Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

And don't forget Nimitz was willing to lose all three carriers, if he could sink three Japanese. Its less of a risk than it appears. The US knows close enough when the IJN will arrive. The IJN plan assumes the US will only sortie after they have attacked Midway. The US has a lot of land based recon to find them first and knows the general direction to look in. It can broadcast findings while the Carriers remain silent while the Japanese are dependent on limited ship based recon initially looking in the wrong direction. If the US carriers detect first the lessons of the pre war exercises and war to date are that the first strike will kill at least one enemy carrier and at any point the US have the option that if detected then can retire, there is nothing inherently valuable about Midway itself.

"And don't forget Nimitz was willing to lose all three carriers, if he could sink three Japanese." That *would* have been a tradeoff worth making, from Nimitz's perspective!

He was surely pinching himself afterward that he had sunk all four Japanese flattops, at such a low cost.

It was a risk for Nimitz, but as Nimitz said, it was a *calculated* risk. Having the air reconn capability off the atoll itself was a big advantage right there: Fletcher could have the atoll's assets do the searching without revealing his own location.

The truth is, even a more middling result would have been a win for Nimitz - say, trading Nagumo a couple decks of each. Something still quite possible and perhaps likely (just looking at the results of the carrier battles around the Solomons) even if McClusky turns the wrong way. Fletcher and Spruance still would have had enough intact squadrons to mount another attack had the first one failed, and they would at least know where Nagumo was by that point.

Probably more at the impossible end. Its a shipping consideration the IJN does not have the sealift, and the prospectus of the plan does not initially call for rapid expansion of the defensive perimeter so they will be going back to the IJA and demanding more troops they cannot shift around to do something they never thought they needed to do 6 months ago.

Well, sealift is another discussion altogether. Though a discussion that must be had, no question. I am merely saying that an infantry brigade fortifying Saipan or Tarawa with the luxury of time is more valuable to the survival of the Empire than one battling down the Yangtze valley.

Sealift would limit what was possible, but there was enough of it to reinforce many of those islands more than Japan actually did.

Basically in order to stop the Americans we have just said we have to attack or we lose China, we have to lose China.

I would not go that far. Whatever you take from China will still be a relatievly small share of the whole. It could limit offensive ops by the Kwangtung Army. but we are not talking abandoning much of anything in China.

In the end, though, China does not have the ability in 1941-45 to destroy Japan. But the United States does.

Perhaps they should have thought about that a little more objectively before deciding to go to war with it.
 
If I were Tojo I would be agreeing with Athelstane's assessment. Right now the British aren't a major threat, the majority of their forces are tied up in Europe.

As we have discussed here in a number of threads, Britain and its empire did have the ability to defeat Japan by itself, but it would have taken a good deal longer and cost it more, even after Germany was defeated.

America, however, was a genuine 800 lb gorilla pretty much from the start. A gorilla that would be several times more beefy by the end of 1943.

But yes, Tojo and most of the leadership in Tokyo really seems to have thought we'd do a deal after getting roughed up a little. They bet their entire empire and even their way of life on that belief, and they lost. This was not going to be a rerun of its wars with China and Russia.
 
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It's not only moving troops out of China to various island atoll's but also supplying them. And Japan was short of shipping before the outbreak of war. Every additional island and every increased garrison means more supply runs to the outlying outposts of the Empire, with increased losses from US subs and aircraft. And at some point things will snafu badly.
 

Geon

Donor
Talking of things going badly snafu I'd like to point out that we are assuming from this point on the U.S. will to coin a euphemism here "roll all sixes" from now on. There's still a lot of chances for things to go against the U.S. and further embolden Japan. Example: The U.S. proceeds with Watchtower and then has to deal with an Iron Bottom Sound and Battle of Guadalcanal which costs it more ships including possibly another carrier. The U.S. is going to have a long road ahead of it to victory here. And any further carrier losses are going to further delay a U.S. push. One other thing, there won't be a Marianas Turkey Shoot. Remember, that Japan lost its most skilled airmen and sailors at Midway. One of the reasons for the success of the "Turkey Shoot" was that most of the air crews the Japanese had now were green and relatively untested. I would think we are looking at a long bloody slog for the U.S. to Tokyo, more so then in OTL.
 
While the IJN lost a significant number of aircrew at Midway (approximately 110), the Solomons campaign was the real 'money pit' for the IJNAF. Between combat and operational losses, the IJNAF lost over 1000 aircraft and most of their aircrew during the campaign.

