Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-japan-accepts-the-british-peace-treaty.443141/

You did not bring that up when you commented on the same peace proposal early last year. Why not do so then?

I did a drive by on that thread, too, but really, I should have directly challenged the source in the first place. I just find this extremely hard to believe. I can't think Churchill would have approved it for minute. It would have destroyed the alliance with the United States.
 
I did a drive by on that thread, too, but really, I should have directly challenged the source in the first place. I just find this extremely hard to believe. I can't think Churchill would have approved it for minute. It would have destroyed the alliance with the United States.

Hence why I cite a source. Wikipedia reports the same on Nakano's webpage but I could not find a direct citation. Still, given the prior thread I am surprised a question about the source itself was not brought up at that time.

***The book nbcman cited wasn't published until November 2018 (https://www.amazon.com/Heidelberg-Shanghai-Jay-Chung-Chen/dp/1543747205) but the old post on this website was from May 2018.
 
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You know, I'm trying to come up with a scenario for how the Japanese could make any kind of success with Operation FS that does not involve a killer asteroid or pandemic in North America, and the best I can come up with is this:

1. Joseph Stalin dies after choking on a herringbone at Easter.
2. Soviet fronts collapse in the face of Fall Blau. Stalingrad falls to von Paulus with little resistance by June.
3. Nagumo rolls sixes at Midway.
4. Ernest King has a fatal stroke after getting Nimitz's after action report.
5. Molotov finally asserts a shaky control over the Soviet regime. He dials up Roosevelt and tells him, "Either you stage SLEDGEHAMMER in the next six weeks or I go and get the best deal I can from Stalin. Also, I have a new Lend-Lease shopping list, and Santa had better come through on it six months early."
6. In a panic, the Americans impose themselves and insist on SLEDGEHAMMER and a maximum diversion of equipment to Murmansk. Churchilll and Brooke cough up hairballs, threaten suppuku, plead that the dog ate their homework, but finally have to give way, especially if they want all those Shermans for the 8th Army after Tobruk.
7. Roosevelt tells Nimitz he's cut off from further deliveries for the balance of 1942, tells him to play defense. Also, he asks for the 1st Marine Division back for use as a follow-on force for SLEDGEHAMMER.
8. The Cotentin Peninsula turns into an abattoir for the Allies, consuming vast amounts of corpses and equipment as they desperately try to hold on in the face of the Wehrmacht counteroffensive.

Yamamoto still can't take New Cal, Fiji and Samoa directly, but perhaps after plunking Efate he tries to cut them off and let them wither on the vine, and in the meantime, somehow pries another division away from the army to try his luck on Fiji.

But this isn't really very satisfactory either, it takes too long, and anyway, they weren't terribly dependent on outside food supplies. And then again, too, the Army may decide that suddenly Vladivostok suddenly looks very attractive for its spare divisions...

In the end, of course, even with a German victory on the Eastern Front, Calbear has already ilustrated well for us that the Japanese are ham on toast anyway, and in fact, probably in less time since the U.S. is no longer busy doing anything useful in NW Europe, no matter how much fun Yamamoto manages to have in Melanesia.

So, maybe, never mind.
 
Hence why I cite a source. Wikipedia reports the same on Nakano's webpage but I could not find a direct citation. Still, given the prior thread I am surprised a question about the source itself was not brought up at that time.

I should have, honestly, but I think I was just doing a drive by, and hardly looked at the OP in close detail. Also, I notice now that several other posters immediately challenged it for sourcing.

But be that as it may, it is reasonable in this discussion to inquire where this claim comes from, and consider it for purposes of interrogating how close the UK government was to a breaking point in early 1942 (which is what you seem to be on about). Honestly, even if it turns out some lower level diplomats actually tried this (which is the only plausible explanation I can come up with), I cannot see Churchill actually taking it, rather than disemboweling the diplomats and/or shipping them off to South Georgia Island to count penguins, because it would absolutely nuke his alliance with the Americans, which was his #AAA1 Numero Uno Priority. The response by everyone in Washington, from Roosevelt to King to Marshall to every member of Congress, would be 15,000 roentgen radioactive. I also can't see Tojo NOT gleefully embracing the proposal, because it gives them everything they were hoping for in making the decision for war in the first place.

