As far as troop quality I will take combat veterans against green troops every time unless the technological difference is vast or the veteran troops got their experience by fighting armies much weaker then themselves. Neither is true of both armies of the Civil War which used basically the same technology as the European ones and had a considerable number of veteran troops even in 1864. The European troops would have been massacred by American ones in equal numbers after late 1862. Most American troops by that period would not panic easily, would know which positions to pick to hold their ground etc. Most European troops would have been green and would panic comparatively easy, would make tactical errors in picking positions to hold etc. just like the American ones did earlier. Even the officers, not talking enlisted, would tend to make more errors. It is one thing to make decisions on paper or even an exercise then to make them in a real battle field where you can get killed, people are screaming in pain all around you and the troops sometimes panic. This is true of the Americans too but by late 1862 they are used to it and the Europeans are not.
Civil War Sealion: The Capture of Washington, D.C.
- Thread starter Amerigo Vespucci
- Start date
As far as troop quality I will take combat veterans against green troops every time unless the technological difference is vast or the veteran troops got their experience by fighting armies much weaker then themselves. Neither is true of both armies of the Civil War which used basically the same technology as the European ones and had a considerable number of veteran troops even in 1864. The European troops would have been massacred by American ones in equal numbers after late 1862. Most American troops by that period would not panic easily, would know which positions to pick to hold their ground etc. Most European troops would have been green and would panic comparatively easy, would make tactical errors in picking positions to hold etc. just like the American ones did earlier. Even the officers, not talking enlisted, would tend to make more errors. It is one thing to make decisions on paper or even an exercise then to make them in a real battle field where you can get killed, people are screaming in pain all around you and the troops sometimes panic. This is true of the Americans too but by late 1862 they are used to it and the Europeans are not.
67th Tigers
Banned
This is not really true. It is 1864 before the Union is really wholly armed with rifles (and the Rebs still have a reasonably large number of smoothbores then). In late 1862 the primary weapons on both sides are smoothbores, the USA had half a million percussion smoothbores in stocks in 1861, and only 60,000 rifle-muskets, and only produced about another 50,000 rifle-muskets in the intervening 18 months. According to Lonn there was serious problems equipping the Union army with such things as boots, and paying them (some regiments went for over a year before pay arrived), and this led to the ridiculous rates of absenteeism (50% of the Army of the Potomac had absented themselves for Antietam).
As in the Veteran Regiments etc. raised for garrison duties from the men discharged?
Really? How so?
Really? I'm assuming we're referring to post 12th May 1864 (when the first real breastworks were dug in a hasty defence posture). This is really the date we can pin the point where ACW tactics reached their peak of competance, as it's also the date Union II Corps forms a proper Attack Column and smashes through the thin linear defences of the CS Army before being stopped by several determined counterattacks. Unfortunately, after this they stopped attacking (just as they worked out that Napoleons solution to the tactical problem worked) and adopted that was in effect seige warfare.
This is plainly ridiculous. The British, French, Danes, Prussians, Russians, Austrians and Italians had fought several major wars during the decade before the ACW.
The problem American troops tended to have was that attacks were rarely pressed hard. An attack would typically run out of imputus between 100 and 50 yards from the enemy positions/ lines, and degenerate into a fairly prolonged firefight. The problem was how to get unwilling troops to cross that deadly ground (and "veterans" were usually less willing to do it than green troops, it's a known phenonmemon that combat troops actually get worse during their first few exposures to combat before getting better). The main method tried by the ACW officers was to feed in reinforcements constantly in the hope that each successive line would push closer in until finally they got close enough to assault the enemy at close quarters. They tried this 16 times at Maryle's Heights (16 brigade attacks en echelon). Unfortunately the tendency was for the reinforcement waves to get as far as the previous waves and just stop.
This was less of a problem in Europe, where armies generally pressed their attacks. The French in 1859 charged through massed rifle and artillery fire, while delivering accurate fire of their own, closed to bayonet range and routinely defeated Austrian formations 3-4 times their size. The 2 British Divisions in 1854 had charged over a river, up a hill and smashed a well entrenched Russian Corps.
