Status
Not open for further replies.
Melting Pot: The Immigrant Stories That America is Made Of
"...the treatment German-Americans received during the brief "gunboat war" of 1887, which had remarkably few casualties outside of the Samoan Archipelago, was ended with a small indemnity to pay for the damaged ships and Germany acquiescing to an unfavorable settlement in Samoa in return for Britain supporting her colonial positions elsewhere in order to mollify both parties, was mild by the standards that expats would receive in later wars, both in the United States and elsewhere. But still, public sentiment turning frosty towards Germans during those tense months of interdicted shipping and the mobilization of the Pacific Squadron to sail to Apia Harbor was a galvanizing moment at a time when German-Americans were already consolidating as an ethnic group. The internal divisions between Catholics and Lutherans and the regional differences between Prussian, Rhenish or South German immigrants were papered over as they came to feel increasingly under attack during the late 1880s; the hostility of the public, sudden and fierce, after the Battle of Apia Harbor reached American print newspapers shocked many Germans who had long felt uneasy with the increasing pressure on them to abandon their heritage. The Liberal Party of James G. Blaine had, in the states, pursued aggressive literacy and educational expansion programs; these were laudable initiatives, but also ones that largely circumscribed education in any language other than English. The Liberal Party's base was Protestant, alienating Catholics, but also pietistic, causing a clash with German Lutherans both of and not of the Confessional school, as well as other liturgical denominations. Thus, the issue of language schools, pietistic moralism and, increasingly, the rising influence of the Anti-Saloon League as a pressure group and the Prohibition Party as a small but influential political organization, pushed Germans together in a way that they had not bonded before. In that sense, they became up for grabs - even German liberals, rock-ribbed in their support of Republicans and favorable to Blaine in the previous two elections, had already started swinging Democratic and did so even more. In order to preserve their denominational schools in the face of amendments designed to defund them, in order to preserve their language in the face of what they saw as efforts to eradicate it, and to continue their cultural heritage in the face of what they saw as efforts to demand full assimilation, the German-American identity, and the cultural institutions of "Germania" that followed, had their first burgeoning in the late 1880s as Catholic and Lutheran organizations set aside their differences to join forces in common cause [1]..."

- Melting Pot: The Immigrant Stories That America is Made Of (John Wyche, 2007)

(That the war is more of a minor colonial conflict and not World War freaking One, and there is not a Democratic Solid South, changes the trajectory of German-American identity quite a bit)
 
How the West Was Won: The Conquest and Settlement of the North American Frontier
"...perhaps no episode emphasizes the brutality, racism and naked capitalism of the Old West as much as the Hells Canyon massacre of May 1887 [1]. Thirty-four Chinese gold miners were ambushed in eastern Oregon by what are alleged to be horse thieves; that they could have been a posse organized by a local sheriff is possible too. All thirty-four men were shot and left for dead, and the perpetrators were not only let off by a jury, but even celebrated! The Knights of Labor, which at the time enjoyed its strongest support in the West not due to the large-scale industrialization there but largely due to the West's penchant for radical politics of both the progressive and reactionary kind, distributed leaflets encouraging the release of the killers and the "project of deportation of all Chinamen from California and Oregon" to continue. Washington's statehood, accepted in late 1887, included provisions that severely restricted the ability to hire "Chinese labor," with the clauses referencing the Thirteenth Amendment. (That all the major Western states were Democratic strongholds and also fiercely using the Thirteenth Amendment to justify racial politics reminiscent of the Confederacy is an irony that should not be lost on anyone). For all their campaigns for fair wages in the Gilded Age, the KoL decisively excluded Chinese labor - even black Knights, otherwise discriminated against and at the bottom of the socioeconomic pile, often participated in what could politely be described as pogroms and race riots against Chinese immigrants in Western cities..."

- How the West Was Won: The Conquest and Settlement of the North American Frontier [2]


[1] Real event
[2] As a reminder, the narrative of this textbook sounds the way it does by virtue of it being written by Howard Zinn
 
Interesting. I thought that the Samoa Crisis would be like an earlier Spanish-American War, but here, it seems to be more of an identity marker for German-Americans. Rather than becoming "proper," integrated Liberals, even Protestant German-Americans are starting to tilt toward the Democratic camp. TTL's Democrats will become even more of a party of immigrants than OTL, with the exception of Chinese Americans, which sets some interesting butterflies. Also, Belgium seems to be on the cusp of some interesting times with its "party prince," while Germany plugs along as boring as ever and Canada becomes increasingly reactionary. Will we see a contemporary Great White North famous not for its progressivism but for its conservatism in comparison to the more radical US?
 