If this Midway POD occurs and no Operation Cartwheel and the rest of the Solomons Island campaign, the USN is going to face a pretty formidable foe when they do begin their offensive operations. It's just a question of where.
 

CalBear

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Talking of things going badly snafu I'd like to point out that we are assuming from this point on the U.S. will to coin a euphemism here "roll all sixes" from now on. There's still a lot of chances for things to go against the U.S. and further embolden Japan. Example: The U.S. proceeds with Watchtower and then has to deal with an Iron Bottom Sound and Battle of Guadalcanal which costs it more ships including possibly another carrier. The U.S. is going to have a long road ahead of it to victory here. And any further carrier losses are going to further delay a U.S. push. One other thing, there won't be a Marianas Turkey Shoot. Remember, that Japan lost its most skilled airmen and sailors at Midway. One of the reasons for the success of the "Turkey Shoot" was that most of the air crews the Japanese had now were green and relatively untested. I would think we are looking at a long bloody slog for the U.S. to Tokyo, more so then in OTL.
Aircrew losses at Midway were quite moderate. While there were the losses suffered during the various strikes the aircrew were the first off the damaged carriers after the Emperor's Portrait.

As an example, in Shattered Sword, the authors list, by name, all the IJN fighter pilots and their post battle status. Of 71 listed personnel 17 were KIA and 1 was WIA. Some 3/4 of the fighter pilots lived to fight another day. The percentage is virtually the same for attack aircraft, the Authors do not list them in the same easily reviewed single page fashion, but does list the fate of each aircraft/crew. Of 480 air crew, some 370 survived the battle and returned home (roughly 2/3 of the losses were gunners or radio operators). Losses were very substantial among maintenance personnel, which would have serious impacts on readiness down the road, but the pilot losses should have been manageable.
 
Aircrew losses at Midway were quite moderate. While there were the losses suffered during the various strikes the aircrew were the first off the damaged carriers after the Emperor's Portrait.

As an example, in Shattered Sword, the authors list, by name, all the IJN fighter pilots and their post battle status. Of 71 listed personnel 17 were KIA and 1 was WIA. Some 3/4 of the fighter pilots lived to fight another day. The percentage is virtually the same for attack aircraft, the Authors do not list them in the same easily reviewed single page fashion, but does list the fate of each aircraft/crew. Of 480 air crew, some 370 survived the battle and returned home (roughly 2/3 of the losses were gunners or radio operators). Losses were very substantial among maintenance personnel, which would have serious impacts on readiness down the road, but the pilot losses should have been manageable.

And this was the difference between the losses on the IJN Carriers (heavy losses of aircraft maintenance personnel due to the nature of the damage) and the Yorktown's and Hornets later sinking - total losses from the Ships companies were 141 and 140 respectively (out of 2200 each) and I believe that this includes aircrew losses (?)

So assuming that the 3 Yorktown are sunk with similar losses then its likely that the majority of the 3 crews would survive to fight another day.
 
It's not only moving troops out of China to various island atoll's but also supplying them. And Japan was short of shipping before the outbreak of war. Every additional island and every increased garrison means more supply runs to the outlying outposts of the Empire, with increased losses from US subs and aircraft. And at some point things will snafu badly.

And that's the kicker. The IJN concept involves having forward bases supplied at ruinous cost in terms of shipping to support flotilla and air forces to attrit the USN. No - one planned for the sealift to support large ground forces or permanent large air bases in the Mandates.

One wonders where they put another BDE on Tarawa but there is a world of difference between supporting a large force much closer to the home islands or PI and a large force in the Mandates where you have to supply everything including water. It basically dies unless you can continually resupply. That far forward to be of use means maintaining an airfield at least or the USN just blockades and occasionally bombs it while the troops turn to cannibalism to survive. Or you sortie into the teeth of the entire USN which basically defeats the object. Unless there is an airfield its just a rock.

The U.S. proceeds with Watchtower and then has to deal with an Iron Bottom Sound and Battle of Guadalcanal which costs it more ships including possibly another carrier. The U.S. is going to have a long road ahead of it to victory here. And any further carrier losses are going to further delay a U.S. push. One other thing, there won't be a Marianas Turkey Shoot. Remember, that Japan lost its most skilled airmen and sailors at Midway.

Not so. They lost the airmen over the Solomons, they lost plane handlers at Midway but the aircrews were taken off, any aircrew losses were in the attacks on the USN. As it is the USN loses Wasp and Hornet off Guadalcanal and is down to One Carrier when E gets damaged. The IJN will be stronger in terms of hulls, in terms of aircrew, not so much.

