Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

The difficulty I have here is that your treatment, taken on its face, suggests that Mikawa should never been ordered down into the Slot in the first place. At least not under those conditions, with Fletcher's carriers still at large.

He should not have been. When Goto tried it again, look at what happened to him. And that result was without carriers.

Savo Island was a lot of Allied bad luck and a bad allied admiral (Richmond Kelly Turner). Eerily similar to a situation off Santiago de Cuba on 3 July 1898, where the two guys in local charge, Sampson (sea) and Schafter (land) left the Blue Force spinning its screws and utterly confused. That time, a leader, Schley, disobeyed orders and charged recklessly into battle and won. Turner (sea) and Vandegrift (land) , were at loggerheads 8-9 August 1942 and managed to mistime another commanders meeting to iron their differences out. The Blue Force captain's call pulled Crutchley, too, away from his post, so there was nobody, like a Schley, (Crutchley was a hero of Narvik.) to watch the situation while the idiots in charge held their argue fest about unloading the transports.

Captain Bode, (USS Chicago Actual) the guy left holding the bag in Crutchley's absence, was no Schley. Based on his earlier actions 31 May-1 June in the IJN attack on Sydney Harbor, he, Bode, should have been summarily relieved and sent home to be reassigned. It would have saved his life and career. He was ashore during the IJN minisub attack on Sydney. When he returned to the ship, he accused his ship's officers of being drunk and of them firing wildly and blindly into Sydney Harbor. He threatened courts martials and summary reliefs. They, the Chicago's command group, were proved correct in their actions, by the Australians, when they confirmed USS Chicago successfully engaged a Japanese X-craft and spoiled its attack. Strange violent temperamental unstable man was Bode. He was obviously not up to the pressures of a major command and was a poor decision maker, proved to be no trainer or manager of men and he was a BAD ship's captain. He shot himself on 19 April 1943 after a board of inquiry was about to find him culpable for his "bizarre" (As in orders he issued that had Chicago running away from enemy contact.) actions during the Savo Island action.

Poor Chicago, unlucky ship. Never got a chance to right herself before Rennell Island.
 
He should not have been. When Goto tried it again, look at what happened to him. And that result was without carriers.

OK. Fair enough. Your position makes more sense to me now.

Your assessment of Turner is seconded. Reading Black Shoe Carrier Admiral was a real eye opener for me on him. The entire unloading operation was a real amateur hour from start to finish.
 
I suspect that was a significant underestimate on their part.

But then again, it could well be that 1.2 million tons to supply Oahu could turn out to be, too.

I don't think so: the distance across the Sea of Japan was not so great, meaning that cargo could be ferried quickly and the ships would immediately be free to transport something else. Furthermore, such calculations are relatively simple and the Japanese spent over a decade planning for that eventuality. (As an aside, the final plan that Hirohito signed off on before America's oil embargo forced the IJA to jettison any funny ideas about Siberia involved ~50% more personnel than the one mentioned above, so the shipping requirement would be correspondingly greater.)
 
I don't think so: the distance across the Sea of Japan was not so great, meaning that cargo could be ferried quickly and the ships would immediately be free to transport something else. Furthermore, such calculations are relatively simple and the Japanese spent over a decade planning for that eventuality. (As an aside, the final plan that Hirohito signed off on before America's oil embargo forced the IJA to jettison any funny ideas about Siberia involved ~50% more personnel than the one mentioned above, so the shipping requirement would be correspondingly greater.)

I'm sure they planned extensively. My suspicion is just that they likely underestimated usage rates of munitions in war time with Soviet forces. Lord knows, the Germans did.
 
Why limit yourself to that war? ;)
It does tend to be a thing in pretty much every modern war, in fairness to the militaries involved they tend to know they need more munitions procured in peacetime but politicians tend to favor buying impressive things like planes,tanks,ships,etc.and not things like spare parts and shells.
 