That's a rather interesting notion. For a start, ACW firefights are not terribly deadly. It took more than 800 rounds of small arms fire to score a hit (vs one encounter in the Crimean where a British volley got 1 in 7 hits, and the 93rd Highlanders smashed an entire Russian division in 30 seconds, albeit an encounter in the fog at 60 yards), although there's a huge difference in the actual lethality and the perceived lethality, particularly amongst those who've served less than 2 years.
>This is not really true. It is 1864 before the Union is really wholly armed with rifles (and the Rebs still have a reasonably large number of smoothbores then). In late 1862 the primary weapons on both sides are smoothbores, the USA had half a million percussion smoothbores in stocks in 1861, and only 60,000 rifle-muskets, and only produced about another 50,000 rifle-muskets in the intervening 18 months. According to Lonn there was serious problems equipping the Union army with such things as boots, and paying them (some regiments went for over a year before pay arrived), and this led to the ridiculous rates of absenteeism (50% of the Army of the Potomac had absented themselves for Antietam).
Which takes you to mid 1863 at worst and the number soars after that.
As in the Veteran Regiments etc. raised for garrison duties from the men discharged?
> During the entire war there were units that served in the war from start to finish.
>Really? How so?
Experience mainly.
Really? I'm assuming we're referring to post 12th May 1864 (when the first real breastworks were dug in a hasty defence posture). This is really the date we can pin the point where ACW tactics reached their peak of competance, as it's also the date Union II Corps forms a proper Attack Column and smashes through the thin linear defences of the CS Army before being stopped by several determined counterattacks. Unfortunately, after this they stopped attacking (just as they worked out that Napoleons solution to the tactical problem worked) and adopted that was in effect seige warfare.
> Which is almost always happens when the opposition have entrenched rifles and cannon. They get blown the hell away.
This is plainly ridiculous. The British, French, Danes, Prussians, Russians, Austrians and Italians had fought several major wars during the decade before the ACW.
> Mostly against colonials and poorly led revolutionaries
The problem American troops tended to have was that attacks were rarely pressed hard. An attack would typically run out of imputus between 100 and 50 yards from the enemy positions/ lines, and degenerate into a fairly prolonged firefight. The problem was how to get unwilling troops to cross that deadly ground (and "veterans" were usually less willing to do it than green troops, it's a known phenonmemon that combat troops actually get worse during their first few exposures to combat before getting better). The main method tried by the ACW officers was to feed in reinforcements constantly in the hope that each successive line would push closer in until finally they got close enough to assault the enemy at close quarters. They tried this 16 times at Maryle's Heights (16 brigade attacks en echelon). Unfortunately the tendency was for the reinforcement waves to get as far as the previous waves and just stop.
> Against massed infantry and cannon on high ground? Of course your going to be cut to pieces. Butler was an idiot even to attempt it.
This was less of a problem in Europe, where armies generally pressed their attacks. The French in 1859 charged through massed rifle and artillery fire, while delivering accurate fire of their own, closed to bayonet range and routinely defeated Austrian formations 3-4 times their size. The 2 British Divisions in 1854 had charged over a river, up a hill and smashed a well entrenched Russian Corps.
> With mostly smoothbore muskets. The problem is that without tanks infantry attacks tend to be cut to pieces by entrenched troops.
That's a rather interesting notion. For a start, ACW firefights are not terribly deadly. It took more than 800 rounds of small arms fire to score a hit (vs one encounter in the Crimean where a British volley got 1 in 7 hits, and the 93rd Highlanders smashed an entire Russian division in 30 seconds, albeit an encounter in the fog at 60 yards), although there's a huge difference in the actual lethality and the perceived lethality, particularly amongst those who've served less than 2 years.
