Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

Actually, reading that essay again I just realized that it understates the ecnomic disparity in key ways.

Think for example about the B-29 and radar. The B-29 program actually cost 50% more than the Manhattan Project did! The investment in radar systems was also enormous. And yet, the United States was able to invest in ALL three advanced tech programs, while building the largest navy and air force in world history, and a 90 division ground army, AND basically mechanizing the Red Army in the process.

The problem is, the Pacific ocean would have limited America's ability to bring all that to bear; tanks can't drive on water. They needed carriers, and after an 'anti-Midway' it would be some time before that force could be rebuilt.
 
I agree with you. I can see the logic of trying to neutralize whatever capital ships Somerville seemed to scraping together out there while the getting was good, but since it doesn't net you new bases for your perimeter, it's hard to see how it is worth the . . . opportunity cost. Even if Nagumo had managed to sink a couple of Illustrious class decks. The Americans were the real threat, not the RN.

The problem with OPERATION C was that it was done mainly due to a lack of anything better to do. Ironically though the Naval General Staff favored operations to cut off Australia from the US. I know hindsight is 20/20 but starting in late March/early April 1942 the Combined Fleet should have directed its energies to capturing Papua New Guinea and the lower Solomons and then maybe moving into the New Hebrides. Eventually Nimitz is going to send forces into the area to counter them.

Also, Allied garrisons at the time were light enough that they could have pulled this off with Imperial Marines and a smaller number of Army troops than would have been needed for a Ceylon operation for example.
 
If the USN couldn’t/wouldn’t send carrier forces to MacArthur’s command in the event of a full blown push south then it would be politically imperative for the RN to send the 2 carriers in the IO.

Yeah. They were cranky enough in Canberra and Wellington even before Midway.

The more I think about it, the more I think Roosevelt would demand those decks, given how Victorious played out OTL. The situation would be even more dangerous here, and the Australians and New Zealanders would be feeling it more keenly. Churchill really couldn't resist that, and anyway, what good were they doing in the Indian Ocean?
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Yeah. They were cranky enough in Canberra and Wellington even before Midway.

The more I think about it, the more I think Roosevelt would demand those decks, given how Victorious played out OTL. The situation would be even more dangerous here, and the Australians and New Zealanders would be feeling it more keenly. Churchill really couldn't resist that, and anyway, what good were they doing in the Indian Ocean?

BTW There was reference in one of the NZ memos to an alternative carrier allocation in 1943 - Ranger lent to the Brits, and two Armoured Brit carriers to the USN Pacific.
 
The problem is, the Pacific ocean would have limited America's ability to bring all that to bear; tanks can't drive on water. They needed carriers, and after an 'anti-Midway' it would be some time before that force could be rebuilt.

Right, and the Combined Fleet table tells you basically when that point in time would be.

So the Solomons gets butterflied away - well, most of it - and the big offensive kicks off in the Central Pacific in late 1943, roughly as it did.

BTW, I count an additional eight (8) Cleveland class hulls under construction in 1942 that were early enough along to be converted to Independence class CVL's, and could have been available by late 1943 to supplement the Essex's and whatever else surived of the pre-war decks. Parshall and Tully don't factor that in, but I think we must here, because it seems highly likely that this is just the sort of thing Roosevelt would do in response to a Midway defeat. It is the only way he can get additional fast carriers into the Pacific in 1943. I don't know if he would demand all eight, but I can see an additional 3-6 hulls being added to the list for conversion.

Doesn't help in 1942, but it sure as hell would help in the summer/autumn of 1943. That's as many as an additional 280 frontline aircraft you can add to Nimitz's fast carrier forces by that point. Honestly, it seems like a slam dunk to me in this situation.
 
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I know hindsight is 20/20 but starting in late March/early April 1942 the Combined Fleet should have directed its energies to capturing Papua New Guinea and the lower Solomons and then maybe moving into the New Hebrides. Eventually Nimitz is going to send forces into the area to counter them.

Right. Indeed.

But you know - correct me if I am wrong - it's not hindsight to appreciate that the U.S. was the real threat, not the RN staging out of the Raj. The Japanese could well appreciate that a) the British were not going to be a serious threat to retake real estate for quite some time, and b) the real estate they might grab was not going to be as strategically dangerous as anything the Americans could (and would) do.

