Consequences of a 1942 Operation Roundup

Pretty straightforward. If the Eastern Front falters and the WAllies launch Roundup on the French Coast, what would happen?

What is the chance for sucess/failure? What might the casualties look like? If it fails, how long before the allies launch a second attempt, and would they change the location from the English Channel?
 

Redbeard

Banned
It would have been a huge disaster for the wallies (Kasserine and Tobruk on steroids) and probably mean the Germans in control of all continental Europe from the Atlantic and well into the SU (Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic).

By 1942 the wallies were far from matching the Germans in combat and still hadn't the logistics to overwhelm the Germans. So even if you succeed in landing a number of (rogue) Divisions on a relatively undefended French coastline the Germans will be able to deploy and supply forces against them much faster by rail. The wallies by 1942 also will not be able to establish a general air superiority.

In the East the Germans probably will have to give up major offensives by 1942 but that will at least also save them from the Stalingrad disaster. Biggest question is if it is Stalin or the Wallies to first offer Germany a peace. Just the suspicion of the other doing it will motivate to an agreement. By 1942 the Red Army was very weak, hardly capable of operating at Divisional level so utilising the moment for a general offensive will most likely only lead to disaster and if the prospect of a "Second Front" suddenly vanish into eternity I think Stalin will try to save as much as possible (not at least himself) by offering Germany a "Lebensraum" in the western and non-Russian parts of the SU.

And the wallies? Well they will probably spend a lot of time and effort on blaming each other for the failure. Brits: "We told you so!" Yanks: "If you hadn't been so busy brewing tea it would have worked!" I don't think any democratically elected government can survive such a disaster and a new government wouldn't be as stupid as to propose doing this again.

In USA the new government probably will focus on those who actually had attacked USA - ie Japan, and in GB it would be about saving as much as possible of the Empire. If Hitler is just a little bit smart (you could question that however) he will offer the British favourable peace conditions and don't give a damn about the Japanese being pissed. If he is also realistic (even more questionable) he will accept a peace proposal from Stalin. If not he will probably still bog down somewhere in the SU, but without the wallies engaged as heavily as in OTL there is no chance of SU actually defeating the Germans (ie entering Berlin etc.). War will end pretty much as after WWI - ie. Germans occupying western Russia/SU, but the regimes on both sides will be hard pressed.

In the Pacific the USA will still wipe out the Japanese and will be even less interested in preserving the British Empire than they were in OTL. Accordingly the British will focus their effort on the Indian Ocean and retaking Burma, Malaya, Singapore etc. There were such plans in OTL but they were given up as the war in Europe demanded the resources (and the USians weren't particularly amused about this).

Someone probably will get nukes at about the same time as OTL, but as in OTL not enough to "win" a nuclear war before the other side has enough to "win" enough too.

And in this ATL I would live in Gau Dänemark of Germania and not dare write alternate history or even speak Danish...
 
I have read a couple of books arguing that a *1943* invasion would have worked: John Grigg *1943, the Victory that Never Was* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980); and Walter S. Dunn, *Second Front Now 1943* (University, AL: University of Alabama Press 1980). I really don't remember enough of their arguments to evaluate them. But *1942*? I don't know of anyone who thinks that would be realistic.
 
Yes... those books. Griggs book is sadly misstitled. It is a nice readable primer on the Symbol conference @ Casablanca in January 1940. In only one chapter does Grigg directly address the subject of a 1943 invasion. The other 90% concerns the debate over Allied strategy during 1942 & the final decision not to invade NW Europe in 1943.

Dunns book has been criticized for playing fast and loose with the numbers. ie: he is accused of using the total number globally for LST at the end of 1943 as the number available for use from the UK in mid 1943. Since I have only skimmed his book and dont have a copy I'll leave this one for others to judge.

Most other analysis I've seen of the question have been generally weak in facts. Or lacking in depth. ie: Post war Montgomery is to have said it was a mistake for the Allies not to have invaded NW Europe in 1943. Since he was involved in such planning in 1942, before sent to command 8th Army, and was involved in the same planning 18 months later as 21st Army Group commander this statement carries some weight, even tho I've not seen supporting argument from Monty.

There are a few analysis of the question that support the idea for a 1942 attack. Michael Guimarra provided a long essay on the subject. Atkinson is a little critical of Brookes arguments against a 1943 attack.

A decade ago I set out to study the difficulty or impossibility of a 1943 attack into NW Europe. That resulted in a sort of 'Oxford Movement' moment for me & in the end I found the difficulties most other folks raised were not in fact supportable, and the real problems were not what most folks considered. Even in the cases where I had some questions it was more of a problem that the evidence either way could not be found. I am still hoping it can be found, but am not optimistic.

So, looking at the OP concerning a 1942 attack.
Pretty straightforward. If the Eastern Front falters and the WAllies launch Roundup on the French Coast, what would happen?

A lot depends on exactly when this occurs. In March, in June, in October? Allied strength and ability varies, & not always in ways folks assume.

What is the chance for sucess/failure? What might the casualties look like? If it fails, how long before the allies launch a second attempt, and would they change the location from the English Channel?

At this point I'd refer to Guimarras essay 'D-Day 1942, D-Day 1944:A Comparative Analysis of Operations SLEDGEHAMMER and OVERLORD' Trying to cite from the many pages would be a exercise in futility. Better the interested parties read the entire thing themselves.
 
It gets the Germans to go defense in the East something the German generals couldn't get Hitler to do and sends about two Army Groups against relatively green WAllied troops without air superiority.
 