Interesting. I thought that the Samoa Crisis would be like an earlier Spanish-American War, but here, it seems to be more of an identity marker for German-Americans. Rather than becoming "proper," integrated Liberals, even Protestant German-Americans are starting to tilt toward the Democratic camp. TTL's Democrats will become even more of a party of immigrants than OTL, with the exception of Chinese Americans, which sets some interesting butterflies. Also, Belgium seems to be on the cusp of some interesting times with its "party prince," while Germany plugs along as boring as ever and Canada becomes increasingly reactionary. Will we see a contemporary Great White North famous not for its progressivism but for its conservatism in comparison to the more radical US?

Once again I must compliment you on picking up where the winds are blowing in this TL!

We'll get a bit more into the Samoa Crisis in the next few updates (probably tomorrow but maybe tonight if I'm in the mood) but it's definitely an even more minor conflict than the spat between Chile and the US. But yes, one of the big changes in this TL will be Canada serving as the British Empire's most reactionary bulwark compared to a more open, progressive United States. In some ways we're switching their places from OTL, though of course for different reasons; Canadian Protestant chauvinism driven by the Orange Order doesn't map perfectly to the causes of postbellum Southern conservatism
 
Once again I must compliment you on picking up where the winds are blowing in this TL!

We'll get a bit more into the Samoa Crisis in the next few updates (probably tomorrow but maybe tonight if I'm in the mood) but it's definitely an even more minor conflict than the spat between Chile and the US. But yes, one of the big changes in this TL will be Canada serving as the British Empire's most reactionary bulwark compared to a more open, progressive United States. In some ways we're switching their places from OTL, though of course for different reasons; Canadian Protestant chauvinism driven by the Orange Order doesn't map perfectly to the causes of postbellum Southern conservatism
Speaking of British Protestant/Catholic tensions, that anecdote about Pope Leo being just accommodating enough to publicly accept the compromise but just stubborn enough to stay on Malta is sort of hilarious. What is even funnier is that nearly everyone agrees that he should return to Rome, but can't publicly say it, which makes the situation even more absurd. It's like the "Prisoner in the Vatican," but with an actual settlement and thus more diplomatic farce.
 
Speaking of British Protestant/Catholic tensions, that anecdote about Pope Leo being just accommodating enough to publicly accept the compromise but just stubborn enough to stay on Malta is sort of hilarious. What is even funnier is that nearly everyone agrees that he should return to Rome, but can't publicly say it, which makes the situation even more absurd. It's like the "Prisoner in the Vatican," but with an actual settlement and thus more diplomatic farce.
haha yup! That's exactly it.

The "Prisoner of the Vatican" complex at least had a logical point; considering how the Italian government was one of the most anticlerical in Europe starting in the early 1870s, in ways that would make Bismarck's Kulturkampf seem mild by the standards of the day, it's understandable that the Church was leery of taking the House of Savoy at their word, especially when one considers how deep-seated the hostility over the Roman Question was as a factor in the Risorgimiento.

Here, the Church's position is much less solid; they're not having to rely on a law passed by an Italian legislature, those fleeting things - the Leonine Compromise is a treaty that literally every European Great Power besides Russia is a party to (YMMV on whether Hohenzollern Spain or a not-dissembled Ottoman Empire are Great Powers; at this point, despite their TTL paths being way smoother, I'd vote no). Italy violating it would result in invasion by not just France and Austria but would be the one clause that would leave Germany on the sidelines in such a general war, and they'd probably forego Britain's help in that case too!
 
Chamberlain's Britain
"...the five year "interregnum," as it became known, between the spring 1885 poll and the autumn 1890 election that returned Liberals to power uninterrupted for a generation, was referred to disparagingly by Chamberlain in his later diaries as "the wilderness." Little did he know that the groundwork he laid as head of the NLF and the most popular public voice in the party was more important during the Tory minority government than ever before - indeed, by the summer of 1887, it looked as if Joseph Chamberlain's chance to one day rise to Downing Street in any capacity, let alone as head of government was effectively at an end. Having been boxed out of high Cabinet office under Harcourt - despite his reforms at the Board of Local Government setting the stage for much of the ballooning in British localism during his later Premiership [1] - and now in opposition, Chamberlain grew restless, impatient, and weary of national politics. But he still felt called; the NLF would likely collapse into infighting despite its well-oiled machinery due to his mercurial nature and singular centrifugal nature as leader. Despite both being radicals on the left of the Liberal Party, he severely distrusted Harcourt but also viewed the likelihood of a Childers or Cavendish Cabinet as a disaster in the offing, the former for his reputation for disaster at every Cabinet office he held - whether it be as First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of War or Chancellor of the Exchequer, Childers had been unpopular in every role - and the latter because Chamberlain feared he would be little more than a catspaw for Hartington, whom he could now freely detest without it threatening a Liberal Cabinet. Dilke, for his part, was too flamboyant, radical and confrontational a man, and prone to scandal, to be a future water-carrier for the burgeoning radicalism Chamberlain continued to work to harness; nor could Lord Ripon in the Lords be the future of the Liberal Party, seeing as he was far too sympathetic to Irish nationalist grievances to be sold to the public. No, it had to be Chamberlain then; it had to be he, with the NLF at his back, that led the Liberals out of the jungles and back into government.

