall of Leningrad?

Deleted member 1487

Alright, let's run with this. Mannerheim has a heart attack after the winter war, his replacement gets bullied into letting the Germans attack from their territory even as the political coalition in power doesn't want it. So instead of launching major attacks against Murmansk and Karelia German troops instead focus on Leningrad from the north and capture it in September. Afterwards the Germans and Finns reorganize and attack in Karelia with their full strength and cut off Murmansk and it withers on the vine, falling by the end of the year. That means the Finns with the Sver front. German troops mostly withdraw from Finland to guard Norway and for use with AG-North or on other fronts (like having mountain troops fight in Yugoslavia in 1942-43).

Leningrad is useless as a supply hub until the Baltic winter ice clears in 1942, so sometime in Spring. By then there are repairs of the port, but not captured Soviet shipping. Soviet naval forces are done, something like 2-2.5 million people are captured in Leningrad along with a fair amount of production. AG-North has a much better situation for winter though and I'd say probably no Tikhvin operation given that they have to focus on dealing with the Leningrad occupation.

Moscow probably goes somewhat similar, but do the Germans focus on taking Kalinin if Leningrad is already taken? I imagine the Soviets launch a lot of futile and costly attacks to liberate the city and in the winter don't do very well. Come 1942 Leningrad becomes the supply hub for AG-North and the rail burden is significantly eased for AG-Center too now that all the hinterland north of the Pripyet can be used for them. Stalin has taken a huge political blow too.

Come 1942 11th army isn't sent north and can remain as a force to support AG-South. The Tiger tank isn't revealed too early because there is nothing to use it for in the North. Maybe it makes its debut around Voronezh in Winter.

Now the Soviets are down some factories and a lot of manpower and have lost the Arctic supply route, so are missing some 45-38% of their LL in 1941-42 and about an average of 25% for the rest of the war. Any savings to the Soviets from having to supply Leningrad during the siege are probably lost during the numerous liberation efforts that are extremely costly and less successful than IOTL without Leningrad splitting German defensive efforts, its proximity to the front as a supply source, and its function as a base and potential to transfer in naval units to use in Lake Lagoda.

The Soviets overall are significantly weaker and probably can't take back Leningrad until 1945 at the earliest. Not sure what the rest of the knock on effects would be for the rest of the East Front for the rest of the war, but Stalingrad may not turn into the OTL victory it was.
 

Deleted member 1487

While considering the Isthmus option is is also good to remember that the northern approaches to Leningrad were the most heavily fortified ones, as it was estimated to be the most obvious attack route in Soviet prewar plans, and thus the the Soviets had been preparing their defenses here since 1928: http://www.nortfort.ru/kaur/index_e.html

Considering how badly mauled Soviet troops were in the area its likely they aren't particularly able to utilize them. Plus if the Germans can use their Sevastopol siege train against Leningrad from the north, its likely those defenses won't matter. I doubt the Soviets built their defenses with the German siege train in mind, the Finnish one is far less heavy.

Going by the history of your link of what happened during the war, the defensive line was pretty much dismantled in 1939 and not that much of an obstacle to the Finns in 1941. Add in determined German troops and their siege train and its going to be pretty ugly for the defenders in August-September.
 
Ah, found that salient section in (although it's rather irrelevant now that we've found a reasonable PoD on the Finnish end, go figure).

Supplying War said:
The approaches to Leningrad were even less suitable for armour than the rest of the Baltic countries, and on 26 July all three tank commanders - Hoepner, Manstein, and Reinhardt - unanimously recommended that it should be withdrawn. Given the fact that it was facing a numerically superior enemy, however, it seems certain that Army Group North's best chance for capturing Leningrad came around the middle of July, when Reinhardt's corps had penetrated to within 80 miles of the city. At this time, however, supply difficulties ruled out any immediate resumption of the offensive. Having had their own way for the first fortnight of the campaign, Hoepner's forces were meeting with stiff opposition which, in turn, led to heavy consumption of ammunition. Demands for extra ammunition could only be met with great difficulty, so that stocks sank to less than fifty percent of establishment. During the second half of July, the supply service was incapable of supporting even the most limited offensive because it was fully occupied in moving its base forward from Dunaburg to the area around Luga, and in this period the start of the attack was postponed no fewer than seven times. So hopeless did the situation appear that, on 2 August, Hoepner suggested the desperate expedient of attacking the city and its two and a half million inhabitants with a single armoured corps. The quartermaster-general did not think he could support even this, however, and the idea was accordingly rejected.

Paging through the bibliography and notes sections, I see various first-hand German language sources, mostly contemporary documents from all levels of command from corps-upward as well as the quartermaster staffs own records and journals. Does anyone know what KTB stands for?
 

