"...arguments persist to this day whether the Great Depression, generally regarded as lasting from 1870-1893, was indeed a formal depression or merely a change in the global economy so profound and radical in its scope and reach that those left behind in its wake see it as such. The overlap of this period with times of profound political change - the unification of Germany and Italy, the independence of the Confederate States and renewed geopolitical intrigues in the Americas, colonialism in Asia and Africa - with the Second Industrial Revolution, the greatest change in science, communication and transportation until the Information Age, leans more to the latter camp [1].
The beginning of the Great Depression is widely viewed as being the Panic of 1870 in the summer of that year, starting in the United States but spreading rapidly to Europe, where the Depression would be felt most critically in Britain. A number of factors caused the Panic: the US economy had never properly digested the end of the War of Confederate Independence, and a severe depression in 1863 and 1864 combined with a collapse in currency values was followed by the inflationary Presidency of Horatio Seymour, who despite his "hard money" sympathies did nothing to curtail the circulation of greenbacks in the new national banking system that was designed to cope with the needs of the war. In the immediate postwar era, in a frenzy to connect New York to San Francisco, a railroad bubble spread across the United States, driven by easy loans and dubious investors. The anticipation of the Naval Act of 1869 also drove investments in shipyards and steel factories in the latter half of the Seymour administration, so by the time his successor Salmon Chase was inaugurated and the Naval Act passed swiftly, the bubble was fully inflated [2].
The pop, as it were, came in Chase's laudable efforts to deinflate the currency, in which the former Secretary of the Treasury - who ostensibly knew what he was doing and had indeed designed the financial system ten years earlier that was now causing rampant inflation - took a three pronged measure. One, Congress passed the Specie Resumption Act, in which Chase - otherwise a radical Republican - caved to conservative interests in setting January 1, 1879 as the date for the full and total return of the United States to the gold standard. Worried in the meantime about financial instability and war debts, he had his Treasury Secretary, George Boutwell, sell gold in monthly increments to pay down the debt rapidly in order to free up government finances for the new Navy. As his second measure, Chase - an old Whig of the Henry Clay school, despite his friendliness with Democrats - encouraged Congress to reinstate the Hamiltonian Bank of the United States as a single national bank. Of the mind that the lack of a national bank was the cause of the frequent panics of the antebellum period, Chase's idea was to consolidate the national banks established during the war into an entity with chartered branches across the country that could lend to other nationally chartered private banks in partnership with the Treasury. The passage of the Bank of the United States Charter in May of 1870 provided for a 25-year charter for a Bank of the United States to be headquartered in Philadelphia in the building the pre-Jacksonian National Bank had been in, with a Presidentially-appointed and Senate-approved Bank President who would govern with a 6-member board to be elected by the Bank's shareholders. The United States government was statutorily obligated to at minimum hold a 25% stake of shares in the BUS. The reconstitution of the Third Bank of the United States was a compromise with the soft money faction of the Republican Party that was suspicious of moneyed eastern interests, and to avoid the issues of the bank becoming a "fourth branch" unanswerable to Congress or to the shareholders, the charter set a term of 5 years for the bank's President, nonrenewable, and board terms would be six years, non-renewable, requiring a frequent turning of bank leadership to avoid corruption.
To continue with this forging on of overhauling the national financial system, Chase caved to the suggestion of his friend Senator John Sherman, a fellow Ohioan and the state's most prominent politician beyond Chase himself, and helped push the Coinage Act of 1870 through after a review the previous year by Secretary Boutwell on the potential impacts of new silver mines in the West that would endanger the gold standard and reinflate the currency during the decade-long process the Treasury would pursue to alleviate it. It was also viewed as a hedge against a future Democratic President attempting to end the gold standard late in the decade. The Coinage Act eliminated three low-denomination coins and ended the minting of silver dollars. It would be signed into law on June 23rd, 1870; a Thursday [3].
The following Monday, the gold market in New York was cornered, part of a nine-month plot by financiers Jay Gould and James Fisk and a handful of associates (including speculator Abel Corbin, a man of little fame other than his marriage to former Union General and 1864 Republican candidate Ulysses Grant, and thus a man with modest connections in Congress) to corner the gold market [4]. The so called "Gold Ring" had driven up the price of gold during the month of June and sold out on Monday June 27th, known afterwards as Black Monday. The Treasury had responded to a rise in the gold price by selling off more of their gold stock as part of their debt reduction load, and when the price corrected the value of the US currency was perceived to collapse suddenly with it, especially with the silver dollar coins being declared to be no longer legal tender within the national banking system unless tendered for other currency - gold or greenbacks, in this case, which was not on immediate supply. The sudden collapse of the US currency led to a bank run, punctuated most ironically with several banks finding angry mobs at their doors on July 3rd, immediately before the Independence Day holiday. Insufficient currency for paying bonds popped the railroad bubble and led to the failure of a number of major American banks, most prominently Jay Cooke & Company, the largest of them all [5]..."
- Panic: Understanding the Great Depression of the Late 19th Century (Harvard School of Economics, 1971)
[1] Economists to this day argue about whether it was actually a "depression" or just a structural shift in the global economy
[2] There's not much disagreement though that the Panic of 1873, here three years early ITTL, was caused by an inflationary cycle followed by a very severe deflationary cycle. See: 1990s Japan
[3] Specie Resumption and Coinage Acts were real laws - here, a former Secretary of the Treasury in the White House decides to try to package all these structural changes at once
[4] Nine months later since these assholes didn't have Corbin's brother in law in the White House to influence, so they have to take their time cornering the market. Putting the OTL Black Friday of 1869 in tandem with the real inflation bubble popping a few years early as well as tied into a sudden deflationary currency crunch made too much sense to me
[5] Real company that failed IOTL due to railroad speculation and overleveraging, essentially the biggest bank in the country failing. Think of this as Washington Mutual in 2008 failing, only without a bailout, and worse. Fails ITTL too for same reasons