For other Liberals, this was madness - Chamberlain was as much a reason for their struggles as a solution, in their view. His party-within-the-party, though an innovation that had powered previous electoral victories and created a forum for new ideas and participation of working class men who might otherwise be tempted by Churchill's paternalist conservatism
a la francaise, was to the old guard a threat; Lord Hartington in particular, along with his brother, were quiet movers behind the scenes to head off Chamberlain, whom the elder of the Cavendish brothers still blamed for the failure of the Kilmainham Treaty during the Land Wars, despite Chamberlain helping spearhead it, and the collapse of Hartington's hard-won majority thereafter. The influence of the Cavendish brothers was flexed when the Earl of Granville stepped aside as Liberal leader in the Lords; with the constant fighting between Liberals in the Commons, both amongst leaders like Harcourt and Childers and among the junior MPs, a respected figure needed elevation to leader the party in the Tory-dominant body of peers. Ripon was of course an unacceptable option for his radicalism; the Earl of Stanley, a former Prime Minister, was discounted for his prior Toryism; and Rosebery, of course, was so personally disliked by Hartington that the former PM made sure that his potential leadership arrived stillborn. [2]

It came down to the Earl of Kimberley and the Earl of Spencer, two men whom the grand old man himself, Gladstone, waded in out of retirement to endorse. Gladstone's reemergence in 1887 seemed to further dim Chamberlain's star; the attention afforded Gladstone by his old colleagues, and rumors of Gladstone's potential return to the Commons after five years writing and traveling the world, were a direct threat to the ambitions of Liberal leaders. Gladstone's son Herbert, an MP for Leeds, was rumored to be setting the stage for his father's triumphant return from political irrelevance, furthering deepening divisions among various Liberals; on the matter of hoping the leader who had managed to lose "unloseable" elections a generation earlier stayed retired, Chamberlain and Hartington were in rare alignment. More than anything, though nobody expected the 77-year old Gladstone to position himself as a future Prime Minister, it was broadly seen as an effort for him to become a kingmaker and steer one of his two sons to Downing Street, which Chamberlain was greatly concerned by - not only for his own future endeavors, but for those of his son Austen, who was due to return to Britain from Berlin in the next year and whom Chamberlain pere hoped to steer into a Parliamentary constituency. In the end, coolness from many Liberals dissuaded the elderly Gladstone from making the return, but his brief foray into attempting to return helped tip the preference of leadership of the Liberal Lords to Spencer, whom was viewed as being the somewhat-lesser Gladstonian figure from peers wary of Gladstone's influence. The appointment would be fortuitous; Spencer was a man well-regarded throughout the Liberal Party, an Old Whig but yet not hostile to the Radicals of Chamberlain's wing. He was popular, fair, and had not caused controversy in any office previously held. Most importantly, as Liberals in the Commons devoured one another in the press and in backrooms, he was a steady man at the helm in case the tenuous Smith government were to collapse and the Queen needed to invite him to form a caretaker government.

The rise of Spencer in 1887, then, marked the moment when Chamberlain felt the most depressive about his potential to achieve greatness; with the factionalism endemic to the Liberals of the Commons, Spencer was the clear future Prime Minister should the Tory administration fall. The era foretold by the election of 1878 that Chamberlain had helped usher, of a time when Cabinets would not only be led from the Commons but dominated by them, where popular democracy would power Britain, seemed to be waning; not only was Foreign Secretary Salisbury the clearly dominant figure in the Smith Cabinet despite his travails under the controversial and detested Earl of Carnarvon, now even the Liberals seemed to be sliding back into the clutches of the land aristocracy through their own inability to cooperate on behalf of the people. For the radical, now in his fifties and unsure of his personal future and that of his movement - which was still ascendant in hindsight, if not immediately clear at the time - the outlook was dim. Chamberlain shocked the public when later that fall he resigned his seat in Parliament and announced his intention to travel the world for a year. To the public of 1887, it seemed that the flame of Chamberlainic liberalism had burned hot and bright and fast; the age of the Radical Liberal seemed to be passing, especially with the industrial economy sound and the burgeoning City of London growing wealthier through its investments as ever, a trend that would accelerate even further in the late 1880s boom times, with the Great Depression (outside of poor farming communities overwhelmed by cheap American grain that even tariffs reintroduced by the Exchequer that year could not fend off) seemingly a thing of the past.