Also, Allied garrisons at the time were light enough that they could have pulled this off with Imperial Marines and a smaller number of Army troops than would have been needed for a Ceylon operation for example.

If you do this in April/May, this is certainly the case with Moresby, Espiritu Santo, and Efate (and yes, Guadalcanal/Tulagi). Not much there in these places at that point.

New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa - different story. Already amply garrisoned by spring '42.

But even just grabbing the former list is a big help to the Japanese. Logistically a challenge to keep a lot of that long-term, but it sets the American starting point that much further back. Dugout Doug has to retake Port Moresby before he can even think about CARTWHEEL.

What is more, these new conquests would be harder to ignore than the Solomons. Nimitz couldn't completely ignore them, I think. The Australians and New Zealanders would surely want them liquidated as soon as possible.
 
Right, and the Combined Fleet table tells you basically when that point in time would be.

So the Solomons gets butterflied away - well, most of it - and the big offensive kicks off in the Central Pacific in late 1943, roughly as it did.

BTW, I count an additional eight (8) Cleveland class hulls under construction in 1942 that were early enough along to be converted to Independence class CVL's, and could have been available by late 1943 to supplement the Essex's and whatever else surived of the pre-war decks. Parshall and Tully don't factor that in, but I think we must here, because it seems highly likely that this is just the sort of thing Roosevelt would do in response to a Midway defeat. It is the only way he can get additional fast carriers into the Pacific in 1943. I don't know if he would demand all eight, but I can see an additional 3-6 hulls being added to the list for conversion.

Doesn't help in 1942, but it sure as hell would help in the summer/autumn of 1943. That's as many as an additional 280 frontline aircraft you can add to Nimitz's fast carrier forces by that point. Honestly, it seems like a slam dunk to me in this situation.

In the Pacific, fleet carriers were an absolute necessity. At no point in the war were CVLs or CVEs at the forefront of a strategic offensive (or defensive) operation by either side. Those ex-Clevelands might have been useful for second-line support (as was the case later in the war), but to rely on them to face Kido Butai alone would not have been ideal.
 

Geon

Donor
On another note, and this is NOT an attempt to blow my own horn. I did a brief TL which included an "anti-Midway" as it's called. In the TL Australia and NZ were demanding more U.S. troops to protect specifically Australia. If there was a Midway disaster and FS was successfully pulled off, would Australia as in my TL be demanding the withdrawal of Aussie troops from North Africa to protect the homeland? They already lost I think a division or so when Singapore fell so I suspect like the West Coast the Australians and the New Zealand populations would be demanding their political authorities bring the troops they have home to defend their own.
 
On another note, and this is NOT an attempt to blow my own horn. I did a brief TL which included an "anti-Midway" as it's called. In the TL Australia and NZ were demanding more U.S. troops to protect specifically Australia. If there was a Midway disaster and FS was successfully pulled off, would Australia as in my TL be demanding the withdrawal of Aussie troops from North Africa to protect the homeland? They already lost I think a division or so when Singapore fell so I suspect like the West Coast the Australians and the New Zealand populations would be demanding their political authorities bring the troops they have home to defend their own.

New Zealand at least would almost have to - a successful FS means the defeat of the two NZ brigades in Fiji - a large part of their army, and there's pretty much nothing between Fiji and Auckland except open ocean (we know that the IJN couldn't make it that far, but the NZ civilians didn't).
Australia I'm less sure of - MacArthur would already have a sizeable army including regular US divisions gathered near Brisbane, so it isn't like Australia is defenceless. Before 2nd Alamein, there is still a credible threat to Egypt and the Suez that Churchill and the others can say "look you're needed, this is urgent too", which may keep the forces from being transferred. I wouldn't be surprised if they got pulled back home once Rommel was chased away however. Japanese Port Moresby is still a dagger pointing south after all.

- BNC
 
In the Pacific, fleet carriers were an absolute necessity. At no point in the war were CVLs or CVEs at the forefront of a strategic offensive (or defensive) operation by either side. Those ex-Clevelands might have been useful for second-line support (as was the case later in the war), but to rely on them to face Kido Butai alone would not have been ideal.

Actually, through as late as 1944, the CVL's formed as much as 40% of the striking power of Spruance's fast carrier groups. So actually, they WERE at the forefront of Nimitz's strategic offensive of 1943-45 - they were just *part* of the force structure, not the sole basis of it.