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Why limit yourself to that war? ;)

You want a war where everyone screwed up logistics estimates. Try the Spanish American War. The USN sails into battle with 60% of their authorized war-shots loaded and half EMPTY powder magazines (no propellant) and NO TORPEDOES at all.

The Spaniards are even worse. Needed 15 kilometers of copper wire to set up command detonation mines at Manila Bay. Montojo stole that wire off a telegraph run from Manila to Dagupan.

Then because someone forgot to order India rubber or soft lead from the British, the covers on the mines were not properly sealed when deployed. That probably saved the USS Olympia because the mine all set in place and timed to sink her, went off prematurely and fizzled.

Want to hear about the defective ammunition delivered to Dewey?
 
The problem is that Mikawa had the golden opportunity - many transports still heavily loaded and the troops ashore desperately in need of those supplies (although they did take quite a bit from the garrison; if that had been destroyed the US forces would have been in a serious situation). Later on there will be fewer transports to catch and many will be partly or totally unloaded, the US forces will not be as bad off.

Time is not on Japan's side here...
There was still the Eastern Group and HMAS Australia in the anchorage. The transports were not completely undefended. After wiping out the Northern Group Mikawa had to regroup, he’d suffered damage, expended torpedoes and ammo and he didn’t know what else was in the area.
 

Geon

Donor
There was still the Eastern Group and HMAS Australia in the anchorage. The transports were not completely undefended. After wiping out the Northern Group Mikawa had to regroup, he’d suffered damage, expended torpedoes and ammo and he didn’t know what else was in the area.

Mikawa still had some things going for him. He had a numeric advantage in fighting ships. None of his ships were damaged to the point of being unable to fight. And, assuming a Midway success he may have believed at least that the Americans wouldn't risk their remaining carriers this far out. That last is not the best of assumptions, but Mikawa had the advantage at this point. And a Midway victory might have given him the initiative to press it.
 
Mikawa didn’t know he had an numerical advantage. At the time they thought the US occupation of Guadalcanal was a raid. Mikawa said after the war that he was following current IJN doctrine that transports only sail in the bubble created by naval power. If the enemy naval power is destroyed then the transports will go away. However the transports showed they were of sterner stuff.
 
There was still the Eastern Group and HMAS Australia in the anchorage. The transports were not completely undefended. After wiping out the Northern Group Mikawa had to regroup, he’d suffered damage, expended torpedoes and ammo and he didn’t know what else was in the area.
Plus a fair few destroyers as were in the anchorage well with several of them being the USN'S 16 torpedo tube DDs and while the USN's torpedoes had problems that many fish in the water would almost certainly ensure a few them would both hit and explode.
 
And a Midway victory might have given him the initiative to press it.
A Midway victory would cancel Watchtower. The USN well understood the power of US Army politics after the absurdly dangerous ‘Through-ticket’ to Manila War Plan Orange in the early 20’s when the Navy wanted to write off the PI and the Army went WTF. Watchtower was to keep the Navy out of MacArthurs hands. Any threat to Hawaii would put the South West Pacific on hold. At least the Army already acknowledged that it required the Navy to hold Hawaii.
 
Plus a fair few destroyers as were in the anchorage well with several of them being the USN'S 16 torpedo tube DDs and while the USN's torpedoes had problems that many fish in the water would almost certainly ensure a few them would both hit and explode.
The DDs hadn’t covered themselves in glory so far. Let Mikawa in unobserved and IIRC one may have torpedoed Canberra blue-on-blue.
 
The DDs hadn’t covered themselves in glory so far. Let Mikawa in unobserved and IIRC one may have torpedoed Canberra blue-on-blue.
I knew about the first(which was in large part due to not enough DDs being assigned to cover the approaches), the second not so much. But they did have amble capabilities to in theory redeem themselves if it had they had been forced to engage.
 
A Midway victory would cancel Watchtower.

It's really hard to believe otherwise.