Which is the reason for Watchtower. Henderson flying B17s is a mortal threat to the IJN position, and McCain knows this. Establish an airbase there and the Japanese have to attack which puts the Mitsubishi and Aichi in a war of attrition with Grumman and Douglas ( and Boeing and all the others) which is exactly what you want them to be in.

If the RN reinforces ( which is OTL just a 6 months later) its just going to bring RN style fighter direction in earlier. Which will apply to Henderson and the US carriers equally.
 
No. Politically impossible, and liable to draw army blades.
It was not impossible at all. Even the Kwantung Army, which was known early on for "bending the rules" or even open defiance of Tokyo, was the greatest victim of redeployments to the Pacific. However, Kwantung Army was only tapped after the China Front's reserve had presumably been exhausted to an uncomfortable degree. From mid 1943, the transfer of divisions (smaller units such as brigades and regiments notwithstanding) went as follows:

From China and Korea:
20th Division
41st "
52nd "
51st \
32nd | ====\
35th | ==== => these four were largely destroyed en-route
43rd /

From Manchuria:
14th
29th
1st
8th
10th
24th
9th
28th
2nd Armored
23rd
12th
71st
11th
25th
57th
1st Armored
111th\
120th|======> To Korea
121st/

Total: 26 divisions

Really it was more a function of IGHQ's vacillation, failure to plan for a long war, and bumbling reactions to Allied counteroffensives than it was inter-service rivalry. With the nation committed to a fight to the end, Army-Navy disagreements were not really a factor on that scale anymore.
 
Given that manpower was becoming a serious issue for the Japanese in the Pacific a question. Could they transfer a division or two from their China front to the Pacific to help bolster their manpower needs and possibly provide the troops necessary to take New Guinea and other islands while turning the Chinese front into a holding action? It would occur to me from the Japanese perspective the Pacific was now the major front.

They drew off the Kwantung Army, which had consequences in 1945. Also the imperial Guards Div was rousted off the parade deck for use in Maylasia. Everytime they reinforced a location it weakend another. & Not on a 1-1 basis. Transporting soldiers reduced supply somewhere.
 

Geon

Donor
Assuming the POD of a complete Japanese naval victory at Midway, and assuming that WATCHTOWER still went ahead with the carriers Wasp and Saratoga. I'd like to pose some questions. It's likely the Battle of Savo Island still takes place here. Admiral Mikawa would have seen this as an even more golden opportunity to bloody the USN's nose. Given he may or may not know that Saratoga and Wasp were in the area would he have been willing to take the chance and attack the transports after finishing off the cruisers? Could the U.S. respond? Finally, assuming loss of some or most of the transports what effect would this have had on WATCHTOWER?
 
Assuming the POD of a complete Japanese naval victory at Midway, and assuming that WATCHTOWER still went ahead with the carriers Wasp and Saratoga. I'd like to pose some questions. It's likely the Battle of Savo Island still takes place here. Admiral Mikawa would have seen this as an even more golden opportunity to bloody the USN's nose. Given he may or may not know that Saratoga and Wasp were in the area would he have been willing to take the chance and attack the transports after finishing off the cruisers? Could the U.S. respond? Finally, assuming loss of some or most of the transports what effect would this have had on WATCHTOWER?

I often felt that if Mikawa knew the carriers were gone (or at least suspected they had) he would have gone for the transports. Unlike Leyte where they'd already been unloaded (so even if Kurita had destroyed them it would have made little difference) here they are still loaded with desperately needed supplies. Their destruction could allow the IJA to assault and retake the airfield. At this point it would be a race to see who could reinforce first, but with Henderson Field not available to the US it could end up a Japanese win.
 
Aircrew losses at Midway were quite moderate. While there were the losses suffered during the various strikes the aircrew were the first off the damaged carriers after the Emperor's Portrait.

As an example, in Shattered Sword, the authors list, by name, all the IJN fighter pilots and their post battle status. Of 71 listed personnel 17 were KIA and 1 was WIA. Some 3/4 of the fighter pilots lived to fight another day. The percentage is virtually the same for attack aircraft, the Authors do not list them in the same easily reviewed single page fashion, but does list the fate of each aircraft/crew. Of 480 air crew, some 370 survived the battle and returned home (roughly 2/3 of the losses were gunners or radio operators). Losses were very substantial among maintenance personnel, which would have serious impacts on readiness down the road, but the pilot losses should have been manageable.

Exactly. People too readily assume that because the carriers sank, all (or most of) the air crews sank with them.