I mean, they were integrated right into them, because they were fast enough (31.5 kt) and could accommodate any of the Navy's standard fighters or bombers - and they were, above all, available. The typical OTL four carrier fast carrier group had a mix of two CV's and two CVL's. This is basically what the U.S. Order of Battle looked like at the Philippine Sea.

What this means is that early on, the CVL's would just form a somewhat higher percentage of the decks. For example, let us say Roosevelt authorizes an additional 6 Independence class conversions in June 1942 (he had already authorized all nine of our history between January and May of 1942).
  • If Nimitz is in a bad pinch in the spring of '43 - say if Yamamoto is trying a new offensive - the only Essex on hand would have been, well, Essex herself. But this expanded Independence program could have given him 6-8 CVL's to complement his few CV's at that point. That could make the difference between being able give battle in a major carrier engagement, and not being able to.
  • By November 1943, this expanded CVL program would give Nimitz 5 Essex class carriers, 15 Independence class light carriers, and Saratoga and Wasp, if they survived to this point. What you could do then, would be to assemble five or even six 4-carrier fast carrier groups, each one built on one Essex (or Saratoga/Wasp) and 3 CVL's. Granted, the striking power of these groups would be modestly less than Spruance's 2/2 groups of OTL, but they're better than not having them at all. And the Independences wouldn't be on their own.
And as more Essexes come online, you adjust the composition of the carrier groups accordingly.

Meanwhile, the CVE's just get used for close air support or ferrying aircraft, as they were OTL.

So no, more Independence class carriers cannot be the sole answer here, but they are still the only way you can get more fast carriers (I mean, over and above what was already on the slipways) into the Pacific in 1943. Converting an Alaska is not an answer here, because none could have been available as a converted carrier until mid-1944. Which *I* (and Calbear!) might do anyway, but only because they'd at least be useful for something toward war's end.

There are no other slipways that are big enough to build an Essex available in mid-1942, beyond the ones already in the processing of constructing them.
 
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If there was a Midway disaster and FS was successfully pulled off, would Australia as in my TL be demanding the withdrawal of Aussie troops from North Africa to protect the homeland?

Well, I mean, they already were in OTL, right? The 6th and 7th Divisions get pulled back to Australia by spring '42, and the 9th gets pulled from Egypt by early 1943, at Curtin's insistence.

It might just speed things up a little.

New Zealand at least would almost have to - a successful FS means the defeat of the two NZ brigades in Fiji - a large part of their army, and there's pretty much nothing between Fiji and Auckland except open ocean (we know that the IJN couldn't make it that far, but the NZ civilians didn't).

Well, that is only if it is done before mid-June. Because that is when the US 37 ID takes over.

Man, if they actually invaded as the switchover was happening...good Lord, they'd be hitting Fiji with BOTH a US division and a NZ division equivalent - 25,000+ troops! That wouldn't be pretty for the Japanese.

When the NZ brigades left Fiji, they went back to New Zealand initially anyway.
 
Actually, through as late as 1944, the CVL's formed as much as 40% of the striking power of Spruance's fast carrier groups. So actually, they WERE at the forefront of Nimitz's strategic offensive of 1943-45 - they were just *part* of the force structure, not the sole basis of it.

I mean, they were integrated right into them, because they were fast enough (31.5 kt) and could accommodate any of the Navy's standard fighters or bombers - and they were, above all, available. The typical OTL four carrier fast carrier group had a mix of two CV's and two CVL's. This is basically what the U.S. Order of Battle looked like at the Philippine Sea.

What this means is that early on, the CVL's would just form a somewhat higher percentage of the decks. For example, let us say Roosevelt authorizes an additional 6 Independence class conversions in June 1942 (he had already authorized all nine of our history between January and May of 1942).
  • If Nimitz is in a bad pinch in the spring of '43 - say if Yamamoto is trying a new offensive - the only Essex on hand would have been, well, Essex herself. But this expanded Independence program could have given him 6-8 CVL's to complement his few CV's at that point. That could make the difference between being able give battle in a major carrier engagement, and not being able to.
  • By November 1943, this expanded CVL program would give Nimitz 5 Essex class carriers, 15 Independence class light carriers, and Saratoga and Wasp, if they survived to this point. What you could do then, would be to assemble five or even six 4-carrier fast carrier groups, each one built on one Essex (or Saratoga/Wasp) and 3 CVL's. Granted, the striking power of these groups would be modestly less than Spruance's 2/2 groups of OTL, but they're better than not having them at all. And the Independences wouldn't be on their own.
And as more Essexes come online, you adjust the composition of the carrier groups accordingly.

