Communist Portugal ???

Say this coup attempt, or maybe a different one under different circumstances post WW2 (feel free to speculate), succeeds and the new communist regime is reasonably stable.

What happens to the Portuguese colonies?
 
What happens to colonies? Exactly the same as IOTL, of course. I don't see any reason why the communists would do anything differently from Portugal's posterior centre-left governments in that regard.

Now, as for what happens to Portugal, it will probably join the Soviet sphere. There's also a fair chance Madeira and Azores manage to gain independence with NATO support or become a Portuguese analog of Taiwan, but that's not certain to happen in my opinion.
 
What happens to colonies? Exactly the same as IOTL, of course. I don't see any reason why the communists would do anything differently from Portugal's posterior centre-left governments in that regard.
Couldn't they go for some Unilateral Declarations of Independence in order to maintain white rule, now that returning to the motherland is no longer an attractive option ?
 
Couldn't they go for some Unilateral Declarations of Independence in order to maintain white rule, now that returning to the motherland is no longer an attractive option ?

so, any chance of colonial UDI's ?

By November 1975 all the colonies had already gained independence (except for Timor and Macau) and vast majority of colonists had been kicked out long ago.

There were earlier instances in the post-Carnation Revolution period in which Portugal could have gone communist, but I really can't think of any plausible way to get a UDI in a Portuguese colony.

Returning to the motherland was never an attractive option for the colonists, the retornados lost everything and they had it really rough in their new lives. They didn't leave voluntarily, they were kicked out.

Some colonists in Mozambique actually tried to fight back. They formed paramilitairy units and it seemed like what they wanted was a sort of UDI, but they had absolutely no chance of pulling that off. Many units of the Portuguese Army stationed in Angola and Mozambique stopped fighting as soon as thye revolution ended, and without there support the colonists could never have a UDI.
 
By November 1975 all the colonies had already gained independence (except for Timor and Macau) and vast majority of colonists had been kicked out long ago.

There were earlier instances in the post-Carnation Revolution period in which Portugal could have gone communist, but I really can't think of any plausible way to get a UDI in a Portuguese colony.

Returning to the motherland was never an attractive option for the colonists, the retornados lost everything and they had it really rough in their new lives. They didn't leave voluntarily, they were kicked out.

Some colonists in Mozambique actually tried to fight back. They formed paramilitairy units and it seemed like what they wanted was a sort of UDI, but they had absolutely no chance of pulling that off. Many units of the Portuguese Army stationed in Angola and Mozambique stopped fighting as soon as thye revolution ended, and without there support the colonists could never have a UDI.

Ok, so let's say communists take over shortly after the Carnation revolution, before the new gov't has had a chance to pull out of Africa.

Would the military actually return to Communist Portugal under those circumstances?

Or a different scenario:
Assume there is another European Power, let's say a Fascist Italy that stayed neutral, or a resurgent Brazil. Then we get the anti-Estado Novo revolution, followed shortly by a communist revolution.

Would the military and/or the colonists turn to this foreign power for protection?
 
Ok, so let's say communists take over shortly after the Carnation revolution, before the new gov't has had a chance to pull out of Africa.

Would the military actually return to Communist Portugal under those circumstances?

Almost surely, yes. We need to remember that there were more communists in the Portuguese militairy than in any other sector of society, and that most of these communists had served or were serving in the colonies at the moment. The army divisions stationed in Angola and Mozambique were as much of a fertile breeding ground for communist ideology as there could be. They were made of young men who had been forcefuly taken away from their homes, their lives, and their families, told to fight to the death for an Empire against leftist guerrillas and never allowed to question any of that. By the end of the war, FRELIMO and the MPLA had lost almost all of their territory and they were militairily finished, but they had won a much more subtle victory that no one had noticed. They'd managed to convert many of their enimies into their ideology, that was what ultimately won independence for Angola and Mozambique.

