Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?
- Thread starter aaronupright
- Start date
Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area: New Britain and Papua campaigns 1942-43, translated by Steven Bullard (p.73) has the following:
On 19 March 1942, the army chief of staff Sugiyama presented the emperor with an overview of outlying
strategic areas. According to a note in the margin of the original response to a question from the emperor, the
military situation in the Fiji and Samoa area was as follows:
Fijian islands (Viti Levu) (British)
New Zealand troops: 7,000–8,000
Local volunteer troops: 3,000
Approximately 50 aircraft
Samoan islands (New Zealand mandated territory), Tutuila (US territory)
US Marines: 750
Aircraft: 1 (?) squadron
New Caledonia
Troops: approximately 3,000 (said to be an American–Australian garrison, but not confirmed)
Aircraft: approximately 60
Per the New Zealand official histories: http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Paci.html
Only the areas immediately near Suva (about 20sq.km) and between Momi-Lautoka were ever properly defended, with just a handful of coastwatchers patrolling the beaches between those two (about 100-150km of "empty" beaches which would have some potential landing sites). Unless the Japanese do something stupid like sail directly into Suva Bay, they should be able to get a wave of invasion troops ashore at the very least (assuming of course that sufficient air and naval assets are provided as escorts).
Re: SSF, no doubt that it is inadequate.
However the Japanese committed more than 30k troops to Guadalcanal (primarily from Java), which were supplied reasonably well until the attrition of Tokyo Express destroyers crippled them by about November. Obviously for Fiji they would be using cargo ships instead of destroyers and attrition wouldn't take as long to wear the supply "line" out, but at least initially the effort could be maintained. Although it would probably be a case of "run a big convoy once or twice a month, dump the supplies, and get out of there" instead of regular supply, but it would work for a little while. 80% of the supplies delivered to Guadalcanal by the Express went to waste anyway, so it isn't like Japan lacked the food/ammo.
Truk to Nadi 3468km
Rabaul to Nadi 3137km
Auckland to Suva c.2200km
It's still quite a long way.
Agreed, it depends on if we're considering a "Japan MAX" scenario or one with significant losses at Coral Sea or Midway. And what time FS is supposed to occur. I will admit that my TL is close to a 'best case' for Japan, under which Fiji and maybe Samoa are possible (although not especially likely), if we instead look at FS starting in September with two Japanese carriers and the landing force knocked out at Midway then Japan is in for a bloody nose or two.
- BNC
As of that date, 19 April, there were two US infantry Divisions enroute for Australia, which could be diverted, the lead regiments of the 6814 TF and the 1st Marine Div were enroute to the Fiji/Samoa region. By the time the Midway battle is resolved & the FS operation gets underway, even as early as mid July the defense is solidifying. What I'm lacking thus far is the actual air strength at various points. Identifying air groups or squadrons is a partial clue, but there were significant unassigned reserves/replacements enroute March through September & beyond. The attrition of airframes at Henderson field hit 100% by October and beyond in November. That strength was kept up by feeding from a large pool established across the SE Pac.
Further complicating the count for aircrew is that many or most of the squadrons sent or in the PTO were over strength. ie: Torpedo 8 while ashore on Oahu had a entire squadrons worth of aircrew attached. Men from the US shore bases & destined for new squadrons scheduled to stand up June-July. Waldron had over 200% strength to pick from when embarking the aircrew back abroad ship. Post Midway it took about two weeks to stand Torpedo 8 back up with new aircraft & the squadron was rembarked abroad the Saratoga for the S Pac. 'A Dawn Like Thunder' Outlines the entire history of Torpedo 8 pre and post Midway including the three months operating out of Guadalcanal.
This was fairly common at the time. The mass of Naval Reserve pilots called up in late 1940 under the emergency war powers legislation had cycled through some 18 months training, and been joined by several thousand pilots taken in during 1941. Up to half the carrier air crews in June 1942 were reservists and rookies taken on to replace the air crew cycled off to train reservist, rookies, and form new squadrons.
