Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

I disagree with the assessment of FS as having a lower chance of success than another attempt on Moresby.

Port Moresby admittedly becomes extremely difficult for the Japanese in August, once [EDIT: 35 and 36] squadrons and the 21st Brigade are deployed there. If the Japanese try it before that with their most likely force structure, they have...a fighting chance, with some luck.

But Operation FS? It could have taken Efate, possibly. Impossible to see how they could go any further. Setting aside their feeble logistics and lack of robust land-based air in the area, they really had no idea how well defended New Caledonia, Samoa, Fiji, and Espiritu Santo were. Fiji was hosting the entire 37th division by June and the 283 Coastal Artillery Battalion by August, on top of the NZ garrison. New Caledonia alone had something like 35,000 troops by midsummer, including the Americal Division, pretty arguably the best division at that time in the entire U.S. Army, backed by land-based air, and on an emminently defensible island almost completely surrounded by massive coral reefs that made amphibious landings almost impossible, save around Noumea. You would need something like Homma's entire Philippine invasion force to even have a chance, and the Japanese simply did not have anything remotely on that scale available (let alone the shipping to get it there and supply it). This is not an op you are staging a few hundred miles off Formosa. It's almost literally on the other side of the world. It's a thousand miles from your nearest air base at Guadalcanal.

Just look at these reefs. New Cal is an amphibious nightmare:

NewCaledonia1.gif


Whereas in OTL, the Japanese with maximum effort could not even evict a single understrength, undersupplied Marine Division from Guadalcanal, a division that had not had months to construct defenses, and with almost no infrastructure to support it.
 
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Hey, the Sikhs were only outnumbered 70:1 (~1,500 Afghan tribesmen vs. 21 Sikhs).

Camaron would be an absolutely epic movie (just the whole Wooden hand pledge alone). Of course the Legion was only outnumbered about 50:1.
And were the Agents of a colonial power against freedom fighter, so it’s problematic.
 
Remember taffy 3, they gave as well as they got.

Oh, absolutely.

But what you want here is a hit-and-run raid force, not a TF providing air cover for an amphibious attack. Speed will be at a premium. I think Nimitz would only consider it as a last resort.
 
IIRC it consumed 8 times the tonnage to ship 1 ton of supplies to the South Pacific from the US as it did to ship 1 ton of supplies to the UK. Shipping through the South Pacific with major IJN carrier forces based at Rabaul will be risky.

IJN could not base carrier forces at Rabaul. It lacked remotely sufficient fuel storage, a ammunition storage depot, and other stores installed. Truk was the nearest viable operational base for the Japanese capitol ships in 1942. Thats why the surface battles were largely fought with cruiser & destroyer flotillas. The Kongo & Hiei were near the limit in sustaining capitol ships that far forward. & they lacked significant ammunition or other necessities to restock at Rabaul. Basically they rendezvoused at Rabaul with the cruiser group then on to raid Guadalcanal. Note that since spring US heavy bombers had been raiding Rabaul from Australia & the forward airfield near Port Morseby. They had sunk several cargo ships in the harbor, set some warehouses on fire, and other wise made it clear anything at the port was at risk. There were plans on the table to build a fuel stooge facility & other accoutrements, but the the IJN had a limited ability to build anything in 1942.

Any IJN carrier forces operating out of range of Truk would require some sort of fleet train, however ad hoc. Cycling oilers back and forth and ammunitions ships with torpedoes & bombs among other things. Maybe the IJN can organize that on a sustained basis in 1942. I don't know.
 
Port Moresby admittedly becomes extremely difficult for the Japanese in August, once [EDIT: 35 and 36] squadrons and the 21st Brigade are deployed there. If the Japanese try it before that with their most likely force structure, they have...a fighting chance, with some luck.

But Operation FS? It could have taken Efate, possibly. Impossible to see how they could go any further. Setting aside their feeble logistics and lack of robust land-based air in the area, they really had no idea how well defended New Caledonia, Samoa, Fiji, and Espiritu Santo were. Fiji was hosting the entire 37th division by June and the 283 Coastal Artillery Battalion by August, on top of the NZ garrison. New Caledonia alone had something like 35,000 troops by midsummer, including the Americal Division, pretty arguably the best division at that time in the entire U.S. Army, backed by land-based air, and on an emminently defensible island almost completely surrounded by massive coral reefs that made amphibious landings almost impossible, save around Noumea. You would need something like Homma's entire Philippine invasion force to even have a chance, and the Japanese simply did not have anything remotely on that scale available (let alone the shipping to get it there and supply it). This is not an op you are staging a few hundred miles off Formosa. It's almost literally on the other side of the world. It's a thousand miles from your nearest air base at Guadalcanal.

