Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

Well if he goes after the transports he gets some as the others presumably scatter but that requires 20/20 hindsight. At the time Mikawa has very limited knowledge of what is going on or US intentions and has just won a signal victory. The US forces have been ashore for 24 hours which is plenty of time to have unloaded everything valuable. So he sinks some transports.

The risk if there are carriers ( and unless the USN has provided no air cover at all there will have been yesterday) nearby is his CA will get caught in daylight for sinking some transports that may or may not be loaded.

On my understanding, though, his fear of American carriers was probably secondary in the decision. The time needed to reload tortpedo tubes after the battle worried him (he was low on shells, too), requiring such time that they'd have to stick around through daylight.

But the whole point of the op was to go in and get those transports. Which he now had the chance to do. Had he proceded immediately, without torpedoes, he would be taking a calculated risk that there were no more surface combatants of note in the Slot, and that you won't get dunked on in daylight on the way out. But I think this is the kind of risk that Japanese commanders have to take at this point. And after all, you just blew up a whole squadron of Allied heavy crusiers - what else do you really think is going to be standing in your way?
 
About. In fact, if that calculation is accurate it would be 50% more than the IJA General Staff's 1941 estimate for the needs of supplying 22 divisions in a war with the USSR across the Sea of Japan (800,000 tons).

I suspect that was a significant underestimate on their part.

But then again, it could well be that 1.2 million tons to supply Oahu could turn out to be, too.
 
I'm not blaming the Japanese, I'm blaming the intellectually lazy historians who continue to parrot that nonsense. Another myth that drives me bat shit is the notion that Nimitz committed everything he had at Midway. He didn't, he committed his three operational carriers and sufficient cruisers and destroyers to escort them and that's it and because he needed to commit. The US Pacific Fleet had other cruisers and destroyers that were not assigned to the Midway operation because they were conducting other missions like escorting convoys to Hawaii and the South Pacific. Essentially Nimitz understood the principle of Economy of Force better than Yamamoto.

1. Convoy from the US sea frontier to the Hawaiian Islands.
2. Lack of fast tanker support.
3. Battleships too slow for tactical speed, so no need for support squadrons deployed forward. They work as a rear guard.
4. Cover forces for Alaska came from Nimitz's force pool.
 
Athelstane said:

That sounds not too far off. That would be something like one fifth of the whole, right?

About. In fact, if that calculation is accurate it would be 50% more than the IJA General Staff's 1941 estimate for the needs of supplying 22 divisions in a war with the USSR across the Sea of Japan (800,000 tons).

Since I did those calculations as part of (in addition to the other guy whose name I cannot remember, I wanted to check and see if his numbers were good.) and for ...Those Marvelous Tin Fish: The Great Torpedo Scandal Avoided, I think the turnarounds and the sheer travel times indicated show just how difficult logistics in the Pacific War was. I never understood how anyone could expect Australia to be physically invaded.
 
Well, we can forget about American Pacific offensives in '42 and for most of '43 as well. Presume all 3 carriers are sunk. Saratoga, Wasp and Ranger are the only carriers left in the US Fleet, and the later two are in the Atlantic. Maybe they both get sent to the Pacific a bit earlier.

I suppose the focus of the later part of 1942 becomes the defence of Hawaii and proetcting the SLOCs to the West Coast.

How would the eventual USN offensive occur, in this TL? Would RN try and take the offensive in the Far East to relieve the pressue on the Americans.

This PoD alone, and its ramifications, would be worth a combined effort by some of the best logistical-military minds here.
 
On my understanding, though, his fear of American carriers was probably secondary in the decision. The time needed to reload tortpedo tubes after the battle worried him (he was low on shells, too), requiring such time that they'd have to stick around through daylight.

But the whole point of the op was to go in and get those transports. Which he now had the chance to do. Had he proceded immediately, without torpedoes, he would be taking a calculated risk that there were no more surface combatants of note in the Slot, and that you won't get dunked on in daylight on the way out. But I think this is the kind of risk that Japanese commanders have to take at this point. And after all, you just blew up a whole squadron of Allied heavy crusiers - what else do you really think is going to be standing in your way?

He was low on fuel. He burned a lot more oil than he expected on his speed run.
 
