1978: both of the US' largest comic book publishers, Marvel and DC, are in serious trouble.
Rising costs and falling sales have pushed both companies into the red. The price of paper has gone up even faster than inflation. Artists and writers are becoming restive, demanding more creative control, more autonomy -- and more money. Meanwhile, newsstand sales have been declining; comics are competing with glossy magazines that are giving (relatively) higher profits to the retailer, so there's a natural tendency to squeeze them into less display space or eliminate them altogether. (1)
OTL, Marvel and DC both managed to survive, though just barely. DC's strategy was simple but effective. In the so-called "DC Implosion" of late 1978, DC drastically downsized its line. By concentrating on a handful of flagship titles (Superman, Batman, etc.) and ditching a lot of interesting but less profitable magazines, DC was able to staunch the flow of red ink and survive, though at the cost of losing market share to Marvel.
The story of Marvel's survival is more complex. First, Marvel bet heavily on the emerging comics store market. Specialty comics stores had only existed since 1973; in 1978, they accounted for only about 5% of comics sales. By 1988, that figure was over 70%. Newsstand sales continued to crash through this same period, but it didn't matter, because comic shops more than took up the slack. It wasn't that comics shops sold more comics -- they didn't -- but they paid for all the comics that they bought (as opposed to newsstands, which would return unsold comics for credit), and they also allowed the publishers direct access to a fan base that would buy a variety of spinoff products that would be harder to sell in a traditional comic book outlet. (2)
Marvel also accomplished a minor revolution in distribution. Until 1978, most Marvel distribution had been done by a single "middleman" monopoly between publisher. Beginning in '78, Marvel threw open the distribution market, allowing anyone who could buy $3,000 worth of comics to become a distributor. This set off a vicious but efficient scramble for market among hundreds of new market entrants, with the
short-to-medium term result of pushing Marvel comics into hundreds of new outlets. (3)
Marvel also benefited from DC's strategy. Marvel's newly appointed Editor-in-Chief Jim Shooter had been having problems with newly truculent writers and artists, and there had even been threats of a walkout. The DC Implosion threw dozens of creators out on the streets, allowing Marvel to hire good talent on the cheap, lowering costs and (for a little while) shutting down the threat of a management-creator confrontation.
Finally, three bits of random chance. One, Jim Shooter turned out to be a uniquely competent manager, able to keep costs down without (too much) alienating competent talent, while aggressively pursuing market share. (4) Two, Marvel had more or less accidentally picked up the comic book rights to George Lucas' first _Star Wars_ film. Unexpectedly, the Star Wars comics were a huge hit, providing Marvel with a desperately needed infusion of cash in 1977-8, just when it was needed most. And three, in 1978 the most popular comic book of the next 25 years was just coming on line: Chris Claremont and John Byrne's New X-Men. Over the next couple of years, rising sales of the X-Men would be the locomotive pulling Marvel back into the black.
And by the early '80s, Marvel was not only in the black but riding high; gross sales were still sliding as the newsstand market collapsed, but profits were up, there were more comic book titles than ever, and the quality of the product was noticeably better too. DC, though slower to recover, eventually found its own legs in the comics shop market (and a couple of breakthrough hits with Alan Moore and Frank Miller) and came surging back to profitability too.
But it was a damn'd close-run thing.
So. What if either Marvel or DC -- or both -- had gone belly-up in 1978-9?
(Part 2 in a little bit, but let's see if anyone is interested.)
Doug M.
(1) This was exacerbated by the fact that, to a typical 1970s retailer -- a newsstand or drug store -- comics were a bit of a PITA. Yes, they brought in customers, but mostly kids and adolescents without a lot of spending power. Furthermore, comics buyers tended to silt up in front of the comics rack, blocking traffic flow and making messes of re-arranged comics that the retailer would have to periodically clean up.
(2) Mind, this led to problems of its own. The real price of comics rose much faster than inflation, as lower sales required higher cover prices. To some extent, comics made a deal with the devil in 1978-88, and the bill came due in 1993, when the comics market suddenly and violently collapsed. But that is another story, to be told another time.
(3) But since comic book distribution benefits/suffers from massive economies of scale, the long-term result would be rapid consolidation in the hands of one big distributor. By 1992 Diamond Comics would be doing over 80% of all US comics distribution, and virtually all of Marvel's. This would help set the stage for the collapse of '93; but that is another story, too.
(4) This is not the venue to review the Great Jim Shooter controversy. Short version: the man has a great many detractors, some of whom hate him with the sort of tenacity that only a creator, or a fan, can manage. And there are some good reasons for this. Shooter was not always an easy guy to work for, and he made a lot of controversial decisions. That said, it's pretty clear that he played a key role in pulling Marvel back from the brink.