Little did anyone know, of course, that Chamberlain would come back from his world tour not to fade further into political obscurity, like his peers Harcourt, Childers, Cavendish and even Earl Spencer all would in time, but to become the dominant figure of turn-of-the-century Britain and one of her greatest and most impactful Prime Ministers..."

- Chamberlain's Britain


[1] A biography of Chamberlain in TTL is hard to write without acknowledging that he's going to be PM eventually
[2] Thus heading off yet another OTL Premiership
 
Titan: The Life and Presidency of James G. Blaine
"...though the circumstances of the war itself were quite different - for one, despite Germany being a European Great Power rather than a South American nuisance, the United States had a substantial naval advantage over it even without the ABC Ships that were now in deployment and being routed to the Samoas to reinforce Admiral Kimberly and head off any additional German saber rattling - the reaction among Democrats was the same. Rumors that Kimberly had fired upon German ships first permeated Democratic papers; insinuations that he had done so under standing orders from the Naval Department soon began to spread among some Congressmen, accusations Blaine dismissed as libelous. That the President was again in ill health did not help him, and despite an orderly mobilization of the Navy upon hearing of the debacle at Apia Harbor, memories of war with Chile and that embarrassment were still fresh.

Blaine requested a declaration of war from Congress within days, urged aggressively by Lincoln not to make the same mistake made two years prior. This did not mollify Democratic critics, who coveted the German-American vote and urged diplomacy. As transatlantic telegraph lines lit up, the new Democratic demand became the standing-down of the Navy until a German response was met, or negotiations failed - in one of the most historically-significant decisions of his Presidency, Blaine gambled that he could earn the support of Liberal papers and public for a "gunboat war" that would dissuade Germany from further activity in Samoa before the Kaiserliche Marine was deployed through the Suez and to Cambodia, an effort that he anticipated would take them long than routing the Albany, Boston and Chicago to Apia. In a sense, he was correct; the ABC ships arrived in Apia long before German vessels did, the North Atlantic and European Squadrons spread out across the north Atlantic ocean to patrol for German vessels, and the government in Berlin, with the severely ill Kaiser recovering from throat cancer surgery, blinked when it could not consolidate around a proper response. Thus was much of the puny German Navy sent through Suez to Cambodia, where it would sit uselessly in port after a long sojourn there, while Britain stepped up patrols as well to dissuade commerce raiding by the warring parties - the fears of German ships interdicting American vessels bound for New York or Philadelphia as Chile had in the Pacific never came to fruition.

But in another way, he was not - Blaine's orders for the Navy to engage any and all German-flagged vessels on the high seas outraged the Democratic House, which claimed he was acting unconstitutionally in not seeking a legal declaration of war. Blaine's response, penned by Lincoln personally as his chief legal advisor, with the help of the newly-hired Solicitor General William Taft [1]
from Ohio's prominent Taft family, carefully avoided the use of the words "war" or even "conflict" lest they be used against him or considered to hold legal weight; instead, the Lincoln-Taft Letter, as it came to be known upon its immediate publication in the nation's newspapers, suggested instead that Blaine had mobilized the navy to "guard the Union's merchant marine against the potential of German aggressiveness on the high seas" and "dispatched vessels to Apia Harbor to defend the rightful chieftain of the Samoas." Democrats, instinctively opposed to imperialism specifically and the Navy generally, decried it as a ploy to seize colonies for the Union, a backdoor for the Navy to govern American foreign policy and conduct operations overseas without Congressional oversight, and the end of constitutional democracy. That the United States had technically and in a legal sense waged war against sovereign Indian communities and made treaties with them afterwards for decades held little weight; though there was some cynicism in the Democratic efforts to make the "illegal war" a red line politically, especially viewing German Catholics and Lutherans as a road back to political power in many states, the fear of a politically-powerful Navy that could emerge as a "Fourth Branch" [2] (which the Navy would be nicknamed in later years) was genuinely held for many, and the response threatened to split the party. Many viewed the war realistically as a colonial spat that would be resolved quickly - that Hay was personally sent across the Atlantic to Germany to attempt to settle the matter spoke volumes about the Blaine administration's interest in prosecuting the war. But that it was called a "war" in even Liberal papers became a key point of contention, and pointed to the emerging power of mass media - if the public believed a war that was not a war to be a war, then it was a war, regardless of what the administration claimed.

