I think that criticism falls in the category of true, but not fair.
Dunn's view is that the shipping for a 1943 landing in France existed, but much of it had disappeared into the South Pacific (which IIRC matches your own research). Therefore Roundup could have been carried out if it had the right priority (which Eisenhower and Montgomery showed meant different things to different people).
Otherwise Dunn's numbers seem generally sensible, although there may be some issues in the details - how do you define exactly when a division relocates if it moves in several parts?
Of course a 1942 landing should be Sledgehammer, not Roundup, but everybody at the time was also confused about this.![]()
I'd ignored the criticism of Dunn, until I ran across a couple of remarks by Rich Anderson, based on original docs & not secondary sources. Those caused me to suspect a lot of the debate is based on more opinion than fact, which eventually led to the discovery that a lot of suposed 'fact' presented in these 'Sledgehammer' & 'Roundup' debates is baseless opinion.
...
Dunn's view is that the shipping for a 1943 landing in France existed, but much of it had disappeared into the South Pacific (which IIRC matches your own research).
Yes, thats one of the few things from Dunn I've followed up on, tho I hesitate to call my effort research. Since records of where the cargo ships actually were are not easily available I've followed a few others in trying to work backwards from the figures for gross material sent. That provides some interesting back of the envelope numbers.
Therefore Roundup could have been carried out if it had the right priority (which Eisenhower and Montgomery showed meant different things to different people).
.....
Of course a 1942 landing should be Sledgehammer, not Roundup, but everybody at the time was also confused about this.![]()
& most still are. So many historians or writers who should do better mislabel the assorted operations planned from 1942 into 1944.