> By the Civil War soldiers figured out the way to keep the enemy from attacking and keep defenders from sticking their heads out is to shoot. You don't have to actually hit them to pin them down. With ammunition production that was getting higher by the year for the North it paid to keep on shooting as there were always more bullets from where they came from. Even the Confederate army was not short of ammunition by the end of the war not talking about the Union one.
Which takes you to mid 1863 at worst and the number soars after that.
As in the Veteran Regiments etc. raised for garrison duties from the men discharged?
> During the entire war there were units that served in the war from start to finish.
>Really? How so?
Experience mainly.
Really? I'm assuming we're referring to post 12th May 1864 (when the first real breastworks were dug in a hasty defence posture). This is really the date we can pin the point where ACW tactics reached their peak of competance, as it's also the date Union II Corps forms a proper Attack Column and smashes through the thin linear defences of the CS Army before being stopped by several determined counterattacks. Unfortunately, after this they stopped attacking (just as they worked out that Napoleons solution to the tactical problem worked) and adopted that was in effect seige warfare.
> Which is almost always happens when the opposition have entrenched rifles and cannon. They get blown the hell away.
This is plainly ridiculous. The British, French, Danes, Prussians, Russians, Austrians and Italians had fought several major wars during the decade before the ACW.
> Mostly against colonials and poorly led revolutionaries
The problem American troops tended to have was that attacks were rarely pressed hard. An attack would typically run out of imputus between 100 and 50 yards from the enemy positions/ lines, and degenerate into a fairly prolonged firefight. The problem was how to get unwilling troops to cross that deadly ground (and "veterans" were usually less willing to do it than green troops, it's a known phenonmemon that combat troops actually get worse during their first few exposures to combat before getting better). The main method tried by the ACW officers was to feed in reinforcements constantly in the hope that each successive line would push closer in until finally they got close enough to assault the enemy at close quarters. They tried this 16 times at Maryle's Heights (16 brigade attacks en echelon). Unfortunately the tendency was for the reinforcement waves to get as far as the previous waves and just stop.
> Against massed infantry and cannon on high ground? Of course your going to be cut to pieces. Butler was an idiot even to attempt it.
This was less of a problem in Europe, where armies generally pressed their attacks. The French in 1859 charged through massed rifle and artillery fire, while delivering accurate fire of their own, closed to bayonet range and routinely defeated Austrian formations 3-4 times their size. The 2 British Divisions in 1854 had charged over a river, up a hill and smashed a well entrenched Russian Corps.
> With mostly smoothbore muskets. The problem is that without tanks infantry attacks tend to be cut to pieces by entrenched troops.
That's a rather interesting notion. For a start, ACW firefights are not terribly deadly. It took more than 800 rounds of small arms fire to score a hit (vs one encounter in the Crimean where a British volley got 1 in 7 hits, and the 93rd Highlanders smashed an entire Russian division in 30 seconds, albeit an encounter in the fog at 60 yards), although there's a huge difference in the actual lethality and the perceived lethality, particularly amongst those who've served less than 2 years.
> By the Civil War soldiers figured out the way to keep the enemy from attacking and keep defenders from sticking their heads out is to shoot. You don't have to actually hit them to pin them down. With ammunition production that was getting higher by the year for the North it paid to keep on shooting as there were always more bullets from where they came from. Even the Confederate army was not short of ammunition by the end of the war not talking about the Union one.
Now assuming the Confederates had all their ducks in a row (logistics, manpower, speed, surprise, superior tactics) I suspect the best we'd hear would be that lone cannon ball hitting the white house, or congress. This would be nothing more then a waste of supplies. Once the Confederates get close enough to cause damage, army units from surronding states would be on the way.
67th Tigers
Banned
Again, it takes until fairly late in 1864 to get enough rifles to arm every Union soldier. In fact, it never quite happened given the extreme lack of care the Union soldier had for his rifle. Until production really ramped up in 1863 the Union were losing rifles (to rust, or simple casting away of arms by troops) faster than they manufactured them, saved only by the fact that they could import whatever surplus rubbish the European nations would export.