3. Battleships too slow for tactical speed, so no need for support squadrons deployed forward. They work as a rear guard.

Actually this raises an interesting question I've just thought about: Would Nimitz have sent fast battleships with TF-16 and 17 if he had had them available - I mean, for AA defense purposes?

USS North Carolina was actually only a few days out from Pearl Harbor on June 4 (arriving June 10), and USS Washington arrived just several weeks later. Both were used to cover Fletcher's carrier force at Gaudalcanal at various points, so Nimitz was clearly willing to use the fast battleships to provide AA defense for his carriers that summer.

If he had - and I think he might have - I don't think this would have been a violation of economy of force on his part, but a recognition of the scarcity of his carriers as his most important resource, and the fast battleships as a critical means of securing that scarce resource. Whereas all of Yamamoto's battleships brought to Midway did was to just circle around and burn oil.
 
He was low on fuel. He burned a lot more oil than he expected on his speed run.

I'd need to see that quantified.

If he literally did not have enough fuel to do more than turn around and go back to Rabaul, then it's a no brainer.

If he had enough for even several more hours of ops in Ironbottom Sound, then I think it was a risk he had to take.
 
Actually this raises an interesting question I've just thought about: Would Nimitz have sent fast battleships with TF-16 and 17 if he had had them available - I mean, for AA defense purposes?

USS North Carolina was actually only a few days out from Pearl Harbor on June 4 (arriving June 10), and USS Washington arrived just several weeks later. Both were used to cover Fletcher's carrier force at Gaudalcanal at various points, so Nimitz was clearly willing to use the fast battleships to provide AA defense for his carriers that summer.

If he had - and I think he might have - I don't think this would have been a violation of economy of force on his part, but a recognition of the scarcity of his carriers as his most important resource, and the fast battleships as a critical means of securing that scarce resource. Whereas all of Yamamoto's battleships brought to Midway did was to just circle around and burn oil.

North Carolina did not arrive in PH on 10 June, she transited the Big Ditch along with the carriers Wasp and Long Island on some destroyers on 10 June but I do agree with you, if she had been available, she would have been with the carriers at Midway.
 
Submarine war. That is about the best the USN can do until the new fleet is built and trained.

Actually, following up on my last post, I have a hypothetical:

Working from the premise that a) Mikawa had a very reasonable chance of destroying most of the TG 62.1 convoy transports had he proceeded south after dropkicking Crutchley's heavy cruisers, and b) eliminating the TG 62.1 transports has a very good chance of dooming Vandegrift's entire ground force on Guadalcanal to destruction...

And, further, let us concede that by sticking around until dawn turning Turner's transports into coral reefs results in a lot of Mikawa's cruisers being sunk or crippled under air attacks in the morning daylight - hey, maybe they run out of fuel! - on the return trip up to Rabaul...

If you are Yamamoto and you have a chance to trade Goto's Cruiser Division 6 (Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa) for the entire American garrison and most of its transports on Guadalcanal, do you make that trade? Is it worth it?

(I am well aware of how few heavy cruisers Japan had at this point, and that it was not in a position add any new ones for the balance of the war, so this is not a question I ask lightly.)
 
North Carolina did not arrive in PH on 10 June, she transited the Big Ditch along with the carriers Wasp and Long Island on some destroyers on 10 June but I do agree with you, if she had been available, she would have been with the carriers at Midway.

Mea culpa: You are right, I misread the timeline. She only got there a week later.

I hadn't offered a position on this, actually, but now that I think about, I think it's probable that Nimitz would have sent them along for AA cover.
 
The Japanese were also starting to feel the fuel pinch at that point in the war and more than once in the second half of 1942 it impacted their operations.

Yes, but I have never read that fuel considerations were a major factor in Mikawa's decision that night.

But if someone has info that they were....
 
I'd need to see that quantified.

If he literally did not have enough fuel to do more than turn around and go back to Rabaul, then it's a no brainer.

If he had enough for even several more hours of ops in Ironbottom Sound, then I think it was a risk he had to take.

He had to make a night speed run to pull out of expected US airpower anti-ship strike radius.

