They always were a pariah state. Britain and France did not bother with recognition/intervention despite the fact that it would check the growing power of the United States.
Not quite the case in terms of neo-Napoleonic France.
"Slidell had written Judah P. Benjamin in February, 1862, that nearly everybody in France expressed a marked partiality for the South, and that the Emperor, members of the Ministry, and other high officers were really quite indifferent to the supposed evils of slavery. 'The Republicans and Orleanists think that Napoleon III will soon recognize the South, or at least declare the blockade insufficient.' Confederate hopes had still run high (in Summer 1863). August Belmont thought that Lee's invasion, the Roebuck-Lindsay diplomatic maneuvers, the (proposed) peace talk by Alexander H. Stephens, and the Draft Riots, were a well-connected effort to bring about foreign recognition. But after Roebuck's humiliation, and the news of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, intervention was impossible. 'So the farthing rush-light of hope blinks and goes out once more,' exclaimed the Richmond
Examiner.
With rising chagrin John Slidell, a far abler and more adroit man than his associate James M. Mason, and as quick in his perceptions as in his mastery of Parisian speech, saw the tide of opinion turn against him. Edouard Antoine Thouvenel in the Foreign Ministry, a man of natural reserve and frigid demeanor, had always been chilly toward the Confederate envoy. He bade Slidell be patient and quiet, making it plain that the French Government would not act until Great Britain took the lead or at least acted with her. While not as rude as Lord John Russell was to Mason, he was not encouraging. Slidell could only seek a little comfort in the Duc de Morny, a half-brother to the Emperor and a grandson of Talleyrand, who had a taste for intrigue, diplomatic adventure, and money-making, and who saw the Confederacy might be induced to abet Napoleon's Mexican schemes. Morny, desirous of an easy fortune and a quiet enhancement of French prestige, believed that Mexico, if seized with Southern acquiescence, might afford both. Slidell also sought encouragement from another slippery adventurer of the imperial entourage, the Count de Persigny, Minister of the Interior.
But did Morny and Persigny really account for much?
Clearly, Thouvenel held the reins of far greater power, for his ministry was in control of all diplomatic action, and his caution had the approval of responsible men. Slidell was too shrewd to be self-deceived. He cautioned the Confederate government against wasting money on privateers, which the Powers had tried to outlaw by the convention of London; such vessels could do nothing but make enemies, for neutral ports would not accept their prizes. Instead, all Confederate resources should be put into commerce destroyers. Slidell also urged Benjamin to send him money to buy French journalists, suggesting that a few thousands in gold might bring one of the leading journals aggressively behind the South. But here he was outwitted and outbid by the expert American newspaperman, John Bigelow. This old-time associate of Bryant, now consul-general and publicity director in Paris, with a longer purse and better cause, executed a series of master strokes in obtaining the support of the most widely-circulated Parisian papers:
Le Temps,
Le Siècle,
l'Opinion Nationale,
La Presse, and
Journal des Débats. These sheets persuaded French readers that "Uncle Tom's Cabin" was a faithful picture of the outrages of slavery."
(To be continued)