Compare: CSA Wins

What I'm looking to do here is look at differences in the effects of two PoDs/TLs that, on the surface, might seem similar. Remember -- this is not the thread to flesh out either of these ideas, especially in this case, as they get plenty of discussion on this board anyway; in other words we're looking at effects, not causes. So with that said:

How would these two rough TLs compare:
1) the Confederacy wins independence in the Civil War with an 1862 PoD, partially by preempting the Emancipation Proclamation
2) the Confederacy wins independence in the Civil War with an 1864 PoD, partially (or largely) by seeing McClellan elected President on a peace platform
 
2) the Confederacy wins independence in the Civil War with an 1864 PoD, partially (or largely) by seeing McClellan elected President on a peace platform

I'd like to point out that that will not work. He's sworn in to office in March 1865, where the CSA has about six weeks of life left. If he truly snatches defeat from the jaws of victory, he'd be the most reviled President in the history of history of all worlds across space and time. I suspect he'd continue the war to its conclusion and then take credit for all of Lincoln's work. Only a fool would negotiate when they are on the verge of winning. McClellan was no fool; overly cautious and a glory-seeking hound but no fool.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I'd like to point out that that will not work. He's sworn in to office in March 1865, where the CSA has about six weeks of life left.]

Only if you assume that the military situation was the same as it was IOTL. If McClellan has won the election, we can assume that this isn't the case, since he could only have won if the Confederates did much better militarily during the 1864 campaign season.

Actually Lincoln would probably order his generals to rush towards victory and end the war earlier then OTL

The 1864-65 winter was intense and brought military operations virtually to a halt. It wasn't as it Lincoln could just say, "Push harder, guys!" They were doing the best they could IOTL. Besides, as noted above, McClellan could only have won if the Confederates had done better in the 1864 campaigns. We can assume that Atlanta is still in Confederate hands and the Army of Tennessee remains a formidable fighting force.
 
I'd like to point out that that will not work.

Would like to reiterate that this thread is not concerned with the "how" of either scenario, and that includes questions of plausibility; if anyone wishes to raise such concerns, I would simply note that there are plenty of other threads on the board where such debates are fully within their OP spirit. And anyone who finds either scenario too implausible to compare need not feel any need to weigh in here.

Only if you assume that the military situation was the same as it was IOTL.

Which reminds me -- the descriptions in the OP should only be considered partial, and in fact neither explicitly gives the PoD I happened to have in mind. All part of keeping this as much about the effects as possible.
 
A '62 POD could work in the sense that the Confederacy could force stalemate throughout 1863-64 which could bring the the Union to the negotiating table. Say there was a great victory at an alternate Antietam somehow, it might prompt foreign recognition and offers of mediation. If the war drags on with no military end in sight and absent great victories like Shiloh and Gettysburg, the Union public will call it quits.

A nation can only be expected to tolerate war for so long.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The thing you have to define, however, is:

What I'm looking to do here is look at differences in the effects of two PoDs/TLs that, on the surface, might seem similar. Remember -- this is not the thread to flesh out either of these ideas, especially in this case, as they get plenty of discussion on this board anyway; in other words we're looking at effects, not causes. So with that said:

How would these two rough TLs compare:
1) the Confederacy wins independence in the Civil War with an 1862 PoD, partially by preempting the Emancipation Proclamation
2) the Confederacy wins independence in the Civil War with an 1864 PoD, partially (or largely) by seeing McClellan elected President on a peace platform

The thing you have to define, however, is, where are the battlelines?

The reality is that even if (somehow, which is pretty ASBish) the US forces lose at Shiloh and Antietam, by the time any sort of an armistice is agreed to (presmably after the mid-terms in '62), the US is in control of:

a) northern Virginia;
b) southeastern Virginia;
c) Ocracoke and Roanoke and most of the Carolina sounds;
d) Port Royal and the surronding territory;
e) odds and ends in Florida, including Key West and Pensacola;
f) Ship Island Mississippi and New Orleans, Louisiana;
g) El Paso, Texas;
h) most of the Indian Territory;
i) northwestern Arkansas;
j) all of Missouri;
k) Middle Tennessee (at least), including Nashville;
l) all of Kentucky;
m) all of West Virginia;

Likewise, by 1864 (late enough for GBM to be elected president and become Petain) the US still controls all of the above, as well as (historically) pretty close to the entirety of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee, as well as various other lodgements here and there on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Trying to build a coherent nation state from what was left to the Confederacy in 1864, even with (presumably) southeastern Tennessee, northwestern Georgia, etc still under rebel control makes trying to build one out of East and West Pakistan look rational.

