Clay Blair on Admiral King and Operation Drumbeat

The conventional wisdom on this forum and elsewhere is that Admiral King dropped the ball on organizing convoys on the US East Coast upon war with Germany. However, Clay Blair in his book "Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939-1942" argues that this view is false. He makes the following points:

FDR prioritized small craft and landing craft over proper ASW vessels, leaving the US Navy lacking the latter when war broke out.

The US had given 50 old destroyers and 10 coast guard cutters to Britain.

The US had a policy of heavily escorting troopships, both in the Atlantic and Pacific, and this led to zero troopship losses.

American destroyers were needed in the Pacific and also in the European theater to escort American capital ships helping to supply Malta and contain the German surface ships.

Potential ASW air units were under the control of the US Army, which preferred "offensive" hunter-killer searches for U-Boats to "defensive" escorting of convoys.

Is Blair correct?
 
As with most things the truth is probably somewhere in the middle. There is probably more King could have done and while I don't know what USN and USMC air assets he had available for coastal convoy work, there must have been some.

Blair does make some good points that I was not aware of before reading his books. The fact that no troopships were lost is one (and rather important IMWO). He also points out that King was part of the group of admirals that recommended serial production of the US Coast Guard's Treasury Class cutters of which there were seven.

The Treasury Class ships were ideal for the North Atlantic convoy routes - big, well armed, and with good endurance and the seven we did have were super stars on the convoy runs. However, the Navy didn't like them because they were slow (20 knots max speed) and FDR didn't like them because he had a thing for smaller craft like submarine chasers which were useless as open ocean escorts so the proposal didn't go anywhere.
 
I don't remember Blair having much to say about Hap Arnold of the Army Air Forces and Harris of RAF Bomber Command dismissing the need for robust aircraft patrols. On the Brit side Coastal Command & the RN in general had to make do with medium and short ranged aircraft. that the second rate aircraft allowed to Coastal Command were effective there is no doubt. By mid 1941 the German submarines could no longer operate near the UK. Donetiz had to redeploy further out into the Atlantic. On the US side it was much the same. While the US Army had claimed it could defended the US coasts, and had among the selling points for the B17 claimed it was a killer maritime weapon, Operation Drumbeat suffered little from the Army Air Forces. The B17 was conspicuous in the small number actual sortied in the Battle of the Atlantic. Where Roosevelt stood in this I can't say. Churchill conversely constantly shouted over the crisis of the BoA and urged every effort, but when Bomber Harris refused to consider a single VLR bomber for patrolling the Atlantic Churchill backed him through 1941 & 1942.

Another point often missed is King did not accend to CNO until January 1942, when Op Drumbeat was already underway. The role his predecessor had in setting up the USN side of the situation in January 1942 is often overlooked.

Then there is a small glitch on the intelligence side. Until the Germans deployed their Type IX boats to the east coast of the US no one had any idea it was possible. It had been correctly estimated the common submarine models could not effective patrol along the east coast or the Caribbean & Gulf of Mexico. It was not at all understood a dozen of the long range Type IX subs could be simultaneously deployed to the west Atlantic for extended patrols. While the Brits did see a possibility & give warning they still seem to have underestimated the threat.
 
I don't remember Blair having much to say about Hap Arnold of the Army Air Forces and Harris of RAF Bomber Command dismissing the need for robust aircraft patrols.

Actually, he mentions that Hap Arnold was against giving the B-17's and B-24's to the Navy and same with Bomber Command to Coastal Command. I don't think he mentioned Harris much, but I've so far only read the first volume, which goes up to August 1942.
 
I thought British experience had shown that inadequately escorted convoys involved lower losses from uboats than independently routed ships. This was because uboats had a very small search area in any given period and so were unlikely to locate a convoy, implying no losses (or only one or two in the rare event they found a convoy), whereas there was a decent chance they would find one or two targets if targets were scattered independently. Large numbers of uboats and search aircraft might change this but neither really held in the Western Atlantic in 1942. If true this implies that the issue wasn't the availability of resources but an institutional failure to learn from British experience and organise accordingly.
 