But with the situation as it was OTL on August 7-9, I think there was a good argument for Mikawa making either decision.
  • To leave after thrashing Crutchley was defensible: He could not account for Fletcher's carriers, and being in the slot in daylight presented a real risk of serious air attack from Fletcher's TBD's. He needed at least three hours to regroup his forces and reload torpedoes; he was low on shells, and yes, he couldn't be sure there were not other major Allied surface units lurking in the immediate vicinity. Staying on to play with house money is how the house typically wins its money back, after all. And Mikawa also knew full well how precious Japan's heavy cruisers were. It had invested enormously in them before the war, in a way that no other naval power had (and blowing past Treaty limits in the process); it had a total of 18 at the beginning of the war, and zero prospect of replacing any of them. It had already suffered the loss of one and crippling of another at Midway. They were a precious and finite resource. When he left the Slot at high speed on December 9, he had the satisfaction of knowing he was bringing every one of them out intact after an overwhelming naval victory. (What happened when he got to Rabaul is another story, of course.)
  • On the other hand, it is easy to understand why Mikawa faced so much criticism in the months afterward from other Japanese officers (to say nothing of the typical consensus of American naval historians in the years since war - not that they are always right, either), especially once they understood better how deeply committed the Americans were to prevailing at Guadalcanal, and how difficult it turned out to be to find another moment of such vulnerability of the American force at Guadalcanal to exploit. I do think that if you are Mikawa and you are going to take the risk of going down to sink the transports off the beach, you have to have already decided in your mind that the loss of most of your command, including those precious heavy cruisers, is worth it. And while I am not sure I can remove the benefit of hindsight from my calculation, I tend to think losing them was worth it. Lose those transports and you not only lose the 7th Regiment, and not only all the supplies remaining on board, but also the Americans' only available means of resupplying Vandegrift over the next few weeks. It is hard to see how Vandegrift can keep from being overrun in those circumstances. That being the case, that kind of setback to U.S. plans in the South Pacific seems worth the sacrifice to me.
(For the record, which can't be used too carelessly here, Japan would lose three heavy cruisers in the Guadalcanal Campaign, and of course would go on to lose all the rest by war's end, including Takao and Myoko sitting crippled in drydock on VJ Day.)

But I'm under no illusions that it isn't a hefty price to pay for that win. I just think the Japanese have to fight with higher risks at that point (so long as they do so intelligently).
 
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It is hard to see how Vandegrift can keep from being overrun in those circumstances.

Its easy really. The Initial IJA reaction force is the Ichiki Butai of less than 1000 men, which is not available, being dead at Midway. The next available force is elements of 35 inf BDE which is not landed until after Eastern Solomons 24/25 August. Nearly 3 months after Midway.

Which is plenty of time for Wasp, Sara and possibly RN carriers to redeploy Illustrious is in Ceylon and Victorious on Arctic convoy duties. Now would all of KB sortie after Midway or would it refit and retrain aircrew for what's next. The air groups would be severely depleted and the IJN tended not to merge groups of split Cardiv. Its not a given either way unless you accept that steaming all over, accelerating the need for refit and burning oil, not to mention operational losses to the air wings, is an inherent good.

Running slow transports during the second half of August means running them in the face of Cactus Dauntless with no docks at the far end. Without air cover they are targets, with air cover the carriers are targets and, again, no realistic air warning system on the IJN.

And that's why you do Watchtower if there is a reasonable chance of supporting the Marines ashore. Hell The RN can support Malta for years against greater odds with no chance of sinking Sicily what is the USN a bunch of pussies?

Midway as a model is misleading. Every admiral knows what happened to Bismarck Prince of Wales and Repulse. If you get caught in daylight with no air cover you are likely dead.

Unless the emergency reaction force sent from Rabaul under the command of the Admiral Commanding 8th Fleet afloat on hearing the news of the US invasion suddenly develops a comprehensive knowledge of the future course of the campaign ( and what he knows about Midway OTL is moot, he saw nothing) he is hanging round in the dark trying to reload with an unknown force ahead of him and daylight coming.
 