As I said before, many units of the Portuguese Army stopped fighting as soon as the revolution happaned. Everyone was fed up with the colonial war and people wouldn't take it anymore.

Any chance of a colonial UDI would require the existance of anti-communist fervour in the militairy, and there wasn't any. If anything, there was pro-communist fervour. And even non-communists in the militairy would surely prefer to return home (even if their home was now ruled by a regime they didn't agree with) than dying for a cause they didn't really believe in.

Or a different scenario:
Assume there is another European Power, let's say a Fascist Italy that stayed neutral, or a resurgent Brazil. Then we get the anti-Estado Novo revolution, followed shortly by a communist revolution.

Would the military and/or the colonists turn to this foreign power for protection?

Well, IOTL Rodhesia and apartheid South Africa were still around, and it was in their best interest to keep the Portuguese colonies white-dominated, but there was simply nothing they could do.

In my opinion, if a UDI is going to happen somewhere in the Portuguese Empire its in southern Mozambique, since the settlers in that area were very influenced by Rodhesian and South African ideologies. In Angola this could never happen because lusotropicalism, the Estado Novo's oficial multiracial colonialist ideology, was actually taken seriously. In Guinea it would be impossible as well due to the lack of a sufficient number of settlers.

Anyway, you'll need some pretty drastic changes for it to happen:
  1. You need much stronger South African and Rodhesian regimes by 1975. Another fascist power, as you suggested, should also suffice, but South Africa and Rodhesia are better in my opinion because they are closer and have direct interest in helping the colonists.
  2. You need a larger number of settler in Mozambique, and you probably want intensive colonisation to start sooner so that these colonists feel a greater connection with the land.
  3. You need a shorter colonial war that ends in Portuguese defeat before communism and anti-colonialism can spread to the army. This, in particular, is very har to get.
 

Lusitania

Donor
The Portuguese communist party at their 1962 convention took a stance to leave Africa and support the communist revel groups. So there is no chance of Portuguese military troops under communist control in staying in Africa.
 
Now, as for what happens to Portugal, it will probably join the Soviet sphere. There's also a fair chance Madeira and Azores manage to gain independence with NATO support or become a Portuguese analog of Taiwan, but that's not certain to happen in my opinion.

Don't you think there would be an intervention to topple that regime? A Soviet Union with access, albeit indirect, to the Med and the Atlantic would be too much to tolerate for the western bloc.

Plus, Franco had just died: would this hamper Spain's transition to democracy either by reaction or due to external threats fearing a red Iberia?
 
Don't you think there would be an intervention to topple that regime? A Soviet Union with access, albeit indirect, to the Med and the Atlantic would be too much to tolerate for the western bloc.

The Americans would try something, but there's obviously no guarantee they'd succeed. They can't just declare war on Portugal, so their intervention will probably be limited to supporting right-wing militias in exile, such as general Spínola's ELP. It's unlikely they can accomplish much.

Plus, Franco had just died: would this hamper Spain's transition to democracy either by reaction or due to external threats fearing a red Iberia?

Very possibly so.
 
The Americans would try something, but there's obviously no guarantee they'd succeed. They can't just declare war on Portugal,

What about a direct intervention via or by Spain?

so their intervention will probably be limited to supporting right-wing militias in exile, such as general Spínola's ELP. It's unlikely they can accomplish much.

The main question is: how much popular support would such a regime garner?
If I understand correctly a big chunk of the expeditionary force in Angola had been converted to communism: would it be a major factor? What about the rest of the military? Did the Church still have significant influence at the time? Did the intelligentsia lean to the left? And...<placeholder for any other actor I forgot to mention> ?
 
There was not widespread support for communism in Portugal, in 1974, despite the idea that may have looked from abroad.
Communists were only a vocal minority even in the armed forces, and the vast majority of the country was deeply hostile to communism.
 
What about a direct intervention via or by Spain?