Blaine, in possibly his career's only substantive mistake, chose not to engage with the crisis beyond the Lincoln-Taft Letter. Increasingly a morose figure of a previous generation, with less than two years of his Presidency left, crippled with bouts of ill health and spending most of the summer as the tempest over the conflict's legal underpinning in Maine rather than Washington, he was a figure withdrawn both from public and political sentiment around him. The Democrats refused twice to grant him a declaration of war, instead imploring him to "seek peace on every sea before a single shell is fired;" Blaine, without Hay around to talk him down, huffed that the US Navy could not wait for "telegrams from Congress" before it decided to defend itself when fired upon, and remarked with amusement that the Democratic position seemed to be to concede to British hegemony to allow them to arbitrate the dispute (the British would, in the end, help arbitrate the dispute regardless). And so the most severe standoff between executive and legislature since the War of Secession blossomed; Blaine refused to order the Navy to withdraw to harbor until negotiations with Germany failed, and thus the Democratic House refused to take up the Liberal Senate's declaration of war on Germany. Blaine blamed Democrats for creating the crisis out of political pique, angering leaders of the opposition; in return, Senator William Rosecrans and a number of House Democrats embarked on a steamship bound for Hamburg to travel as "envoys" to negotiate with the Kaiser, outraging Blaine so badly that he had a severe health episode - possibly a strong - and was forced to retreat to Augusta after having only been in Washington a few days after returning from his summer convalescence. With Hay in Germany already working on a settlement with the help of the British ambassador there - that Hay was much less an Anglophobe than Blaine or any Democrat for once came to be to his advantage - and no Vice President, Lincoln and Goff fell into the role of trying to manage the administration's legal and naval response largely via telegram to Maine. This perhaps only deepened the crisis through their stubbornness - when it emerged through the slip of the tongue of a private secretary that Lincoln and Taft conferred about potentially arresting Rosecrans and his small coterie of Congressmen upon their return from Europe for violating the Logan Act [3] and had consulted with Chief Justice Edmunds about how the Supreme Court might view suits against the President and the mechanics of a potential impeachment trial and how Edmunds would "conduct himself," the Democratic House erupted into outrage, and discussions of impeachment went from idle talk to a reality. Speaker Lamborn, affable but rudderless, suggested that such a move would be too controversial and destructive, involving himself in the dispute for the first time after weeks of silence. Once again, the crisis deepened..." [4]

- Titan: The Life and Presidency of James G. Blaine


[1] Making his first appearance!
[2] Yes, this is indeed the name of the textbook covering the US Navy in Cinco de Mayo
[3] I mean what Rosecrans is doing here is patently illegal under any plain reading of the Logan Act, which has to be fair only been used twice in American history
[4] And let's be honest, this shit is just as much Robert Lincoln's fault as the Chilean-American War snafu was. He really should just stick to golf
 
[3] I mean what Rosecrans is doing here is patently illegal under any plain reading of the Logan Act, which has to be fair only been used twice in American history
When have anti-corruption laws ever gotten in the way of an old-fashioned American political publicity stunt?
 
