Common misconceptions about the American Civil War?

Maybe I'm wrong but isn't there also a misconception about the uniforms. From what I remember the Confederates would be dressed in a less than uniform color spectrum.

Confederate uniforms were normally a grey drab of some sort but some units (especially at the start of the war) had a big variety of color, some being in bright white, purple, dark blue etc. and I believe the Union had a similar issue as well but only at the start of the war. A.P Hill's brigade during the battle of Antietam is a perfect example of that. They were wearing blue uniforms that they had grabbed from Harper's Ferry and that caused a good bit of confusion when they entered the battle for the union. Same with the 33rd Virginian Regiment at Bull Run who over-ran an artillery battery since they were in blue uniforms.
 
The misconception that I think is the most important is that Virginia was the decisive theater. It seems to come up a lot (and has an immense amount of scholarship and writing on it) mainly because of Robert E Lee.

But to me it is clear that the West, specifically the fighting in Tennessee, Kentucky and Mississippi that led to the deep penetration drives into Alabama, Georgia and ultimately into the Carolinas (by Sherman) are the principal and most important theater.

It seems to me that all the Union had to do is keep Lee busy, defend Washington, and support operations against the Virginia and Carolina ports (and not lose Washington) while the decisive blows were struck in the Mississippi Valley and the rivers that fed into it. Plus of course Atlanta.

Historically it is pretty clear that once the Union Army is marching at will through the Deep South that desertion rates climbed, morale plummeted and supplies dried up for the Army of Northern Virginia, thus ensuring its eventual defeat.
Absolutely. Though saying 'all' the Union has to do is contain Lee possibly makes it seem easier than it was! (Not your intention I'm sure.)

A misconception probably held by some contempories also. Do you think the Confederates placed too much emphasis on operations against Washington and too little on the West?

OT for this thread but are there any threads on 'WI the Confederacy kept its capital in the Deep South' or somewhere more central to its territory?
 
People don't seem to understand that Lincoln's emergency powers only extended to territories in rebellion, and so Lincoln was literally unable to free slaves in New Orleans etc.

And then that's used as an argument for why Lincoln was a racist dickhead.
Wasn't New Orleans held by the Union at the time of the Proclamation?
 

Gaius Julius Magnus

Gone Fishin'
People don't seem to understand that Lincoln's emergency powers only extended to territories in rebellion, and so Lincoln was literally unable to free slaves in New Orleans etc.

And then that's used as an argument for why Lincoln was a racist dickhead.
And also seem to ignore the proclamation was still in effect as the Union armies kept advancing into the South, freeing many more than the ones who just been traveling with the Union army at the time it being issued.

I blame the Lost Cause.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
It is pretty common, even though didn't he out-right state that he would fight the war to the finish if he was elected? Or was that after the war?
His acceptance of the nomination repudiated the peace plank, so functionally yes.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
...actually, I'd just say "McClellan's treatment" and leave it at that, but I do think there's also a very real misconception which is related to the weapons of the armies.



It's quite common for people to get confused about the nature of the artillery of the armies (such as the fraction of the artillery park that was smoothbore) and even more than this there's a generalized assumption that the weapons of the war were the Enfield and the Springfield. But even mid-war the Union was relying on smoothbores and on imported Austrian rifles as much as imported Enfields and new-built Springfields, and it's only in 1864 that you can really say definitely that the Union has standardized on .577 and .58 rifles such as the Enfield and Springfield. Similarly the repeaters barely showed up at all, because production was minimal, and the oft-quoted numbers (e.g. for the Henry or the Spencer) are total production including postwar.

How this shows up is that people talk about "rifle fire" in 1862 battles, where in fact the correct term is probably "musketry".



The other one to mention is the idea that the Union "had one hand behind its back". This is true if one looks solely at the fact that the Union did not have total mobilization of adult males (which is what the original quote comes from, it was that a university could still have a boat race IIRC), but in terms of industrial capacity or finance or the like it's pretty clear the Union is under severe strain for much of the war.
 

Japhy

Banned
His acceptance of the nomination repudiated the peace plank, so functionally yes.
Which was a ploy to have it both ways. Lincoln was correct that there was no way McClellan could have continued the war had he been elected on the backs of the Copperhead movement.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Which was a ploy to have it both ways. Lincoln was correct that there was no way McClellan could have continued the war had he been elected on the backs of the Copperhead movement.
Um... why not?

It's the only time in history the DNC didn't make their nomination final, which suggests they didn't think he was their ideal candidate to say the least (but they did think he was a popular one, indeed many who did not vote for McClellan did so because of the VP pick, Pendleton, who was a Peace Democrat), and once in office it's McClellan's discretion as to whether to fight to the finish or not.
 
The other one to mention is the idea that the Union "had one hand behind its back". This is true if one looks solely at the fact that the Union did not have total mobilization of adult males (which is what the original quote comes from, it was that a university could still have a boat race IIRC), but in terms of industrial capacity or finance or the like it's pretty clear the Union is under severe strain for much of the war.

Given the stakes of the war, it would have been either really eccentric or really incompetent of Lincoln not to get the Union's other hand out, at least after the first few engagements when it became clear that the war wasn't going to be over quickly.
 

Japhy

Banned
Um... why not?

It's the only time in history the DNC didn't make their nomination final, which suggests they didn't think he was their ideal candidate to say the least (but they did think he was a popular one, indeed many who did not vote for McClellan did so because of the VP pick, Pendleton, who was a Peace Democrat), and once in office it's McClellan's discretion as to whether to fight to the finish or not.
The DNC nomination being finalized was due to the fact that War Democrats who were leaving the party blocked the approval as a spite move actually.