I will take another look for sources, but if you come up with anything, by all means do share. It would be a fascinating revelation if there were even the barest meat on this bone, even if nothing would actually come of it.
 
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nbcman

Donor
I didn't look as far last year-or I used a different google search wording this time. I did note that the claim for the peace treaty on Nakano's wiki page had no footnote indicating the source - and that "spy thriller" that I referenced earlier is no source.

Yeah. Either way, the claim is being presented now, and it's reasonable to discuss what its ultimate sourcing was. It is an extraordinary claim - extraordinary claims requiring extraordinary evidence all that, you know - and it would obviously be important for the argument being made of the political aftershocks of a Midway defeat among Allied publics.

Clearly, though, whatever it is, there was zero public knowledge of it at the time, and we therefore can't see any interaction between it and whatever Fraser or Curtin may have said or done post-Midway defeat.
 
Sorry I haven’t read your TL but how does a win at Coral Sea butterfly Midway? The Japanese were planning OP MI prior to Coral Sea and assigning CARDIV 5 to MO was almost an afterthought. I have trouble seeing Yamamoto giving up his pet project regardless of what happens at CS.

Midway was ultimately an attempt at forcing the US carriers into the "decisive battle". My logic for its abandonment is that if both carriers are sunk with minimal Japanese losses, the Japanese might think that they have weakened the USN sufficiently to not need another decisive battle, or that if they do they can fight it in the South Pacific instead. MI wasn't a particularly popular plan to begin with, so even if Yamamoto still wants to do it, few of his staff will.

It is indeed worth underlining here that it is not just logistical issues that make it so difficult to make Japanese troops available for these options, but also, as Zheng says, IJA opposition to the use of its troops on such scale.

Take those 30,000 troops employed at Guadalcanal. If the IJN had approached the Army in early summer and said: "Hey, we need to take this remote jungle-infested island in the Solomons because we think we can build a strategically valuable airfield there - we just need 30,000 of your troops to do it," they would likely have been thrown out of the room. Guadalcanal was instead built up by dribs and drabs, with a regiment here, a brigade there, extracted from the IJA to be fed into the meatgrinder, easier to sell when it became apparent how much the Americans were committing to the battle. Now honor was at stake.

To get the IJA to commit a multi-division force up front for New Cal or Fiji or Samoa - even if you could somehow scrounge up the shipping to a) get them there, and b) keep supplying them - this is going to be much harder.

From what I've seen, there's just a lot of bad intelligence (New Caledonia) and handwavium (Fiji) in the spring articulation of Operation FS. Either it was just assumed that the islands would be minimally defended, or that they'd just be routed in short order anyway. One can't help but feel a strong strain of victory disease in these Japanese plans.
FS was pretty much the army's favourite idea for what to do in the Pacific (start with Tojo and work down). If there's anything that they would be willing to use those 30k troops that are sitting in Java doing nothing on, it would be that. Plus if the Navy (which is going to be needed if FS is to even be considered) says "either you get those guys from Java to do this or we won't help you at all" then the IJA will IMO at least consider sending those troops. That they sent them to Guadalcanal indicates that the Army would be willing to use them if they felt that the situation in the South Pacific demanded it.

- BNC
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
I'd just love to see that army assessment. Have to look into that.

It doesn't seem realistic, more of an absolute worst case scenario (which might pry loose more funding for the army!). I mean, Auckland is almost as far from New Cal as New Cal is from Rabaul. This looks like a somewhat sensationalized NZ Herald story.