Rising costs and falling sales have pushed both companies into the red. The price of paper has gone up even faster than inflation. Artists and writers are becoming restive, demanding more creative control, more autonomy -- and more money. Meanwhile, newsstand sales have been declining; comics are competing with glossy magazines that are giving (relatively) higher profits to the retailer, so there's a natural tendency to squeeze them into less display space or eliminate them altogether. (1)
OTL, Marvel and DC both managed to survive, though just barely. DC's strategy was simple but effective. In the so-called "DC Implosion" of late 1978, DC drastically downsized its line. By concentrating on a handful of flagship titles (Superman, Batman, etc.) and ditching a lot of interesting but less profitable magazines, DC was able to staunch the flow of red ink and survive, though at the cost of losing market share to Marvel.
The story of Marvel's survival is more complex. First, Marvel bet heavily on the emerging comics store market. Specialty comics stores had only existed since 1973; in 1978, they accounted for only about 5% of comics sales. By 1988, that figure was over 70%. Newsstand sales continued to crash through this same period, but it didn't matter, because comic shops more than took up the slack. It wasn't that comics shops sold more comics -- they didn't -- but they paid for all the comics that they bought (as opposed to newsstands, which would return unsold comics for credit), and they also allowed the publishers direct access to a fan base that would buy a variety of spinoff products that would be harder to sell in a traditional comic book outlet. (2)
Marvel also accomplished a minor revolution in distribution. Until 1978, most Marvel distribution had been done by a single "middleman" monopoly between publisher. Beginning in '78, Marvel threw open the distribution market, allowing anyone who could buy $3,000 worth of comics to become a distributor. This set off a vicious but efficient scramble for market among hundreds of new market entrants, with the
short-to-medium term result of pushing Marvel comics into hundreds of new outlets. (3)
Marvel also benefited from DC's strategy. Marvel's newly appointed Editor-in-Chief Jim Shooter had been having problems with newly truculent writers and artists, and there had even been threats of a walkout. The DC Implosion threw dozens of creators out on the streets, allowing Marvel to hire good talent on the cheap, lowering costs and (for a little while) shutting down the threat of a management-creator confrontation.
Finally, three bits of random chance. One, Jim Shooter turned out to be a uniquely competent manager, able to keep costs down without (too much) alienating competent talent, while aggressively pursuing market share. (4) Two, Marvel had more or less accidentally picked up the comic book rights to George Lucas' first _Star Wars_ film. Unexpectedly, the Star Wars comics were a huge hit, providing Marvel with a desperately needed infusion of cash in 1977-8, just when it was needed most. And three, in 1978 the most popular comic book of the next 25 years was just coming on line: Chris Claremont and John Byrne's New X-Men. Over the next couple of years, rising sales of the X-Men would be the locomotive pulling Marvel back into the black.
And by the early '80s, Marvel was not only in the black but riding high; gross sales were still sliding as the newsstand market collapsed, but profits were up, there were more comic book titles than ever, and the quality of the product was noticeably better too. DC, though slower to recover, eventually found its own legs in the comics shop market (and a couple of breakthrough hits with Alan Moore and Frank Miller) and came surging back to profitability too.
But it was a damn'd close-run thing.
So. What if either Marvel or DC -- or both -- had gone belly-up in 1978-9?
(Part 2 in a little bit, but let's see if anyone is interested.)
Doug M.
(1) This was exacerbated by the fact that, to a typical 1970s retailer -- a newsstand or drug store -- comics were a bit of a PITA. Yes, they brought in customers, but mostly kids and adolescents without a lot of spending power. Furthermore, comics buyers tended to silt up in front of the comics rack, blocking traffic flow and making messes of re-arranged comics that the retailer would have to periodically clean up.
(2) Mind, this led to problems of its own. The real price of comics rose much faster than inflation, as lower sales required higher cover prices. To some extent, comics made a deal with the devil in 1978-88, and the bill came due in 1993, when the comics market suddenly and violently collapsed. But that is another story, to be told another time.
(3) But since comic book distribution benefits/suffers from massive economies of scale, the long-term result would be rapid consolidation in the hands of one big distributor. By 1992 Diamond Comics would be doing over 80% of all US comics distribution, and virtually all of Marvel's. This would help set the stage for the collapse of '93; but that is another story, too.
(4) This is not the venue to review the Great Jim Shooter controversy. Short version: the man has a great many detractors, some of whom hate him with the sort of tenacity that only a creator, or a fan, can manage. And there are some good reasons for this. Shooter was not always an easy guy to work for, and he made a lot of controversial decisions. That said, it's pretty clear that he played a key role in pulling Marvel back from the brink.