If true this implies that the issue wasn't the availability of resources but an institutional failure to learn from British experience and organise accordingly.

That was exactly the problem. The USN totally ignored British experience that even lightly-escorted convoys were safer than independently-routed ships, and that sending warships out on patrol was a waste of resources. The myth that there was a shortage of escorts arose because the Americans basically said "We want to send out all these ships to thrash about the ocean hoping to come across a U-boat, and after doing that we don't have any for convoys". To add to the display of incompetence, they bought into the fatuous belief that 'a convoy with inadequate escorts is worse then no convoy at all', although it had been clearly demonstrated that even an unescorted convoy is safer than sailing ships independently, and the safety of the ships increased as the number of escorts increased: one escort is much better than zero; two escorts are better than one, and so on.

The problem with Clay's books is that he has an agenda: to whitewash the USN and King, and shift all the blame to Roosevelt and the British.
 
The myth that there was a shortage of escorts arose because the Americans basically said "We want to send out all these ships to thrash about the ocean hoping to come across a U-boat, and after doing that we don't have any for convoys".

I'd agree with most of what you're saying but I think there was a genuine shortage of escorts regardless of whether convoy was introduced, I think we would both agree that not introducing convoys was not the appropriate response to an escort shortage
 
That was exactly the problem. The USN totally ignored British experience that even lightly-escorted convoys were safer than independently-routed ships, and that sending warships out on patrol was a waste of resources. The myth that there was a shortage of escorts arose because the Americans basically said "We want to send out all these ships to thrash about the ocean hoping to come across a U-boat, and after doing that we don't have any for convoys". To add to the display of incompetence, they bought into the fatuous belief that 'a convoy with inadequate escorts is worse then no convoy at all', although it had been clearly demonstrated that even an unescorted convoy is safer than sailing ships independently, and the safety of the ships increased as the number of escorts increased: one escort is much better than zero; two escorts are better than one, and so on.

The problem with Clay's books is that he has an agenda: to whitewash the USN and King, and shift all the blame to Roosevelt and the British.


What is the basis of your opinion that Blair is biased?
 
Obviously I don't have a copy of Blair in front of me. I recall he at least refered to the question of disruption to industrial deliveries as convoys were organized. Did he delve into numbers on this? Klien in 'A Call to Arms' does devote a paragraph to the subject, but was unable to research the claims.
 
Obviously I don't have a copy of Blair in front of me. I recall he at least refered to the question of disruption to industrial deliveries as convoys were organized. Did he delve into numbers on this? Klien in 'A Call to Arms' does devote a paragraph to the subject, but was unable to research the claims.

Well, Blair said that organizing convoys cut British imports by a quarter at the beginning of the war, and presumably a similar effect would happen with American convoys.
 
I don't think back of the envelope estimates would prove much there. Would take some serious research and number crunching to show that the economic loss from a hasty start of convoys Dec-Jan would outweigh the losses from Op Drumbeat in Jan-Feb & on. Klein points to a claim a rapid ramp up to east coast convoys would have paralyzed industry on the eastern seaboard for 2-3 months, but make no judgement on the accuracy of this or other claims.
 
Then there is a small glitch on the intelligence side. Until the Germans deployed their Type IX boats to the east coast of the US no one had any idea it was possible. It had been correctly estimated the common submarine models could not effective patrol along the east coast or the Caribbean & Gulf of Mexico. It was not at all understood a dozen of the long range Type IX subs could be simultaneously deployed to the west Atlantic for extended patrols. While the Brits did see a possibility & give warning they still seem to have underestimated the threat.

A lot of the losses in the period from Dec 1941 to early 1942 happened in the coastal waters of the US East Water as most of the ASW and escort forces were focused on escorting the trans-Atlantic trips and there were insufficient smaller vessels suitable for coastal operations.
 