If some crazy fascist takes control in Spain after Franco's death we could see an invasion of Portugal, but I don't see a bill supporting such a invasion passing in the American Congress. If the Americans somehow support this it's going to have to be covertly.

There was not widespread support for communism in Portugal, in 1974, despite the idea that may have looked from abroad.
Communists were only a vocal minority even in the armed forces, and the vast majority of the country was deeply hostile to communism.

This is fairly hard to evaluate. In the 1975 election they only got 12.5% of the votes (PCP) plus 4.5% for the MDP. In 1979, tough, the two parties combined (as the United People's Alliance, APU) got up to 19%. This may not seem much, but Lenin also only garnered 23% in 1917 Russia...

Anyway, it is important to note that this was all after the 25 November coup and the events of the Hot Summer had greatly tarnished the communists' reputation. Before the election actually happaned, I think everyone was expecting them to fair much better. They had massive popular support in south of the country, especially in Alentejo and in the industrial areas south of river Tagus. It was really just in the north and in some parts of Madeira and Azores that they were really unpopular.

In my opinion there was more than enough support coming from the militairy and certain sectors of the population to sustain a communist regime. All it'd take would be a few tweaks here and there and screwing the moderate left.

The main question is: how much popular support would such a regime garner?
If I understand correctly a big chunk of the expeditionary force in Angola had been converted to communism: would it be a major factor? What about the rest of the military? Did the Church still have significant influence at the time? Did the intelligentsia lean to the left? And...<placeholder for any other actor I forgot to mention> ?

You are correct about communism being popular among the troops stationed in the colonies, not just in Angola but in Mozambique as well. As the vast majority o the militairy had, at some point, served in the colonial war by 1975, I'd say that we can definetly count a large fraction of the army in general as being sympathetic to communism.

That church held some influence during the Estado Novo, but they'd mostly chosen to keep quiet during the immediate post-revolutionary period.

As for the intelligentsia, I don't really think there was much of that in Portugal at the time. Most of the population was very uneducated. Communism seemed to be popular among university students, though.
 
This is fairly hard to evaluate. In the 1975 election they only got 12.5% of the votes (PCP) plus 4.5% for the MDP. In 1979, tough, the two parties combined (as the United People's Alliance, APU) got up to 19%. This may not seem much, but Lenin also only garnered 23% in 1917 Russia...

Anyway, it is important to note that this was all after the 25 November coup and the events of the Hot Summer had greatly tarnished the communists' reputation. Before the election actually happaned, I think everyone was expecting them to fair much better. They had massive popular support in south of the country, especially in Alentejo and in the industrial areas south of river Tagus. It was really just in the north and in some parts of Madeira and Azores that they were really unpopular.

In my opinion there was more than enough support coming from the militairy and certain sectors of the population to sustain a communist regime. All it'd take would be a few tweaks here and there and screwing the moderate left.
The 1979 election contained a element of protest (and no more fear that the far-left could win).
Communists were massively unpopular in the areas containing the vast majority of the population.
Historically support for communism in Portugal is associated with areas without tradition of private property and people hailing from those areas. That limited its appeal to a large part of the south (with a smaller percentage of the population).
The centre-left basis of support was different from the communist basis of support.
1917 Russia was a country with less tradition of private property, less tradition of representative government and less literacy, with a society that was very different from 1974 Portugal.
 
The 1979 election contained a element of protest (and no more fear that the far-left could win).
Communists were massively unpopular in the areas containing the vast majority of the population.
Historically support for communism in Portugal is associated with areas without tradition of private property and people hailing from those areas. That limited its appeal to a large part of the south (with a smaller percentage of the population).
The centre-left basis of support was different from the communist basis of support.
1917 Russia was a country with less tradition of private property, less tradition of representative government and less literacy, with a society that was very different from 1974 Portugal.

