That's pretty much one of my suggestionsWell it's difficult to criticize the American war effort to much because they started getting into the war around peak Axis and gained the initiative in less than a year in both theaters.
That's pretty much one of my suggestionsWell it's difficult to criticize the American war effort to much because they started getting into the war around peak Axis and gained the initiative in less than a year in both theaters.
As a more general point, are there any writers critical of the US war effort in the mould of Correlli Barnett?
Well it's difficult to criticize the American war effort to much because they started getting into the war around peak Axis and gained the initiative in less than a year in both theaters.
Well it's difficult to criticize the American war effort to much because they started getting into the war around peak Axis and gained the initiative in less than a year in both theaters.
There's quite a few things to be critical of, if you look:
- Backing away from Germany First
- Belief in the effectiveness of the Chinese Army
- Slowness in actually getting into the fight - few divisions were in combat 2 years after the war started
- Daylight bombing
- Selection and preparation of higher commanders (sacking 3 Corps commanders in a year)
- Replacement system
- A large amount of "not invented here"
- Etc
However, there were few absolute disasters, and most memories of US performance are of the last year of the war when they were dominant in all spheres.
There was nothing wrong with daylight bomb8ng It was the Insistence on unescorted bombing that was error.
- Slowness in actually getting into the fight - few divisions were in combat 2 years after the war started
Or, conversely, overeagerness to get into the fight - a cross-channel assault in 1942 or 1943, before the Battle of the Atlantic was truly won or the Luftwaffe had been decisively defeated, could have been catastrophic.
Then of course there is nonsense like this:
https://www.amazon.com/Churchill-Hi...8&qid=1515105602&sr=8-1&keywords=pat+buchanan
Catastrophic for the British mainly, as US involvement would have been limited, especially in 1942.
Both CNO, Starke & King had some distractions. The Japanese attacks were occupying a lot of attention. I also notice US Naval intelligence gave credibility to the idea the Germans were about to make major moves in West Africa, South Atlantic, and Brazil. German inquiries to Petains government about air reconissance bases in Morroco & Dakar were apparently discovered. The Brits were fretting about possible Axis air & submarine bases in the Spanish/Portuguse Atlantic islands. January-March King gave some attention to this, including plans for the Atlantic fleet to seize assorted Atlantic islands and Plan RUBBER for chasing a Nazi airborne corps off the north coast of Brazil.
That last would have been ASB, but the Brits were taking the possibility of naval/airbases in Morroco & the Atlantic islands seriously at the time. They had their own ideas in 1941 for seizing the islands, and Op GYMNAST started as a counter to Axis use of Morroco. Churchill was anxiously inquiring of the Americans about carrying part of the load in those actions. Globally Churchill was presenting a lot more urgent actions for the US in general & the USN specifically. He wanted a considerable portion of the US Navy to rush off to the South Pacific to save the Dutch East Indies, he urged the USN prob=vide more escorts for the mid and south Atlantic battles, the USn needed to put priority on helping in upgrading the ports in the Persian Gulf to assist the USSR, could the USN assist in the Mediterranean battle & supplying Malta? Point here is that while the Brits did urge the USN to do something about the danger of submarines off the East Coast, Carribean, and Gulf of Mexico they were also urging major action by the USN on a half dozen other points. Churchills management style tended to lose the message in the noise and leave priorities adrift. So its not suprising the Brit advice about one of several factors in the anti submarine battle was not taken into imeadiate action.