Yes, they were called the Regular Army.
Nope, only if mishandled. It simply becomes a different tactical problem to solve. Most European Armies had faced this problem and overcome it. The ACW armies did find a solution, but then abandoned it as they had no real shock cavalry forces to exploit the situation.
Nope again. This period of time sees the emergence of modern warfare, except it doesn't happen in America, it happens in Europe. Well, strictly speaking it begins in North Africa in the 1830's with rifle armed Muslims fighting the French....
Yet the British did it in 1854 against more opposition with less troops committed....
It's
Nope, they were armed with P1851 Minie Rifles.
Tanks are not really a requirement until the combination of barbed wire, smokeless powder, belt fed weapons and indirect fire artillery come into play 50 odd years after the ACW. In fact there were a lot of quite successful attacks fight into WW1 without tanks.
In fact, I don't remember many tanks being available to 2nd Bn, Scots Guards as they charged up Mount Tumbledown against the elite Argentine 5th Marine Bn in an extremely fortified position and taking it at bayonet point....
Suppressive fire simply doesn't exist in the doctrine of the time, in fact it would be pretty counterproductive, simply firing off ammunition (which is scarce, these aren't 5.56mm where an infantryman can easily carry the best part of a thousand rounds if necessary, it was a struggle to carry 60 odd rounds), and a lot of firefights were settled by one side simply running out of ammunition and being forced to retire.
Also, both sides simply didn't have the gunpowder to waste. The supply was basically restricted to whatever the British could (or would) supply, at least until 1864 when DuPont's guano process started to generate results. Both sides were realistically restricted to about 2,000 tons a year of powder use (if none was required for artillery, the navy, mining etc. this equates to 500 million shots of rifle ammunition)
Anaxagoras
Banned
In his official report, Grant states that Early could have entered Washington before reinforcements had arrived, had he not been delayed by the Battle of Monocacy.
67th Tigers
Banned
Exactly, it was not the fortifications that stopped Early, it was the fact that he'd contacted the lead elements of two Union Corps which had just transshipped up from Virginia
Again, it takes until fairly late in 1864 to get enough rifles to arm every Union soldier. In fact, it never quite happened given the extreme lack of care the Union soldier had for his rifle. Until production really ramped up in 1863 the Union were losing rifles (to rust, or simple casting away of arms by troops) faster than they manufactured them, saved only by the fact that they could import whatever surplus rubbish the European nations would export.
Yes, they were called the Regular Army.
>By mid April 1864 at least 136,000 veterns resigned and mostly by unit.
Nope, only if mishandled. It simply becomes a different tactical problem to solve. Most European Armies had faced this problem and overcome it. The ACW armies did find a solution, but then abandoned it as they had no real shock cavalry forces to exploit the situation.
> Doubt it. Entrenched infantry is damned hard to beat without tanks.
Nope again. This period of time sees the emergence of modern warfare, except it doesn't happen in America, it happens in Europe. Well, strictly speaking it begins in North Africa in the 1830's with rifle armed Muslims fighting the French....
> A small time colonial fight in North Africa over Algeria is the emergence of modern warfare? You don't need new methods to beat Arabs.
Yet the British did it in 1854 against more opposition with less troops committed....
> So did Grant's army in Tennesee, sometimes you get lucky. You can't do it consistantly. One battle means squat.
Tanks are not really a requirement until the combination of barbed wire, smokeless powder, belt fed weapons and indirect fire artillery come into play 50 odd years after the ACW. In fact there were a lot of quite successful attacks fight into WW1 without tanks.
> And far more bloody repulses. You CAN get lucky once in a while but the vast majority of the time you don't.
In fact, I don't remember many tanks being available to 2nd Bn, Scots Guards as they charged up Mount Tumbledown against the elite Argentine 5th Marine Bn in an extremely fortified position and taking it at bayonet point....