I'd agree with most of what you're saying but I think there was a genuine shortage of escorts regardless of whether convoy was introduced, I think we would both agree that not introducing convoys was not the appropriate response to an escort shortage

The Operations Evaluation Group report on WWII ASW contains the following interesting paragraphs:

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/ASW-51/ASW-4.html

In January 1942, the U-boats transferred their attention from the transatlantic and East Atlantic convoys to the unescorted shipping in the West Atlantic. This is reflected in the fact that only 10 per cent of the shipping sunk by U-boats during the first six months of 1942 was in convoy when sunk. This proportion increased again to about 30 per cent during the period July to September 1942 when the bulk of U. S. coastal shipping was being convoyed and the U-boats were attacking the transatlantic convoys again.

It was realized during the early months of the war that convoying was the only solution to the heavy losses off the Atlantic Coast. However, the U. S. Navy, due to its commitments in transatlantic escort and in the Pacific, did not have enough escorts to start the convoying of coastal shipping at the beginning of 1942. To provide additional forces, 24 British antisubmarine trawlers were allocated for service on the American coast and ten British corvettes were turned over to the U. S. Navy. Further, the whole system of transatlantic escort was recast and all antisubmarine forces (U. S. Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Navy) were pooled in a single cross-Atlantic convoy scheme. This resulted in a certain economy and released a limited number of U. S. destroyers.

With the forces thus available and with the increased production of antisubmarine ships in the United States, it was possible to start convoying in the Western Atlantic in May 1942. Coastal convoys between Norfolk, Virginia, and Key West, Florida, started running on May 14. By opening up the transatlantic convoy cycle, the British were able to divert enough forces to the Caribbean to start convoys, mainly for tankers, over the Trinidad-Halifax and Aruba-Curacao-Trinidad routes.

During July, the convoy system on the cast coast was greatly extended, with convoys running between Trinidad and Key West by way of Curacao and Aruba. Convoys were instituted between Panama and Guantanamo to connect with the other convoys. Convoys were also started in the Gulf of Mexico and the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
 

hipper

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Well, Blair said that organizing convoys cut British imports by a quarter at the beginning of the war, and presumably a similar effect would happen with American convoys.

Presumably the effects of not sailing at night cut coastal shipping efficency by. 50%, The numbers had been measured in WW1, the introduction of Convoy drops merchant shipping efficency by 18% over individually routed ships in wartime. However due to losses incurred in the non convoyed ships convoy becomes more efficient in a few months.
 
The problem with Clay's books is that he has an agenda: to whitewash the USN and King, and shift all the blame to Roosevelt and the British.

As a more general point, are there any writers critical of the US war effort in the mould of Correlli Barnett?
 
As a more general point, are there any writers critical of the US war effort in the mould of Correlli Barnett?

I thought Barnett was very critical of the British war effort? Was he critical of both?

I think Drumbeat is the most common criticism of the US War effort, since it was perhaps the most glaring deficiency.
 
I thought Barnett was very critical of the British war effort? Was he critical of both?

I think Drumbeat is the most common criticism of the US War effort, since it was perhaps the most glaring deficiency.
I think the question was whether there is anyone as critical of the US war effort in general as Barnett was of the British war effort.

I'm not aware of any, although there is plenty of criticism of individual decisions/campaigns. This could reflect a perception of a better run war effort, a larger safety margin in the US war effort, that the US only stood on the defensive for about a year and after that had the initiative, or just that the whole US war effort is less often told as a single narrative due to its greater geographic diffusion and greater compression in time.
 
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I think the question was whether there is anyone as critical of the US war effort in general as Barnett was of the British war effort.

I'm not aware of any, although there is plenty of criticism of individual decisions/campaigns. This could reflect a perception of a better run war effort, a larger safety margin in the US war effort, that the US only stood on the defensive for about a year and after that had the initiative, or just that the whole US war effort is less often told as a single narrative due to its greater geographic diffusion and greater compression in time.

Well it's difficult to criticize the American war effort to much because they started getting into the war around peak Axis and gained the initiative in less than a year in both theaters.
 
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