Confederate Kentucky TL - Brainstorming Thread

(This is a copy of a thread I created at CivilWarTalk)

Hi everybody, my Confederate Kentucky timeline has languished in development hell for a while now, and will likely be there a little longer still. My main reason for this is concerns over plausibility in various respects. I've asked several of the best minds available on both this site and other places to gather information. To avoid spamming this forum and various poor members' inboxes with questions on various topics, I've decided to create this thread as a catch-all for my questions and to propose ideas.

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Basic Premise: In the elections in April-May, June, and August 1861 at the Border State Convention, U.S. House of Representatives, and state legislature, the pro-Southern States' Rights Party does slightly better at each election. In September, Frémont orders Grant to take Paducah, causing the state legislature to call upon the Confederacy to defend the state.


Questions:
Now that one of Lincoln's worst fears has just been realized, how does he react? I think it's safe to say Frémont is out.

How does this change the Union's overall strategy? McClellan suggested moving a large chunk of his men to Kentucky in early 1862, does this give us any clues?

What will the Kentucky State Guard do? One idea would be to send them to deal with Camp Dick Robinson, but I'm really not sure.

I'm guessing there will still be a battle between Grant and Polk/Pillow. How it will go, I'm not sure, both armies were very green.

I'm also guessing Louisville is going to stay pro-Union, and will be the jumping point for any Union assault into the state.

In Kentucky, it appears there were men who would side with either the Unionists or Secessionists no matter what, but the largest chunk would have sided with their state. My guess is pretty much our history in reverse: roughly 60,000-70,000 men fighting for the Confederacy, and about 30,000-40,000 for the Union.

With Kentucky being where the main battle lines are drawn, it seems Tennessee, particularly Nashville and the industry there, will be much safer.

There are just a few questions/observations, feel free to answer any or make me aware of things I overlooked.

Also, map of Kentucky:
https://www.davidrumsey.com/ll/thum...arch?os=0&mid=RUMSEY~8~1~237326~5511102&bs=10
 
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IOTL, both Polk and Grant were in a race for Paducah. Polk managed to beat Grant and, by extension, hand the Union the propaganda victory of pointing out the Confederates violated Kentucky's neutrality first.
 
Just have Fremont give the order to send Grant forward earlier....maybe August.

It should be noted that "Bull" Nelson was recruiting men in Kentucky in direct violation of its "neutrality". If Grant seizes Paducah early, these events could push the state toward the CSA.
 
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Just have Fremont give the order to send Grant forward earlier....maybe August.

It should be noted that "Bull" Nelson was recruiting men in Kentucky in direct violation of its "neutrality". If Grant seizes Paducah early, these events could push the state toward the CSA.
That, in brief, is pretty much the POD here, I just provided some extra background information.

Just wondering, does anyone know what the respective sizes of the Kentucky State Guard and Home Guard were in September 1861?
 
Adding Kentucky aids the Confederacy greatly in men and materiale, and I expect this to affect the overall strategic situation. I expect McClellan to send perhaps 10,000-15,000 men west to deal with the increase in rebel numbers there. This will naturally have an effect on how the Peninsula Campaign will progress, if at all. Right now, I'm expecting the campaign to come well short of its goals. The Warwick line will very likely hold here, if McClellan is even able to really test it here. Alternatively, the line might get evacuated, only McClellan is spread too thin, and a good chunk of the AotP gets captured, along with maybe McC himself.
 
Adding Kentucky aids the Confederacy greatly in men and materiale, and I expect this to affect the overall strategic situation. I expect McClellan to send perhaps 10,000-15,000 men west to deal with the increase in rebel numbers there. This will naturally have an effect on how the Peninsula Campaign will progress, if at all. Right now, I'm expecting the campaign to come well short of its goals. The Warwick line will very likely hold here, if McClellan is even able to really test it here. Alternatively, the line might get evacuated, only McClellan is spread too thin, and a good chunk of the AotP gets captured, along with maybe McC himself.

Two other things to consider:

1. Kentucky was the main domestic source of saltpeter. The Federals were already in a bind for powder during 1862 IOTL, here it'd be a much worse crisis.
2. Tennessee was the main source of iron for South prior to the war. With the war in Kentucky and Tennessee in Confederate hands either much longer or indefinitely, the Southern railway system will remain much more functional and efficient than IOTL, while output of weapons will also be greatly increased; IOTL shortages severely hampered what Confederate factories could put out, as well as their quality. The issue of fuses at Gettysburg is the most famous example of this.
 