>Again one battle means almost nothing. How many times did the Brits attack and get torn to pieces?
Suppressive fire simply doesn't exist in the doctrine of the time, in fact it would be pretty counterproductive, simply firing off ammunition (which is scarce, these aren't 5.56mm where an infantryman can easily carry the best part of a thousand rounds if necessary, it was a struggle to carry 60 odd rounds), and a lot of firefights were settled by one side simply running out of ammunition and being forced to retire.
Also, both sides simply didn't have the gunpowder to waste. The supply was basically restricted to whatever the British could (or would) supply, at least until 1864 when DuPont's guano process started to generate results. Both sides were realistically restricted to about 2,000 tons a year of powder use (if none was required for artillery, the navy, mining etc. this equates to 500 million shots of rifle ammunition)
>800 shots per kill suggests they had PLENTY of ammo to waste unless you want to imply that Union and Confederate soldiers were half blind and lousy shots. I am a pretty bad shot but with 800 of them I can turn somebody into Swiss Cheese if I don't have to keep my head down.
Yes, they were called the Regular Army.
>By mid April 1864 at least 136,000 veterns resigned and mostly by unit.
Nope, only if mishandled. It simply becomes a different tactical problem to solve. Most European Armies had faced this problem and overcome it. The ACW armies did find a solution, but then abandoned it as they had no real shock cavalry forces to exploit the situation.
> Doubt it. Entrenched infantry is damned hard to beat without tanks.
Nope again. This period of time sees the emergence of modern warfare, except it doesn't happen in America, it happens in Europe. Well, strictly speaking it begins in North Africa in the 1830's with rifle armed Muslims fighting the French....
> A small time colonial fight in North Africa over Algeria is the emergence of modern warfare? You don't need new methods to beat Arabs.
Yet the British did it in 1854 against more opposition with less troops committed....
> So did Grant's army in Tennesee, sometimes you get lucky. You can't do it consistantly. One battle means squat.
Tanks are not really a requirement until the combination of barbed wire, smokeless powder, belt fed weapons and indirect fire artillery come into play 50 odd years after the ACW. In fact there were a lot of quite successful attacks fight into WW1 without tanks.
> And far more bloody repulses. You CAN get lucky once in a while but the vast majority of the time you don't.
In fact, I don't remember many tanks being available to 2nd Bn, Scots Guards as they charged up Mount Tumbledown against the elite Argentine 5th Marine Bn in an extremely fortified position and taking it at bayonet point....
>Again one battle means almost nothing. How many times did the Brits attack and get torn to pieces?
Suppressive fire simply doesn't exist in the doctrine of the time, in fact it would be pretty counterproductive, simply firing off ammunition (which is scarce, these aren't 5.56mm where an infantryman can easily carry the best part of a thousand rounds if necessary, it was a struggle to carry 60 odd rounds), and a lot of firefights were settled by one side simply running out of ammunition and being forced to retire.
Also, both sides simply didn't have the gunpowder to waste. The supply was basically restricted to whatever the British could (or would) supply, at least until 1864 when DuPont's guano process started to generate results. Both sides were realistically restricted to about 2,000 tons a year of powder use (if none was required for artillery, the navy, mining etc. this equates to 500 million shots of rifle ammunition)
>800 shots per kill suggests they had PLENTY of ammo to waste unless you want to imply that Union and Confederate soldiers were half blind and lousy shots. I am a pretty bad shot but with 800 of them I can turn somebody into Swiss Cheese if I don't have to keep my head down.
J, not sure if this is yours or a quote but believe me when three quarter inch bullets are flying over and around you and artillery shells are going boom your aim is effected.
J, not sure if this is yours or a quote but believe me when three quarter inch bullets are flying over and around you and artillery shells are going boom your aim is effected.