Meanwhile, the CVE's just get used for close air support or ferrying aircraft, as they were OTL.

So no, more Independence class carriers cannot be the sole answer here, but they are still the only way you can get more fast carriers (I mean, over and above what was already on the slipways) into the Pacific in 1943. Converting an Alaska is not an answer here, because none could have been available as a converted carrier until mid-1944. Which *I* (and Calbear!) might do anyway, but only because they'd at least be useful for something toward war's end.

There are no other slipways that are big enough to build an Essex available in mid-1942, beyond the ones already in the processing of constructing them.
The main problem I see with this plan is the lack of cruisers to escort said CVLs and later the Essexes due to said extra CVLs directly impacting the number of new cruisers available in 1943(and in general). Lets hope cruiser losses in 1942/43 are significantly lower than otl or the USN will not have the cruisers to provide its carrier task forces with enough AA daka to keep said very fragile CVLs safe.
 
The main problem I see with this plan is the lack of cruisers to escort said CVLs and later the Essexes due to said extra CVLs directly impacting the number of new cruisers available in 1943(and in general). Lets hope cruiser losses in 1942/43 are significantly lower than otl or the USN will not have the cruisers to provide its carrier task forces with enough AA daka to keep said very fragile CVLs safe.

It's a fair concern.

I do think that it's one you can compensate for, though.

The U.S. had...let me see, 26 cruisers at the outbreak of war. One (Houston) had already been sunk. 7 more cruisers would be lost in the Solomons battles of late 1942 and early 1943.

By mid-1943, you would see the following accessions,if I have this right:

3 Atlanta class
5 Cleveland class (too far along to convert)
2 Baltimore class

Anyway, what strikes me is that about half of the USN's cruiser strength was deployed to the Atlantic at the outset of the war, and not that many had been redeployed to the Pacific. I don't know just how many Cleveland class hulls Roosevelt and the Navy would convert in this situation, but I think something like 3-6 seems reasonable, on the basis that 2 CVLs = 1 CV, and you have three CV you need to replace. I would then opt (anjd Ithink King would also opt) to rob Peter to pay Paul here by redeploying the needed cruisers out of the Atlantic as needed, because Paul needs them much more than Peter does.

Also, redeploying one or two fast battleships from the Atlantic in late 1942 is almost certainly going to happen, and that provides some additional AA defense with the new carrier groups, too.

That aside, if the Solomons are butterflied away, then all those USN cruiser losses are, too, and then we have to wonder just what plausible operations that take place instead could result in cruiser losses, which is a hard question to answer; though it does seem to me that the cruisers lost at battles like Savo took place in the close confines of the Slot, and that kind of action seems less likely in any combat that might take place off the New Hebrides. My gut says that the USN will suffer fewer cruiser losses in 3Q 1942-2Q 1943 of this ATL, but again, it is hard to say.
 
It's a fair concern.

I do think that it's one you can compensate for, though.

The U.S. had...let me see, 26 cruisers at the outbreak of war. One (Houston) had already been sunk. 7 more cruisers would be lost in the Solomons battles of late 1942 and early 1943.

By mid-1943, you would see the following accessions,if I have this right:

3 Atlanta class
5 Cleveland class (too far along to convert)
2 Baltimore class

Anyway, what strikes me is that about half of the USN's cruiser strength was deployed to the Atlantic at the outset of the war, and not that many had been redeployed to the Pacific. I don't know just how many Cleveland class hulls Roosevelt and the Navy would convert in this situation, but I think something like 3-6 seems reasonable, on the basis that 2 CVLs = 1 CV, and you have three CV you need to replace. I would then opt (anjd Ithink King would also opt) to rob Peter to pay Paul here by redeploying the needed cruisers out of the Atlantic as needed, because Paul needs them much more than Peter does.

Also, redeploying one or two fast battleships from the Atlantic in late 1942 is almost certainly going to happen, and that provides some additional AA defense with the new carrier groups, too.