Deleted member 1487

Ah, found that salient section in (although it's rather irrelevant now that we've found a reasonable PoD on the Finnish end, go figure).



Paging through the bibliography and notes sections, I see various first-hand German language sources, mostly contemporary documents from all levels of command from corps-upward as well as the quartermaster staffs own records and journals. Does anyone know what KTB stands for?
The problem is this is very abstract in terms of what was going on, we aren't given hard numbers to work with. Its all Crevelds commentary and interpretation. Where was this heavy fighting going on? What was the situation around the Luga Bridgehead, what could be supplied by air, etc. ?
Based on other material I think the big fight was Manstein at Slotsy, plus the attempt to push at divergent axises with all forces at once, rather than prioritizing the main advance.
 
Shouldn't the debate be more about the 'consequences...' as per the title, rather than how it happened.

Opinions may differ as to how long it would take to be able to use it as a supply route. Moreover, it doesn't bare thinking about the fate of any Leningrad survivors!
It may well be that the 'October' that is referred to refers to the end of final resistance!?

So when weather conditions allow the Pzrs head south-east to assist with the attack on Moscow, with the Army splitting one part joining them in support, the other going east to cut the Murmansk railway.

I think, Hitler had an idea to appeal to FDR - i.e. if you want the civilians fed, send some grain ships!
 

Deleted member 1487

Shouldn't the debate be more about the 'consequences...' as per the title, rather than how it happened.

Opinions may differ as to how long it would take to be able to use it as a supply route. Moreover, it doesn't bare thinking about the fate of any Leningrad survivors!
It may well be that the 'October' that is referred to refers to the end of final resistance!?

So when weather conditions allow the Pzrs head south-east to assist with the attack on Moscow, with the Army splitting one part joining them in support, the other going east to cut the Murmansk railway.

I think, Hitler had an idea to appeal to FDR - i.e. if you want the civilians fed, send some grain ships!

The force going East against Murmansk or at least the railway would be mostly Finns and some German mountain troops, while the remainder of AG-North stays in place to guard Leningrad against what is probably heavy counterattacks to retake it. Without Tikhvin then perhaps all of the Panzer divisions of AG-North instead go to Moscow?
 
The Germans best hope for victory against the USSR would be politically. The worse things go for the USSR the better the odds that Stalin gets paranoid and starts purging more people. Or some of his potential victims decide Stalin is losing it and needs to be taken out.

If the USSR then dissolved into various factions fighting to stay alive against each other rather than solely focusing on fighting the Germans they might not be able to turn the tide.

If the USSR maintains a strong central government they would most likely eventually win. If they are starting from a weaker position with less supplies due to the north being cut off the war would probably take longer though.
 
The problem is this is very abstract in terms of what was going on, we aren't given hard numbers to work with.

Around the Luga bridgehead, relatively static, not enough. Probably the only place you are going to get the specific numbers is from the German archives themselves.

Its all Crevelds commentary and interpretation.
Given that the citations show that Crewald looked at the aforementioned quartermaster archives personally and given that the attack was postponed seven separate times, and that as late as August 2nd the German General-Quartermaster, who more then anyone else in the German Armed Forces would know the state of the supply lines given that it was pretty much his entire job to know, denied Hoepner's request to supply a single corps for the attack on the basis that not even a single corps could be adequately supplied for a push on Leningrad rules out any prospect of the Germans taking Leningrad in July from the south.

Where was this heavy fighting going on? What was the situation around the Luga Bridgehead, what could be supplied by air, etc. ?
In along Reinhardt's corps, relatively static, and not enough. Notably, the Crewald mentions that the air resupply you so love to wax on about was not about to sustaining the advance but rescuing a select number of forces from their supply shortage becoming dangerous. In order to actually continue the advance, the establishment of a forward supply base was necessary.

Based on other material I think the big fight was Manstein at Slotsy,
Not in evidence. Manstein's fight was separate and he was ultimately rescued by the Totenkopf SS Division operating directly under the command of 3rd Panzer Group, not by Reinhardt's XXXI corps who is the one that was in position for an immediate drive towards Leningrad. Tellingly, one of the major reasons Manstein withdrew from Soltsy was because of the desperate shortage of supplies threatened him with being overrun..

plus the attempt to push at divergent axises with all forces at once, rather than prioritizing the main advance.
An inevitability, given the nature of Barbarossa. Or are you suggesting the Germans concentrate exclusively on Leningrad and abandon the Belarussian and Ukrainian drives? While that might take Leningrad, it's not exactly something that is going to prolong the war in Germany's favor...
 
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