Chronic Allied morale breakdown ETO 1944/45

Could Allied ground troops participating in ETO during 1944/45 have suffered from a massive slump in morale of such a nature as to chronically undermine their combat efficiency ? In Sept 1943, 200 British veteran soldiers of the 8th Army, already weary from fighting in North Africa and Sicily, and some suffering from malaria, mutinied after, on their way across to the Salerno beach-head, they'd been assigned to new units of the US 5th Army, although initially informed that they'd rejoin their old outfits. WI the Salerno mutiny, which was the largest combat refusal by British soldiers during WWII, had been replicated later on around the time of D-Day, the Normandy battles, the Holland and Ardennes campaign during 1944-45 ?

Apparently, during the leadup to D-Day in 1943/44, among the seasoned American and British veterans of such outfits which had fought in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, then were transferred to England to spearhead the invasion of France, such as the 1st BIG RED 1 and 9th OLD RELIABLES Inf Divs, 82nd ALL AMERICANS Airborne Div, surviving Rangers to form the 2nd and 5th Ranger bns, 7th DESERT RATS Armd Div, 50th TYNES AND TEESIDE Inf Div, and 51st Highland Div, there were some vets who believed that they'd already done enough in the fight thus far, that other men should now shoulder the burden, and who resented having to risk their lives yet again. Could such sentiments among the seasoned Allied troops available to fight in ETO have been the underlying sentiment for some largescale combat refusal, had there been perhaps some catastrophic incident during the campaign like larger casualties during 6th June or the destruction of an entire beach, or greater casulaties and even slower progress in the BOCAGE ? OTL, during the Normandy campaign, there were some instances of combat fatigue among individual soldiers in Monty's 21st Army Group. What about later on in the NWE campaign- could such a huge morale breakdown have occurred after the debacles at Arnhem, the Hurtgen Forest, or the opening stages of the Battle of the Bulge ? How much would the Allied advance on Germany have been stuffed up had there been the spectacle of large nos. of combat fatigued veteran soldiers, feeling they'd done more than their fair share and refusing to go back into the line, engaged in largescale brawls and shootouts with MPs, or substantial nos. of individual soldiers deciding to go AWOL ?
 
The Candion Army Munitined in Kingston Canada in 1944 when they were order to ship over seas and in 1945 a Canadion CL voted itself out of the war in the Pacific and was pelted with potalos when it hit Pear on its way home by us sailors .
 
The Salerno mutiny had a more specific cause. Yes, it was true that the soldiers were to be assigned outside of their own battalions - The British Army (and in WW2 at least) the US Airborne units kept men together in their original unit, returning them after recovery from wounds etc. The US Army just sent men where it was felt they were needed. Both approaches have pluses and minuses.

So, there was this 'betrayal' of the troops by their higher command.
What is less well known is that the units from which the mutineers came from (scottish regiments of 51HD) were due to be sent back to the UK as part of the D-Dat preparations. So, in addition to the betrayal, there was also the, understandable, grievance at being denied home leave.

In retrospect most UK commentators have felt the incident was not well handled.

D-Day, is unlikely to have led to the same problems, this was the start of the Great Cursade to liberate Europe.

More likely was the aftermath or Hurtgen or Metz or any of the other battles along the West Wall. However, here, the US system of individual replacement may have had some benefit - a constant stream of willing enthusiastic soldiers.

What tended to happen was that the veterans tended to 'play safe' and rather than mutiny, they just called off attacks at the slightest resistance rather than press on. It is unsurprising that the 'nebies' tended to suffer the most casualties - they were still keen enough to go forward or take point and inexperienced enough not to know when to stop.

Also, learning from WW1, both the British and US armies knew that regular rotation out of the line (unlike the French in WW1 where troops stayed near the front all the time) gave men a chance to unwind and recover.

For what it is worth concerning mutiny etc, neither the UK nor US armies engaged in the wholesale execution of troops for desertion that the German or USSR armies did
 
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