That aside, if the Solomons are butterflied away, then all those USN cruiser losses are, too, and then we have to wonder just what plausible operations that take place instead could result in cruiser losses, which is a hard question to answer; though it does seem to me that the cruisers lost at battles like Savo took place in the close confines of the Slot, and that kind of action seems less likely in any combat that might take place off the New Hebrides. My gut says that the USN will suffer fewer cruiser losses in 3Q 1942-2Q 1943 of this ATL, but again, it is hard to say.
Ummm you forgot the Omaha(for what they're worth) in your cruiser count. You're r8vht that the USN left a lot of its modern cruisers(especially the Brooklyns) in the Atlantic for way too long and many of them could be transferred earlirr(and more of them of course) than otl. On the other hand the USN will be getting a metric ton of cruisers in 1944 despite many more Clevelands being converted but that means the USN will be short of new hulls for a year...which is a very bad thing if numerous cruisers end being in need of extensive repairs like otl 1942/1943 and the USN doesn't have new cruisers to replace them on the line.
 
Ummm you forgot the Omaha(for what they're worth) in your cruiser count. You're r8vht that the USN left a lot of its modern cruisers(especially the Brooklyns) in the Atlantic for way too long and many of them could be transferred earlirr(and more of them of course) than otl. On the other hand the USN will be getting a metric ton of cruisers in 1944 despite many more Clevelands being converted but that means the USN will be short of new hulls for a year...which is a very bad thing if numerous cruisers end being in need of extensive repairs like otl 1942/1943 and the USN doesn't have new cruisers to replace them on the line.

Oops, you're right about the Omahas. That is what I get for relying on a Wiki page with a screwy non-chronological list...

Still, I think in the context of total cruiser numbers we are talking about, losing 4-6 light cruiser hulls could be bearable, if you redeploy from the Atlantic - which I feel fairly confident that King would do.

So much depends on just what kind of major combat action takes place in this ATL Midway Disaster timeline, in the July 1942-June 1943 period. In our timeline, there was a veritable assload of surface ship combat. There might be here too, but then again, perhaps not, depending on what Yamamoto does and what kind of losses he takes doing it.

Fact is, as much as Nimitz needs cruisers, he will now need carrier decks even more. Sometimes, you have to make the hard choice. I'd rather take the 4-6 extra CVL's, but more to the point, everything about Roosevelt's record in regards to the Independence class in OTL suggests he would, too. Honestly, for me the question is not whether FDR would demand additional Cleveland conversions, but how many.

The other thing is, I have not looked closely at available slipways large enough for light and heavy cruisers like I have for capital ships, so I really do not know if you could step up cruiser production to compensate, and what you might be giving up to do so.
 
Oops, you're right about the Omahas. That is what I get for relying on a Wiki page with a screwy non-chronological list...

Still, I think in the context of total cruiser numbers we are talking about, losing 4-6 light cruiser hulls could be bearable, if you redeploy from the Atlantic - which I feel fairly confident that King would do.

So much depends on just what kind of major combat action takes place in this ATL Midway Disaster timeline, in the July 1942-June 1943 period. In our timeline, there was a veritable assload of surface ship combat. There might be here too, but then again, perhaps not, depending on what Yamamoto does and what kind of losses he takes doing it.

Fact is, as much as Nimitz needs cruisers, he will now need carrier decks even more. Sometimes, you have to make the hard choice. I'd rather take the 4-6 extra CVL's, but more to the point, everything about Roosevelt's record in regards to the Independence class in OTL suggests he would, too. Honestly, for me the question is not whether FDR would demand additional Cleveland conversions, but how many.

The other thing is, I have not looked closely at available slipways large enough for light and heavy cruisers like I have for capital ships, so I really do not know if you could step up cruiser production to compensate, and what you might be giving up to do so.
At the bare minimum the USN can build more Clevelands(or speed up the construction of the exisitng non converted hulls,probably both) since the armor and guns(and their turrets and fire control systems) ie the most time consuming parts of ship to make for the conversions are lying around, you just need the steel for the hull and the engines(which is the last major long lead time item left)along with a slipway and the workers for it and you're good to go
 
Anyone have any reliable numbers for this?
How many tons cargo used to sustain Ops CARTWHEEL & MATTERHORN ect...

Planned for Matterhorn, 20,000 tons airlifted per month, 18,000 tons a month over the pipeline from India, 65,000 tons per month by road to the 127 airfields ( 113 new construction plus the road and pipeline) starting in early 1945 supporting around 4000 heavy bombers.