Best,
 
Getting back to the OP, the big difference that comes to my mind is how the institution of slavery is affected: in the first scenario, the Emancipation Proclamation is prevented and if an armistice is soon achieved (late 62 or early 63, which I incidentally think is plausible) then the new nation will be less war ravaged than OTL, giving the Confederate maneuverability to preserve their institution their way of life depends upon.

Conversely, if our PoD is in 1864 and the war doesn't end until late that year at the very earliest, than not only is the CSA achieving its recognition under greater, more general strains of war, but their they've got all kinds of unrest from their enslaved population, particularly those colored troops (and possibly sympathetic white unionists) with combat experience, in their land, who are not looking to give up so easily; in short, I would expect months or even years of racial violence TTL with casualties in the hundreds of thousands, combined with yet more unrest in the North and West. As the young nation struggles to keep order in its fresh borders, the general crisis might force the CSA to further weaken their cherished institution (at least in terms of long term viability), if only similar to OTL panicked attempts (e.g. Cleburne's idea).

Thoughts here?

The thing you have to define, however, is, where are the battlelines?

Well it's certainly a valid point that a later PoD means the Union forces will control more land at the time of the armistice, which will play important role in the peace negotiations in not only the size, but the stability of the CSA at the start. (That said, I think that's all the detail I'll give here for now -- the more we get into on "how" the CSA wins, the more the thread becomes derailed debating said "how"s. )
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Well, yeah, but it also defines whether:

Getting back to the OP, the big difference that comes to my mind is how the institution of slavery is affected: in the first scenario, the Emancipation Proclamation is prevented and if an armistice is soon achieved (late 62 or early 63, which I incidentally think is plausible) then the new nation will be less war ravaged than OTL, giving the Confederate maneuverability to preserve their institution their way of life depends upon.

Conversely, if our PoD is in 1864 and the war doesn't end until late that year at the very earliest, than not only is the CSA achieving its recognition under greater, more general strains of war, but their they've got all kinds of unrest from their enslaved population, particularly those colored troops (and possibly sympathetic white unionists) with combat experience, in their land, who are not looking to give up so easily; in short, I would expect months or even years of racial violence TTL with casualties in the hundreds of thousands, combined with yet more unrest in the North and West. As the young nation struggles to keep order in its fresh borders, the general crisis might force the CSA to further weaken their cherished institution (at least in terms of long term viability), if only similar to OTL panicked attempts (e.g. Cleburne's idea).

Thoughts here?



Well it's certainly a valid point that a later PoD means the Union forces will control more land at the time of the armistice, which will play important role in the peace negotiations in not only the size, but the stability of the CSA at the start. (That said, I think that's all the detail I'll give here for now -- the more we get into on "how" the CSA wins, the more the thread becomes derailed debating said "how"s. )

Well, yeah, but it also defines whether:

a) the CSA is split in (at least) two pieces or not;
b) has lost two of its three largest cities or not;
c) has lost control of the largest inland waterway or not;
d) the largest port (Norfolk) in the state where at least one of its capitals is located is under its control or not;
e) etc etc etc etc or nit; to
z) is even remotely viable in economic and demographic terms;

I mean, I understand your goal in trying to get at a "postwar" confederacy, but the reality is you have to provide some sort of description of what they might want to have, how that would impact the reality of any armistice, etc - otherwise, it's like Ireland with all the counties, or not, in 1922...

Or India as in the Raj, not India, Pakistan, Bangladesh...

What you really run into in trying to posit an independent confederacy is the question of will on both sides, and given that the historical reality is once the guns fired, the US never lost the will to put down the rebellion, and the rebels quite obviously lost the will to fight it out to the end, the historical reality of the correlation of forces is such that - absent Buchanan saying something ahistorical, like "so long and good riddance" - it just was not going to happen...

So you can posit a velvet divorce, I suppose (but you really still should offer some sort of reason why, other than handwavium), but independence after war breaks out? The US has the economic, demographic, political, and military edge, and to expect that not to come into play is sort of like expecting water to (naturally) run uphill.

Good luck with that...

Best,
 
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