The German on the Spanish Throne: The Reign of Leopold I
"...Leopold often commented on how he was a rigid and cold Swabian in a land of spirited passions; that the Spanish bickered so much amongst themselves at first amused him but eventually made him weary. That the leaders of his favored National Liberal Party, governing Spain, could not seem to get the knives from each other's throats drove him mad, especially as anarchist-flavored "cantonalist" protests erupted across much to Andalusia in 1887 in a preview of the syndicalist sympathies that would eventually threaten the country's stability under his son's reign. Leopold was more than anything jealous of the self-sustaining placidness of Germany [1] compared to his own realm; the tight grip Serrano held over both his political lieutenants as well as the machinery of state had papered over the rivalries that would detonate with the death of Juan Prim in July of 1887 shortly after the Cantonalist Uprising demanded the dispatch of the military to aggressively put down the rioting workers. With the appointment of Martos to the Premiership, the primistas were once again ascendant at all levels of government despite being outnumbered by the serranistas aligned with Praxedes Mateo Sagasta; the rivalry was even more over patronage, especially amongst the caciques in rural provinces who helped control the votes of the oft-illiterate voters, than it was over ideology, but nevertheless the progressive wing began to clash with the more conservative establishmentarians who had grown fat and content under Serrano, to the point that Leopold noted to his sons that he was worried about a split in the party. This was an unacceptable result to him, to the point that he stuck his nose in the matter more than once, injecting himself into Cabinet disputes now that nearly two decades on the thrown had left him more comfortable in his position. Leopold even entertained a suggestion by Canovas [2] to forge a coalition between serranistas and his own party as a center-right bloc in the Cortes; the increasing sympathy of Martos to more radical ideas regarding anticlericalism, which threatened to destroy the detente between church and state in Spain, as well as unwinding some of Serrano's legacy on centralism in Madrid, lent Leopold some credence to the idea. More than anything, he feared a split in the moderate, stay-the-course National Liberal legacy would open the door to Zorilla's Radicals, a possibility El Escorial could not condone. So Leopold hosted Martos and Sagasta, two men barely on speaking terms but loathe to resign or make any move that would empower the other frequently to prevent their private rivalry from breaking the stability of Spain's political dynamic, a stability which had granted the country a tremendous boon in economic growth and political maturation over the last fifteen years..."

- The German on the Spanish Throne: The Reign of Leopold I


[1] Considering his distant cousin had to put down a putsch and his government is basically just feuding factions, this is ironic, yes
[2] Leader of the Conservative Party of Spain; antiliberal, pro-monarchy, too associated with Carlism to earn much more than 20-25% of the voting bloc
 
The Eaglet Takes Flight: The Reign of Napoleon IV 1874-1905
"...the first steel beams of Eiffel's ambitious tower going up clued Parisians in to the grand affair that was now but two years away; for Napoleon IV, who had heard legends of the 1851 Exposition and its Crystal Palace from his father, the Exposition Universelle that Paris would host in 1889 was an opportunity to rival what the Great Exposition had done for British prestige in the world. There would be no grander show of French Imperial might; in its planning it was audaciously grand and expensive. It was to denote the centennial of the French Revolution, which the Tuileries had taken to celebrating and even appropriating as a marker of French nationalism, tying the Revolution into the Bonaparte imperial myth, and in that way signifying the fusion of radical modernism and monarchy in one (a message which other European monarchies received skeptically). It was to also be a propaganda event for the Second Empire internationally in the way the Triomphe Orientale had been domestically, a gaudy indulgence of France Scientifique and the industrial eruption that had occurred in French cities and the splendor of the overseas French domains, with Eiffel's marvel as its centerpiece on the Champs de Mars..."

- The Eaglet Takes Flight: The Reign of Napoleon IV 1874-1905


(Credit where credit is due: obviously very different circumstances, but recasting the 1889 exposition - which will form the emotional/psychological bookend of the Decade d'Or in France later on - as an orgy of French nationalism rather than the celebration of the Storming of the Bastile is an idea I got in part from the ongoing Boulanger Coup TL by @Exvio74, which is excellent and I fully endorse you all checking out when you have a chance!)
 
This is certainly a much more positive reception than the OTL Eiffel Tower got in its early years. One man ate lunch in the tower every day just because it was the only place he couldn't see the tower.
 
This is certainly a much more positive reception than the OTL Eiffel Tower got in its early years. One man ate lunch in the tower every day just because it was the only place he couldn't see the tower.
It would be interesting if republican critics of the Bonaparte regime latch onto the Eiffel Tower as a symbol of the "soullessness" of building such an edifice on the anniversary of the Revolution while betraying its true principles. That being said, the fact that the Tower would be the tallest in the world will inevitably lead to some pride in the monument.
 
Games Afoot: Association Football, Privilege and the Working Man
"...for the contest between Hibernian and Preston North End was not just an opportunity for Scot and Englishman to joyfully indulge their age old rivalries in a forum for sporting rather than battlefield; it represented the further sophistication of the football club, the beating heart and essence of the rising sport, challenging the aristocratic and collegiate fundamentals of rugby. Whereas on both sides of the Atlantic rugby increasingly became the game of the elite - amateur, for what need would its players have of the wages from professional play, and almost exclusively conducted on the campuses of universities where the capitalist class promulgated - it was football that became the game of the masses, of a simple ball to be kicked about on streets behind factories between shifts, on the schoolyards of undercapitalized public schools and denominational academies where the Jews and Catholics could bond together over a common game, available to all, and where the best players could earn a few shillings or dollars on the side for their performance, a rule of fundamental egalitarianism..."