I mean, if your point is just that you're going to get more of a panic going in Australia and New Zealand, I don't disagree. But the real test is how Washington responds, because it holds all the cards, and there were definite limits to how much Wellington and Canberra could do to change Washington's thinking on things.

There are a series of telegrams and reports in the NZ Official History. The Table of contents isn't that helpful, but the Defence of NZ section starts with
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-3Doc-c7-20.html
The Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) to the New Zealand Liaison Officer (London)
27 February 1942

2. Conclusions: There are so many imponderable factors in paragraph 1 that any forecast of enemy intentions must be largely guesswork. If it could be clearly established that Allied naval forces could effectively intervene against the expedition, I agree that the scale of
attack is likely to consist of sporadic raids only, but the defeat of the Allied naval forces would at once make invasion possible. If our air forces could attain a strength sufficient to be considerably superior at or near to the point of attack to a Japanese air force of four carriers plus aircraft from warships, then again invasion would appear to be improbable. But while these conditions are unfulfilled and while, at the same time, our land forces are only partially trained and are deficient in many important items of modern equipment, I regard the scale of attack against which New Zealand must prepare, and in fact is preparing, as one division supported by strong naval forces, including four aircraft carriers, and followed by a second division with reinforcing aircraft ferried by carriers. As Japan should feel competent, subject to the naval situation, to seize sheltered waters such as the Bay of Islands or Marlborough Sounds, I do not regard the capture of Fiji or New Caledonia as essentially a condition precedent to the invasion of New Zealand. In any case I cannot agree that Fiji or New Caledonia affect the scale of attack against which New Zealand must prepare as, in the event of their capture, it would be far too late to make increased preparations. At the same time I regard both places as highly important advanced bases for the enemy and the Allies and requiring the strongest possible defences.​

And the chapter on the Home Guard in The Home Front volume:
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-1Hom-c12.html
 
There are a series of telegrams and reports in the NZ Official History. The Table of contents isn't that helpful, but the Defence of NZ section starts with
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-3Doc-c7-20.html
The Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) to the New Zealand Liaison Officer (London)
27 February 1942

2. Conclusions: There are so many imponderable factors in paragraph 1 that any forecast of enemy intentions must be largely guesswork. If it could be clearly established that Allied naval forces could effectively intervene against the expedition, I agree that the scale of
attack is likely to consist of sporadic raids only, but the defeat of the Allied naval forces would at once make invasion possible. If our air forces could attain a strength sufficient to be considerably superior at or near to the point of attack to a Japanese air force of four carriers plus aircraft from warships, then again invasion would appear to be improbable. But while these conditions are unfulfilled and while, at the same time, our land forces are only partially trained and are deficient in many important items of modern equipment, I regard the scale of attack against which New Zealand must prepare, and in fact is preparing, as one division supported by strong naval forces, including four aircraft carriers, and followed by a second division with reinforcing aircraft ferried by carriers. As Japan should feel competent, subject to the naval situation, to seize sheltered waters such as the Bay of Islands or Marlborough Sounds, I do not regard the capture of Fiji or New Caledonia as essentially a condition precedent to the invasion of New Zealand. In any case I cannot agree that Fiji or New Caledonia affect the scale of attack against which New Zealand must prepare as, in the event of their capture, it would be far too late to make increased preparations. At the same time I regard both places as highly important advanced bases for the enemy and the Allies and requiring the strongest possible defences.​

And the chapter on the Home Guard in The Home Front volume:
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-1Hom-c12.html

Fascinating! Thanks for sharing this.

It's clear that the CGS did not have an accurate assessment of IJN logistics (let alone amphibious doctrine) if he thought that it could just skip New Cal and Fiji and stage all the way down to New Zealand for a major amphibious assault, but hey, he wasn't alone in overestimating them at this point.

It's also not clear that he's claiming that this notional two division force could actually conquer the country, as opposed to seizing a secure enclave on it (on the northern part of the North Island, it seems). Though of course even this would be a Bad Outcome.

