Concentration on Subs

Germany concentrates solely on submarines before and during WW1, and does not build up an ultimately useless surface fleet?
is this too improbable?
 
It may not be entirely impossible, but the big question will be what the other powers do as a response to it. They WILL find out, sooner rather than later, although without a demonstration such as WW1 they may not fully appreciate what a large submarine fleet is capable of.

There are also some things that submarines aren't very good at, and one of them is tying together a colonial empire. Germany pre-WW1 certainly looked like it was trying to create something like that. Focusing entirely on subs would effectively put them out of the power-projection business and mean their maritime commerce was dependent on the goodwill of others, at least until it was proved that subs could defend it as well as cruisers.

So to my mind, the big questions are:
1) What will the other powers do as a response to this?
and
2) How will this affect Germany's position, economically and internationally?
 
It may not be entirely impossible, but the big question will be what the other powers do as a response to it. They WILL find out, sooner rather than later, although without a demonstration such as WW1 they may not fully appreciate what a large submarine fleet is capable of.

There are also some things that submarines aren't very good at, and one of them is tying together a colonial empire. Germany pre-WW1 certainly looked like it was trying to create something like that. Focusing entirely on subs would effectively put them out of the power-projection business and mean their maritime commerce was dependent on the goodwill of others, at least until it was proved that subs could defend it as well as cruisers.
I'm guessing the butterflies don't reach as far as stopping WW1....
but WW1 is probably going to be very different, perhaps even with a German victory, since there would be more subs to starve out the british...
But I'm not sure doctrine would have been that different for the british. Submarines were seen as a poor man's weapon, and were without the glory of the battleship.....

So to my mind, the big questions are:
1) What will the other powers do as a response to this?
and
2) How will this affect Germany's position, economically and internationally?
1) the other power probably laugh at the “huns”, until they start starving in war war 1, that is
2) Germany is less of a power, but I didn’t say they didn’t have ANY surface fleet, just a small one for escort and displays……
 
In the decade leadiing up to WW1 the sub was an experimental weapon, not the sort of thing you build a fleet around. In contrast the battleship was the linear descendant of ships such as USS Monitor and HMS Warrior of 50 years before and them of HMS Victory 110 years and HMS Revenge 325 years before. They were exactly what you built your fleet around, centuries of experience that gunned ships were the arbiter of sea power.
 
In the decade leadiing up to WW1 the sub was an experimental weapon, not the sort of thing you build a fleet around. In contrast the battleship was the linear descendant of ships such as USS Monitor and HMS Warrior of 50 years before and them of HMS Victory 110 years and HMS Revenge 325 years before. They were exactly what you built your fleet around, centuries of experience that gunned ships were the arbiter of sea power.

I'm not talking about the WHOLE WORLD, just IMPERIAL GERMANY!!:D
 
The point was that Imperial Germany would have to overlook 325 years of incontestible history to go for a experimental weapon only a handful of years old which had done exactly nothing in war to show its potential. It would be like them ditching their entire cavalry arm in order to switch to aeroplanes when exactly none of their enemies were doing so.
 
So to my mind, the big questions are:
1) What will the other powers do as a response to this?
They'd almost certainly resort to a regular campaign of mining and bombarding every harbor that could serve as a sub base. Pretty tough on the civilians, but so be it. And with no German surface fleet (to speak of) to oppose, resources could be diverted to an increased number of ASW vessels and (eventually) aircraft. Subs in those days were not true underwater warships; they were more like surface vessels that could submerge at need. So they were vulnerable to the right sort of attack. If anything, the changed military demands might actually accelerate the development of things like naval aircraft and sonar.
 
They'd almost certainly resort to a regular campaign of mining and bombarding every harbor that could serve as a sub base. Pretty tough on the civilians, but so be it. And with no German surface fleet (to speak of) to oppose, resources could be diverted to an increased number of ASW vessels and (eventually) aircraft. Subs in those days were not true underwater warships; they were more like surface vessels that could submerge at need. So they were vulnerable to the right sort of attack. If anything, the changed military demands might actually accelerate the development of things like naval aircraft and sonar.

that's assuming the british admiralty get's the idea that subs are actually dangerous....
 

