Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

Please remember that around 60% of all US production in 42 and 43 was going to the pacific theatre anyway (and its three offensives in the pacific, Operation Matterhorn) and the British were well aware of the resources allocated and happy with them to avoid the US army forcing an unsupported and premature landing in Europe by the British army.

Whether Watchtower is cancelled is moot. With the Japanese landing force either mauled or defeated at Midway and the losses to IJN carrier aircraft, and pretty good intel on where they are the US may take the view that seizing Guadalcanal is the offensive response needed as the Japanese cannot counterinvade before Henderson is built up and that screws the entire Japanese ponsion in the Solomons.

But as said the impact on the ETO is basically none. Unless you cancel Cartwheel and Matterhorn, in which case what actually happens is a reduction in the shipping needed to support two unneeded offensives and concentration on the POA in mid 43 which probably shortens the war by about a year in both theatres.


The main fleet carrier support for Torch is all British Force H which is kind of excessive given the lack of an opposing air force and Gibraltar and Ranger and the CVE. Harpoon and Pedestal will go through but its quite possible that the Allied carrier fleet in the pacific for the balance of 42 and early 43 is Sara, Wasp, Formidable and Victorious. With 3/4 IJN carriers intact distant cover on Torch is not so much a priority now.

Regarding second happy time the biggest impact is probably on King who has stripped the Eastern Seaboard of all defences and now lost a fleet at Midway all in 3 months. Blaming his secretary probably wont work this time. No Midway.
 
Someone else has already hinted at the fact that the Democratic majority in Congress might be threatened.

P.S. This is actually a more likely possibility. Roosevelt never came closer to losing a chamber than he did in 1942. The Democrats scraped by with only a 222-209 majority. In fact, they lost the popular vote by over a million (see, Republicans are not the only party capable of doing this!).

Truth is, Roosevelt had very few successes to point to so far, and lots of defeats. TORCH only took place a few days after the election - might have saved several seats if it had not been delayed.

Not impossible that losing at Midway costs FDR the House (though it depends on how much the Navy is allowed to say about what happened), though I still don't think this is enough to abandon Germany-First.
 
Least threatening? Remember that the Second Happy Time was occurring at this time and there were dozens of merchies being sunk right off the Eastern seaboard. Sorry, even a US loss at Midway wouldn't change the opinion that Germany was the greater threat.

This might be worth its own thread. Again, we have the benefit of hindsight, but in early/mid 1942 there was a massive fear of invasion by Japan in Australia et al and concerns for invasion or assault on the Western US. Would Washington hold fast to a Germany first policy if Japan is able to take the most distant of the Hawaiian islands? I think both sides of that argument have merit. Political pressure will come to bear from the West and in the face of continued Japanese victories it would certainly cause discussion.
 
Whether Watchtower is cancelled is moot. With the Japanese landing force either mauled or defeated at Midway and the losses to IJN carrier aircraft, and pretty good intel on where they are the US may take the view that seizing Guadalcanal is the offensive response needed as the Japanese cannot counterinvade before Henderson is built up and that screws the entire Japanese ponsion in the Solomons.

Realistically, though, it is hard to see King and Nimitz deciding to do WATCHTOWER if they just got kicked at Midway.

Much more likely that they continue the buildup on the key islands in the SE Pacific, and keep the surviving carriers to at least pose a threat of a fleet in being. I do think you may be onto something with both VICTOROUS and FORMIDABLE being sent out as temporary reinforcement.
 
Would Washington hold fast to a Germany first policy if Japan is able to take the most distant of the Hawaiian islands?

But they won't, you know. Not unless your POD is a lot further back, and Nimitz has not put much of a garrison on Midway in the first place.

Nagumo conquering Midway in June 1942 really is bordering on Unmentionable Sea Mammal territory, as has been discussed in threads over the years...more than I can count. The garrison was simply too strong for what the Japanese brought to take it.

I think only a Japanese conquest of Oahu would do the trick. And of course, that was even less likely than SEALION being successful.
 

Geon

Donor
I'd think it would depend on the state of Midway itself. If, as noted several times in this thread, the US loses the sea battle, but the forces on Midway Island repel a Japanese invasion, the US can spin that as a win... the first time the Japanese have failed to capture something. Since the USN has other assets around, DC can lowkey the losses...

