Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

What was the total IJN air crew, how many were currenly operating, and how many currently carrier qualed? The.IJN had a fair number of pilots in multi engine squadrons, who are counted for different circumstances. Most of the combat sorties during the Guadlcanal battle or campaign were land based. Which makes a focus on carriers only distorting. But, neither can the numbers be viewed as a homogenous whole.

It's also difficult to separate the action surround Gudalcanal from the battle on & over New Guinea & Rabual that were simultaneus. All three deeply influenced Japanese thinking. Ie: while the air raids on Rabual were relatively lite they did do damage, and we're persistant enough the IJN & IJA had to constantly consider it's perishability as a forward base. That was one of several important points in their decision making August through December.
 
Given a Midway disaster for the USN, The U.S. will not reach parity with the IJN until 1943 according to the figures from Combined Fleet. I would presume this would mean not "turkey shoot" as for one thing Japan still has a lot of her skilled air and maintenance crews. Also, I wonder about the fact that building a new carrier fleet we would have a situation like the 'turkey shoot' in reverse. A lot of trained U.S. airmen with little to no experience against seasoned Japanese air crews. Not a good situation.


Hard to say if a turkey shoot would be in reverse, technology was shifting in the favour of the allies and their pilot training program was solid. Japan was also still going to suffer fuel shortages which would limit the ability of the Japanese fleet to be as active as it would like to be.

My gut feel is that if the US lost badly at Midway it would be looking to operate with the support of friendly airfields, this would constrain its options but their superior ability to build and support airfields would put Japan in a battle of aviation attrition that it was ill suited to wage.
 
Its easy really. The Initial IJA reaction force is the Ichiki Butai of less than 1000 men, which is not available, being dead at Midway. The next available force is elements of 35 inf BDE which is not landed until after Eastern Solomons 24/25 August. Nearly 3 months after Midway.

Ichiki's force would be dead, true (perhaps no great loss where Guadalcanal is concerned), but if indeed Yamamoto has shifted into full-scale FS planning, we cannot exclude that he would have begun a troop buildup in the Rabaul area as prelude to the operation, rebuilding the South Seas Force as necessary. I don't think we can say with confidence that available elements in the area would be the same as in OTL.

Which is plenty of time for Wasp, Sara and possibly RN carriers to redeploy Illustrious is in Ceylon and Victorious on Arctic convoy duties. Now would all of KB sortie after Midway or would it refit and retrain aircrew for what's next. The air groups would be severely depleted and the IJN tended not to merge groups of split Cardiv. Its not a given either way unless you accept that steaming all over, accelerating the need for refit and burning oil, not to mention operational losses to the air wings, is an inherent good.

Running slow transports during the second half of August means running them in the face of Cactus Dauntless with no docks at the far end. Without air cover they are targets, with air cover the carriers are targets and, again, no realistic air warning system on the IJN.

And that's why you do Watchtower if there is a reasonable chance of supporting the Marines ashore. Hell The RN can support Malta for years against greater odds with no chance of sinking Sicily what is the USN a bunch of pussies?

I don't think the "pussies" comment is called for here. As it was in OTL, Vandegrift (no shrinking violet he) and Ghormley were both appalled at the decision to go to Guadalcanal when they learned of it on June 24, because they simply didn't think the Marines and the logistics were ready (which was true in the absolute logistic sense, at any rate, since D-Day had to be moved back from Aug 1 to Aug 7, not least because of that ridiculous Wellington dock workers' strike); Vandegrift felt that months of training were needed in New Zealand, and had not anticipated any offensive action until the new year. In this he was vindicated, when he saw after hitting the beach how inept the patrol patterns his men were doing around the initial perimeter were. The marines would have to learn on the job, unfortunately, and they did; but I also think Vandegrift (proud as he was of his marines) would be the first to tell you that it was more surprise and Japanese ineptitude that kept the command alive in those first weeks.