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Maybe a lot of the rank and file and the IJA were kept in the dark about the USN's now proven ability to wreck Japanese surface action groups through aircraft carrier aviation, but Mikawa was senior enough to know about Midway and what happened to Nagumo and Kurita. he could not afford the risk to be caught in daylight under US bombers that far from his own friendly air-cover. Based on what he knew; he really thought he had no choice.
 
Actually, following up on my last post, I have a hypothetical:

Working from the premise that a) Mikawa had a very reasonable chance of destroying most of the TG 62.1 convoy transports had he proceeded south after dropkicking Crutchley's heavy cruisers, and b) eliminating the TG 62.1 transports has a very good chance of dooming Vandegrift's entire ground force on Guadalcanal to destruction...

And, further, let us concede that by sticking around until dawn turning Turner's transports into coral reefs results in a lot of Mikawa's cruisers being sunk or crippled under air attacks in the morning daylight - hey, maybe they run out of fuel! - on the return trip up to Rabaul...

If you are Yamamoto and you have a chance to trade Goto's Cruiser Division 6 (Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa) for the entire American garrison and most of its transports on Guadalcanal, do you make that trade? Is it worth it?

(I am well aware of how few heavy cruisers Japan had at this point, and that it was not in a position add any new ones for the balance of the war, so this is not a question I ask lightly.)

Asked, but what if Mikawa guesses wrong and Norm Scott with the eastern force racing in from the Sealark Channel post facto catches him Winchester? It is never a sure thing. And if Fletcher is there at dawn, Nimitz will shrug his shoulders and say; "We lost the screen but we kicked open the door to Rabaul."
 
[snip]If you are Yamamoto and you have a chance to trade Goto's Cruiser Division 6 (Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa) for the entire American garrison and most of its transports on Guadalcanal, do you make that trade? Is it worth it?

I vote yes. Of course this just prolongs the war, it won't win it for Japan.
 
He had to make a night speed run to pull out of expected US airpower anti-ship strike radius.

View attachment 502366


Maybe a lot of the rank and file and the IJA were kept in the dark about the USN's now proven ability to wreck Japanese surface action groups through aircraft carrier aviation, but Mikawa was senior enough to know about Midway and what happened to Nagumo and Kurita. he could not afford the risk to be caught in daylight under US bombers that far from his own friendly air-cover. Based on what he knew; he really thought he had no choice.

The difficulty I have here is that your treatment, taken on its face, suggests that Mikawa should never been ordered down into the Slot in the first place. At least not under those conditions, with Fletcher's carriers still at large.

While it's true that Mikawa took the daylight air threat very seriously, even pausing as he did off Kieta on the morning of Aug. 8 could not eliminate the necessity of making the final run down the slight for hours before dusk; or likewise, that he would have to make some part of the trip back to Rabaul in daylight the next morning while also within (probable) range of U.S. dive bombers. The risk of American daylight air attack could be reduced, but it could not be eliminated, either on the journey down, or the journey back north.

Mikawa's orders were to "attack and destroy enemy transports in the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area." But it was also anticipated that he would likely have to battle Allied surface units while doing so, as the IJN had plenty of intel that there were such units present off Guadalcanal/Tulagi. In short, these risks were part of the operation.
 

Geon

Donor
Actually, following up on my last post, I have a hypothetical:

Working from the premise that a) Mikawa had a very reasonable chance of destroying most of the TG 62.1 convoy transports had he proceeded south after dropkicking Crutchley's heavy cruisers, and b) eliminating the TG 62.1 transports has a very good chance of dooming Vandegrift's entire ground force on Guadalcanal to destruction...

And, further, let us concede that by sticking around until dawn turning Turner's transports into coral reefs results in a lot of Mikawa's cruisers being sunk or crippled under air attacks in the morning daylight - hey, maybe they run out of fuel! - on the return trip up to Rabaul...

If you are Yamamoto and you have a chance to trade Goto's Cruiser Division 6 (Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa) for the entire American garrison and most of its transports on Guadalcanal, do you make that trade? Is it worth it?

(I am well aware of how few heavy cruisers Japan had at this point, and that it was not in a position add any new ones for the balance of the war, so this is not a question I ask lightly.)

Yamamoto was a gambler. I believe he would have considered the trade well worth it if it means the American's lose their foothold on Guadalcanal. That further delays any plans the Americans have.
 
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