Given what you say here I could see the U.S. Navy commissioning another documentary by John Ford similar to his very excellently done December 7th. For those who haven't seen it please look it up on YouTube and look for the uncut version. It is well worth watching.

In any case in the December 7 documentary Ford actually is somewhat honest about the losses the U.S, suffered at Pearl Harbor but shows how many of the ships were salvageable and later able to fight. There will be no denying the losses at Midway were significant. That can only be downplayed so much. But it can be pointed out that the island held against the Japanese.

Even so, however, I could see a lot of jitters on the West Coast. It could make things even rougher for the Japanese internees. I could easily see a west coast versus east coast political battle in congress as constituents on both sides portray the menace as greater to their respective area.
 
Given what you say here I could see the U.S. Navy commissioning another documentary by John Ford similar to his very excellently done December 7th. For those who haven't seen it please look it up on YouTube and look for the uncut version. It is well worth watching.

In any case in the December 7 documentary Ford actually is somewhat honest about the losses the U.S, suffered at Pearl Harbor but shows how many of the ships were salvageable and later able to fight. There will be no denying the losses at Midway were significant. That can only be downplayed so much. But it can be pointed out that the island held against the Japanese.

This is a superb point. No, really, it is.

I can absolutely see the Navy doing exactly this. "Yes, our carriers took it on the chin. But this forlorn garrison resisted the might of Yamamoto's entire fleet for [X] days. And they're still there, today, defiantly where the [unprintable racial epithet] so cavalierly assumed they could be brushed aside." It would be Wake Island times three, only with a happy ending, and lots of stunning John Ford footage to rush into theaters by autumn. Nimitz would come out and pin some kind of medal on every man on the island, cameras rolling.
 
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But as said the impact on the ETO is basically none. Unless you cancel Cartwheel and Matterhorn, in which case what actually happens is a reduction in the shipping needed to support two unneeded offensives and concentration on the POA in mid 43 which probably shortens the war by about a year in both theatre. ...

Anyone have any reliable numbers for this?
How many tons cargo used to sustain Ops CARTWHEEL & MATTERHORN ect...
 
This is a superb point. No, really, it is.

I can absolutely see the Navy doing exactly this. "Yeah, our carriers took it on the chin. But this forlorn garrison resisted the might of Yamamoto's entire fleet for [X] days. And they're still there, today, defiantly where the [unprintable racial epithet] so cavalierly assumed they could be brushed aside." It would be Wake Island times three, only with a happy ending, and lots of stunning John Ford footage to rush into theaters by autumn. Nimitz would come out and pin some kind of medal on every man on the island, cameras rolling.

& Being optimistic on Japanese losses.
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Thats about 280 aircraft. Not clear if that is squadron strength or includes reserves. Aircraft enroute might double that, plus anything diverted from that designated for Australia.

My father was a ordnance officer in a B26 squadron in the US at the time. He recalled how that summer they all had to read the books on torpedoes and practice installing the gear for hanging torpedoes in the B26. They excitement died off by the end of summer & they never actually few training with torpedoes. He did not mention if they embarked the torpedo fittings when they embarked for England the following summer.

BTW the RNZAF Vincents in the list were not equipped for torpedoes, and the RNZAF didn't have any.
 

Geon

Donor
Assuming the Japanese win a naval victory at Midway, even if they fail to take Midway the main objective of the Midway operation is accomplished. For all intents and purposes - from the Japanese standpoint - the American air/naval presence in the Pacific has been neutralized for (optimistically from the IJN point of view) 6 months to a year. Realistically what do they do now? The U.S. is still not coming to the negotiating table. The FS Operation is risky at best it's been noted. But at the same time Victory Fever is at an all time high in the IJN (not as much in the IJA but still considerable). What do they do now? Do they play it safe? Yamamoto wasn't the type to do that. He was a gambler. From the Japanese perspective given the commanders at the time - what realistic moves could the Japanese make at this point?
 

nbcman

Donor
This might be worth its own thread. Again, we have the benefit of hindsight, but in early/mid 1942 there was a massive fear of invasion by Japan in Australia et al and concerns for invasion or assault on the Western US. Would Washington hold fast to a Germany first policy if Japan is able to take the most distant of the Hawaiian islands? I think both sides of that argument have merit. Political pressure will come to bear from the West and in the face of continued Japanese victories it would certainly cause discussion.
Maybe so, but the US Government can downplay the invasion fears as they did IOTL since the US Western states have far less importance in US politics in 1940 as compared to now. For example, WA, OR & CA made up about 6.6% of electoral college votes in 1940 as compared to now (13.8%) where CA is a behemoth with over 10% of the EC by themselves.
 