Other key qualifier here is important: "the defeat of the Allied naval forces would at once make invasion possible." Losing at Midway is a major defeat, no question, but is it enough of one, at least beyond any panicked reaction? Would the Kiwis think so, once they got the reports from Nimitz (which would likely overestimate Japanese losses, as discussed up above)? Setting aside the handful of Royal Navy/Commonwealth warships like Canberra aside, look at what the USN still has in theater in late summer of 1942, at least by my quickie back of hand calculation (people please feel free to tweak my numbers,which I think are actually on the low side):

2 fleet carriers
3 "Standard" battleships
3 new fast battleships, just arriving in theater
11 heavy cruisers
10 light cruisers
70+ destroyers
50+ submarines

In addition to which, Ranger and at least another fast battleship could and probably would be redeployed quickly, and probably a half dozen more cruisers and the usual smattering of destroyers.

All of this constitutes, support ships aside, a fairly formidable naval force (especially once you throw in that many now have radar) that Yamamoto must take into serious account, even after pasting Fletcher's carriers - to say nothing of the considerable numbers of land-based fighters and bombers on New Caledonia and Fiji that would take potshots at him, or at least radio contact reports, as he steams by. He can hardly go haring down to New Zealand with all that hardware out there as an active threat, even if he's got the oilers to get there and back. Not that these calculations wouldn't avoid some panic, of course, even among some of NZ's leadership; but Ernie King will know the score, and so will Roosevelt, a.k.a., "Former Naval Person."

Still, any such alarm was not going to increase any appetite by New Zealand's or Australia's leadership for peace, and it is a long distance from additional memos like this in Wellington or Canberra to a drastic change in global Allied strategy. A few more regiments already in theater diverted to the North Island probably calms everyone down.
 
FS was pretty much the army's favourite idea for what to do in the Pacific (start with Tojo and work down).

Naturally, because it required the least amount of their troops!

It's not impossible that Yamamoto might be able to pry a few more troops from Java, post-Midway; his victory aura would be pretty bright. But again, the harder part really is the shipping to get them there, and then to supply them, and the oil needed to make them go.

Honestly, though, the likely outcome is this: Yamamoto hits Espiritu Santo and Efate with the SSF, gets very badly bloodied among both troops and aircrew, if not ships, even if he manages to take one or the other, and then has to see what he can scrounge up for a bigger follow-on operation aimed at Fiji. By this point, they probably start to get a fair notion from reconnaisance of how formidable New Cal's garrison is, after all, and he can't really go after Samoa until he has Fiji, at least. OTOH, by going into the New Hebrides, Yamamoto has revealed his hand, and Nimitz can and would pile whatever he had into the islands while Yamamoto assembles his follow-on attack.

Alternately, Yamamoto might ponder soberly what he is learning about the garrisons and air forces on New Cal and Fiji, the long supply lines and distance from his Solomons air bases and the imponderables of American reinforcements to the Pacific, and decide instead to pile the extra Java troops into whatever he has seized in the New Hebrides, to dig in and fortify. Perhaps hoping to use them as bait and reconn for any Nimitz counterattack.
 
The premise of the OP was the US Navy gets destroyed at Midway. So Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet are gone with the nearest remaining carrier a fairly long distance away. Now you have a garrison at Midway to keep supplied and fueled as Japanese forces have naval superiority and the means to potentially take Midway or any of several other islands. Fraser's government in New Zealand had concluded that an invasion of 20,000 could take the islands while their Expeditionary Force of 30,000 was still largely in Europe and North Africa with Australia in a similar debate. Fiji et al are vulnerable and it's the last line of defense. The populace knows about the massacres and atrocities - but now the last best hope for additional help in the near term is beaten. Some Japanese Army and Navy forces in 1942 discussed possible peace offers to the UK, potentially including Australia and New Zealand, after another US defeat. It's not a guarantee but I don't envy those in said countries making those decisions if such an offer were presented.