Satrap

Donor
I think the major issue would be the Kaiser, his vanity would not let IMPERIAL Germany not have a large battlefleet.
 
Building a sizable fleet of subs would imply planning for a relatively long war. Most German schemes, like the Schlieffen plan were based on a brief war.
a difference of outlook, like running vice sprinting
 
It would be a revolution, not evolution, for sure.

However, is it comparable to what Guderian proposed doing? Concentrating Panzers, not an infantry tank, speed, agility, fire power. Breaking through at the point of least resistance, support success, those things.

Surely Guderian's tactics were there for a lot to see and it was spoken about in books before he pulled it together. The tanks were just as "experimental" at that stage (1930's).

Submarines may have been experimental as well, but with foresight, focused effort and a development cycle as in WWII (going from coastal boats to ocean going one's), would it have made a difference?

It is clear that the notion of a surface fleet would have to go. However, despite Germany having a range of capable battleships, they were designed for the North Sea (as far as I know).

Now, building one "Bayern" vs 50 submarines (??) would then be the trade-off.

I somehow believe that could have made a huge impact, especially if the late WWI submarines could come into service very early (1914/5).

If, as we could imagine, the other anvies would laugh it off, there would not be any proven counter-measures for at least 1-2 years.

Using them (because they were there) in two places: the Channel and the approaches to the UK would have an impact.

Would it have forced UK out of the war? it nearly did with the few one's available.

Ivan
 
It is clear that the notion of a surface fleet would have to go. However, despite Germany having a range of capable battleships, they were designed for the North Sea (as far as I know).

Where else besides the North Sea should the Germans be considering to use their battleships?
 
However, is it comparable to what Guderian proposed doing? ...........................Surely Guderian's tactics were there for a lot to see and it was spoken about in books before he pulled it together. The tanks were just as "experimental" at that stage (1930's).

Guderian was leaning a lot on late WW1 German practice of the sort that led to victory at Caporetto and the huge breakthroughs in the March 1918 offensives. Nor was the tank experimental in the 1930s, it was experimental in 1916 but a key part of the Allied 1918 offensives. Guderian just happened to get the mix right when it counted, as befits a losing power who needs to learn the most.

In a similar way Donitz` wolf pack tactics and the 1940 happy time are a result of the lessons learnt and advances made to uboats during WW1. These are not really able to be projected back to WW1 for a myriad of reasons; things like the radios to control uboat flotillas didn`t have a range of 1000km until late in the war, or aerial scouting wasn`t possible until 1940.

That said I think Germany`s 1914 uboats could have had a happy time if the concentrated in the Channel and tried to cut the supply lines to the BEF.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Germany concentrates solely on submarines before and during WW1, and does not build up an ultimately useless surface fleet?
is this too improbable?


No, fleet built with the submarine as the main ship of the fleet is ASB. Even in WW2 with the lessons of WW1 available, no major power spent the majority of the budget on submarines.

Now i can see the Kaiser building a few (1-4) fewer battleships and building more submarines, light cruisers, torpedo boats, etc. A battleships of a Bayern was near 1200 and displaced 32,000 tons. A crew of a U-boat was 10's of men. Maybe have the Germany Navy with another 30 to 50 subs, 30 to 50 torpedo boats, and a extra squadron of light cruisers at one of the colonies.
 
That the major navies did not perceive the submarine as worthwhile may indeed just prove the point. Paradigm shift somehow.

Look at the aircraft carriers. The "black shoe" sailors were not in favour of those things detractng for a good ol' battleships with good 14" guns. Well, something happened.

Maybe the UK approaches, the channel and the North Sea were much more suited to submarines with (admitted) a faster development cycle. One Bayern less and 40 more submarines would perhaps be felt.

