Conclusive Iraqi victory in Iran-Iraq war

Say Iraq somehow achieved their objective of capturing what they saw as Arab land (Khuzestan) and maintain full control over the Shatt Al-Arab or Aravund River. What would happen?
 
Iraq did this by when? Fall 1980? 1982? If Saddam won decisively at the start, in late 1980, and was satisfied by those territorial gains at the expense of Iran, he might've been emboldened to invade Kuwait maybe even KSA around '85 or so.
Iran of course would've wanted the turf back but with the Islamic republic alienated from the US and with the USSR backing Iraq, it would've been tough to get adequate arms.
 

Cook

Banned
Say Iraq somehow achieved their objective of capturing what they saw as Arab land (Khuzestan) and maintain full control over the Shatt Al-Arab or Aravund River. What would happen?

The best opportunity for Saddam to be successful, probably the only time it was likely, is in the initial Iraqi offensive in late September – early October 1980, with the invasion conforming far more to the Iraqi plan for a three week war followed by a UN imposed ceasefire.

For that to be successful is asking quite a lot; that Iraqi generals be appointed according to military merit rather than loyalty to Saddam and that the Iraqi armed forces, particularly the air force, train extensively in preparation for the attack. The former would be going against Saddam’s instincts and basic motivation; priority one for Saddam was the security of his regime, and a professional army was a very real potential threat to him; better an army led by loyal incompetents than a competent but disloyal army.

It also required the Iranian response to the Iraqi invasion be slower and less forceful. The most immediately obvious way that could have occurred would be for the purges of the officer corps to be more extensive, swift and bloody; instead of pilots and army officers still languishing in jails when the invasion took place, they might have already faced a revolutionary tribunal and been slung up from a power pole.

Any resulting ceasefire would only be temporary and unstable, lasting only until the Iranians had rebuilt their forces; there was simply no way that the new regime, or any regime in Tehran for that matter, would ever have swallowed the loss of Khūzestan of any protracted time period; aside from the extremely important oil industry of the province, the Iranian people would never have tolerated the loss of prestige – the revolution was just as much nationalist as it was Islamic.

The Iranian recovery in equipment would have probably been quicker than it was in OTL; in this scenario Saddam would be full of his own success and ready to further his mission of making himself leader of the Arab Nation, something that would pose a serious and very immediate threat to Israel; consequently Israel and the United States might have supplied even more spare parts and armaments for Iran’s US manufactured equipment. Then, once the re-equipping and build-up of its armed forces was complete, Iran would launch an attack to recover its lost province and bring down the Iraqi regime.
 
Iraq did this by when? Fall 1980? 1982? If Saddam won decisively at the start, in late 1980, and was satisfied by those territorial gains at the expense of Iran, he might've been emboldened to invade Kuwait maybe even KSA around '85 or so.
Iran of course would've wanted the turf back but with the Islamic republic alienated from the US and with the USSR backing Iraq, it would've been tough to get adequate arms.

Would he still want Kuwait seeing as he will reap the economic benefits of Khuzestan's oil which will make him a kingmaker in deciding global oil prices?
 
Would he still want Kuwait seeing as he will reap the economic benefits of Khuzestan's oil which will make him a kingmaker in deciding global oil prices?
He's unlikely to invade Kuwait as a major reason was his high debt which would be less of an issue with access to Khuzestan
 
The Iranian recovery in equipment would have probably been quicker than it was in OTL;....
consequently Israel and the United States might have supplied even more spare parts and armaments for Iran’s US manufactured equipment. Then, once the re-equipping and build-up of its armed forces was complete, Iran would launch an attack to recover its lost province and bring down the Iraqi regime.

But if Iran suffers a loss of oil revenue, that, coupled with animosity toward the US and the USSR backing Iraq, would pose serious problems. Who's gonna foot the bill for rearmament? Iran might get some freebies but I doubt it could match what Iraq would get.
 
He's unlikely to invade Kuwait as a major reason was his high debt which would be less of an issue with access to Khuzestan

I think Iraq would've gone after Kuwait long before it did had it not been for outside protection and other commitments (Kurds, Israel, Iran). Saddam considered Kuwait historically part of Iraq. Iraq threatened Kuwait as far back as 1961. It did recognize its independence in 1963 but probably only because it couldn't take it--British forces prevented an Iraqi takeover in '61.
 

Cook

Banned
But if Iran suffers a loss of oil revenue, that, coupled with animosity toward the US...

The Iranian regime maintained its public animosity towards the United States throughout the period of the Iran-Iraq war because it could; it was still able to obtain foreign arms despite its belligerent public persona. If oil revenue were significantly reduced you might have seen a reduction in anti-American and anti-Israeli statements by the regime in order to reach a more workable relationship with the United States and obtain more arms; in the period immediately following the fall of the Shah, Khomeini authorised Iranian Prime Minister Bazargan to negotiate with Carter’s National Security Advisor Brzezinski in Algiers on of normalisation of relations. These talks led nowhere because Carter, against warnings by Bazargan and Ambassador Sullivan not to, permitted the former Shah into the United States – this led to an explosion of anti-American feelings on the streets of Tehran and the occupation of the US embassy by students.