McClellan himself came out against the platform but did nothing else besides, and willingly allowed the Democratic Party to run an Anti-Emancipation Anti-War campaign. While candidates of the era didn't actively campaign on the road they did exert influence on the direction that the campaign was worked on, McClellan's in action being a sign of culpability that everyone at the time recognized as a move for the negotiated settlement peace plan. Had he been elected on such grounds the popular will which was essential to continue the war would have been gone, that would have been reflected in the Union Armies while on the other hand the Confederate Forces would have seen a drastic downturn in desertions because triumph was in sight. Politically and Militarily there would have been no way to continue the fight without men or the funds that Peace Democrats would have denied.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Given the stakes of the war, it would have been either really eccentric or really incompetent of Lincoln not to get the Union's other hand out, at least after the first few engagements when it became clear that the war wasn't going to be over quickly.
Oddly enough the main objection to doing that was cost - that's why recruiting was closed in 1862, the problem was money, and it's why there's a dearth of small arms in early 1862 (when every man they can arm is going to the front) but a surplus in mid 1862 (when there's 300,000 small arms stockpiled including about 100,000 "good rifled arms"). It's also probably why there was a troops crisis in mid-1862, with nobody really willing to send McClellan anything at all as reinforcements.

McClellan himself came out against the platform but did nothing else besides, and willingly allowed the Democratic Party to run an Anti-Emancipation Anti-War campaign. While candidates of the era didn't actively campaign on the road they did exert influence on the direction that the campaign was worked on, McClellan's in action being a sign of culpability that everyone at the time recognized as a move for the negotiated settlement peace plan.
How would McClellan have done otherwise? He was still a serving military officer at the time, remember, resigning on election day, and wasn't a party higher-up (he was functionally a popular outsider with the D party designation) so couldn't really exert much influence on them.


Had he been elected on such grounds the popular will which was essential to continue the war would have been gone, that would have been reflected in the Union Armies while on the other hand the Confederate Forces would have seen a drastic downturn in desertions because triumph was in sight. Politically and Militarily there would have been no way to continue the fight without men or the funds that Peace Democrats would have denied.
With the new Congress not taking office until March I'm not sure there would have been a huge funds problem - if they turn off the money tap right then there's still a massive advantage around Richmond and the CSA is collapsing. But that assumes that there's a massive Peace Wave putting McClellan into office, where it's more likely that what would put McClellan into office is simply his relative popularity compared to Lincoln. (Even a 5% swing to McClellan, which repeated nationally would put him into office, would put the popular vote totals even for President, and if repeated for the Democrats would (e.g.) flip four seats out of nineteen in Ohio and 0 out of 3 in California - for which we have data - and would thus increase the Democratic bench from this sample from 2/22 to 6/22).

Of course, none of that really affects the salient point, which is that McClellan did repudiate the peace plank and there's nothing about his professional life that suggests he would do otherwise as a President. He did after all fight the Confederacy, and prioritized reunifying the country over other things.
 
Um... why not?

It's the only time in history the DNC didn't make their nomination final, which suggests they didn't think he was their ideal candidate to say the least (but they did think he was a popular one, indeed many who did not vote for McClellan did so because of the VP pick, Pendleton, who was a Peace Democrat), and once in office it's McClellan's discretion as to whether to fight to the finish or not.

For once I agree with you, by 1865 the war will be all but over whether Lincoln is re-elected or not. McClellan is going to spend the time between the election and his inauguration making clear to the South that he won't give up on the South giving up independence and Lincoln will try to step things up further. The CSA would have a temporary bump in morale after Lincoln's loss but it would go away with disappointment. I can't see how the CSA could hold Atlanta much longer than slightly after the election.

Most likely Sherman is at or near the Atlantic Coast by the time Mac is inaugurated and he isn't going to end the war when it is on the verge of being won and go down in US history as the man who lost the Union. He is going to tell Sherman to keep going and take credit for winning a war that was all but won before he was sworn in. In my TL I kill off little Mac before he is sworn in so that Pleasanton would take over.
 
Oddly enough the main objection to doing that was cost - that's why recruiting was closed in 1862, the problem was money, and it's why there's a dearth of small arms in early 1862 (when every man they can arm is going to the front) but a surplus in mid 1862 (when there's 300,000 small arms stockpiled including about 100,000 "good rifled arms"). It's also probably why there was a troops crisis in mid-1862, with nobody really willing to send McClellan anything at all as reinforcements.


How would McClellan have done otherwise? He was still a serving military officer at the time, remember, resigning on election day, and wasn't a party higher-up (he was functionally a popular outsider with the D party designation) so couldn't really exert much influence on them.



With the new Congress not taking office until March I'm not sure there would have been a huge funds problem - if they turn off the money tap right then there's still a massive advantage around Richmond and the CSA is collapsing. But that assumes that there's a massive Peace Wave putting McClellan into office, where it's more likely that what would put McClellan into office is simply his relative popularity compared to Lincoln. (Even a 5% swing to McClellan, which repeated nationally would put him into office, would put the popular vote totals even for President, and if repeated for the Democrats would (e.g.) flip four seats out of nineteen in Ohio and 0 out of 3 in California - for which we have data - and would thus increase the Democratic bench from this sample from 2/22 to 6/22).

Of course, none of that really affects the salient point, which is that McClellan did repudiate the peace plank and there's nothing about his professional life that suggests he would do otherwise as a President. He did after all fight the Confederacy, and prioritized reunifying the country over other things.


Also the chances of Congress cutting off funds with an army on the field is near zero. That didn't happen even in Vietnam.
 
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