Just look at these reefs. New Cal is an amphibious nightmare:

NewCaledonia1.gif


Whereas in OTL, the Japanese with maximum effort could not even evict a single understrength, undersupplied Marine Division from Guadalcanal, a division that had not had months to construct defenses, and with almost no infrastructure to support it.

With the initial landing in the Guadalcanal campaign a surprise landing let US Marines seize the airfield almost immediately. Operation FS would have benefited greatly from that almost complete airfield which worried the Allies enough that Guadalcanal and nearby islands became the target. A disaster at Midway sees that airfield operational for Japan, an equivalent at Espiritu Santo gives them significant reach. More distant islands might then be isolated and reduced accordingly.
 
I think we are past due to study the strength, air and ground, the US and Allies had in this region in June through September 1942. & the reinforcements enroute.
 
Any IJN carrier forces operating out of range of Truk would require some sort of fleet train, however ad hoc. Cycling oilers back and forth and ammunitions ships with torpedoes & bombs among other things. Maybe the IJN can organize that on a sustained basis in 1942. I don't know.

No, this is a good point. Any IJN operation aimed at New Cal, Fiji, or Samoa will have to operate at least 2,300 miles (!) from its nearest fleet base. The only IJN precedents we have for such an op were Midway and Pearl Harbor, and both only had logistics to support very brief times on target. Here, however, you somehow have to provide sustained support of amphibious operations against defended targets over weeks. And you'd be doing it in the teeth of considerable land-based air power, too.
 
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With the initial landing in the Guadalcanal campaign a surprise landing let US Marines seize the airfield almost immediately. Operation FS would have benefited greatly from that almost complete airfield which worried the Allies enough that Guadalcanal and nearby islands became the target. A disaster at Midway sees that airfield operational for Japan, an equivalent at Espiritu Santo gives them significant reach. More distant islands might then be isolated and reduced accordingly.

If we're looking at Espiritu Santo, the Seabees actually won the race against the Japanese team on Guadalcanal, completing the airfield there in late July. Of course, if the Japanese seize it, they can thank the Americans for doing all the hard work!

I admit that with Espiritu Santo, much depends on when the Japanese try to take it. The longer they wait, the harder it gets.

When the Japanese moved into the Solomons and began construction of airfields on Guadalcanal, an Allied air base in an advance area became vital. The choice of Espiritu Santo, 630 miles southeast of Guadalcanal, in the New Hebrides, as a site for a major Army and Navy operating base, brought the U.S. bombers 400 miles closer to the Japanese positions and provided a staging area for the forthcoming Allied invasion of the Solomons. The base provided aircraft facilities capable of supporting heavy bombers, fighters, and two carrier groups; an accumulation of ammunition, provisions, stores, and equipment for offensive operations; repair and salvage facilities for all types of vessels. It became a vital link between Henderson Field on Guadalcanal and the airfields at Noumea and Efate.

Espiritu Santo is the northernmost and largest of the New Hebrides islands. It has an irregular outline, with numerous small islands near its shores. Heavily wooded and mountainous, particularly in the south and west where the highest peak rises to more than 6000 feet, Santo, as it is locally known, is about 75 miles long and 45 miles wide. Like that of Efate, the government is under joint British and French control.

A small reconnaissance party of three men left Efate on June 28, 1942, to find an airfield site closer than Efate to Henderson Field. Espiritu Santo was chosen, and on July 8, a small group of Seabees of the Efate detachment arrived at Santo with a Marine anti-aircraft battery and a company of colored infantrymen to begin work on Turtle Bay airfield.

The Santo pioneers were given twenty days in which to construct the field. They worked day and night, in the race against time. Equipment for heavy grading was not available and they had to make out with six tractors, two scrapers, one grease truck, one gas wagon, three weapon carriers, and one 50-kw generator. Assisting them were 295 infantrymen, 90 Marines, and 50 natives.

A 6000-foot runway was cleared and surfaced with coral in time to met the deadline. On July 28, the first fighter squadron came in and was followed the next day by a squadron of B-17's. The planes were fueled from drums and gave the Japs in Guadalcanal their first big bombing on July 30.