But the more important point here is the posture of King and Nimitz, and what we can discern of what *they* (not I) would do here. Before Midway, all of King's efforts were directed to the buildup of forces in the islands securing the main lines to Australia and New Zealand, shipping 56,000-man garrison forces (41,000 Army; 15, 000 Marines) to New Cal, Fiji, Samoa, and Efate between January and May (most of them actually not arriving until May, giving King great anxiety). While the Solomons was part of the planning for an axis of advance from the start (even in early February, King was urging a garrison at Efate, as "it will serve to deny a stepping stone to the Japanese if they moved South from Rabaul, New Britain," and provide a strong point "from which a step-by-step general advance could be made through the New Hebrides, Solomons and Bismarcks." (a) COMINCH, letters, FF1/A16-3/F-1, Ser 00105 of 18 Feb 1942), the really decisive move by King for Guadalcanal did not come until after Midway, with King's famous June 24 memo - when what was about to become WATCHTOWER was seen as a way of *keeping* the initiative in American hands after its great victory, rather than *seizing* it away from the Japanese.

In fact, in May MacArthur and King had discussed the possibility of sending a Marine battalion to destroy the Japanese base being built at Tulagi. This was seen as a raid rather than a garrison. But on June 1, three days before Midway, King backed away from the plan as too risky (CinCPac ltr to CinCSWPA, 28May42 (located at NHD)). He decided that the force was not big enough, even for a raid in force.

In a scenario where Nimitz has just lost three fleet carriers and the Kido Butai remains intact (albeit presumably with ravaged air crews) it is hard to see how you get the shift you see in King's stance in June. Rather, in OTL, it was clearly done in reaction to what had happened in the battle at Midway. If the Japanese juggernaut is still rolling, it seems far more likely that the pattern of January-May continues to assert itself: Continue the buildup of American forces in the islands of Melanesia against any further Japanese advance (hopefully now with Somerville's fast carrriers in hand), which now would be more likely than ever.
 
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Hope to have Shattered Sword this weekend and this may give a more concise number

Parshalls claims 3,700. Close enough for citation since he went to Japanese source documents. USN numbers for PACFLT after the Midway Massacre of our naval aviation was about 1,800. That ramps up rapidly to about 5,000 by end of 1942, but the Allies were outnumbered, outplaned and out qualitied during AIRSOLS initial battles.
 
P.S. Since we were talking earlier about the reployment of Somerville's fast carriers to the SE Pacific to assist Nimitz after the defeat at Midway, I did uncover this fascinating item over at the Hyperwar archives, which indicates, to my surprise, that MacArthur and King(!!!) both were actually advocating this move even before Midway:


General MacArthur, after the 8 May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea, which had luckily turned back the Japanese Port Moresby Invasion Group, joined forces with the Navy Planners in plugging for stronger action in the Pacific. His despatch of 23 May 1942 read in part:

Lack of sea power in the Pacific is and has been the fatal weakness in our position since the beginning of the war.
Continuing, he was so bold as to suggest that the Indian and Atlantic Oceans be stripped of sea power so as to combine British and American naval strength and to overwhelm the Japanese Navy:

Much more than the fate of Australia will be jeopardized if this is not done. The United States will face a series of such disasters. (Australia DIspatch 199)
This despatch struck a responsive note with Admiral King since an appreciation of the realities of sea power was not always displayed by Army Planners at lower levels in Washington. The next day, 24 May 1942, Admiral King sent to General Marshall a paper which he proposed should be transmitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this paper, Admiral King stated that the Japanese were devoting "practically their entire naval strength, plus a great part of their air and army strength for offensive action against the Australia-Noumea-Fiji-Samoa-Hawaii-Alaska line."( Proposed JCS Memo to CCS, 24 May 1942.) Admiral King included among his recommendations that air strength in the Pacific be increased as rapidly as possible and that the British Eastern Fleet be moved to Colombo as soon as practicable, for concentration in the Fiji-Australian area by 1 July 1942. (COMINCH to COMNAVFOREUR Ser 100046 of Jun 1942.)