- Games Afoot: Association Football, Privilege and the Working Man [1]

[1] Soon to be adapted as a feature film by Ken Loach! (This is a joke with an audience of, oh idk, maybe four people, but whatever, I haven't had my coffee and I'm sticking to it)
 
This is certainly a much more positive reception than the OTL Eiffel Tower got in its early years. One man ate lunch in the tower every day just because it was the only place he couldn't see the tower.
I'd never heard that anecdote but that's actually pretty hilarious (and really French haha)

EDIT: Would also note that the source book The Eaglet Takes Flight is hagiographic bordering on sycophantic in its portrayal of the Bonapartes, so a more muddled reaction to the Eiffel Tower probably still occurs TTL among the public
 
The Cornerstone: John Hay and the Foundation of American Global Prestige
"...the deal that Hay returned to Washington with was one of his great prides; though the Germans had not pressed too hard considering the convalescence of their Emperor, the negotiations with German Chancellor Hohenlohe had advanced within weeks to find a face-saving compromise for both parties and Hay and Hohenlohe had traveled to London together to hash out the details under the supervision of Lord Salisbury, who had offered to serve as a neutral arbiter in the matter rather than Sweden's Oscar II, who had made a similar suggestion. As negotiations continued, American gunboats had arrived in Samoa and occupied Apia Harbor under the watchful eye of the Royal Navy; the North Atlantic Fleet intercepted multiple German-flagged merchant vessels, inspected them, and then allowed them to continue on their way, ending German fears of American commerce raiding. In all, the Samoa War was a minor affair, the eventual Samoa Settlement hugely favorable to the United States in that it effectively foreswore any German designs on the islands and allowed the installation of Mata'afa as king of the islands. The United States would now have three major coaling ports and naval stations in the Pacific and Far East - Midway, Samoa and Port Hamilton off the Korean coast - and as part of the Settlement there was a firmer British agreement to support German colonial interests in Asia in places where "other powers have not staked an interest."

So it was to Hay's tremendous surprise that despite the resounding success, one much more impressive than the treaty with Chile that was a win for the Union only in the sense that Chile had the Navy on its back heels when it was signed, his reception back in Washington was frosty from Liberals and downright hostile from Democrats. The Senate quickly passed the Samoa Settlement to give it the force of a binding treaty but many, including Navy Secretary Goff, were frustrated that the Union had not pressed its advantage against Germany more and made more of a show of force to make up for its humiliation by Chile; a "splendid little war" would have done much to try out the logistics revolution ongoing at Annapolis and the Naval War College, and offered a true test of the ABC Ships. Democrats, meanwhile, were not mollified by the cessation of hostilities, still hung up on the strict constructionist interpretation of constitutional war powers and outraged by what they saw as an imperial presidency consolidated increasingly in the Blaine administration. Hay offered to appear before the House to lobby the White House's case, but was rebuffed; a small coterie of radical opponents of the administration had drafted articles of impeachment against Blaine, Hay, Lincoln and Goff, aware that they could not successfully secure a conviction but still desiring a trial in the Senate, led by Indiana Democrat Courtland Matson, who was set to take over the Judiciary Committee when Congress reconvened on December 7th. The articles mentioned not one but two "illegally executed wars" and Blaine's "emoluments" violations in his overseas business holdings, particularly in the guano trade. Hay, appalled, requested a meeting with Speaker Levi Lamborn; upon hearing news of the meeting, Matson began aggressively whipping Democrats to start finding an alternative to Lamborn if he would "not allow free and open debate upon these articles when presented on the floor." Though Lamborn had effectively become Speaker at the start of the 50th Congress on March 3rd, that Congress would not convene officially until December opened the question [1] of whether his Speakership could survive. As autumn deepened, Hay shuttled back and forth from Washington to Augusta to confer with the supremely ill Blaine, as the country teetered on the edge of its very first Presidential impeachment. Democrats split on the issue, presaging a quick and speedy end to the trial, while Liberals braced for their unpopular administration to only grow more haggard in the press despite their diplomatic coup..."

- The Cornerstone: John Hay and the Foundation of American Global Prestige


[1] This is a tiny bit of a retcon I guess - I'm not sure how it worked back then that the Congress started March 3 but didn't start start until December. Wouldn't the Democrats who just took the House want to convene earlier? How did that work?
 