True enough but if there isn't a hail of bullets (Like he implies) then your aim isn't as bad. You can have one or the other, not both. I have read far too many depictions of Civil War battles where there is a good deal of evidence that ammunition wasn't being conserved very much. Too many statements of soldiers firing with demonical fury. Remember there were considerable periods of time going by between major battles. Until 1864 you did not have the two armies constantly banging away at each other. You don't need nearly as much ammo if there are weeks going by between major battles.
Add to that accounts of soldiers tossing their rifles to the ground, due to stuffing the paper cartridges wrong, and using a dead mans rifle. In Gettysberg, and Bull Run numerous Union soldiers gathered multiple rifles from the dead and took quick shots before taking cover to reload. So while not the heavy suppressive fire we are familiar with, it was rather easy to create a high volume of fire to hold back the enemy.
Shrugs, happens in most wars. The Civil war was neither the first or last war where soldiers thew away their weapons or took weapons and ammunition from the dead. It is certainly not 20th century heavy machine gun fire but you don't need that to keep somebody pinned.
Right and yet people still cling to the image of pristine rows, getting fifteen feet away and shooting. From the battle fields I've been to, Gettysberg being the freshest in my mind, the distances fought utterly destroy mental imagines of set battles. Take little round top, at one point the Union was firing at rebels moving up the east side (or whatever direction the forrest is not on) hill, the distance was like a foot ball field. So add that to the rate of fire that ten-twenty men can fire in a minute, and a killing field is made.
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67th Tigers
Banned
For garrison duty.
That's a very strange notion, and completely at odds with the sum total of combat experience of the last 200 years.
That's incredibly ignorant. Algeria sees the introduction of light infantry and rifle tactics as the norm in a continental army.
When? Vicksburg? That was a pretty typical siege with every assault failing...
Never, the six major infantry assaults against extremely entrenched positions in a defenders paradise were all successful (Goose Green, Mt Harriett, Mt Longdon, Wireless Ridge, Mt Tumbledown and Two Sisters)
[/quote]
Rubbish at shooting, yes, obviously, for the obvious reasons (which I suspect you don't know).
Also, as I've said, ammunition of this time is much, much heavier than contemporary ammunition. Troops usually carried only 50-60 rounds, and resupply was very hapahazard.
As has been shown from the records, in a typical standup ACW firefight between two regiments, both sides will inflict about 1 casualty on the other per minute, and run out of ammunition in 15-30 minutes (depending on their rate and how much they're carrying).
67th Tigers
Banned
That would be the southside, and Little Round Top was decided by firefighting at 10 paces. Depending on your assumptions we can estimate that maybe 1% of the 20th Maines fire actually hit something at ca 25ft (depending how many Alabamans were bayoneted, or killed/wounded taking Great Round Top)
Grant's decision at Vicksburg was entirely sound. He could launch one or more bloody assaults guaranteed to dramatically reduce his forces even in victory or he could conduct a seige which ensured a slower but much less costly victory. Since the CSA had no relief force available and the end at Vicksburg free Grant's forces for use elsewhere it worked out fine.
67th Tigers
Banned
I agree, Grant did stirling work at Vicksburg.
However, my opposite number seems convinced that Grant's army in the West successfully stormed fortified infantry. We have to fastforward to Upton's attack at Spotslyvannia Courthouse for that....
Just as how some people were convinced that California had 20,000 troops ready to join the Confederacy?
67th Tigers
Banned
Just as how some people were convinced that California had 20,000 troops ready to join the Confederacy?
Strictly speaking, they aren't troops, but the contemporary assessments that 20,000 men would take up arms for the Pacific Republic (and de facto the CSA) seems fair.
In fact, the 1860 vote was:
38,733 Republican
37,999 Northern Democrat
33,969 Southern Democrat
9,111 Constitutional Union
or roughly the same number, and a greater share of the vote for the pro-secession party as that "bastion of the north", Missouri (although perhaps it's worth noting that a greater percentage of Pennslyvanians voted for the pro-secession party)
Actually the South did have a "Relief Force" it was turned back by the Union forces near Jackson the Relief Force was Joe Johnston's Army of Tennessee.