Yes the Japanese have naval superiority around midway. For a day or two. Then they run out of fuel and have to withdraw. They could perhaps draw it out a bit longer with pre-established tanker support and extensive use of economical cruising speeds... but there's literally nothing that the USN Sub commanders would love more then a bunch of big expensive battlewagons cruising around in a highly predictable area at slow speed. The Mark 14 didn't fail every time, and all you need is a bit of bad luck on the part of the Japanese and suddenly WHOOPS, there goes a Yamato class!
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
It's also not clear that he's claiming that this notional two division force could actually conquer the country, as opposed to seizing a secure enclave on it (on the northern part of the North Island, it seems). Though of course even this would be a Bad Outcome.

Two to 'conquer' - defeat large scale organised resistance perhaps? There was mention somewhere of seven divisions to occupy.
Bay of Islands is NE North Island, Marlborough Sounds NE South Island. Both large sheltered anchorages a long (land) distance from cities. Note the harbours on the west coasts (e.g. Kaipara (big one NW of Auckland), Raglan (SW of Auckland)) aren't that useful, as they have significant bars at the entrance.
 
I didn't look as far last year-or I used a different google search wording this time. I did note that the claim for the peace treaty on Nakano's wiki page had no footnote indicating the source - and that "spy thriller" that I referenced earlier is no source.

Your post is from May 2018. The book you cited was published in November 2018. Please explain.
 
Two to 'conquer' - defeat large scale organised resistance perhaps? There was mention somewhere of seven divisions to occupy.
Bay of Islands is NE North Island, Marlborough Sounds NE South Island. Both large sheltered anchorages a long (land) distance from cities. Note the harbours on the west coasts (e.g. Kaipara (big one NW of Auckland), Raglan (SW of Auckland)) aren't that useful, as they have significant bars at the entrance.

You're right, I wasn't looking closely at Marlborough Sounds there.

It's worst-case planning that actually didn't reflect the actual IJN capabilities, but it is not surprising to see it in action. Army officials plan for all scenarios, and with the successes Japan was rolling up at the time, you'd want to maximize the response from the government. "Let's not take any chances." I would expect a greater effort to build up the Home Guard first and foremost, some crash field works and guns at the Bay of Islands and Auckland, along with the pleading to Washington...

There would be more of that after a loss at Midway, to be sure, though I still think the actual changes to U.S. policy would be fairly modest. If it were me, I'd calm the Kiwis down by dispatching a few more regiments to Auckland, as soon as I could scrounge up the shipping. The real build up would be up in Melanesia.
 
Your post is from May 2018. The book you cited was published in November 2018. Please explain.

Again, no offense, but: Does it matter?

I mean, the burden of proof in this discussion is on the person who introduced the claim in the first place, when it is so extraordinary and lacking in confirmation. This is a pretty astounding claim.
 

Geon

Donor
I'd like to follow up on my earlier posting and Athelstane's discussing whether Nimitz would send his two remaining carriers to try and stop Operation FS. It occurs to me that you would have Nimitz and MacArthur on the same side virtually begging cap in hand for Admiral King to allow Nimitz to try and intercept the Japanese invasion fleet. Their argument would be that if Operation FS succeeds it becomes harder to reinforce and resupply Australia. Thus the U.S. is effectively paralyzed for a year while new carriers are built allowing the Japanese to get away with who knows what. King would argue that they've already tried things Nimitz way and lost - badly. Better to hold the line and wait for the Essex and Independence class to come out in force then confront the Japanese with sheer numbers. MacArthur supports Nimitz because he wants his moment of glory to return to the Philippines. A delay could mean a plan that would bypass the Philippines so MacArthur is in this case on Chester Nimitz side.

The argument eventually goes to FDR. What does he decide?
 