Any time Admiral King felt it necessary to call in the British Navy to shore up the United States Navy in its own bailiwick, the long reaches of the Pacific, one could surmise that he considered the situation bordered on the desperate.
No kidding.

I think we can take the reployment of Formidable and Indomitable (and perhaps even Warspite) to Nimitz's neck of the woods after a Midway defeat as basically a guarantee at this point. With the example of Victorious giving signs of how they might be used, if the Japanese gave Nimitz the luxury of time in reworking them in this way.
 
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Also, I wonder about the fact that building a new carrier fleet we would have a situation like the 'turkey shoot' in reverse.
The turkey shoot happened because of a lot of factors, of which experience was fairly minor really. American training programs were vastly superior to the Japanese, so the floor of the new pilots was higher. In addition, the US Navy had started the war with aircraft that were about as good as the IJN's, and by later in the war were signficantly superior, and the deployment of AA proximity fuses meant that US anti-aircraft fire was far more useful than it had been early.

So no, there won't be a reverse turkey shoot. At worst you'll have a roughly even battle. At best the problems plaguing the IJN will continue to get worse as the war progresses, especially if they throw away a lot of war materiel on some stupid offensive after winning at Midway.
 
P.S. Another helpful item from hyperwar: I had been trying to track down something online (my books being all in storage) for sourcing on Samoa's garrison in the summer 1942, since I already had New Cal and Fiji. And sure enough, they offer a short precis. A key excerpt:

More than 10,000 Marine ground troops were stationed in the Samoan area by the beginning of June, and reinforcements arrived in a steady flow. Marine air was also well established. General Larsen's interest and pressure assured that Tutuila's airfield was ready for use on 17 March, two days before the advance echelon of MAG-13 arrived. The new air group, organized on 1 March at San Diego, was earmarked for Price's command. Initially the group commander, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Walker, Jr., had only one tactical squadron, VMF-111, operating from Tutuila's airfield, but VMO-151, a scout-bomber squadron, joined in May with the arrival of the 3d Marine Brigade convoy. The amphibians of the Navy's VS-1-D14 squadron were also put under Walker's command and sent forward to operate from Upolu and Wallis while the airfields projected for those islands were rushed to completion by naval construction battalions.​

More at the link.

Samoa looks almost as formidable to any Japanese amphibious attack as Fiji does. This reinforces my conviction that the absolute limit for Operation FS, with some lucky breaks, is no further than Efate.
 
Parshalls claims 3,700. Close enough for citation since he went to Japanese source documents. USN numbers for PACFLT after the Midway Massacre of our naval aviation was about 1,800. That ramps up rapidly to about 5,000 by end of 1942, but the Allies were outnumbered, outplaned and out qualitied during AIRSOLS initial battles.

Cheers McP
 

Geon

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If I may I'd like to do a quick recap based on what everyone has said here. Consider this an unofficial TL.

  1. The naval battle of Midway ends with the sinking of the U.S. carriers Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown. Owing to their proximity to Midway most of the pilots and their planes are able to reach the island so experienced pilots are for the most part not lost.
  2. The invasion of Midway occurs on June 8th. It is a bloody debacle for the Japanese. Their troops are slaughtered as they come on shore. Eventually the order is given to withdraw but the IJA has just suffered a major loss.
  3. Footage from the battle is rushed back to Hollywood by director John Ford who was on the island at the time of the attack. Within 3 months The Battle of Midway is playing in major theaters. The film is a masterpiece of "honest" propaganda in that it admits the losses of the carriers but plays them down to show that Midway Island is still held and was not another Wake Island.
  4. President Roosevelt asks Churchill to send one of his carriers from the Mediterranean into the Pacific to aid the USN. He hints that if the British are unable to supply a carrier it could mean the U.S. might have to "revise" somewhat their Europe-First strategy. After nearly choking on his cigar Churchill agrees.
  5. Admiral Yamamoto launches Operation FS but it is a revised version that is more limited in scope. It takes some of the original objectives including Port Moresby. New Guinea now belongs to the Japanese, However they are very overextended.
  6. After some heated debate in Washington WATCHTOWER goes ahead as scheduled with the British carrier Illustrious, and the American carriers Saratoga and Wasp.
  7. WATCHTOWER goes ahead as it did in OTL. Henderson Field is captured on schedule.
  8. Battle of Savo Island. Admiral Mikawa successfully destroys the cruiser force just as he did in OTL. But decides to take a further chance and attacks the transports sinking them and supplies for the invasion force.
  9. The Japanese on Guadalcanal eventually retake Henderson Field, albeit with bloody losses. The Marines are pushed back into the jungle and are forced to await resupply.
  10. Guadalcanal becomes the focal point instead of Midway for the decisive naval/air/ground battles of the war. Both sides send reinforcements and the battle becomes a bloody one of attrition that highly favors the U.S.N.
 