That would be enough to fully support 11x German 6th Army at Stalingrad, forever. Its the single most expensive campaign planned for WW2 and that assumes the B29 sunk cost is excluded.

Now that does not happen but the preparatory work starting in 43 does with the establishment of the Indian end of the line and initial airfield construction which requires the aircraft, materials and shipping and supplies to sustain US forces in India and although not at planned levels the actual deliveries would keep 3/4 6th armies in woolly socks and ammo.

Cartwheel is harder as its a string of operations and then sustainment of a string of bases so the expense is less on the offensive operations and more on the supplies and shipping to maintain large forces, and air forces in particular, in not achieving very much in terms of defeating Japan. I am not aware of any single source.

But all of it is dependent on shipping and with a weaker USN is it affordable. The real savings are twofold. One is in merchant shipping which instead of sailing the vasty pacific is doing short quick trips across the Atlantic. and In the Follow ups to Cartwheel into the PI. If you keep roughly to schedule Truk is bypassed in early 44 and with Truk bypassed Rabaul is not a target. Its purpose is to defend Truk.
 
Would it have been possible for the Japanese to destroy Midway's communication equipment, and then bombard the American positions with poison gas?
 
The premise of the OP was the US Navy gets destroyed at Midway. So Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet are gone with the nearest remaining carrier a fairly long distance away. Now you have a garrison at Midway to keep supplied and fueled as Japanese forces have naval superiority and the means to potentially take Midway or any of several other islands. Fraser's government in New Zealand had concluded that an invasion of 20,000 could take the islands while their Expeditionary Force of 30,000 was still largely in Europe and North Africa with Australia in a similar debate. Fiji et al are vulnerable and it's the last line of defense. The populace knows about the massacres and atrocities - but now the last best hope for additional help in the near term is beaten. Some Japanese Army and Navy forces in 1942 discussed possible peace offers to the UK, potentially including Australia and New Zealand, after another US defeat. It's not a guarantee but I don't envy those in said countries making those decisions if such an offer were presented.

As others have said the chances of taking Midway island are slim and none. The Japanese naval superiority is fleeting, the ships can only maintain themselves at sea for a very limited period (during the Guadalcanal fighting the IJA was warned that naval support was only available for two weeks then the fleet had to retire to refuel and resupply, there is a reason the USN build a fleet train) That takes no account of ammo expenditure btw. So any remaining garrison has an airbase and only needs periodic reinforcement convoys.

Any Japanese base is in the same position but with fewer resources.

Operation FS is a fantasy. The Japanese simply do not have the troops available nor do they have the shipping to move or sustain them. The identified available forces. forces are 17th army ( actually a corps) the actual forces available are 35th inf BDE, 4th and 28 inf regt with the possibility of the balance of 2nd ID (4th IR is a component) and an outside possibility of elements of 38th ID ( OTL one regiment was used the rest in New Guinea.)

The NZ correspondence relates to February and very early march 42 and is about withdrawing troops from the middle east OR not withdrawing them and using US forces. Which they do with the troops in position or sailing by mid April.

28 IR is the Midway invasion force so unless you can magic up armies its not available and as its the first to arrive on Guadalcanal any other forces, using non existent shipping, will only be available some time in August. Giving the allies a month or to two react to Midway.

What the IJN is doing is attempting to use IJA resources to extend their defensive perimeter because it does not work as long as the US carrier force is in existence. The IJA is having none of this because they are already committed in China, with inadequate forces, or already stuck on islands unable to leave because a) they need to garrison them ad b) there is no shipping available or use them because c) there is no shipping available.

This is not Victory disease ( aka we were so good only we could beat ourselves, not our fault) but more we had an entirely flawed war plan which becomes apparent within a 6 weeks of Pearl Harbour and we were trying to fix it ( is our fault the cities are ash and GIs are everywhere.)

With the US carrier force destroyed the IJN will withdraw to refit, the losses on the air groups will have been horrendous then argue about what to do next with the IJA refusing to release more forces until the ones they have are supplied and moved, which the IJN cannot do because it does not have the shipping.

And inside a month the allied Carrier force is likely to be Sara, Wasp, Victorious, Formidable and maybe lights. Plus a fairly humungous land based air force.
 
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