Russia, in its empire stretches from White Russia, Karelia and the Ukraine, to Persia, Siberia, and Alaska and the Yukon. Tsar Nicholas II, eldest son of Tsar Aleksandr II comes to the throne in the mid 1890s and by 1910 is aged sixty-seven. Married to Princess Dagmar of Denmark, he has several sons and the succession is assured in his line.
Since the acquisition of the Yukon, Russia has been fortifying its borders, expanding its internal expeditions and settlements, and boosting settlement along the coast.
Since the acquisition of Persia, Russia has been subduing the autonomous states in the East of that country, as well as trying to subvert the Khanate of Kalat, as well as the other border states. In a strange tug of war with Britain, Russia has been pulling the border nations this way and that, trying to dominate them, as one of the three forces in action.
Russia in Dzungaria, Kuldja etc is also a force in the independent state of Kashgaria.
Russia in Mongolia, and on the Amur, is a force to be reckoned with in Imperial China. Despite China's resurgance, its great Northern rival reaches across the North, whilst independent states like Tibet, Kashagaria, and Taiping China ring it from other directions.
Russia maintains three strong (in their areas) fleets - a Baltic Fleet that is the equal of Sweden, or pre-1892 Prussia as was. - a Mediterranean Fleet which is the equal of any force which can be safely mustered against it, and - a Pacific Fleet which is based at Petropavlosk and Kodiak Island, which is minor in a fleet sense and not able to take on the US Navy but in a localised sense could prove a match for Japan, or Imperial China or Taiping China.
Grey Wolf
Russia is a major conundrum. It is well capable of raising the armies and fighting the wars needed to subdue Central Asian states, such as what I have it do with the petty Dzungarian states, and also to wage a war against a Persian Army that is not going to be equipped in any better way. Russia, also will gain from having free access for trade to and from the Black Sea, and with the Ottoman Empire. The acquisition of a Persian Gulf shore should also be a boost to trade, though I am not sure how much this is going to be so in the immediate term. Then there is Alaska-Yukon, the fifty percent participation in the Klondike gold rush etc. But how much this is offset by the lack of any port more viable than Petropavlosk or Ayan on the Sea of Okhotsk? No Vladivostock or the province that it stands on. This means no direct access to Korea, and the economy of that vassal kingdom.
Russia in the West has lost Poland and Finland, and any direct influence it had in the Rumanian principalities. What this means both for trade and industrialisation I am not sure.
Consider the navy for instance. OTL by the time of the Crimean War, the Russian Navy in the Black Sea remained largely a SAILING navy, not a steam-driven ship-of-the-line one. It was efficient in what it was, but greatly outdated and outclassed by the Anglo-French force which it could not hope to meet in battle. This has definite relevance in this timeline, as it could well indicate that altough Russia made the advance to iron warships after the defeat in the 1860s it has failed to modernise and keep up with other great powers, mainly because it does not feel the need to.
In OTL Russia made several great attempts to catch up, not least around the turn of the century with purchases of foreign-built warships (from France, the USA, and rather curiously Denmark) and with adopting or buying in foreign technology.
I am also finding strategic considerations confusing. For example one can point to areas of clashing interests with most major powers - with Britain over the arc of independent states surrounding British India, with France and Austria on strategic European issues, and with the USA over Alaska and the Yukon. But some of these are going to be more important than others. For example, Russo-American relations could well be quite cordial most of the time. There will be areas of rivalry (perhaps Hawaii), but negotiated treaties would have settled the issue of the demarcated border since the crisis of the mid 1870s. Thus, there is no logical reason why Russia and the USA should be rivals rather than partners in many things. The Anglo-American War can be expected to have shown Russia the dangers of under-estimating Britain on the one hand, and the potential strength of the USA on the other. Thus, if one is looking for an ATL power to replace France as a benefactor to Russia in terms of loans, technology etc, then why does the USA not meet this requirement?
Thus it could well come down to the question of whether Russia sees the need to continue to develop and wants to, or whether a certain self-satisfied stagnation sets in ?
Grey Wolf
I think one major difference that is perhaps under-stated is the approach to imperialism in this timeline. Britain for example can be said to have followed the following policy :-
- consolidate existing holdings
- establish protectorates as points of power-projection
- establish alliances with key regional powers
In addition, there is the guarantor role, with Britain being a guarantor of Texas since the 1840s, and also of Miskitia since it ceased to be a protectorate. I imagine a similar role with regard to the two independent Canadian states.
Differences with OTL include the fact that protectorates do not become colonies, because there is no drive to develop new colonies. Thus, for example, the Maori Kingdom of New Zealand remains a protectorate (and is analogous to how Madagascar was in OTL before France decided to annex it).