Alos look at the Harwich Force in WWI. light cruisers and destroyers with a far more impressive record than the entire HSF and Home Fleet.

Now, nobody claims that a small submarine force could defeat the entire Home Fleet. However, it is amazing to see that just the thought of submarines in the water forced Jellicho's hand at Jutland.

So, the mere thouight of submarines, let alone the actual presence, was a factor.

As much as the submarine was experimental in WWI, it was a proven weapon from 1917/8. A focus on its development very early with the submariens of 1917/8 being available in 1914 must have been a factor.

I really thought that the modern tank design really came together in 1936/7/8 after the Panzer I and II's. Panzer IV was sort of the finished design. The T-34 was not perfected before 1940's. Panzer VI and KV-II could be said to be the ultimate design and that was 1942's.

Maybe not experimental but Guderian, looking at tactiscs and reading a lot of (UK) books, got it right. However, he really got it right in 1941 in Russia I believe. France, despite its success, was still a bit of a test bed I believe.

Poland was much more traditional (soldiers marching or horse transport).

The major point here is, the HSF did not do anything in WWI. Maybe the submarines could.

Ivan
 
That the major navies did not perceive the submarine as worthwhile may indeed just prove the point. Paradigm shift somehow.

Look at the aircraft carriers. The "black shoe" sailors were not in favour of those things detractng for a good ol' battleships with good 14" guns. Well, something happened.

Maybe the UK approaches, the channel and the North Sea were much more suited to submarines with (admitted) a faster development cycle. One Bayern less and 40 more submarines would perhaps be felt.

Alos look at the Harwich Force in WWI. light cruisers and destroyers with a far more impressive record than the entire HSF and Home Fleet.

Now, nobody claims that a small submarine force could defeat the entire Home Fleet. However, it is amazing to see that just the thought of submarines in the water forced Jellicho's hand at Jutland.

So, the mere thouight of submarines, let alone the actual presence, was a factor.

As much as the submarine was experimental in WWI, it was a proven weapon from 1917/8. A focus on its development very early with the submariens of 1917/8 being available in 1914 must have been a factor.

I really thought that the modern tank design really came together in 1936/7/8 after the Panzer I and II's. Panzer IV was sort of the finished design. The T-34 was not perfected before 1940's. Panzer VI and KV-II could be said to be the ultimate design and that was 1942's.

Maybe not experimental but Guderian, looking at tactiscs and reading a lot of (UK) books, got it right. However, he really got it right in 1941 in Russia I believe. France, despite its success, was still a bit of a test bed I believe.

Poland was much more traditional (soldiers marching or horse transport).

The major point here is, the HSF did not do anything in WWI. Maybe the submarines could.

Ivan

my thoughts exactly...
 
The difference between subs and any kind of surface vessel is that with surface vessels you CONTROL the seas and enable the usage of for transports and other friendly traffic. Submarines can only serve as DENIAL weapons, in that they make transgressing area of water more dangerous. You cannot control sea with subs. At least not with WWI era subs. And Germany needed sea control not only denial. At that point they aspired to world class navy and world class empire. With colonies and all the whistles.
 
It is true you cannot project power with WWI subs.
If the strategy is from day one to deny the UK usage of the North Sea and the approaches, subs would be the way to go.

If it is empire building, etc. subs are not so great.

So, we could have a situation where the subs are used to actively prevent BEF getting supplies across the channel and to prevent the UK getting supplies in from anywhere else, while at the same time opening the North Sea for German imports (making the North Sea too dangerous for home fleet).

Not sure if it would be possible, but with an additional number of subs, not to be ruled out.

Early days admirals were not exactly embracing the carriers as I understand it, especially as the US very early made it law that the commander must be a Navy pilot, not "black shoe sailor". I can have it wrong, though

Ivan
 
Speaking of empire building, but of a different kind; small, gritty, sneaky subs aren`t the best place for an Admiral to boldy face the enemy, outwit and destroy him in a single afternoon to become a national hero in the process.
 
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