Even after the hostage crisis had begun, Bazargan and Iranian President Banisadr were still able, again with Khomeini’s approval, to undertake negotiations with the US; so, if there was the need to do so, a better working relationship with the US probably would have been reached. The rationalisation of this probably would have been that the former Shah was now dead and his patron Carter had fallen from power and a new, more-godly president had replaced him. Khomeini was not implacably anti-American and demonstrated notable flexibility throughout his time as supreme leader; had better relations been required doubtless he would have tried again to obtain them. That improved relationship would not have included seeing US military personnel back in Iran though; the US had burned too many bridges to permit that to occur.

Alternatively the public pronouncements of hostility might have continued and the improvement in the relationship between Iran, Israel and the US might have taken place entirely in secret, just as it did in OTL. That still permitted large quantities of replacement parts for their existing US equipment to have reached Iran, along with significant intelligence on Iraq from Israel. Israeli lobbying probably would have seen reduced hostility to Iran in the US Congress; they needed an ally to Saddam's east to keep him from focusing entirely on them.

The Soviets also cheerfully supplied arms to Tehran; when it came to the international arms trade, Moscow at that time was thoroughly capitalist – they supplied arms to Bagdad because Saddam had the money to pay them, and they did the same for Tehran. And Iran would still have been making a lot of revenue from oil exports, even if they lost Khūzestan; Iran’s largest mainland oil fields are in the province, but by no means all of them, and Iran was also exploiting significant offshore reserves by then, which Iraq had no way of reaching.

The Iraqi invasion also stimulated a home-grown Iranian arms industry that produced tanks and APCs for the army.

He's unlikely to invade Kuwait as a major reason was his high debt which would be less of an issue with access to Khuzestan
Kuwait’s refusal to write off Saddam’s debts was taken as proof that Kuwait was “in the camp of the Zionists” and hostile to the interests of a united Arab nation led by Saddam, but uniting that nation under him, indirectly if need be but directly if the opportunity arose, was always Saddam’s objective. (Get your hands on Kevin Wood’s “The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime 1978-2001” if you can.)
 
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But if Iran suffers a loss of oil revenue, that, coupled with animosity toward the US and the USSR backing Iraq,
If Iraq wins the war quickly (as noted by someone above, the best chance was in the first few weeks), then the US won't ever be involved... they generally didn't get involved until the war turned against Iraq and there was a real chance of the Iranians winning. If Iraq wins later on, then the US will likely have been involved. In either case, the Iranian antipathy towards the US is unlikely to change much... it was about as bad as it could get anyway...
 
A decisive Iraqi victory might be enough to topple the revolutionary regime in Tehran, though I wouldn't understimate Khomeyni's ability to handle the storm. A storm would be, anyway. Iraq very emphatically becomes, as noted, the foremost enemy of any Iranian regime, Khomeinist or not. An interesting even if very unlikely possibility would be if the MEK take over in Iran after this (which became notionally an Iraqi war aim, though I don't think it had happened by the first offensives). Rajavi in charge would create a leftist, less Islamic (but not actually secular by any means) and very much dictatorial Iran. It would be also very unstable and perhaps fairly crazy. MEK would probably not take the radical "feminist" turn it did IOTL if coming to power early. They may seek relations with the Soviets (being after all every bit as anti-American as Khomeyni was) though anti-Iraqi pragmatism might prevail. Of course, in this context, Saddam's quickly becomes the biggest regional threat in America's eyes.
 
This is interesting, but it has the butterflies causing POD problem.

Arab dictators, like many dictators, liked having armies that were competent enough to handle any domestic opposition but too incompetent to mount a coup, meaning too incompetent to fight wars with other states. Saddam Hussein did this but failed to draw the necessary conclusion that then you really have to avoid getting into a war with another state. So the POD of a more competent Iraqi army leads to a successful coup at some point against Saddam Hussein, if only to prevent his children from succeeding him.

You could make Iran more of a shambles than IOTL but that produces its own butterflies.

Anyway, with Khuzestan Iraq gets more oil, better seaports, and prestige, has no need to Kuwait, and are strong enough to get the emirates to resolve any disputes peacefully in the Iraqi favor.
 
Arab dictators, like many dictators, liked having armies that were competent enough to handle any domestic opposition but too incompetent to mount a coup, meaning too incompetent to fight wars with other states.
uh.... some of them did this. The states who fought with Israel stocked up on all the military goodies they could get their hands on. Iraq was one of them. I'll agree with you that the Iraqi army definitely lacked competent leadership though. But if you really want a military that 'is competent enough to handle domestic opposition but too incompetent to mount a coup', then what you really want is what Kuwait and SA had... small infantry based forces that are heavy on small arms and light on heavy equipment. Saddam's problem was that he had an army that was nicely stocked with a lot of heavy equipment, and some rather bungling boobs to lead them...
 

Cook

Banned
is what Kuwait and SA had... small infantry based forces that are heavy on small arms and light on heavy equipment.

Actually Kuwait's army in 1991 was just the opposite; it was fully mechanised, with some 160 Chieftain tanks, 200 M113 APCs and well equipped with self propelled artillery.
 
Actually Kuwait's army in 1991 was just the opposite; it was fully mechanised, with some 160 Chieftain tanks, 200 M113 APCs and well equipped with self propelled artillery.
ah, didn't know that... the one book I have on the war made it sound as if the Kuwaitis had a lightly armed border guard and not much else... regardless of what they had, they apparently did poorly against the Iraqis...
 
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