Just wondering, does anyone know what the respective sizes of the Kentucky State Guard and Home Guard were in September 1861?
The Kentucky State Guard was made up of a number of local militia companies originally formed to quell slave insurrections, but under Buckner’s tutelage, they became much more. With constant practice, these units became highly respected for their high state of drill and discipline. Issued distinctive military uniforms, camp equipment, and standardized weapons, the State Guard rivaled and even surpassed many units of the U.S. Army at the time. The State Guard was not only a military organization, but a quasipolitical one as well. Many a Kentucky gentleman used the State Guard as a stepping-stone to office. Virtually all of the officers and most of the men in the ranks had a deep sympathy for the South. In fact, the North probably respected Kentucky’s neutrality because of a reluctance to combat the State Guard more than for purely political reasons. The State Guard had only about 4,000 men, but it was organized and ready, while the Union men in the state had neither arms nor organization to oppose it.

Gott, Kendall D.. Where the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson Campaign, February 1862 (p. 15). Stackpole Books. Kindle Edition.
 
Gott's book has some very useful info on Kentucky during this early period. After Polk' seizure of Columbus, the Governor sent an ultimatum to President Davis to withdraw from the state, which he ignored; this turned Kentucky into a pro-Union bastion and endangered Tennessee.

General Polk had been busy building the forts to block the Mississippi and had occupied and fortified the town of New Madrid, Missouri, in July 1861. They were good sites from which to prevent Union invaders from descending the river, but the bishop-general was looking at still another site farther upstream. Polk specifically had his eye on Columbus, Kentucky, which was situated on a high bluff over the river and was an even more formidable obstacle than New Madrid. Kentucky was still neutral, however, and no one in Richmond had authorized any such move. Working behind the scenes was Polk’s subordinate, Gen. Gideon Pillow. Pillow was impatient for action and felt the Federals were about to occupy Columbus themselves. Some today believe he simply wanted a significant victory to secure a promotion. He incessantly bombarded General Polk with proposals and requests for authorization to occupy the town. Over time, Polk was eventually convinced that it was indeed vital to seize Columbus and Paducah as well, in spite of any repercussions of a breach of Kentucky neutrality. Using slight Union violations of Kentucky neutrality as a pretext, Pillow executed Polk’s plan and occupied Columbus on September 3, 1861. There Pillow began to entrench, expecting a Union attack at any moment. This unauthorized expedition effectively ended Kentucky’s neutrality and set the wheels in motion for a Federal invasion of Tennessee. Up to this time, Kentucky was at least sympathetic toward the Confederacy, but the occupation of Columbus prompted a strong rebuke from the formerly friendly Governor Magoffin. In a resolution passed by the state legislature, he wrote: “In obedience to the subjoined resolution . . . the Government of the Confederate States, the State of Tennessee, and all others concerned, are hereby informed that Kentucky expects the Confederate or Tennessee troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally.” In Richmond, the Confederate government was caught completely off guard by Polk’s authorized occupation of Columbus. The reaction was confused and indecisive. The secretary of war ordered the forces withdrawn immediately, but Polk persuaded Davis to let him stay. Davis was particularly embarrassed, since he had sent a letter to Governor Magoffin the previous week reaffirming Kentucky’s neutrality. But the Confederate president now reasoned that since the neutrality was irreparably breached, military considerations overruled political ones. The fact that the ultimatum was ignored infuriated the governor and many people of the state, and in the end, it pushed Kentucky irrevocably into the Union hands. Now, without a neutral Kentucky to act as a buffer zone, the weak Confederate line was exposed to attack.

Gott, Kendall D.. Where the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson Campaign, February 1862 (pp. 36-37). Stackpole Books. Kindle Edition.

By the end of July, it was becoming clear that Kentucky would not secede from the Union and the influence of the South began to slip. The pro-Union legislature gained firm control of the state and disbanded the pro-Southern State Guard. These well-trained and equipped militia units were required to turn in their weapons and gear, which were then issued to the loyal Home Guard. These were warning signals to the Confederacy that the good times were soon to come to a close. If the long line of defense in the West was to be successfully maintained, much had to be done, and quickly.

Gott, Kendall D.. Where the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson Campaign, February 1862 (p. 16). Stackpole Books. Kindle Edition.
One POD is to have Grant seize both Columbus and Paducah before Polk can move. This will certainly push Kentucky more firmly into the Confederacy. If the Governor issues an ultimatum though, I would think Lincoln would handle it more prudently than Davis did.
One butterfly from this is that instead of fortifying Columbus, Polk's guns would be used to fortify points on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.
 
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Gott's book has some very useful info on Kentucky during this early period. After Polk' seizure of Columbus, the Governor sent an ultimatum to President Davis to withdraw from the state, which he ignored; this turned Kentucky into a pro-Union bastion and endangered Tennessee.



One POD is to have Grant seize both Columbus and Paducah before Polk can move. This will certainly push Kentucky more firmly into the Confederacy. If the Governor issues an ultimatum though, I would think Lincoln would handle it more prudently than Davis did.
One butterfly from this is that instead of fortifying Columbus, Polk's guns would be used to fortify points on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.
Governor Beriah Magoffin was pro-South, and not send an ultimatum to Lincoln. It seems likely there will still be a battle between Grant and Polk at some point, though probably not at Belmont.
 
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