With the Japanese landing force either mauled or defeated at Midway and the losses to IJN carrier aircraft, and pretty good intel on where they are the US may take the view that seizing Guadalcanal is the offensive response needed as the Japanese cannot counterinvade before Henderson is built up and that screws the entire Japanese ponsion in the Solomons.

The premise of the OP was the US Navy gets destroyed at Midway. So Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet are gone with the nearest remaining carrier a fairly long distance away. Now you have a garrison at Midway to keep supplied and fueled as Japanese forces have naval superiority and the means to potentially take Midway or any of several other islands. Fraser's government in New Zealand had concluded that an invasion of 20,000 could take the islands while their Expeditionary Force of 30,000 was still largely in Europe and North Africa with Australia in a similar debate. Fiji et al are vulnerable and it's the last line of defense. The populace knows about the massacres and atrocities - but now the last best hope for additional help in the near term is beaten. Some Japanese Army and Navy forces in 1942 discussed possible peace offers to the UK, potentially including Australia and New Zealand, after another US defeat. It's not a guarantee but I don't envy those in said countries making those decisions if such an offer were presented.
 
Maybe so, but the US Government can downplay the invasion fears as they did IOTL since the US Western states have far less importance in US politics in 1940 as compared to now. For example, WA, OR & CA made up about 6.6% of electoral college votes in 1940 as compared to now (13.8%) where CA is a behemoth with over 10% of the EC by themselves.

It's much easier to downplay an invasion while a viable carrier fleet still exists. The shock from (preventable) rapid Japanese successes was still in effect. I'm not saying the US leaves the war but its 1942 elections and strategies will change notably from OTL.
 
Assuming the Japanese win a naval victory at Midway, even if they fail to take Midway the main objective of the Midway operation is accomplished. For all intents and purposes - from the Japanese standpoint - the American air/naval presence in the Pacific has been neutralized for (optimistically from the IJN point of view) 6 months to a year. Realistically what do they do now? The U.S. is still not coming to the negotiating table. The FS Operation is risky at best it's been noted. But at the same time Victory Fever is at an all time high in the IJN (not as much in the IJA but still considerable). What do they do now? Do they play it safe? Yamamoto wasn't the type to do that. He was a gambler. From the Japanese perspective given the commanders at the time - what realistic moves could the Japanese make at this point?

What they *would* do is Operation FS, as soon they could replenish air groups and assemble the forces. Presumably in August-September. They might have success with Espiritu Santo and Efate, but overall the op would be a bloody failure for them. They'd lose ships, not just soldiers, especially if Nimitz sends Sara and Wasp down there to ride their flanks.

What they *should* do, I think, is go all in on Port Moresby, as quickly as possible. Finish the airfield at Guadalcanal. Mount a few raids to keep the Yanks on their toes. And then fortify the hell out of all their key islands. Dig, dig, dig.

There really is not much else they can do now. They're pretty much at their limit.
 
What they *would* do is Operation FS, as soon they could replenish air groups and assemble the forces. Presumably in August-September. They might have success with Espiritu Santo and Efate, but overall the op would be a bloody failure for them. They'd lose ships, notjust soldiers.

What they *should* do, I think, is go all in on Port Moresby, as quickly as possible. Finish the airfield at Guadalcanal. Mount a few raids to keep the Yanks on their toes. And then fortify the hell out of all their key islands. Dig, dig, dig.

There really is not much else they can do now.

The airfield at Guadalcanal was actually ahead of schedule by this point, coincidentally the workers were given extra sake to celebrate their early completion not long before the US marine landings in OTL. Fiji is vulnerable as are E. Santo and Efate, New Caledonia will be tougher but its capture is not impossible. E. Santo has an airfield already underway but not entirely ready yet, a reverse of Henderson Field would be ironic. This does not include whatever proposals Japan might put forward to oust New Zealand or Australia from the Pacific conflict upon a devastating victory at Midway.