Frederick and Victoria: Consorts of Germany
"...if German politics in the post-Waldersee Putsch era had not been sclerotic and haphazard enough, it would soon become more chaotic; Fritz, finally mobile and modestly recovered from his surgery, was stunned upon hearing that the October Reichstag elections had not delivered a third three-year term for his Liberal-Progressive coalition but instead a hung legislature; Bennigsen's National Liberals held serve, with a net loss of only two seats, but their Progressive allies shed more than half their caucus, with many of their previous seats being won by Liberals. The Centre Party of Ludwig Windthorst grew substantially, with both it and the National Liberals now in control of exactly 102 seats apiece. The Conservatives and the Reich Party grew slightly as well, giving the center-right bloc just shy of the 199 seats for a majority. Bennigsen announced his resignation as Vice Chancellor with a majority in the Reichstag no longer available, but the squabbling parties - the lay Catholics who made up the base of the Centre mistrusted the secularist Liberals for their support of the Kulturkampf, the Liberals mistrusted the Catholicism of the Centre and the agrarian chauvinism of the Conservatives, the Conservatives had their own disputes with the industrialist and pro-free trade German Reich Party, sisters to the Prussian Free Conservatives, and all that was before one took into account the Socialists, who now had 31 seats but whom everyone aggressively scorned, or the smaller regional parties representing Poles, Danes and Hanoverians, or the crackpot Anti-Semitic People's Party of Otto Böckel, which elected only its leader. Weeks of haggling between the various parties resulted in only one major piece of legislation - an extension of Reichstag terms from three years to four - before Windthorst eventually was voted in as Vice Chancellor after mild nudging from the Stadtschloss made the NLP relent after Windthorst agreed to a unity coalition..."

- Frederick and Victoria: Consorts of Germany
 
The Dragon Stirs: The Qing Dynasty under the Guangxu Emperor
"...such natural disasters, though uncommon, were multiplied in their damage in 19th century China thanks in large part to the country's decentralization and backwardness. That as many as 2 million souls could have perished in the Yellow River's autumn floods in 1887 is still a number so massive and mind-boggling to consider one struggles to wrap one's head around it..."

- The Dragon Stirs: The Qing Dynasty under the Guangxu Emperor
 
Maximilian of Mexico
"...what made his "wilderness years" all the more frustrating was his sense of betrayal; it was he, after all, who had been unflinchingly loyal to the Emperor since Maximilian and Carlota had landed at Veracruz a quarter century earlier, he who had helped win the war against the Juaristas, he who was the hero of Guanajuato. As his political influence waned, Miramon grew ever more restless and agitated; though still with substantial control of the military and many public works projects, the once-swashbuckling young soldier-president who never married and carried tremendous prestige amongst both the aristocracy and the emerging bourgeois middle class was now in his late fifties, pondering his legacy, what was to come next, what other project needed his attention beyond loyalty to church and crown.

But for all Miramon's quiet sulking and backroom court intrigues to keep himself, it was still a less toxic environment in the Chapultepec than it had been in the years between Vidaurri's death and the outbreak of the Revolt of the Caudillos; Zuloaga was decisively in control of the government now, with Maximilian more of a constitutional monarch in practice than he had ever been before, even if it was not the case on paper. For the Emperor was sliding comfortably into middle age as well, bonding with his children as they aged, spending more time hunting and reading than he spent meddling with public works projects. The Maximilian who in his thirties had gritted his teeth to haul Mexico into a modern nation state, meeting with investors personally and diving into the minute details of every railroad, mine and factory project, was largely gone. In his place was a man who's regime and life had survived the gauntlet of a vast uprising against him by regional cliques and their loyal peasantry without tearing the nation asunder, who had emerged from Mexico's final true civil war stronger and more trusted by his base of support in the Altiplano, who had grown out of some of his naivety and learned to trust his closest advisors.

If the Maximilian of the Feliciato years had any one fault, it was perhaps that he now wasn't involved in the day to day of the Empire enough, that he spent too much time planning his son's wedding - planned initially for 1888 but pushed into the next year due to Luis Maximiliano's unexpected poor health for much of that summer - and too little time managing the massive personalities of longtime rivals Miramon and Zuloaga. But with new constitutional structures in place to end much of the personalism in Mexico City, Maximilian felt that there was less need for him to be personally involved; after a quarter century of the Second Empire, the state was healthier, wealthier, and safer than it had been even before the Revolt of the Caudillos. It even left him time to reconcile with Carlota, to a point. Though it would take months if not years for them to find their way back to one another, both of them had less frequent affairs than before; where Maximilian was joked to have enough bastard children by all his mistresses to form an auxiliary Imperial Guard (a joke that would be recycled on behalf of his even-more promiscuous heir) and Carlota was said to have slept with half of Europe's nobility while away, they now spent more time together both during the day and the night, closer than they had been in well over a decade..."

- Maximilian of Mexico
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top