battleline had been worked over.

In Zimm's Attack on Pearl Harbor, he talks about the prioritization of targets. The Val dive-bombers first priority was carriers, if in port, and then cruisers. With no carriers being present, you would have thought that the Val's would have decimated the USN cruiser force. Instead, they decided to attack the USS Nevada, which they couldn't really harm, go figure.

I mean would any self-respecting Japanese pilot make it all the way to Pearl and waste his ordnance load on a secondary target?
 
President Roosevelt asks Churchill to send one of his carriers from the Mediterranean into the Pacific to aid the USN. He hints that if the British are unable to supply a carrier it could mean the U.S. might have to "revise" somewhat their Europe-First strategy. After nearly choking on his cigar Churchill agrees.

It's unlikely that Roosevelt would request, or Churchill would accede to, a Brit carrier in the Med, where it would be desperately needed in the summer of 1942. In any event Illustrious at the time was supporting the invasion of Madagascar, not in the Med. (She would join the Eastern Fleet later in the summer.)

It does seem more likely, though, that the British would send both of its fast carriers (Indomitable and Formidable) to Nimitz - as King was requesting already in May - with Illustrious coming up in their wake to replace them.
 
It's unlikely that Roosevelt would request, or Churchill would accede to, a Brit carrier in the Med, where it would be desperately needed in the summer of 1942. In any event Illustrious at the time was supporting the invasion of Madagascar, not in the Med. (She would join the Eastern Fleet later in the summer.)

It does seem more likely, though, that the British would send both of its fast carriers (Indomitable and Formidable) to Nimitz - as King was requesting already in May - with Illustrious coming up in their wake to replace them.

Who commands them? Somerville has just demonstrated that he is "unlucky" off Sri Lanka.
 

CalBear

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In Zimm's Attack on Pearl Harbor, he talks about the prioritization of targets. The Val dive-bombers first priority was carriers, if in port, and then cruisers. With no carriers being present, you would have thought that the Val's would have decimated the USN cruiser force. Instead, they decided to attack the USS Nevada, which they couldn't really harm, go figure.
This was not the Japanese attack plan.

The Japanese Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3 (issued on 23 November 1941) Specifies that the first attack units first group were to limit targets to "four aircraft carriers and four battleships" with the rest of the 1st wave assigned to attack Ford and Wheeler Fields (no cruisers were to be targeted by the 1st Wave). The 2nd Wave was to the remaining airfileds and hangers remaining undamaged afyer the first strike, the next group was to attack "four or five enemy carriers" (the Japanese literally had no idea how many carriers were at Pearl, in point of fact at the time of the attack the USN only had a total of seven full sized carrier in commission, and one of them (Hornet) was still working up) and then, only if insufficient targets were available were cruisers and battleships (in that order) to be targeted.
 
This was not the Japanese attack plan.