The war with Venezuela over the Orinoco border can be considered to be consolidation of existing holdings, the establishment of a definite border for British Guyana where the British want it to be, and not seeing it pushed back by Venezuelan encroachment.
Thus, the entanglements with South America can be reviewed in this light. The support for Paraguay is not arbitrary, its on the back of a decision to back Paraguay as their major ally in South America. These things kind of grow, too - initially the decision made sense because in the first instance it gave access to Paraguayan markets and it was a buffer against an embittered Argentina. The establishment of protectorates over the Republic of Uruguay (more or less since its birth) and the Kingdom of Araucania and Patagonia also fit into this patterm. It is an ATL analogy of colonial annexation - involvement in a theatre brings with it a need to consolidate and deepen that involvement. Thus the support for the territorial annexation by allies, and direct military support where necessary.
With regard to the ring of independent states around British India, this is again a deliberate policy. The nature of the 'Game' from Britain's perspective is not to annex but to influence. As Nicholas I once said in OTL about the Ottoman Empire, so it can be applied here - better a neighbour that can be dominated, than a direct border with a rival power which cannot. The British administration in India most definitely does not want to find itself with a several thousand miles long border with imperial Russia. Much better to deal with the Khan of Kalat, the Emir of Afghanistan, the Sikh rulers, the Central Asian rulers etc.
Grey Wolf
A lot of good points from people, which I will address in one post if I may, seeing as my life is full of planning and paperwork at the moment !
Britain won't be investing much in the USA for the simple reason that investing a country you have been at war with and may go to war with again is not a safe investment. Capital tends to get confiscated, loans annulled that kind of thing. In addition, risk is a big thing in international finance.
I expect that during the period of Radical rapprochement from the later 1860s to the end of the 1870s there would have been some investment, but from the start of the Sherman administration onwards none, and from after the Anglo-American War no-one is going to risk investing in the USA.
Regarding the US economy, I would expect it to develop in a different way. I am no economist, I can't say foir sure what. I would expect that enough other capital-rich nations and companies would invest in the USA in this ATL. Maybe this means Belgium and Switzerland. Maybe its more obvious, and I just don't see it.
But overall, I see the USA as not lacking in necessary investment. To my mind even a weaker US economy should be able to invest outwardly - it will depend on the rules governing federal doobries. A non-bankrupt USA almost defaulted on loans under Grover Cleveland. The key is whether in this ATL the laws are changed, freeing the US economy from the shackles of OTL
As for Russia finding Britain as a partner, they did work together in the mid 1880s, but sizeable differences remain. In the later 1890s Britain and the USA have a certain rapprochement. I doubt this leads to much.
Grey Wolf
Gold in the Witwatersrand
Due to the Boers spreading out over a greater area, with Boer states in Bechuanaland and Matebeleland as well as the Orange River valley, the Transvaal and Natal, the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand is delayed until 1905.
The situation of the Boer states is also different from OTL. They have never come under British domination - there was no war in the 1870s, no treaty which gave Britain suzerain powers, or which denied them the right to handle their own foreign affairs.
Nevertheless, once gold is discovered the workforce is still going to involve a large number of Uitlanders, from the British Cape Province and from Britain itself. One wonders if they will come from elsewhere in this ATL ? Argentine occurred to me, due to its less than happy position, but I doubt it has the population to export.
None of the strategic considerations are the same - with Natal a Boer state there is no reliance on Cape province ports. There is also no reason for complaint if railways are built into Portuguese Mozambique.
The British approach to imperialism is also different - they aren't looking to conquer or colonise, but primarily to influence.
I am also wondering whether after 1892 there might not be Prussian and Dutch settlement in Namibia, the formation of an independent state on the borders of the Boers.
Grey Wolf
The opening of the Trans-Oceanic Canal is going to provide a major boost to US trade and the US economy. I date this to 1897. The canal crosses from Nicaragua (in the US-dominated UPCA) to Miskitia, which is independent. Thus, it cannot be an all-American affair closed to other nations. Thus, again, it would carry trade from countries other than the USA and the UPCA. As well as Miskitia, the obvious contenders are Texas, Mexico, and the Republic of the Yucatan, as well as the European powers. I think they do need to be split into two groups as the local countries could well come to rely on a transit which is in American hands - Mexico especially, for example, could get used to ships traversing from one ocean to the other and being able to, but if the USA were to close the canal to them then it would be a massive economic weapon.
I see the later 1890s as a period of US-British warming of relations. It will never be close like in the 1870s, but the hostility that preceded and followed the mid 1880s war has died down. A new generation has come to power, with different visions.