***For any who have served in the US armed forces, your service is appreciated***
 

nbcman

Donor
The premise of the OP was the US Navy gets destroyed at Midway. So Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet are gone with the nearest remaining carrier a fairly long distance away.
Saratoga left PH and was sailing towards Midway on 6 June. Not exactly a long distance and she was fully covered by US land based air.
Now you have a garrison at Midway to keep supplied and fueled as Japanese forces have naval superiority and the means to potentially take Midway or any of several other islands.
The IJN would have had naval superiority in the immediate aftermath of this Alt-Midway. But the IJN neither had ability to keep those ships on station at Midway nor had the means to take Midway when the invading force was smaller than the defending force.

Fraser's government in New Zealand had concluded that an invasion of 20,000 could take the islands while their Expeditionary Force of 30,000 was still largely in Europe and North Africa with Australia in a similar debate. Fiji et al are vulnerable and it's the last line of defense.
As noted in post #160, there were already US forces occupying some of the islands that the FS forces had to invade in May / June 1942. In fact there was a whole US ID in Fiji in May 1942 at the time of the Coral Sea. So forget about the IJN rolling over Fiji with anything less than a corps based assault which isn't going to be permitted by the IJA. Plus there were 2 US Inf Rgts in NZ so there were US forces available there with more that could be directed there before any IJ offensive would get to NZ.
The populace knows about the massacres and atrocities - but now the last best hope for additional help in the near term is beaten. Some Japanese Army and Navy forces in 1942 discussed possible peace offers to the UK, potentially including Australia and New Zealand, after another US defeat. It's not a guarantee but I don't envy those in said countries making those decisions if such an offer were presented.
I've already responded to this assertion that IJ would make any type of a peace offer that could be accepted by AUS & NZ. However, they would already see substantial US help in theater by June 1942 before this Alt-Midway occurs. So why the defeatist attitude now from AUS & NZ when there are well over a hundred thousand US forces in theater?

It's much easier to downplay an invasion while a viable carrier fleet still exists. The shock from (preventable) rapid Japanese successes was still in effect. I'm not saying the US leaves the war but its 1942 elections and strategies will change notably from OTL.
Except there was no possibility of an IJ invasion of Hawaii let alone the complete fantasy of an attack directly on CONUS. Even if a few western Governors or Senators get their knickers twisted, there won't be any significant change to Germany First.[/QUOTE]
 
Given what you say here I could see the U.S. Navy commissioning another documentary by John Ford similar to his very excellently done December 7th. For those who haven't seen it please look it up on YouTube and look for the uncut version. It is well worth watching.

In any case in the December 7 documentary Ford actually is somewhat honest about the losses the U.S, suffered at Pearl Harbor but shows how many of the ships were salvageable and later able to fight. There will be no denying the losses at Midway were significant. That can only be downplayed so much. But it can be pointed out that the island held against the Japanese.

And John Ford is there, with the slaughter of the Japanese landing Forces on Film
 
Fiji is vulnerable as are E. Santo and Efate, New Caledonia will be tougher but its capture is not impossible.

Fiji by June has over 15,000 trooops, almost all the US 37th division. It has multiple squadrons, and two good 7,000 ft airfields and ample fuel supplies to support them, along with numerous coastal artillery batteries and 3.7in AA batteries. If it is "vulnerable," it's not to anything the Japanese can realistically throw at it, over a thousand miles from Rabaul. I suppose the United States Navy and Marine Corps of late 1944 could have taken it. The Japanese could take one of the outlying islands, sure, but since none had airfields or good ports, I am no sure what that does for them.

New Caledonia by August has something like 35,000 troops, featuring the best division in the US Army. Almost none of its shores are reachable by landing craft thanks to massive coral reefs. This is a campaign on a scale of Luzon 1941-42 - which, let us remember, was defended mostly by underequipped and undertrained Philippine units. How can the Japanese possibly mount that in the New Hebrides in summer/fall 1942?

No offense, but I'm just not seeing it. Yamamoto might be able to do air raids on these islands, sink some shipping to them. But he can't take them with anything has available.

***For any who have served in the US armed forces, your service is appreciated***

Amen to this.
 
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