The Japanese Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3 (issued on 23 November 1941) Specifies that the first attack units first group were to limit targets to "four aircraft carriers and four battleships" with the rest of the 1st wave assigned to attack Ford and Wheeler Fields (no cruisers were to be targeted by the 1st Wave). The 2nd Wave was to the remaining airfileds and hangers remaining undamaged afyer the first strike, the next group was to attack "four or five enemy carriers" (the Japanese literally had no idea how many carriers were at Pearl, in point of fact at the time of the attack the USN only had a total of seven full sized carrier in commission, and one of them (Hornet) was still working up) and then, only if insufficient targets were available were cruisers and battleships (in that order) to be targeted.

ARTICLE

One further aspect of Japanese RI (radio intercept analysis) against Hawaii occurred in late 1940 as the U.S. Army Signal Corps was testing a new speech-scrambler system for radio telephone calls between Honolulu and San Francisco. Designed by AT&T, this A-3 device was already in use between Washington and U.S. embassies in Europe. When the scrambler was turned on for the test, an operator in Japan broke in and asked if something was wrong with the channel, because Tokyo could not understand the voice transmission between the two American terminals. This indicated that the Japanese PT&T Ministry was monitoring calls between Honolulu and the United States.19

If that did not set off alarm bells within the US command element in Hawaii that Pearl Harbor was a target then what did it take?

What the Americans knew or found out subsequently at the time.

From HYPERWAR

This monograph is a collection of pertinent Navy Orders and Directives, Combined Fleet Orders, and Carrier Striking Task Force Orders concerning the Pearl Harbor operation. Since all copies of these orders were destroyed prior to the end of the war, they have been reconstructed from personal notes and memory.

In editing, explanatory footnotes were added when deemed necessary.

19 February 1953

The point is that not even the Japanese know for sure what the texts of the op-orders were.
 
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CalBear

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ARTICLE



If that did not set off alarm bells within the US command element in Hawaii that Pearl Harbor was a target then what did it take?

What the Americans knew or found out subsequently at the time.

From HYPERWAR



The point is that not even the Japanese know for sure what the texts of the op-orders were.
The multiple surviving officers interrogated after the war did. It is, I suppose, possible that they got together and decided to tell the same lie just for shits & giggles, but I'm willing to bet the under on that one.
 
The multiple surviving officers interrogated after the war did. It is, I suppose, possible that they got together and decided to tell the same lie just for shits & giggles, but I'm willing to bet the under on that one.

One of them was Fuchida... He was a grand liar on a grand scale. I have to consider the MANY known examples of captured enemy personnel from WW II gilding the lily.


Now the Japanese may have defective memories or they may have honestly misremembered or they were relying on their memories years after events. BUT if the US forensics were as bad for reconstructing their actions and recortds as it turned out for Halder and his gang of cutthroats?
 
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One further aspect of Japanese RI (radio intercept analysis) against Hawaii occurred in late 1940 as the U.S. Army Signal Corps was testing a new speech-scrambler system for radio telephone calls between Honolulu and San Francisco. Designed by AT&T, this A-3 device was already in use between Washington and U.S. embassies in Europe. When the scrambler was turned on for the test, an operator in Japan broke in and asked if something was wrong with the channel, because Tokyo could not understand the voice transmission between the two American terminals. This indicated that the Japanese PT&T Ministry was monitoring calls between Honolulu and the United States.19

Triva note. This was the same system the Germans hacked shortly after it was installed. While the nature of the traffic between Washington & the US required skilled analysis to use Hitlers ego was stroked with regular summaries of the 'conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill'. I have to wonder is there any evidence the Germans loaned Japan anything they could use to penetrate the AT&T A3 system?
 
Who commands them? Somerville has just demonstrated that he is "unlucky" off Sri Lanka.

That's harder to say.

All King asked for was the ships. (I tend to suspect that Somerville will remain behind with the Eastern Fleet, though. Maybe it's just Boyd?)
 
Triva note. This was the same system the Germans hacked shortly after it was installed. While the nature of the traffic between Washington & the US required skilled analysis to use Hitlers ego was stroked with regular summaries of the 'conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill'. I have to wonder is there any evidence the Germans loaned Japan anything they could use to penetrate the AT&T A3 system?

They may have. I have to look at my sources.
 
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