If the Western Allies pulled off such an operation, then they would have most likely cost themselves the war. It would be likely even more disastrous than the Germans attempting Operation Sealion. Launching the operation would cause several Allied casualties and potentially severely damage morale for the Western powers. The Soviet Union may actually lose faith that the Germans will lose the Western front and Stalin would likely provide Hitler concessions. One thing's for certain: it would all result in one big ego boost for Hitler.
 
June/July 1942? The allies had yet to develop an effective understanding of amphibious operations (Torch isn't for another five months... and that was an attack on a relatively poorly equipped and prepared force). Allied ASW is still in the process of working up to full effectiveness and has had no time to attrite the U-Boat arm. Likewise in the air over Europe. Hell! I doubt he US has raised, fully trained and equipped sufficient forces to support an invasion (not a comment on the US's fighting or industrial capabilities... but it is only 6-7 months since they entered the war...).

Yeah, bugger all hope of such an attack working.
 
Say the Eastern Front is in trouble in the summer/fall of 1942, so the WAllies invade in the fall. How long could the allies hold on? Would the allies still go for Overlord in 1944, or would they try to invade France through the "soft underbelly" in the south?
 
Like Operation Torch gets redirected to Southern France, with earlier landing at Algiers as a diversion to get the Germans to move troops to Tunis?
Something like that. An allied invasion of Southern France in 43/44 after securing their flanks in the med.
 
Dunns book has been criticized for playing fast and loose with the numbers. ie: he is accused of using the total number globally for LST at the end of 1943 as the number available for use from the UK in mid 1943. Since I have only skimmed his book and dont have a copy I'll leave this one for others to judge.

I think that criticism falls in the category of true, but not fair.

Dunn's view is that the shipping for a 1943 landing in France existed, but much of it had disappeared into the South Pacific (which IIRC matches your own research). Therefore Roundup could have been carried out if it had the right priority (which Eisenhower and Montgomery showed meant different things to different people).

Otherwise Dunn's numbers seem generally sensible, although there may be some issues in the details - how do you define exactly when a division relocates if it moves in several parts?

Of course a 1942 landing should be Sledgehammer, not Roundup, but everybody at the time was also confused about this.:)
 
IF

- Army Group Center overextends even more than OTL in front of Moscow and is partially encircled
and
- Soviet counteroffensives else during that winter are more restrained (e.g. no landing in Crimea to relieve Sevastopol, only to throw those forces away), conserving manpower
and
- Army Group A is trapped in the Caucasus by Soviet forces reaching Rostov in Dec. '42, and ends up losing most heavy equipment as it evacuates across the Kerch strait
and
- ATL Battle of Gazala is an Allied victory that stops Rommel in his tracks, limiting the need for the massive reinforcements that went to Egypt OTL

then an early-to-mid '43 Allied landing in northern France, aiming for a limited objective such as taking the Cotentin Peninsula, has IMHO a chance of surviving.

The Germans, assuming the defeats above, will simply not have enough of a panzer reserve left over to push the Allies into the sea, without catastrophically weakening the eastern front. Consider that the British had ~2200 tanks in Egypt in October '42 OTL.
 
They wouldn't need to push them into the sea, the Cotentin Peninsula just becomes a large POW camp. The Germans seal it off at the base, with defences in depth, while bombing the Allied troops trapped, and sinking supply ships - the Allies don't have command of the air - as proved by the fiasco at Dieppe.
 
They wouldn't need to push them into the sea, the Cotentin Peninsula just becomes a large POW camp. The Germans seal it off at the base, with defences in depth, while bombing the Allied troops trapped, and sinking supply ships - the Allies don't have command of the air - as proved by the fiasco at Dieppe.

The Germans were waiting for the Dieppe raid (for example 4 additional machine gun battalions were sent there in the weeks leading to the attack and the 2 Local Fighter wings were on standby) - a landing intended to capture the entire Peninsula with significantly more than a Brigade would involve significantly more NGS than the 6 x 4" gun Hunt class DDs as per the OTL raid and a maximum effort from the RAF (which used 70 odd Squadrons on the Day of the Dieppe Raid and relatively very few bombers).

Its interesting to note that had Rutter gone ahead then Surprise might have been achieved?

So While the JG2 and JG26 did quite well on the 29th Aug 1942 with a 2 to 1 loss rate they did not achieve air superiority while the RAF with considerably more aircraft did actually have command of the air over the battlefield!

And could the LW have sustained that loss rate - 20 Aircraft (16%+ Attrition or 1/6th) for the 2 Fighter JGs and 28 Bombers from the various Bomber JGs (about a 1/4 of the bombers committed) for day after day during a large campaign - and more so if assets targeted their airbases?

As it was the Allied to German Loss rate was 2:1 throughout 1942 and the Allies could sustain it and the Germans could not.
 
They wouldn't need to push them into the sea, the Cotentin Peninsula just becomes a large POW camp.

POW camps normally won't host a number of airfields that can host both fighters and medium bombers.
Plus, the Allies can afford redoing a WWI style front line, Nazis cannot, and the Nazis have to watch for other landings all along the coast.
 
It'd be a bloody mess but the attrition would probably favour the Allies, although the poor sods dying probably wouldn't appreciate being told that. Mind you, the attrition in Normandy wasn't exactly a barrel of laughs either.

Odd thing about Dieppe though is that the Luftwaffe didn't attack the shipping much AIUI - they seemed to be more interested in air-to-air combat? I'm not sure how the loss ratios would look if they'd really tried to attack the shipping, but it probably would have been more favourable. It'd be interesting to know the depth of fighter reserves available to each side at this point.
 
An interesting read is Michael Giumarra's

D-Day 1942, D-Day 1944:


A Comparative Analysis of

Operations SLEDGEHAMMER and OVERLORD
 
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