IIRC the Navy was determined to keep carriers out of MacArthurs hands. They had to get the boundary between Nimitz’s command and MacArthur’s moved from east of Guadalcanal to the west so that Watchtower could go ahead.
 
Alternately, Yamamoto might ponder soberly what he is learning about the garrisons and air forces on New Cal and Fiji, the long supply lines and distance from his Solomons air bases and the imponderables of American reinforcements to the Pacific, and decide instead to pile the extra Java troops into whatever he has seized in the New Hebrides, to dig in and fortify. Perhaps hoping to use them as bait and reconn for any Nimitz counterattack.

Ultimately that is the smart play. The further they extend the defensive perimeter the harder it gets to defend or even supply on a day to day basis.
 
King would argue that they've already tried things Nimitz way and lost - badly. Better to hold the line and wait for the Essex and Independence class to come out in force then confront the Japanese with sheer numbers.

Not so sure about that.

King was not a man to back away from a fight. He'd also worry greatly about the morale effect in the fleet of hiding in port, refusing to parry a Japanese offensive.

Instead, I can see him demanding that Ranger be deployed to the Pacific, for starters, and maybe Washington, too (hell it was going out there anyway in the fall). It would be hard to deny him. Ranger has its weaknesses, but at this point, it's all hands on deck, and now you have a three deck fast carrier force once again, roughly, and plenty of big AA platforms to escort them (if you can fuel them).

Meanwhile I expect they would ferry as many aircraft as they could to the big three islands, and step up submarine patrols, since Melanesia is such an obvious next target. Be more interesting to ask what happens with regards to Port Moresby. I think it is unlikely Nimitz can help, but what MacArthur and the Aussies would do there...interesting to think about.

Once HYPO et al catch wind of a Japanese offensive, I think a lot would depend on how much they learn about FS. If it looks like the full Kido Butai, King might still push for allowing Nimitz to send the carriers down there - preferably not under Halsey! - but under tighter restrictions. Maybe you let Nagumo get bloodied during the attacks on Efate and Espiritu Santo, with the carriers only hitting them at the back end if they've been damaged enough to make the bet worthwhile. For example, maybe a squadron at Efate gets lucky and disables one or two of Nagumo's carriers.

I think Roosevelt would be reluctant to second guess such an argument by King, at any rate. He seems to have been willing to let King and Nimitz run big risks, like he did with the Doolittle Raid.

I also cannot rule out that King might even swallow his pride and ask for a Brit deck or two to beef up the force - since, well, that is what happened in 1943 OTL, after all, and the need here is even graver. Granted that even if Churchill acceded, they wouldn't be available in theater until sometime in the fall, presumably to counter the second phase of FS.

Still, I think we CAN say that all offensive operations are out of bounds until well into 1943, and there are some Essexes and Independences in hand. Maybe the odd raid, but otherwise...
 
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Obligatory @BobTheBarbarian summons.

Sorry for late response. In my view, the main impact on the Pacific theater was already discussed in this thread, especially at this link: http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

The numbers for both sides are somewhat incorrect, but the main idea is outlined very succinctly. Certainly the campaign in the Solomons and New Guinea would have been delayed, Port Moresby might have fallen, and Japan could have further isolated Australia (Operation F-S). Operation 5 against Chungking could have occurred as well, resulting in even more severe damage to the KMT; perhaps organized resistance in China might have collapsed and the IJA could deploy more troops elsewhere.

As for the US counter-offensive, I am of the opinion that the Central/South Pacific routes would still have been the most likely strategic approach. Some alt-history writers, OTOH, have speculated about the Americans using the Aleutians/Kuriles as an alternative following a Midway debacle.

The campaign in Europe would not likely have been affected much. Germany probably surrenders more or less on cue (or at least early enough to be spared nuclear attack), while Japan is subject to economic strangulation via submarines (albeit at a slower rate) and a steady bomber offensive once the Marianas fall.
 
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