Communists polled 12.5+4.5% in 1976, 19.0% in 1979 , 17.0% in 1980 and 18.2% in 1983. That wasn't all protest voting. There was a significant portion of the population during the 70s that did support communist ideology. The Carnation Revolution brought a huge wave of revolutionary enthusiasm to various sectors of Portuguese society, and that enthusiam took almost a decade to wither away.

Also, I really don't understand what you mean by "tradition of private property". Alentejo before the revolution had been dominated by latifúndios since the 1820s, that's as much of a "tradition of private property" in the capitalist as you can get. And it was the opression of rural workers by the landowners that ultimately pushed them towards communist ideology, so I really don't see your point.

"The centre-left basis of support was different from the communist basis of support." Not really, the Socialist Party during the seventies received support mostly from moderate working class voters. Nowdays they're more of a middle-class based party, but there wasn't as much of a middle-class at the time as there is now. One of the mains points of tension during the hot summer was the conflict between PS-aligned and PCP-aligned labour unions. By tweaking a few things during the PREC we could easily get a much more popular communist party.

Anyway, I think you're vastly overestimating the amount of mass support needed to establish a dictatorship. If the PCP could garner the support of 20 something percent of the population and knew how to take advantage of the enthusiasm of southern rural and factory workers as well as of their overrepresentation in the militairy, they could very well set up a stable enough regime. Sure, plenty of people wouldn't be happy at all, but what could they do, start a gerrilla? I don't really see many people wanting to do that, not even in the most conservative leaning parts of the country.
 
Also, I really don't understand what you mean by "tradition of private property". Alentejo before the revolution had been dominated by latifúndios since the 1820s, that's as much of a "tradition of private property" in the capitalist as you can get. And it was the opression of rural workers by the landowners that ultimately pushed them towards communist ideology, so I really don't see your point.
By tradition of private property, I should have said tradition of small private property, common in the centre and north. I know well about the abuses the rural workers unfortunately suffered under absentee landlords, but the latifundia were a characteristic of the south.

"The centre-left basis of support was different from the communist basis of support." Not really, the Socialist Party during the seventies received support mostly from moderate working class voters. Nowdays they're more of a middle-class based party, but there wasn't as much of a middle-class at the time as there is now. One of the mains points of tension during the hot summer was the conflict between PS-aligned and PCP-aligned labour unions. By tweaking a few things during the PREC we could easily get a much more popular communist party
The Socialists drew much support from civil servants and religious left (small farmers and urban workers). One of things that drew people to form the UGT was that they didn't want to be controlled by communists.

Anyway, I think you're vastly overestimating the amount of mass support needed to establish a dictatorship. If the PCP could garner the support of 20 something percent of the population and knew how to take advantage of the enthusiasm of southern rural and factory workers as well as of their overrepresentation in the militairy, they could very well set up a stable enough regime. Sure, plenty of people wouldn't be happy at all, but what could they do, start a gerrilla? I don't really see many people wanting to do that, not even in the most conservative leaning parts of the country.
The burning of communist party facilities across a lot of the country was indicative of widespread hostility to communism, and the Group of Nine and the non-far left parties had contingencies for a coup attempt by the far left, including transferring the government to the north and recovering the south from there.
The Hot Summer was a case of a "Revolutionary Vanguard" acting without popular support. Even the strength among the armed forces of the time is debatable. Some military assembly meetings were made without the conditions for proper representation by the elements they claimed to represent.
 
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If some crazy fascist takes control in Spain after Franco's death we could see an invasion of Portugal, but I don't see a bill supporting such a invasion passing in the American Congress. If the Americans somehow support this it's going to have to be covertly.

My point is that congress or no congress the US would have never tolerated a NATO member (since its inception, no less) turning communist and predictably moving into Moscow's sphere of influence.

It would have become a fifth column behind consolidated defences and also everyone knew since WW2 how important the Azores are as staging point.

I'm not even sure the Soviets would have opposed in more than words: after all if the Yalta equilibrium had fallen, their satellite states would have been fair game too.
 
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