From http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/G/u/Guadalcanal.htm
For August 7:
Efate
16 B-17 Flying Fortress
18 F4F Wildcat
6 scout planes
New Caledonia
22 PBY-5 Catalina
9 B-17 Flying Fortress
10 B-26 Marauder Trained for torpedo attack
38 P-39 Airacobra
16 F4F-3 Wildcat
6 A-28 Hudson
3 scout planes
17 SBD Dauntless
Fiji
6 PBY Catalina
3 Singapore
12 A-28 Hudson
12 F4F Wildcat
12 B-26 Marauder Trained for torpedo attack
8 B-17 Flying Fortress
9 Vincent
Tongatapu
6 scout planes
24 F4F Wildcat
Samoa
17 SBD Dauntless
18 F4F Wildcat
10 scout planes
plus 20 B-17s under MacArthur's command.
Haven't got numbers for crew, but if you know (or can find) the numbers for Guadalcanal then it is probably fair to assume similar proportions on the other islands.
FS after Midway, because of fuel concerns, is probably not going to be launched before September, which is almost certainly too late for any real hope of success. Most of my thinking on the operation comes from what I've been using for my timeline, which assumes a major Japanese win at Coral Sea and no attempt at Midway at all, for a July/August campaign... under that scenario there is enough room for FS to be carried out (albeit resulting in a bloody mess), how much that ability carries through into a post-Midway scenario depends on what assumptions we are using particularly regarding fuel and whether the Allies commit to Watchtower, some other operation like another carrier raid or just focus on Torch. A Japanese best case after Midway probably has just enough room for a possible semi-victory (say, take Efate and Espiritu Santo convincingly) in FS, but it certainly is a lot harder than a Coral Sea POD.
- BNC
Thats about 280 aircraft. Not clear if that is squadron strength or includes reserves. Aircraft enroute might double that, plus anything diverted from that designated for Australia.
My father was a ordnance officer in a B26 squadron in the US at the time. He recalled how that summer they all had to read the books on torpedoes and practice installing the gear for hanging torpedoes in the B26. They excitement died off by the end of summer & they never actually few training with torpedoes. He did not mention if they embarked the torpedo fittings when they embarked for England the following summer.
My father was a ordnance officer in a B26 squadron in the US at the time. He recalled how that summer they all had to read the books on torpedoes and practice installing the gear for hanging torpedoes in the B26. They excitement died off by the end of summer & they never actually few training with torpedoes. He did not mention if they embarked the torpedo fittings when they embarked for England the following summer.
Probablly the best case is Yamamoto is overruled & the FS op goes ahead in June or earlier. The defense is still strong in numbers, but less prepared.
Even in June, you need a multi-division force to take New Cal or Fiji.
Espiritu Santo and Efate could be doable.
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And they don’t have the divisions, the IJA was fully committed in China and getting them to pony up troops for anything else was like pulling teeth.
Sorry I haven’t read your TL but how does a win at Coral Sea butterfly Midway? The Japanese were planning OP MI prior to Coral Sea and assigning CARDIV 5 to MO was almost an afterthought. I have trouble seeing Yamamoto giving up his pet project regardless of what happens at CS.
Basically you have the 17th Army. OTL that with some reinforcements was split between Guadalcanal & New Guinea.
If Yamamoto is 'removed' from the decision loop... Not clear how committed the senior Navy leaders were to protecting their point man.
It is indeed worth underlining here that it is not just logistical issues that make it so difficult to make Japanese troops available for these options, but also, as Zheng says, IJA opposition to the use of its troops on such scale.
Take those 30,000 troops employed at Guadalcanal. If the IJN had approached the Army in early summer and said: "Hey, we need to take this remote jungle-infested island in the Solomons because we think we can build a strategically valuable airfield there - we just need 30,000 of your troops to do it," they would likely have been thrown out of the room. Guadalcanal was instead built up by dribs and drabs, with a regiment here, a brigade there, extracted from the IJA to be fed into the meatgrinder, easier to sell when it became apparent how much the Americans were committing to the battle. Now honor was at stake.
