Have read the US initially held back on loaning the UK Marshall Plan aid as result of Attlee being elected, with the UK in desperation sending Churchill over to plead the UK's case and coming back with a few Billion. Only for the Attlee government to subsequently sit on the Billions for months, while the exchange rate changed and promptly lost half its value.
How much more Marshall Plan aid would the UK have potentially received had Churchill been elected instead of Attlee? Would it have been enough for the UK to recover from the war much quicker compared to OTL?
Actually, what is striking is the US willingness to give aid to a government determined on nationalizations:
"Not least, a key article of the original draft Agreement required Britain to 'undertake' all policies that would ensure the efficient and practical use of its economic resources, and it was felt that this might provide US policymakers with sufficient grounds to obstruct the Government's nationalization plans. However, after British negotiators raised objections to this part of the Agreement it was watered down so that the UK would only need to use its 'best endeavours' to achieve these ends.
"Similarly, a clause within the same article which obliged the UK to balance its Governmental budget was greatly softened by an interpretative minute after protests that this might lead to restrictions being placed on Labour's spending plans. The minute, added to the end of the Agreement, stated that the UK's budget need only be balanced in the long run. In effect, this caveat was left so ill defined that the purpose of the original sentence was rendered almost meaningless and British policymakers were able to interpret for themselves a favourable definition of the phrase 'long run'.
"These instances helped to set an important precedent that would resonate throughout the history of the Marshall Plan. They indicated not only the determination of Attlee's government to resist any possibility that the conditions of Marshall Aid might inhibit their attempts to reconstruct the UK along socialist lines, but also the willingness of American negotiators to acknowledge and act upon these concerns. The Economist magazine grasped this point when it reported that:
... whatever suggestions of American
dictation or even intrusion may have
been contained in earlier drafts have
been swept away [and that] ... the
Americans have clearly gone almost
all the way to meet legitimate British
objections.
"...The understanding shown by the London Mission and the ECA generally towards the British government was a central theme of the Marshall Plan story in the UK. There were obvious diplomatic reasons for the US to tread carefully in all negotiations with its closest ally as the strategic usefulness of the Commonwealth ensured that the UK continued to be a friend worth having. Furthermore, with the emergence of the Eastern Bloc of Soviet satellite states, Attlee's democratically elected government represented the acceptable face of socialism and a bastion from which the US could seek to thwart the growth of Communism in the rest of Europe. It would have been imprudent, therefore, for the US to jeopardize friendly relations with the UK by imposing its will with the same forcefulness that was brought to bear elsewhere.
"Additionally, the State Department repeatedly declared, in private as well as in public, that it was not the business of the US to become embroiled in political and economic decisions taken by the UK. Though this outlook, which was echoed by the ECA, was informed by strategic reasons it also reflected a genuinely held belief that democratically elected governments, where the leadership was considered to be responsible, should be left, to the largest possible extent, to guide national policy as they saw fit. While many were not deemed sufficiently dependable, Attlee's government consistently demonstrated that they were prepared to put the needs of reconstruction ahead of other priorities. For example, the austerity and wage restraint imposed by Labour to safeguard the UK's limited dollar reserves and hold down inflation were applauded in the US and such parsimony was contrasted favourably with the perceived excesses of European neighbours. Even the strident free-marketer Republican Senator, Robert Taft, was said to have acknowledged that the record of Attlee's government permitted the conclusion that socialism was not necessarily inefficient.
"Clearly the ECA did not inherently view socialism as an insurmountable obstacle to recovery. On the contrary, rather than an uncompromising antipathy towards Labour's polices, there was a general recognition within the ECA and among other key US policymakers that Labour's methods could be successful, and on occasion they were even deemed entirely appropriate.
"In April 1951, Harold Wilson, the President of the Board of Trade, and Nye Bevan resigned from the Cabinet protesting that the US was dictating the Government's budgetary policy as it sought European rearmament following the outbreak of the Korean War. But writing in the leftwing Tribune, free from the ties of collective ministerial responsibility, Wilson did not accuse the US of such strong-arm tactics when it came to the European Recovery Programme. In fact, Wilson stated that there had been no strings attached to Labour's receipt of Marshall Aid.
"To a large extent, Labour had benefited from the willingness of the United States to respect the independence of its closest and most important ally. There was also an acceptance among senior US officials and politicians that it was the UK, under responsible stewardship, that was in the best position to decide for itself what its own social and economic organization should be, and that socialist policies, far from necessarily hindering reconstruction, could complement and further the aims of the Marshall Plan. With this level of understanding in mind, it is difficult to disagree with the opinion of E.A. Berthoud, an official within the Foreign Office, that 'What the United States did was really unparalleled--so much contribution with so few conditions.' "
https://www.thefreelibrary.com/British+socialism+and+the+Marshall+Plan:+James+Williamson,+who+was...-a0174639392
Were some conservative Republicans in Congress leery of helping a Socialist Government? Yes. Did they represent the position of the Truman administration? No. No doubt the US intended the Marshall Plan to be for its own benefit as well as that of Europe. And no doubt the British Labour Government could find some grounds for dissatisfaction--but so could, for example, the Christian Democratic government of Italy.
In short, your whole assumption that the US government didn't want to help Britain because Attlee rather than Churchill won does not seem to be supported by the evidence. (Truman had no particular antipathy toward democratic socialist regimes if they took the US side in the Cold War. After all, Truman himself and his "Fair Deal" policies were often derided as "socialistic" by Republicans.)