The Solomons was the real meatgrinder for Japanese naval air crews.
 
They drew off the Kwantung Army, which had consequences in 1945. Also the imperial Guards Div was rousted off the parade deck for use in Maylasia. Everytime they reinforced a location it weakend another. & Not on a 1-1 basis. Transporting soldiers reduced supply somewhere.

All true. But given the force structure they had in 1942-45, they really had little choice. Peter is always going to have to be robbed to pay Paul.
 
And that's the kicker. The IJN concept involves having forward bases supplied at ruinous cost in terms of shipping to support flotilla and air forces to attrit the USN. No - one planned for the sealift to support large ground forces or permanent large air bases in the Mandates.

One wonders where they put another BDE on Tarawa but there is a world of difference between supporting a large force much closer to the home islands or PI and a large force in the Mandates where you have to supply everything including water. It basically dies unless you can continually resupply. That far forward to be of use means maintaining an airfield at least or the USN just blockades and occasionally bombs it while the troops turn to cannibalism to survive. Or you sortie into the teeth of the entire USN which basically defeats the object. Unless there is an airfield its just a rock.

It's something of a Hobson's Choice, though. It's what your resources and geography dictate.

You can't build to match the United States (let alone them plus Britain) - not even close.

Japanese political leradership and staff officers knew this, of course. But they were betting so much on getting their Decisive Battle to resolve the imbalance, without consideration for the probability that a power like the U.S. could actually survive losing one decisive battle and come back for another, even stronger (vastly stronger, as it turned out). Which is in effect what happened, after all: Yamamoto destroyed the American battle line at Pearl Harbor, sinking or crippling a lot more tonnage of warships (let alone aircraft) than Togo did at Tsushima. But the Americans just came back with a lot more pistols in their belt and beat the tar out of them at Philippine Sea. Making your real estate as hard to take as possible at least covers your bet to a modest extent.

Actually, come to think of it, you could say that Midway was a Decisive Battle, too, even if not conceived in the Japanese pre-war paradigm (which involved luring the Yankees deep into imperial space to smash them). The American Pacific Fleet at war's outset was so big that Yamamoto really needed two Decisive Battles to destroy it, and only one was successful. And even so, save possibly in cruisers, surprisingly little of that fleet as it existed on Dec. 6, 1941 was actually what was used to destroy the IJN in 1943-45. All those resurrected Pearl Harbor battlewagons at Surigao were heart-warming, but really unnecessary to deal with Nishimura's and Shima's task forces, and of course only two of Mitscher's vast array of fast carriers that thrashed everything from Tarawa to Tokyo were even afloat in 1941.

The Marianas particularly attract my eye, especially because Japan owned them (except Guam) even before the war, and because it was plain as a pikestaff that the United States simply could not go around them on the way to Japan. They could have done a much more thorough job of fortifying and provisioning them, had they started earlier. Now, American war-making power was so powerful that it's really hard to fortify *anything* that we could not have taken, if we really wanted to. But they could have made it take a good deal longer, at a higher price, and that at least buys you time - buys you time before submarine interdiction ratchets up, before American bombing of the Home Islands happens, before, well, an invasion can happen. That's all fortifications really do, of course; buy you time while you try to respond, or your enemy exhausts himself.

Of course, you'd still lose in the end. The only safe move for Japan was not to play. But to me, the failure to build up defenses (and yes, provisions) of some of these islands, especially the absolutely essential ones in the Marianas, looks like a seriously missed opportunity, regardless of what it would take to supply them.
 
Actually, come to think of it, you could say that Midway was a Decisive Battle, too, even if not conceived in the Japanese pre-war paradigm (which involved luring the Yankees deep into imperial space to smash them). The American Pacific Fleet at war's outset was so big that Yamamoto really needed two Decisive Battles to destroy it, and only one was successful. And even so, save possibly in cruisers, surprisingly little of that fleet as it existed on Dec. 6, 1941 was actually what was used to destroy the IJN in 1943-45. All those resurrected Pearl Harbor battlewagons at Surigao were heart-warming, but really unnecessary to deal with Nishimura's and Shima's task forces, and of course only two of Mitscher's vast array of fast carriers that thrashed everything from Tarawa to Tokyo were even afloat in 1941.

There is also the fact that most of the fleet that was sitting in Pearl Harbor did not even get its paint scratched. In reality only 21 ships were sunk or damaged to any degree and that was including a target ship (UTAH) and an ancient minelayer (OGLALA) and a harbor tug. Of the 18 other ships, nine were back in the fleet by February (some sooner) and of the other nine ships sunk or damaged, only two were total write offs (ARIZONA and OKLAHOMA).