With the opening of the canal, I see the USA begin to focus increasingly on trans-Pacific trade. Across the ocean lie the independent states of Imperial China, Taiping China, Japan and Vietnam (de facto), whilst Korea remains more of a vassal to the Chi'ing.
One can imagine the peace in the region constantly marred by small skirmishes and border wars, often unofficial. Vietnam no longer has a border with the Chinese Empire but with smaller successor states in the interior, and with French Kwangchow province. Whilst French influence in Vietnam will remain high it doesn't mean it will remain popular, or consistent. There will be emperors or Chief Ministers who oppose it, who fear it and who court other nations - the USA would be seen as a safe bet due to the distance and lack of nearby colonies (unlike Britain, Spain or the Netherlands).
The same could be said for Japan where the Bakufu has modernised under French auspices, fought off rebellions etc and maintained the power of the Shogunate. The daimyo have been subordinated to central authority and the trends visible in OTL 1860s continued under the Tokugawa.
Absent Germany from the international scene, and Prussia since 1892, any nations looking to militarise or reform would be looking to different powers - Britain, France, the USA, and quite likely Russia and Austria.
The Russian model might be good for cash-strapped Far Eastern countries, but may at the same time be too alien, and too dangerous given how close Russia is and how immense.
Austria would certainly be interesting, an extension of its power into areas it really didn't get much of in OTL. Victorious against Prussia, and against Piedmont, Austrian arms under Emperor Rudolph are going to look a good bet, and a validated way forward.
Maybe Belgium could also gain from this ?
Grey Wolf
In OTL, Austria had a small naval force based in the Far East and a trading sphere. And that was with OTL's problems.
I agree regarding Austria's dominant concern being the Central and Eastern Mediterranean, and the Red Sea. John knows more about it than I do, but somehow Austria had a trading position in the Soudan and surrounding area, and I would see no reason for this to be mitigated greatly.
China, or 'The Chinas' as they would probably be known, offer great opportunitiesd for trade. I was thinking that maybe an Austria on the up, with a recent great military victory to its name, could expand its influence here, even if it is not a major strategic interest. After all, how strategically interested in Persia was Sweden in OTL ?
Looking at the Eastern Mediterranean, things have been 'quiet' there for forty years, unless I misremember my own timeline ! The dualities of Russia-Ottomans and France-Egypt still exist. In a sense, Britain and Austria have less directly at stake, but perhaps more indirectly at stake, what with the Suez Canal being an important route to India, and for Austria being the key to its thriving Red Sea trade. That neither Austria nor Britain has been directly involved in conflict would help their position with both dualities.
I don't see the dualities as being equal. Russia and the Ottoman Empire are bound under the successor treaty to Unkiar Skelessi. There was no Straits Convention in this ATL, and Unkiar Skelessi remained in force until the c1870s IIRC. Thus, the successor treaty builds on this, but recognises that Russia no longer has any position of protector towards the Ottomans. Its more of a convention between equals now, and the fruits of this would have been seen in the involvement of both parties in the invasion and carving up of Persia. Russia leases bases off the Ottomans, probably being facilities at Smyrna, and the entire base at Lemnos, these being where the Russian Mediterranean Fleet has its forward bases. Russian warships have automatic right of passage through the Straits.
France-Egypt has always been more of an alliance and influence thing. Franbce's role is important but has gone through periods of waxing and waning. In theory France could cease its political involvement, but its economic, military procurement and bureaucratic influence would remain. However, I certainly don't see the young King Charles XI as being the kind of person to withdraw French influence from anywhere !
Regarding Ireland and Britain, the 1830s civil war would have delivered a big hit to population. For example, in addition to the battles across Ireland, the war there was climaxed by the massacre and expulsion of the majority of the Protestant population of Ulster who settled in Western Scotland and the North-West of England. I see this as mitigating the population effects of any famine. In addition, the new kingdom would be established with French bureaucracy and proven management - the situation which in OTL led to the worst effects of the Potato Famine would be eradicated. Other chaoses may reign in the immediate aftermath of the war, but I don't see the pressure as being the same.
Later in the century, after decades of growth and re-establishment Irish emigration probably becomes an issue again. I could imagine some certainly head to the independent Canadas; beyond that is confusing because would Irishmen from an independent kingdom head to British colonies? Might they not be more tempted to go to Texas, or Uruguay or some such?
