Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

Alternately, Yamamoto might ponder soberly what he is learning about the garrisons and air forces on New Cal and Fiji, the long supply lines and distance from his Solomons air bases and the imponderables of American reinforcements to the Pacific, and decide instead to pile the extra Java troops into whatever he has seized in the New Hebrides, to dig in and fortify. Perhaps hoping to use them as bait and reconn for any Nimitz counterattack.

Ultimately that is the smart play. The further they extend the defensive perimeter the harder it gets to defend or even supply on a day to day basis.

I still think Port Moresby is the smartest play, but if I had to stage FS, I think this might be the best way to go about it.
 
I found an additional reference to the supposed peace proposal in a book that is, to put it politely, utter garbage. It is a side reference to a document that was stolen from a safe in a spy thriller-which is then followed by physical abuse, a rape scene, and other assorted violence.

From Heidelberg to Shanghai by Jay Chung-Chen.

Again, no offense, but: Does it matter?

It matter when someone refutes information by claiming its origin is a source published only months after the time of refutation.
 
Sorry for late response. In my view, the main impact on the Pacific theater was already discussed in this thread, especially at this link: http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

The numbers for both sides are somewhat incorrect, but the main idea is outlined very succinctly. Certainly the campaign in the Solomons and New Guinea would have been delayed, Port Moresby might have fallen, and Japan could have further isolated Australia (Operation F-S). Operation 5 against Chungking could have occurred as well, resulting in even more severe damage to the KMT; perhaps organized resistance in China might have collapsed and the IJA could deploy more troops elsewhere.

As for the US counter-offensive, I am of the opinion that the Central/South Pacific routes would still have been the most likely strategic approach. Some alt-history writers, OTOH, have speculated about the Americans using the Aleutians/Kuriles as an alternative following a Midway debacle.

The campaign in Europe would not likely have been affected much. Germany probably surrenders more or less on cue (or at least early enough to be spared nuclear attack), while Japan is subject to economic strangulation via submarines (albeit at a slower rate) and a steady bomber offensive once the Marianas fall.

Actually, reading that essay again I just realized that it understates the ecnomic disparity in key ways.

Think for example about the B-29 and radar. The B-29 program actually cost 50% more than the Manhattan Project did! The investment in radar systems was also enormous. And yet, the United States was able to invest in ALL three advanced tech programs, while building the largest navy and air force in world history, and a 90 division ground army, AND basically mechanizing the Red Army in the process.
 
It matter when someone refutes information by claiming its origin is a source published only months after the time of refutation.

Ok.

But it did it actually happen, though?

That's what I want to know if it is going to be discussed any further.
 
I still think Port Moresby is the smartest play, but if I had to stage FS, I think this might be the best way to go about it.

Agreed but they should have gone after it a month sooner instead of dicking around in the Indian Ocean. They should have occupied the lower and central Solomons then as well.
 
Agreed but they should have gone after it a month sooner instead of dicking around in the Indian Ocean. They should have occupied the lower and central Solomons then as well.

Ceylon might be an idea but wouldn't the supply line problems be magnified?
 

nbcman

Donor
It matter when someone refutes information by claiming its origin is a source published only months after the time of refutation.
I didn’t make such a claim. I observed that there was another website that included a reference to the supposed peace offer plus observed that the spy thriller wasn’t a proper source for anything. Nothing more. I invite you to go find an actual reliable document that supports the claim that there was a supposed IJ-UK peace offer. Good luck in your search.
 
Agreed but they should have gone after it a month sooner instead of dicking around in the Indian Ocean. They should have occupied the lower and central Solomons then as well.

I agree with you. I can see the logic of trying to neutralize whatever capital ships Somerville seemed to scraping together out there while the getting was good, but since it doesn't net you new bases for your perimeter, it's hard to see how it is worth the . . . opportunity cost. Even if Nagumo had managed to sink a couple of Illustrious class decks. The Americans were the real threat, not the RN.
 
Ceylon might be an idea but wouldn't the supply line problems be magnified?

We beat the logistics to death in scrums over a Ceylon opp with Glenn in at least a few threads.

Perhaps not so hard to land a force in eastern Ceylon. Supplying them, OTOH . . .
 
Once HYPO et al catch wind of a Japanese offensive, I think a lot would depend on how much they learn about FS
The intelligence assessment before Coral Sea notes that while it could be a move towards Fiji or New Caledonia, the small size of the support (Car Div 5 + Kaga) suggested that it was a limited offensive. A full blown FS would be recognised if KB was involved.
 

Geon

Donor
How many additional British capital ships would the British have been realistically willing to commit to the Pacific given the above scenario given Pearl Harbor, a Japanese naval victory at Midway, and the sinking of both Prince of Wales and Repulse, a defeat that left Churchill in shock according to all accounts?

The UK still has to deal with the Italian navy and the German U-Boat threat.
 
We beat the logistics to death in scrums over a Ceylon opp with Glenn in at least a few threads.

Perhaps not so hard to land a force in eastern Ceylon. Supplying them, OTOH . . .
After the 1942 Cocos Islands mutiny, the loyalty of Ceylonese troops was doubted and no front line units were used in combat for the rest of the war.
 
The intelligence assessment before Coral Sea notes that while it could be a move towards Fiji or New Caledonia, the small size of the support (Car Div 5 + Kaga) suggested that it was a limited offensive. A full blown FS would be recognised if KB was involved.

True enough.

It does make me wonder just how fast the IJN could replenish the air crews after the beating they would have to have taken at Midway even in a total victory (they lost 13% just bombing the atoll on the morning of June 4) - at least, if they did not alter their standard practice for squadron replacements. If they suffer over 50% losses (quite possible, even probable), they might not be able to deploy the full Kido Butai for FS until September.
 
How many additional British capital ships would the British have been realistically willing to commit to the Pacific given the above scenario given Pearl Harbor, a Japanese naval victory at Midway, and the sinking of both Prince of Wales and Repulse, a defeat that left Churchill in shock according to all accounts?

The UK still has to deal with the Italian navy and the German U-Boat threat.

True, but they WERE willing to give Somerville Indomitable, Formidable, and Warspite in spring 1942, and that ain't nothing. (I grant that we can hardly count the R-class as front line ships at that point.) And of course Victorious got sent out several months later.

Getting an extra deck or two from the RN doesn't seem impossible to me, if Roosevelt twists arms, and the Aussies and Kiwis back him up. "OK, Winston, we'll go ahead with TORCH. But in return, I want Somerville's two fast carriers to get us over the hump in the Pacific until we have some of our new decks on hand next spring."

I think Churchill has to grant that request, and whoever Nimitz puts in charge of the TF uses them pretty much as Ramsey would use Victorious, as air cover while Saratoga, Wasp are primarily used for strikes. Ranger's lack of torpedo space would probably get her teamed with the Brit decks.
 
Last edited:
By the end of March 1942 the garrison of Ceylon was one British, one East African, two Australian, and two Indian brigades along with one brigade of local volunteers. The Australian brigades were from the 6th Division so they were the real deal.
 
If the USN couldn’t/wouldn’t send carrier forces to MacArthur’s command in the event of a full blown push south then it would be politically imperative for the RN to send the 2 carriers in the IO.
 
By the end of March 1942 the garrison of Ceylon was one British, one East African, two Australian, and two Indian brigades along with one brigade of local volunteers. The Australian brigades were from the 6th Division so they were the real deal.

Yeah. And even if the Japanese do establish a foothold on Ceylon - it is a big island, not impossible - that was a good enough garrison to keep them from getting very far with it.
 
Top