Army Air Force and Marine personnel poured into the island shortly thereafter, and after the Marines landed on Guadalcanal on August 7, the new field at Santo gave vital support to that action.


On August 11, 1942, the 7th Battalion arrived and immediately began construction of more extensive air facilities to support the Guadalcanal campaign. In sixty days, they completed a second fighter strip, 4500 feet by 170 feet, with 7500 feet of taxiways and 60 revetments. They then began work on two fields to support bomber operations.

A runway, 5000 feet by 150 feet, of steel mat on an 8-inch coral base, was constructed on the shores of Pallikulo Bay (Bomber Field No. 1). Working in cooperation with a company of the 810th Army Engineers, the 7th Battalion also cleared, graded, and surfaced with coral a runway of the same dimensions at Pekoa (Bomber Field No. 2).

When the 15th Battalion reached Espiritu Santo on October 13, 1942, they were assigned the complete overhaul of the grading and drainage of Bomber Field No. 1. They also added taxiways, revetments, and a 1,000-foot extension for air transport operation. In similar fashion, they renovated the grading and drainage of the fighter strip, extended its length 500 feet, and provided it with additional taxiways, revetments, and access roads.

The work at Bomber Field No. 2, which had been begun by the 7th Battalion, was also taken over by the 15th. They completed the construction of a 7,000-foot-runway, having a steel-mat surface on coral, and built taxiways, revetments, and miscellaneous structures.​

So if Yamamoto gets there in mid-August, he already is facing a pretty significant land and air garrison. But that is just OTL. The question then would be what else Nimitz might throw in their after losing Midway and realizing that all these islands would now be facing possible attack. He has the entire 1st Marine Division to throw anywhere he wants; and all these islands are close enough to shuttle in aircraft. If Yamamoto is coming in October, then there's even more.

But even if he takes Efate and Espiritu Santo and manages to bridge air units in from Guadalcanal, that just ain't gonna be enough to take New Cal, Fiji, or Samoa, all of which by end of summer had what amounted to multi-divisional garrisons with considerable land-based air power, even if Nimitz doesn't deploy any carrier task forces to defend them. Operation FS was not proposing to employ anything more than a reinforced brigade! They would have one hell of a rude surprise waiting for them, even if they could logistically support such an operation.

A starve 'em out operation is not the sort of operation Japan could readily do. It requires a massive logistical commitment far from its bases. The Midway operation alone, which was a couple weeks of deployment, burned what had amounted to an entire years worth of pre-war fuel usage for the IJN! Now they'd have to fuel and supply ships on station for months on end.

Honestly, I still think Yamamoto's best bet is to try to take Moresby, as quickly as he possibly can (say, in July). Even that would be difficult, but it's doable, and is a reasonable rounding out of the defense perimeter of the Empire. He could try Efate also, perhaps; but it would really be more in the way of a spoiling attack. Anything he sent there would have to be written off within six months: an expendable garrison.
 
Wow, something worse than SEA LION.

Or at least, equivalent.

Or if you want a Pacific war equivalent: Trying to take Oahu in the summer or fall of 1942!

It is not *impossible* that the IJN could take Efate or even Espiritu Santo at this time. But to conquer New Caledonia, Fiji, or Samoa: We really are moving into Unmentionable Sea Mammal territory, I'm afraid. I mean, unless the Allies decide to write these islands off and bug out, which I think is damned unlikely, to put it mildly.

I didn't used to think that, but then I looked under the hood at what Operation FS entailed and the logistics it required, and what the state of garrisons and infrastructure the Allies had in these places, the ease of reinforcement and mutual support, and the whole thing just looked absurd, even without Nimitz committing every hull he had to defending them.

The real problem was that Japan just had little useful intelligence on what the Allies had in these places. If Yamamoto had known, he would have set fire to the entire set of files on the spot.

Bizarre as it sounds, the Japanese would have had a much easier time seizing Darwin in mid-1942 than they would have New Caledonia. (Though to what useful end, I can't imagine.)
 