To get the IJA to commit a multi-division force up front for New Cal or Fiji or Samoa - even if you could somehow scrounge up the shipping to a) get them there, and b) keep supplying them - this is going to be much harder.
From what I've seen, there's just a lot of bad intelligence (New Caledonia) and handwavium (Fiji) in the spring articulation of Operation FS. Either it was just assumed that the islands would be minimally defended, or that they'd just be routed in short order anyway. One can't help but feel a strong strain of victory disease in these Japanese plans.
Which of course would not have qualified for "army" status in any Allied table of forces.
Otherwise, yes, you have to extract army units from China, Manchuria, or Japan itself.
IIRC it was around February 1942 the USAAC ordered that any aircraft that could carry a torpedo be tested to do so. The B-26 Marauder carried torpedoes only at Midway and off Alaska although some RAF B-26's used them operationally as well. The B-25 Mitchell was tested and did well but never carried them (they were used for skip-bombing later though). And the A-20 Havoc was tested and apparently also performed well but the weight reduced range enough that it too never was tried operationally.
His service to the country is appreciated. If he was out that way, did he ever talk about the Aussies and the beer tax? Yanks would bring beer, Aussies would refridgerate it in exchange for half, everyone wins?
Geon
Donor
I'm personally wondering about the U.S. reaction on the Homefront. After a major defeat at Midway the representatives and Senators of the West Coast states would be under pressure by their constituents to do something fast. Someone else has already hinted at the fact that the Democratic majority in Congress might be threatened. And maybe Nimitz head isn't on the chopping block but someone else likely is. Knox maybe? Or Spruance? I'm siding with those who see at least a modification of the German First strategy. With first Pearl Harbor and now Midway people will be wondering why we're going after the Axis power that - at the moment - seems least threatening.
On the other hand, foreign policy is precisely the one area where the presidency wields the most power, is most insulated from congressional politics. This is even more true in wartime.
I cannot see FDR being moved off his Germany-First policy - he seems to have been personally committed to it. I *can* see him using congressional agitation against Churchill and the British chiefs to get his preferences to win out in planning. "Look, we either go with a concrete commitment to ROUNDUP in 1943, or I won't be able to resist moving some of these divisions out to the Pacific." He did a fair bit of that sort of thing as it was, and the British were sensitive to the danger.
And of course the administration can hardly just detail what forces it is deploying to the Pacific anyway. Roosevelt might have to make do with a West Coast trip to calm people down, reaffirm his commitment to the defense of the West Coast, Hawaii, and Alaska, etc.
That said, I think others have detailed here some likely, more modest responses: beefing up the Independence CVL program to make up for the lost decks in a speedy way, for example. Maybe you also see more of the fast battleships moved out to EastPac faster. Efforts to reinforce garrisons in the South Pacific (all those destinations aimed at by Operation FS) might get accelerated. All of this is doable without endangering TORCH or ROUNDUP or the bomber campaign.
It is hard to say whose heads could roll, if any. Nimitz was too well liked by FDR (who reached down over the heads of dozens of more senior admirals to name him) to think he would take the hit. Spruance and Fletcher might well be dead in this scenario, but if not, it would be a terrible mistake to nick either of them - especially Spruance. Still, everyone is going to be on a shorter leash now.
Remember, too, that by far the most damage that could be most readily felt in the States was being inflicted on the EAST coast, not the west, at this point in time, thanks to Doenitz's OPERATION DRUMBEAT. Ships were literally being sunk right off major ports, by the score. U.S. authorities could downplay it through censorship, but almost anyone living in those cities had a good idea what was happening.
I'd think it would depend on the state of Midway itself. If, as noted several times in this thread, the US loses the sea battle, but the forces on Midway Island repel a Japanese invasion, the US can spin that as a win... the first time the Japanese have failed to capture something. Since the USN has other assets around, DC can lowkey the losses...
nbcman
Donor
Least threatening? Remember that the Second Happy Time was occurring at this time and there were dozens of merchies being sunk right off the Eastern seaboard. Sorry, even a US loss at Midway wouldn't change the opinion that Germany was the greater threat.