Grey Wolf
The USA
Much as I would prefer the world to revolve around the ins and outs of European powers, one cannot escape the fact that the USA at the dawn of the twentieth century stands at the threshold of greatness. Even without the Spanish-American War in this ATL, the USA has a global presence. Sherman's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine ensured that the USA would challenge every attempt to exert influence within the Americas by European powers. This led to war with Britain, and an eventual defeat, though as the defeat was in Argentina the actual severity of losing the struggle was mitigated. The naval defeat off Newfoundland would be more of a spur to action in the years ahead than a national humiliation, and the inroads made into Rupertsland brought Winnipeg under American control.
In the years since the Anglo-American War, the roughly two decades since the peace in the 1880s, the USA has passed through Radical Party administrations which focused again on workers and farmers and the economy, and with the renewed spirit of optimism with the opening of the Trans-Continental Canal in 1897 has entered a period where the USA believes in a global mission, whilst at the same time sees a warming of relations with Britain.
There are tensions with Russia over trade, power and influence in the Northern Pacific, and Russia's de facto acquisition of a protectorate over the Kingdom of Hawaii in the early 1900s has added to the tensions. US trade with The Chinas, with Japan and with a Vietnam where US influence in other areas is increasing, is growing mightily.
The UPCA is seeing new tensions as we approach 1910. There are moves within it to have it become a US state, rather than a quasi-independent nation that cannot do anything without Washington's say-so. The factions within the UPCA are a disparate lot - the blacks resetled there after the civil war, in autonomous mini-Liberias which merged into the federal nature of the country, the Union veterans, the veterans from the Anglo-American War, the native Hispanic and Indian peoples, the traders and entrepreneurs drawn by the canal and the new wealth, and who provide the greatest impetus towards formal merger with the USA.
The Kingdom of Miskitia however provides something of a contradiction. Its independence guaranteed by Great Britain, Miskitia refuses to play the role of US vassal, and has negotiated independent rights to its end of the canal. It maintains an independent stance on foreign affairs, and King Robert II (who is in this ATL alive and well in 1910 unlike OTL) heads a nation that looks askance at the idea of the USA annexing the UPCA.
The Republic of the Yucatan is not too thrilled with the idea, either. After having shaken off US protectorship in the wake of the US Civil War, Yucatan has developed a strong individual identity and sees its period of vassalship in a negative light. It has developed trade in the Caribbean and has strong links to the Republic of Texas. It would too not view the annexation of the UPCA as a happy act.
More importantly, perhaps, neither Britain nor France would react well to any moves towards this. The USA and Britain have seen a warming of their relationship since the end of the 1890s, and the president in Washington has to be aware of this.
At the same time, the USA has an ambivalent relationship with Russia. On the one hand they are suspicious of Russian influence in the Pacific, and angered by the protectorate over Hawaii, but on the other hand US-Russian bilateral relations remain good, and the USA supplies Russia with naval development expertise - at a price.
President Ignatius Donelly's 1896 bid for re-election fails, the US public tired after two terms of introspective Radical Party administrations, albeit under different presidents. President Mark Hanna is elected in 1896 for the Reform Party, and re-elected again in 1900, but dies in 1904 during the campaign season.
The 1904 election is thus contested between Williams J Bryan of the Radical Party and Robert La Follette of the Reform Party. Building on Hanna's legacy, La Follette wins and serves out the term 1904 to 1908.
However, by 1908 he is facing strong internal pressure within the Reform Party and his bid for re-election runs into serious problems. The controversy in the UPCA over the merchant-entrepreneur's party's wish to see the nation annexed to the USA causes problems as La Follette's negative reaction causes a backlash from the right-wing part of his party. Refusal to intervene in Hawaii causes chaos in the primaries, and eventually at the Reform Party national convention a stormy session chooses Henry Cabot Lodge as the presidential nominee.
The 1908 election is a chaotic shambles of an event. Splinters from both the Radicals and the La Follette Reformists add to the mix, and the rise of Union Labour under Euegene Debs simply creates a situation which is too close to call. In a result where all of the factions carry states, it is eventually Lodge who emerges as the winner, and who is inaugurated as president in March 1909.
Grey Wolf
Maybe I should have stuck to my original impulse not to name any more presidents, but I thought it would be of some interest. I don't see it as a problem that Bryan and La Follette are both of an isolationist tendency, their main differences are on economic domestic issues and La Follette wins on that basis. It is his defeat in 1908 where overseas issues come to dominate - neither the Radicals nor La Follette's wing of the Reform Party seem to cater for the protection or advancement of US interests in the issues of the day.
I don't know if Lodge is a useful choice or not to emerge from this, but one could certainly imagine someone adopting a point of view they didn't necessarily agree with in order to get the nomination.
Of course in the ATL I could simply make people up, but as yet I prefer not to as the use of real people in different circumstances seems far more...fun !