It is not *impossible* that the IJN could take Efate or even Espiritu Santo at this time. But to conquer New Caledonia, Fiji, or Samoa: We really are moving into Unmentionable Sea Mammal territory, I'm afraid. I mean, unless the Allies decide to write these islands off and bug out, which I think is damned unlikely, to put it mildly.
I wouldn't quite say that. From OTL's Guadalcanal, we can see that Japan did have a few advantages:
- First, they actually had a night fighting doctrine, while at the time the USN didn't: this is the reason Savo Island was a total bloody mess (and if FS is launched, it means Watchtower isn't, and the US hasn't learned the lessons from it)... for the first couple of night battles in the region, Japan is a likely winner.
- Second, this is also the time when Japanese submarines were sinking US ships every other week. Moving the battlefield south isn't going to change that too much, and it is going to mean hell for the Americans moving stuff to F/S/NC.
- Third, Japan's intelligence estimated the Allied strength in Fiji, Samoa and the New Hebrides reasonably accurately (though they were way off with New Caledonia). I think it is a fair assumption that if they do attempt taking the islands, they would send enough forces that they believe they can win (rather than just the South Seas Force as the May plans said).
- Finally, Fiji and Samoa are hardly closer to any "major" Allied bases (Auckland/Brisbane) than they are to Rabaul. Resupplying these places isn't going to be much easier for the Allies than it is for Japan. As it was, maintaining the Fiji garrison was already stretching NZ's resources.

Before about September, the Allied defences on the islands were weak enough that if Japan threw enough men at them, they would have some chance of taking them. Except New Caledonia, which would need an entire corps thrown at it (and that is beyond Japan's capability).

Instead FS' problem comes down to oil - if they do Midway, they probably aren't going to have enough of it to do FS quickly enough to have a reasonable chance of victory (unless they move the fleet south to Truk immediately after hitting Midway, without going back to Japan first). But even so, still easier than the USM. They had (barely) the resources to pull it off, and in July/August the Allied strength in the reason isn't great enough to kill the operation immediately.

- BNC
 
I wouldn't quite say that. From OTL's Guadalcanal, we can see that Japan did have a few advantages:
- First, they actually had a night fighting doctrine, while at the time the USN didn't: this is the reason Savo Island was a total bloody mess (and if FS is launched, it means Watchtower isn't, and the US hasn't learned the lessons from it)... for the first couple of night battles in the region, Japan is a likely winner.
- Second, this is also the time when Japanese submarines were sinking US ships every other week. Moving the battlefield south isn't going to change that too much, and it is going to mean hell for the Americans moving stuff to F/S/NC.
- Third, Japan's intelligence estimated the Allied strength in Fiji, Samoa and the New Hebrides reasonably accurately (though they were way off with New Caledonia). I think it is a fair assumption that if they do attempt taking the islands, they would send enough forces that they believe they can win (rather than just the South Seas Force as the May plans said).
- Finally, Fiji and Samoa are hardly closer to any "major" Allied bases (Auckland/Brisbane) than they are to Rabaul. Resupplying these places isn't going to be much easier for the Allies than it is for Japan. As it was, maintaining the Fiji garrison was already stretching NZ's resources.

Before about September, the Allied defences on the islands were weak enough that if Japan threw enough men at them, they would have some chance of taking them. Except New Caledonia, which would need an entire corps thrown at it (and that is beyond Japan's capability).

Instead FS' problem comes down to oil - if they do Midway, they probably aren't going to have enough of it to do FS quickly enough to have a reasonable chance of victory (unless they move the fleet south to Truk immediately after hitting Midway, without going back to Japan first). But even so, still easier than the USM. They had (barely) the resources to pull it off, and in July/August the Allied strength in the reason isn't great enough to kill the operation immediately.

- BNC

1. Fully conceded on IJN night-fighting doctrine. Of course, for that to come into play, you need a night battle with surface units in the first place...most of the Solomons naval battles were still in the daytime.

2. Yes, indeed, Japanese subs were already probing about in the area by summer. It's a real threat to any U.S. surface groups deployed there. Of course, they are also farther away from resupply than Allied subs are...

3. Do you have some specific sources on Japanese intel on Samoa and Fiji? I don't dispute that they were not as erroneous in their estimates as with New Cal - Japanese subs actually tracked the 37th Division's convoy to Fiji, for example - but what I've read suggests they underestimated these, too.

"I think it is a fair assumption that if they do attempt taking the islands, they would send enough forces that they believe they can win (rather than just the South Seas Force as the May plans said)."

I think this is much more easily said than done. But let's take Fiji for example.