Its easy really. The Initial IJA reaction force is the Ichiki Butai of less than 1000 men, which is not available, being dead at Midway. The next available force is elements of 35 inf BDE which is not landed until after Eastern Solomons 24/25 August. Nearly 3 months after Midway.

Which is plenty of time for Wasp, Sara and possibly RN carriers to redeploy Illustrious is in Ceylon and Victorious on Arctic convoy duties. Now would all of KB sortie after Midway or would it refit and retrain aircrew for what's next. The air groups would be severely depleted and the IJN tended not to merge groups of split Cardiv. Its not a given either way unless you accept that steaming all over, accelerating the need for refit and burning oil, not to mention operational losses to the air wings, is an inherent good.

Running slow transports during the second half of August means running them in the face of Cactus Dauntless with no docks at the far end. Without air cover they are targets, with air cover the carriers are targets and, again, no realistic air warning system on the IJN.

And that's why you do Watchtower if there is a reasonable chance of supporting the Marines ashore. Hell The RN can support Malta for years against greater odds with no chance of sinking Sicily what is the USN a bunch of pussies?

Midway as a model is misleading. Every admiral knows what happened to Bismarck Prince of Wales and Repulse. If you get caught in daylight with no air cover you are likely dead.

Unless the emergency reaction force sent from Rabaul under the command of the Admiral Commanding 8th Fleet afloat on hearing the news of the US invasion suddenly develops a comprehensive knowledge of the future course of the campaign ( and what he knows about Midway OTL is moot, he saw nothing) he is hanging round in the dark trying to reload with an unknown force ahead of him and daylight coming.

With regards to Aircrews my understanding is that the IJN had amassed a pool of 4000 deck landing trained pilots by 1942 (at lot of those would be 'wasted' in the attritional battles verses the USN, USAAF and Commonwealth air forces in 43 and 44)

So aircrew numbers for the IJN should not be a major issue unless those deck qualified pilots are similarly 'expended'.

Hope to have Shattered Sword this weekend and this may give a more concise number
 
With regards to Aircrews my understanding is that the IJN had amassed a pool of 4000 deck landing trained pilots by 1942 (at lot of those would be 'wasted' in the attritional battles verses the USN, USAAF and Commonwealth air forces in 43 and 44)

So aircrew numbers for the IJN should not be a major issue unless those deck qualified pilots are similarly 'expended'.

Hope to have Shattered Sword this weekend and this may give a more concise number

That sounds a lot when there were only around 600 ship based slots (inc catapult aircraft) at the start of the war and 1800 total A/C> whole war the IJN trained around 18,000 pilots. As it is they were debarking carrier pilots to fight the solomons battles ( in part because of the longer ranged Zeros on the carriers admittedly)

But the point remains the USN alone was training 10,000 pilots in 42 and 20,000 in 43. Plus the AAF plus the RAAF ( who train more pilots whole war than the IJN). You want to start the attritional battles as soon as because you are setting up for an attritional war and the other guys is not. Knocking them back early means they never get the chance to adjust. Both the UK and US were assuming a long war so in 42 ( for the US) were still in the process of mobilising both Germany and Japan had to win in a short war because they were never going to be comparatively stronger than they were at the start and had foregone future training for current strength to get to that.

The Japanese strategic concept depended on the USN following The Script in the Pacific and presenting itself for destruction while the IJN was at its comparative strongest. Then seeking peace cos stuff.


Order Kaigun now, or in the black Friday Sales once you read Shattered Sword it becomes inevitable.

Then Stahel; Barbarossa, Kiev, Moscow, Typhoon, Retreat from Moscow is due out about now.
 

Geon

Donor
Given a Midway disaster for the USN, The U.S. will not reach parity with the IJN until 1943 according to the figures from Combined Fleet. I would presume this would mean not "turkey shoot" as for one thing Japan still has a lot of her skilled air and maintenance crews. Also, I wonder about the fact that building a new carrier fleet we would have a situation like the 'turkey shoot' in reverse. A lot of trained U.S. airmen with little to no experience against seasoned Japanese air crews. Not a good situation.
 
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