Grey Wolf
The 1908 Hawaiian Crisis was a defining moment in the US presidential campaign of 1908. The arrival in Honolulu of the Russian battleship Rossiya seemed to be a slap in the face for American interests, an impression heightened by the fact that the new flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet had been built with significant American technological help.
President Robert La Follette, running for a third term was faced with a rising tide of anger from within his own Reform Party, and suddenly what had looked like a competition between an incumbent with a sound economic record, and an unknown of the Radical Party with policies that were little different except at the edges, now became wide open. The Reform Party primaries began to return electors empowered to vote for candidates other than the president.
At the same time, dis-satisfied Radical Party activists began to toy with the Union Labour movement of Euegene Debs, whilst William J Bryan was running on an Independent Populist platform.
At the Reform Party convention in the Summer of 1908, there was a narrow victory for Henry Cabot Lodge, adopted by the foreign interventionist wing of the Reform Party as their candidate, regardless of his own feelings on the matters to hand. At the heart of this victory had been Lodge's comments on the position of US citizens in the United Provinces of Central America. A movement started by merchants and entrepreneurs, attracted to the UPCA since the opening of the Trans-Continental Canal in 1897, had begun clamouring for annexation to the USA. La Follette's administration had dismissed these calls, but big business had made its contributions to Lodge's campaign, and despite his own ambiguous feelings on the matter, Henry Cabot Lodge had made a series of key speeches in favour of annexation.
The November 1908 election was a confusion of chaos, with every candidate carrying some state or other. In the event, a tiny majority was the cause for Lodge's victory, and in March 1909 he was inaugurated as president of the United Stated of America.
Grey Wolf
Egypt
From
http://www.uq.net.au/~zzhsoszy/state...mic/egypt.html
HH Prince Muhammed Said Halim Pasha, born 18th January 1865 in Shubra, Cairo, Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, married 1890, Emine Indji Toussoun, born 1st March 1876, (daughter of Muhammed Toussoun Pasha and Bachachat-Imr Hanim), died 31st May 1915 in Yenikeuy, Bosphorus, and had issue. He died 6th December 1921 in Rome.
Obviously, this is OTL.
From what I recall of the Islamic succession laws, had Ismail not changed it to a primogeniture system in the 1860s, Said Halim would have been ruler of Egypt after the death of Ismail.
In the ATL, this occurs in the 1895 on Ismail's death. He would thus accede as Sultan Said II of Egypt.
IIRC under the same Islamic succession laws, his successor would in fact be the guy installed by the British as khedive in 1914 after they overthrew the incumbent who came out in favour of the Ottoman Empire.
Was it Egypt like ? I can't help but think that it will from time-to-time be key, especially with the Suez Canal being so important. Including in its realm Lebanon (under French auspices), Palestine, Transjordania, the Hejaz with Mecca and Medina, Asir and Yemen, as well as Soudan, Eritrea and Equatoria, the geographical spread of Egypt is both dangerously vast and fascinating large.
I foresee that the Arab slaver states of the Eastern interior, established in concert with European adventurers such as Stanley and occupying what would in OTL become the Eastern Congo, would be important to Egypt's economy.
Abyssinia has diverged differently without the intervening rule of King John, going from a longer reign of Theodore to his OTL protege and here his annointed successor in Menelik.
I view Tripoli as still an Ottoman possession, and the Ottoman revival after the 1870s as seeing the reimposition of direct rule, and later the expansion into Fezzan and the potential for a clash with Egypt in the Arab emirates and sultanates of the interior.
Tunis, under the Bey, remains nominally Ottoman but in effect independent. I imagine there would be a certain amount of French influence, probably balanced by British and Austrian to assuage the fears that Tunis could become a French dependency.
Egypt also retains Crete, and the anchorage at Suva Bay which has been developed by the Egyptian Navy. This brings it within direct confrontation with the Mecklenburg Kingdom of Greece. But Greece since its disaster has never really recovered. It is poor, unstable and squeezed out of strategic considerations.
French influence within Egypt, from finance through loans, to military advisors, purchase of new military technology, and French bureaucracy and industry all lead France to have a dominant position within Egypt, even if the French government of the time has little direct interest in the sultanate.
I envisage the arsenal of Alexandria to at least be as good as that of Foochow before the Sino-French war, able to build small warships with no additional help. I would imagine that Egypt with its naval tradition, and its ability to draw upon France for technological assistance in upgrading its facilities, can actually build large cruisers and small battleships off its own back. It probably uses French, and maybe Austrian, yards for new designs - eg large battleship developments, or something akin to a destroyer when they first come out.
Grey Wolf
End of Part 15