Just to hit the highlights: In June of 1942, the 10,000 man NZ garrison was replaced by the US 37th Infantry Division, a force of about 14,000 men. In addition to this, the US 3rd construction battallion ha also arrived, and about 260 men of the NZ garrison remained behind, along with noteworthy regular and irregular Fijian units. The Kiwis left behind significant fixed coastal and 3.7-inch AA artillery batteries. Fiji had two major airfields with 7,000 ft runways (Nandi and Narewa), and these hosted squadrons of the 42nd bombardment group, equipped at that point wth B-26's. On top of all this, the coral reefs around the main island, Viti Levu, are almost as bad as New Cal - an amphib force is going to have to hit it on the south coast, which of course was also the best defended. And we all know woeful Japanese amphibious doctrine was.

Even without any significant Allied reinforcement or sea opposed defense, I think we can agree that the SSF is going to be woefully inadequate to defeat a garrison like this. You are going to need a multi-divisional force, even if you can get them ashore. Where do you get the troops? Where do you get the shipping? How will you maintain supply at that distance, for what is going to be a campaign leasting at least several weeks, if not indeed months?

4. My quibble about Rabaul is that it cannot be taken as a base equivalent to Auckland or Brisbane. Truk might come close; otherwise, you have to go back to the Home Islands to find a full equivalent.

5. Your point on oil is well taken. I don't disagree that they had the reserves to do some kind of major op that summer; the bigger problem was assembling the kind of tanker train they would need.

Again, I think it is not impossible that with a little luck that they *could* have taken either Moresby, or Efate, and perhaps even Espiritu Santo, especially if US and Australian intel didn't get enough of their traffic to figure it out ahead of time. But I do think anything beyond that was simply a bridge too far for the IJN.
 
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The biggest problem is that there is nothing the Japanese can do to knock the US, Great Britain, or Australia out of the war. There is always another port, another base, or another chain of islands for the Allies to fall back on and every "success" the Japanese achieve after the lock in their initial gains (the Southern Resource Area) means they have a defensive perimeter that is that much bigger and that much harder to defend and that much harder to keep supplied.
 
Do you somehow think the US had no ability to interdict submarine operations off the coast of their major stronghold in the Pacific? You'd lose some ships sure, but convoys would be implemented in rather short order. And the threat is not from above you in the hierarchy, its from some junior officer with a chip on his shoulder and his service pistol or sword, with a better 'idea' about how the war should be run then the real professionals.


Yeah, sub hunting is mainly a DD or DE endeavor in WW2 and the US was cranking them out like crazy.
 
Re: US Ground Forces in South Pacific 1942

Picking through the unit histories in Stauntons OD of the US army in 1942 the following movement in the PTO is revealed. Those marked with a star* were in, near, or enroute to the S Pac before the FS operations kick off.

*102 Inf Reg from US to Bora Bora Jan 42

41stID Departed US Mar 42, arrived Australia May 42

27thID Departed US for Oahu Mar 42

*TF 6814 arrive New Caledonia March/April 42. Designated AmeriCal Div- May 42 wi three inf regiments To Guadalcanal Nov 42

*146 Inf Reg from US to New Zealand May 42, to Fiji July 42,

*24thInf Reg From US to New Hebridies May 42

*24thInf Reg From US to New Hebridies May 42

*37thID Departed US May 42, Fiji June 42

138 Inf Reg from US to Alaska May 42

*32d ID Departed US April 42, arrived Australia May 42, - to New Guinea Sept-Nov 42

24thID @ Oahu to May 43

*146 Inf Reg from US to New Zealand May 42, to Fiji July 42,

53rdInf Reg From US to Alaska Jun 42

58thInf Reg from US to Alaska May 42

40thID Departed US to Hawaii Aug 42

43d ID Departed US Oct 42, to Fiji New Caledonia

25thID @ Oahu to 25 Nov 42, to Guadalcanal

For the US Army thats four Separate Regiments, each with its cannon company of six pack howitzers & company of 37mm AT guns, and Two Infantry divisions counting TF 6814. The Marines had the three rifle regiments of the 1st Marine Division on several island,s along with the artillery & other support scattered about. Parts of the 2d Marine Div arrived during the summer & early autumn.

In simple terms theres the equivalent of four divisions spread across the target area of the FS operation, plus the equivalent of a corps or army combat support echelon in artillery, AAA, light armor ect... Near at hand in Australia theres two more Inf Div for possible reinforcement. In Hawaii or the US theres at least two more.
 
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