This notion that the whole Pacific Fleet got whacked at PH is an annoying little myth.
 
I often felt that if Mikawa knew the carriers were gone (or at least suspected they had) he would have gone for the transports. Unlike Leyte where they'd already been unloaded (so even if Kurita had destroyed them it would have made little difference) here they are still loaded with desperately needed supplies. Their destruction could allow the IJA to assault and retake the airfield. At this point it would be a race to see who could reinforce first, but with Henderson Field not available to the US it could end up a Japanese win.

"I often felt that if Mikawa knew the carriers were gone (or at least suspected they had) he would have gone for the transports."

Oh, almost certainly.

Problem is, Savo Island was right at the outset, before any of the Solomon Islands carrier battles. And he would know that the Americans still had at least two carriers in the theater after Midway, possibly even three.

Now, if you have a surface action after something like Santa Cruz, and you know you've accounted for all American flattops, that would be a different story. And I think that moment would have come, had we done WATCHTOWER after a Midway defeat, because we know what kind of a beating American carriers took in the Solomons: five carriers mission-killed (three sunk) in less than three months.

This is why I tend to think that under these circumstances, Nimitz and King would not have attempted WATCHTOWER. No margin for error. Even with two Brit carriers on hand (and I cannot think they would have been ready to operate with Nimitz's carriers until well after August 8, given how long it took Victorious to get upgraded and up to speed).
 
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Actually, come to think of it, you could say that Midway was a Decisive Battle, too, even if not conceived in the Japanese pre-war paradigm (which involved luring the Yankees deep into imperial space to smash them). The American Pacific Fleet at war's outset was so big that Yamamoto really needed two Decisive Battles to destroy it, and only one was successful. And even so, save possibly in cruisers, surprisingly little of that fleet as it existed on Dec. 6, 1941 was actually what was used to destroy the IJN in 1943-45. All those resurrected Pearl Harbor battlewagons at Surigao were heart-warming, but really unnecessary to deal with Nishimura's and Shima's task forces, and of course only two of Mitscher's vast array of fast carriers that thrashed everything from Tarawa to Tokyo were even afloat in 1941.

There is also the fact that most of the fleet that was sitting in Pearl Harbor did not even get its paint scratched. In reality only 21 ships were sunk or damaged to any degree and that was including a target ship (UTAH) and an ancient minelayer (OGLALA) and a harbor tug. Of the 18 other ships, nine were back in the fleet by February (some sooner) and of the other nine ships sunk or damaged, only two were total write offs (ARIZONA and OKLAHOMA).

This notion that the whole Pacific Fleet got whacked at PH is an annoying little myth.

This is true, of course.

Though we can hardly fault IJN planners too much for this: they had a limited number of shots to take, and they prioritized the capital ships in taking those shots. Just as the Americans did at Midway, or the Brits did at Taranto.

(I cannot help but feel that some of this was residue from earlier incarnations of the plan, in which the IJN would be bringing few carriers and air crews.)

Given how large the USN cruiser force was even at the outset, however, I can't help but feel that they could have spared a few more torpedos and bombs for the likes of Phoenix, Raleigh et al. when they had the chance, especially after it was clear the battleline had been worked over.
 
[snip]Now, if you have a surface action after something like Santa Cruz, and you know you've accounted for all American flattops, that would be a different story. And I think that moment would have come, had we done WATCHTOWER after a Midway defeat, because we know what kind of a beating American carriers took in the Solomons: five carriers mission-killed (three sunk) in less than three months.

The problem is that Mikawa had the golden opportunity - many transports still heavily loaded and the troops ashore desperately in need of those supplies (although they did take quite a bit from the garrison; if that had been destroyed the US forces would have been in a serious situation). Later on there will be fewer transports to catch and many will be partly or totally unloaded, the US forces will not be as bad off.

Time is not on Japan's side here...
 
The problem is that Mikawa had the golden opportunity - many transports still heavily loaded and the troops ashore desperately in need of those supplies (although they did take quite a bit from the garrison; if that had been destroyed the US forces would have been in a serious situation). Later on there will be fewer transports to catch and many will be partly or totally unloaded, the US forces will not be as bad off.

Time is not on Japan's side here...

Yes, it's clear that even Japanese commanders thought that Mikawa had made a serious mistake at the time. He was being too cautious, and the Japanese had to take some risks in the short term to have any chance at all.
 
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